[Cite as State v. Crawford, 2021-Ohio-785.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
CASE NO. 2020-L-074
- vs - :
ALLEN A. CRAWFORD, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2019 CR
000780.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Karen A. Sheppert, and Teri R.
Daniel, Assistant Prosecutors, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street,
P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Aaron A. Schwartz, Megan M. Patituce and Lauren Kay Wazevich, Patituce &
Associates LLC, 16855 Foltz Industrial Parkway, Strongsville, OH 44149 (For
Defendant-Appellant).
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Allen A. Crawford appeals from the judgment of the Lake
County Court of Common Pleas, sentencing him to an indefinite term of 33 to 38 and
one-half years. Appellant challenges the duration of his sentence, the consecutive
nature of the judge’s order, as well as the trial court’s refusal to merge certain counts for
purposes of sentencing. We affirm.
{¶2} On July 21, 2019, V.R. and A.B., the principal victims, were in an
apartment with appellant’s and V.R.’s three young children. Appellant arrived at the
apartment carrying a backpack and brandishing a firearm. He immediately ordered A.B.
and V.R. to the floor of the residence. The children were ordered to their room.
Appellant demanded the women’s cell phones and he commenced binding their hands
behind their backs with black duct tape. Appellant announced he planned on killing
them both and made threats regarding how he would shoot them and leave with the
children. During these overtures, he was pouring lighter fluid over the women and
throughout the apartment and advising the victims he intended to kill them. While V.R.
was pleading for her life, appellant advised her to be quiet; he then struck her with the
firearm. Appellant pulled out a knife and then stabbed both women in the neck; he
stabbed V.R. two to three times and A.B. once. Appellant retrieved the children, ignited
the lighter fluid, and fled the apartment.
{¶3} After appellant left, A.B., despite being on fire, was able to free herself
from the binding. She was able to extinguish the fire on her body, as well as in other
areas of the apartment. She also located a cell phone appellant discarded and she
called 911. Emergency responders arrived and transported both women to medical
facilities where they were treated for their burns and other wounds. After being treated,
A.B. recounted the attack to police and identified appellant as the assailant. Meanwhile,
police had received a 911 call from appellant stating he attacked the women at the
address they were located; appellant told police that, upon their arrival, they would find
deceased people at the residence. Appellant was ultimately apprehended and taken
into custody.
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{¶4} On November 4, 2019, appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated
burglary, in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1), a felony of the first degree, with a firearm
specification; one count of aggravated burglary, in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(2), a
felony of the first degree, with a firearm specification; two counts of attempted
aggravated murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B) and R.C. 2923.02, felonies of the
first degree, each with a firearm specification; two counts of attempted murder, in
violation of R.C. 2903.02(A) and R.C. 2923.02, felonies of the first degree, each with a
firearm specification; two counts of kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2),
felonies of the first degree, each with firearm specifications; two counts of kidnapping, in
violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3), felonies of the first degree, each with firearm
specifications; two counts of felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1),
felonies of the second degree, each with firearm specifications; two counts of felonious
assault, in violation of RC. 2903.11(A)(2), felonies of the second degree, each with
firearm specifications; two counts of aggravated arson, in violation of R.C.
2909.02(A)(1), felonies of the first degree, each with a firearm specification; and three
counts of endangering children, in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A), each misdemeanors of
the first degree.
{¶5} On April 22, 2020, appellant entered a plea of guilty to one count of
aggravated burglary, with a firearm specification; two counts of attempted murder, each
with a firearm specification; two counts of kidnapping, each with firearm specifications;
one count of aggravated arson, with a firearm specification; and three counts of
endangering children, each misdemeanors of the first degree.
{¶6} After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced appellant to 11-year
terms for each attempted murder count, with an additional three-year, mandatory term
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for the accompanying firearm specifications. These counts were ordered to be served
consecutively to one another. He was sentenced to five years on the aggravated arson
count, to be served consecutively to the attempted murder counts; the firearm
specification attached to the aggravated arson was ordered to be served concurrently to
the previously-mentioned specifications. Appellant was sentenced to two three-year
terms for each kidnapping count, to be served concurrently with the underlying terms
and, similarly, the firearm specifications attached to these counts were ordered to be
served concurrently with the other firearm specifications. Finally, appellant was
sentenced to 180 days in jail for each child endangering count. Appellant therefore
received a total of 33 years imprisonment up to a maximum term of 38 and one-half
years. Appellant now appeals and assigns three errors. We shall address his first and
third together, as they are related. They provide, respectively:
{¶7} “The trial court erred in sentencing Mr. Crawford to serve consecutive
sentences.
{¶8} “The trial court erred in sentencing Mr. Crawford to a 33-38.5 year term of
imprisonment.”
{¶9} We shall first address the issue of the duration of appellant’s sentence.
Recently, in State v. Gwynne, 156 Ohio St.3d 279, 2019-Ohio-4761, the Supreme Court
of Ohio clarified that R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 apply to the review of the duration
of individual sentences. Gwynne, supra, at ¶17-18. R.C. 2929.11 addresses the
purposes and principles of felony sentencing and R.C. 2929.12 sets forth “seriousness”
and “recidivism” factors. A sentencing court is not required to use specific language and
render precise findings to satisfactorily “consider” the relevant seriousness and
recidivism factors. State v. Long, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2013-L-102, 2014-Ohio-4416, ¶79.
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Thus, we presume a trial court considered the statutory purposes, principles, and
factors from a silent record. State v. Morefield, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2013-CA-71, 2014-
Ohio-5170, ¶41.
{¶10} Here, the trial court expressly considered the purposes and principles of
felony sentencing as well as the seriousness and recidivism factors it found relevant to
appellant’s case. Specifically, the court stated at the sentencing hearing:
{¶11} I have reviewed the presentence report. I’ve reviewed the past
reports of Dr. Rindsbert. I reviewed the sentencing memorandum
from [defense counsel] which include a number of letters in support
of [appellant.] I did not, for the record I did not receive any victim
impact statements.
{¶12} I have considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing
in 2929.11 every aspect of that statute. I’ve considered 2929.12,
every aspect of that statute. I’ve listened to the individuals who
spoke today on behalf of [appellant], listened to [appellant], listened
to counsel.
{¶13} So this is a unique case from the standpoint that it was an
absolutely brutal act from that standpoint it’s unique. It’s also
unique from the standpoint that somebody who committed such a
brutal act that doesn’t have a lot in his background. There is some
indication of violence in the past because you got an assault, you
got a domestic violence, you got a weapons charge. Most of it I
suspected when reviewing the presentence report probably relates
to too much drinking. I don’t have the specifics on those cases but
those offenses taken with what you stated in the presentence
reports would lend itself to indicate that.
{¶14} So you for the reasons that are outlined in the police report and the
presentence report were angry about something specific, leaned
back on you habit of drinking to excess and you acted upon it and
you went in there with the tools to accomplish what you wanted to
accomplish because of that and you walked out of there thinking
you accomplished it, right, you thought that you had killed them
both?
{¶15} [Appellant]: (Nodding affirmatively)
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{¶16} THE COURT: That’s what you told, I think you told your brother-in-
law and that’s certainly what you told the police when you called.
Now the two brutal acts were committed against the two young
ladies who [were] with your children in the apartment were minding
their own business and so you put them through hell because they
thought, they thought they were going to die, that’s clear, and you
thought they were going to die, that was your intention when you
went in there. So as a result of your action there are serious
disfiguring physical injuries that they are never going to get over.
And I’m certain based on the activity there are serious
psychological injuries to both that they will likely never get over
‘cause I’m not sure how somebody ever from a psychological
standpoint gets over the horror [of] spending 10 or 15 minutes of
knowing they were about to die with your three kids in the next
room or in the room and in the next room. So I’m certain that they
suffered serious psychological harm as I outlined before let alone
your kids. They were young but old enough to remember what they
witnessed and I don’t see how they are going to forget what they
witnessed between their mother, their aunt and their father. So one
hopes, certainly we hope they get over it but who knows if they ever
will.
{¶17} And the second group of people you put in harm’s way was
everybody else that lived in that apartment. You set a fire that you
intended to burn and luckily one of the ladies broke free and were
able to put it out. You have [in] setting that fire endangered
everybody else that was in that apartment so to a certain extent
you were very lucky in your ineptitude in accomplishing what you
wanted to accomplish otherwise we’d be in a whole different
stratosphere.
{¶18} So the issue when it comes to something like this, what I’m doing is
what [the prosecutor] said a little bit earlier, how do you fashion a
number for that? Your scrapes with the law in the past, both with
your misdemeanor offenses and your traffic offenses are in the
grand scheme of things of what comes in here relatively minor.
You certainly did not grow up in a situation where you have no
support, that’s obvious from your mother and father on down that
you had a support system that most people sitting here don’t have
and for whatever reason you acted as you did.
{¶19} The reason was because you were mad about something specific
and unable to control your rage about that specific incident yourself.
While it’s true that it was your support both spoken here today, in
the letters has indicated that this was out of character for you [sic].
The stark reality is that you talked about earlier with regard to the
two young ladies and your kids it’s happened and it’s irreversible,
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you can’t take back what you did so you’re faced with me
fashioning a number that reflects not only you and your past life
and your situation but what happened to these victims and what
could have happened as a result of setting the fire.
{¶20} So that’s, that’s what I have in order to assist [the prosecutor] in
fashioning a number. Now had you succeeded in your attempt then
I’d be off here 20 minutes ago ‘cause there would have been no
question what would have been done and you would never have
seen the light of day. No question about that so the fact is that your
inability to complete what you started works in your favor at this
time.
{¶21} Now even though I did not receive victim impact statements in
reviewing the presentences report which includes the police report,
I’m aware of the extent of what they’ve been through so I have,
although I would have liked to find the presentence or victim impact
statement it really doesn’t impact what I’m doing because I’m aware
of these things.
{¶22} The court then proceeded to calculate the individual terms of
imprisonment it elected to impose on each individual crime.
{¶23} Appellant first contends that his conduct, while serious, was not as serious
as conduct normally constituting the offenses for which he pleaded guilty. He bases this
point on the inapplicability of various other R.C. 2929.12(B) factors. We find this point
somewhat off base.
{¶24} R.C. 2929.12(B) sets forth a non-exhaustive list of factors a court may
consider. See State v. Bilicic, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2019-A-0047, 2020-Ohio-982,
¶17. As such, a court is not confined to the factors set forth under the statute, but can
consider other relevant nuances of the criminal acts in creating an appropriate
sentence. Moreover, we recognize the trial court placed significant weight upon the
nature of the crime, the physical and psychological harm caused to the victims,
appellant’s relationship to the victims (including the children), as well as appellant’s
admitted intention to kill the same. A trial court, in considering the R.C. 2929.12 factors,
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is vested with the discretion to “determine the weight to assign a particular statutory
factor.” State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215 (2000). Accordingly, the inapplicability
of certain other factors does not necessarily militate against the trial court’s
determination, particularly where, as here, the nature and seriousness of the crimes is
fairly shocking and savage. We, therefore, conclude the inapplicability of certain
statutory-seriousness factors does not, in this case, suggest appellant’s conduct was
somehow not as serious as other conduct which would otherwise constitute the criminal
acts to which he pleaded guilty.
{¶25} Next, appellant contends there were factors indicating his conduct was
less serious that weighed against the court’s ultimate sentence. For instance, he notes
he led a relatively law-abiding life prior to the crimes in question and accepted full
responsibility for his actions. He further emphasizes his substance abuse, while not
excusing his behavior, provides a context for his actions and, because he is now
purportedly sober, this will no longer be an issue.
{¶26} The court did consider the foregoing points but did not find they rendered
his conduct less serious in relation to the commission of the crimes. We discern no
error in the court’s reasoning. Although appellant’s criminal record was not severe prior
to the incident, it does include an assault and domestic violence. We do not know the
facts of those crimes, but they nevertheless suggest appellant has had occasion in the
past to act out violently. And, even assuming appellant is sober, the court could
reasonably conclude, in light of the facts, that any relapse could lead to a highly
combustible and violent outburst in the future. Finally, appellant accepted responsibility
and exhibited contrition; still, the court stated the harm caused by his actions is, for
these victims, “irreversible.” Keeping in mind the full context of the incident, the court
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was entitled to conclude that appellant’s acceptance of responsibility did not diminish
the seriousness of his conduct. We, therefore, conclude the trial court did not err in
calculating the individual durations of each crime to which appellant pleaded.
{¶27} Next, we consider the consecutive nature of the sentencing order. “On
appeals involving the imposition of consecutive sentences, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a)
directs the appellate court to review the record, including the findings underlying the
sentence, and to modify or vacate the sentence if it clearly and convincingly finds that
the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under R.C.
2929.14(C)(4).” State v. Maple, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2018-A-0091, 2019-Ohio-2091,
¶9, citing State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶28. “Under this
standard, an appellate court upholds the imposed felony sentence unless: (1) required
mandatory findings are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record; or (2) the
sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law.” State v. Aldrich, 11th Dist.
Ashtabula No. 2017-A-0033, 2017-Ohio-8944, ¶32 (citations omitted).
{¶28} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) states:
{¶29} If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions
of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the
prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive
service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to
punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to
the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also
finds any of the following:
{¶30} (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a
sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18
of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior
offense.
{¶31} (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or
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more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual
that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part
of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the
seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
{¶32} (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
future crime by the offender.
{¶33} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:
{¶34} Now with regards to those consecutive sentences I find that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
future crime by you and they are necessary to protect the public.
There is no question that the brutality of the acts that you
committed in the context of everything we discussed here warrants
that consecutive sentence are necessary to protect the public from
future crime by you.
{¶35} * * *
{¶36} With regard to the consecutive sentences one other finding is that
at least two of the offenses were committed as part of one or more
courses of conduct. The harm caused by these offenses to both
these victims and everybody else, the danger was so great or
unusual that no single prison term would adequately reflect the
seriousness of the conduct.
{¶37} Appellant asserts the trial court erred in sentencing him to consecutive
sentences because the record does not support the trial court’s finding that the terms
were necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish him. He further
claims that the record fails to support the court’s conclusion that the harm caused by the
offenses was so great or unusual that no single prison term would sufficiently reflect the
seriousness of the conduct. We do not agree.
{¶38} As noted above, the trial court could reasonably conclude that, in light of
the unique and severe nature of the incident, appellant poses a threat to the public and
could, if fueled by anger and alcohol, commit future crime. The court underscored the
serious harm suffered by A.B. and V.R.; the likely psychological harm that the children
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will suffer; and the harm that could have come to all who lived in the apartment building
(and others) had the fire spread. The criminal actions demonstrated appellant, on that
evening, lacked any sense of foresight, restraint, or empathy. Although appellant
indicates such an episode is not likely to happen again, the court was entitled to find
consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from him and punish him
for his actions.
{¶39} Furthermore, as discussed above, the trial court was entitled to conclude
that the harm caused was so great or unusual that no single term would adequately
reflect the seriousness of appellant’s actions. The court focused upon the nature and
brutality of appellant’s actions and the serious harm they caused. Perhaps, viewed in a
vacuum, there are more gory or horrific attempted murder/kidnapping/arson cases.
That is not the point. The court considered each aspect of this individual case and
concluded the harm was so significant that individual sentences would essentially
diminish the seriousness of appellant’s conduct. We hold the trial court did not err in
entering its order.
{¶40} Appellant’s first and third assignments of error lack merit.
{¶41} For his second assignment of error, appellant asserts:
{¶42} “The trial court erred in failing to merge Mr. Crawford’s aggravated
burglary, aggravated arson, and two counts of kidnapping convictions with his two
attempted murder convictions for the purposes of sentencing.”
{¶43} Appellant argues the court should have merged his aggravated burglary,
aggravated arson, and kidnapping counts with his attempted murder counts for
purposes of sentencing. Appellant acknowledges he entered the victims’ home with a
firearm, bound them, stabbed them, and set them on fire. He maintains he committed
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these acts with the same animus and thus should have been merged for sentencing. In
support, appellant relies on State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314.
Johnson, however, has been largely rendered obsolete by subsequent rulings of the
Supreme Court of Ohio. State v. Earley, 145 Ohio St.3d 281, 2015-Ohio-4615, ¶11,
citing State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995.
{¶44} The Supreme Court of Ohio in Ruff set forth three questions under R.C.
2941.25 in order to determine whether a defendant can be convicted of multiple
offenses:
{¶45} (1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or significance? (2) Were they
committed separately? and (3) Were they committed with separate animus or
motivation? An affirmative answer to any of the above will permit separate
convictions. Id. at ¶31.
{¶46} In this matter, appellant committed and completed the aggravated burglary
when, by force, he trespassed into the apartment with the victims and children present,
while displaying a firearm, with the purpose of committing a criminal offense (by his own
admission, murder) and threatened to inflict harm on A.B. and V.R. See R.C.
2911.11(A)(1). Further, the kidnappings were committed and completed when appellant
ordered A.B. and V.R. to the floor and bound their hands with duct tape, with the
purpose to terrorize and/or inflict serious physical harm on them. See R.C.
2905.01(A)(3). The attempted murders were committed and completed when appellant
knowingly and purposely, stabbed each victim in the neck because, if he was successful
in his ultimate goal, this conduct would have purposely caused their deaths. See R.C.
2923.02; R.C. 2903.03(A). Finally, appellant committed and completed the crime of
aggravated arson when he knowingly doused the apartment, as well as each woman,
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with lighter fluid and ignited the same causing each victim and the residence to catch
fire. See R.C. 2909.02(A)(1).
{¶47} In Ruff, the Supreme Court “provided two alternatives to determine
whether the offenses are of dissimilar import: separate victims or separate harms.”
State v. Carradine, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101940, 2015-Ohio-3670, ¶70, (Gallagher,
J., concurring). Specifically, the court in Ruff held that “two or more offenses of
dissimilar import exist within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B)[, Ohio’s merger statute,]
when the defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses involving separate victims or if the
harm that results from each offense is separate and identifiable.” Ruff at ¶26. Each of
the four crimes involved a separate act or a separate harm (i.e., were of dissimilar
import). Even if the motivation or animus was continuous throughout, therefore, the trial
court did not err in declining to merge the crimes for sentencing.
{¶48} Appellant’s final assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶49} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Lake
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
MATT LYNCH, J.,
concur.
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