UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-7726
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TRACY MAURICE THOMAS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Greenville. W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge. (4:08-cr-00020-BR-1)
Submitted: March 5, 2021 Decided: March 11, 2021
Before WYNN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Tracy Maurice Thomas, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tracy Maurice Thomas appeals from the district court’s order denying his motions
for reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) and § 404(b) of the First Step
Act of 2018 (FSA 2018), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. * The district court
determined that Thomas was eligible for relief under these provisions but declined to
exercise its discretion to reduce Thomas’ sentence. Because the district court decided
Thomas’ motions without the benefit of our decision in United States v. McDonald,
986 F.3d 402 (4th Cir. 2021), we vacate and remand.
We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s ruling on Thomas’ motions.
See United States v. Jackson, 952 F.3d 492, 497, 502 (4th Cir. 2020). “A district court
abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to consider judicially
recognized factors constraining its exercise of discretion, relies on erroneous factual or
legal premises, or commits an error of law.” United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 158
(4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
On appeal, Thomas challenges the sufficiency of the district court’s explanation for
denying his motions. In the analogous context of a sentence reduction motion under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), the Supreme Court has explained that a district court need only
“set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it] ha[s] considered the parties’
arguments and ha[s] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking
*
The district court also denied Thomas’ request for relief under § 403 of the FSA
2018, but Thomas confines his appeal to the court’s denial of his request for relief under
§ 404(b).
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authority.” Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1966 (2018) (quoting Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). The Supreme Court also emphasized, however,
that the federal courts of appeals have broad discretion “to request a more detailed
explanation [from the district court] when necessary.” Id. at 1967. After Chavez-Meza,
we issued our decision in United States v. Martin, 916 F.3d 389, 396-97 (4th Cir. 2019),
and concluded that a district court is obliged to provide an individualized explanation for
denying a § 3582(c)(2) motion when the defendant submits evidence of post-sentencing
rehabilitation in support thereof. In our recent decision in McDonald, we applied
Chavez-Meza and Martin in the context of a sentence reduction motion filed pursuant to
§ 3582(c)(1)(B), and § 404(b) of the FSA 2018. 986 F.3d at 408-12. There, we held that
a district court must provide an individualized explanation for denying a sentence reduction
motion under the FSA 2018 when the defendant presents evidence of his post-sentencing
rehabilitation. Id. at 412. In making that individualized explanation, the district court may
“consider the facts of [a defendant’s] original transgressions,” but the court “must also at
least weigh [the defendant’s] conduct in the years since [his] initial sentencing[].” Id.
Here, the district court declined to reduce Thomas’ sentence based on the sentence
commutation he had received. Contrary to McDonald, the district court’s order does not
address Thomas’ arguments that a sentence reduction was warranted in light of the number
of years he had served in prison, his adjustment and rehabilitation in prison, and certain
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The court’s order also fails to address Thomas’
post-sentencing rehabilitation evidence.
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Consistent with our broad authority to request a more detailed explanation from the
district court, see Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1967, we vacate the district court’s order and
remand so that the district court may reassess Thomas’ motions in light of McDonald.
We deny Thomas’ motion to expedite decision and dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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