J-S50027-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DEON ELLIS :
:
Appellant : No. 2820 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 20, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0001952-2016
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MARCH 16, 2021
Deon Ellis, Appellant, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
on September 20, 2019, following his convictions for rape, unlawful conduct
with a minor, endangering the welfare of children, corruption of minors, and
aggravated indecent assault of a minor less than sixteen years of age.1 After
careful review, we affirm.
The trial court set forth the following factual history:
L.R., the complainant herein, who was eighteen years[]old
when she appeared as a witness at [Appellant’s] trial, resided with
her mother, grandmother, and her older sisters in West
Philadelphia through her teen years. Appellant, L.R.’s mother’s
boyfriend, also stayed there at various times. In September of
2014, when L.R. was fourteen years[] old, L.R. had taken a shower
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(a)(1), 6318(a)(1), 4304(a)(1), 6301(a)(1)(i), and
3125(a)(8), respectively.
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and as she exited the bathroom wrapped in a towel, she observed
Appellant standing outside the door to her room. L.R. entered her
room followed by Appellant, who closed the door to [L.R.’s]
bedroom. L.R. was home that day because she had been
suspended from school.
Once both Appellant and L.R. were inside the bedroom,
Appellant pushed L.R. onto her bed. She was crying and yelling at
the time and attempted to get some clothes. Appellant then forced
L.R. to engage in sexual intercourse with him and he also stuck his
fingers in her vagina. While this occurred, L.R. said she was not
screaming because she was “stuck.” During the assault, Appellant
told L.R. that he would kill her. She did not tell anyone about the
incident because she was scared that Appellant would follow
through on his threat.
After the assault ended, Appellant left L.R.’s room and went
to her mother’s room when L.R.’s grandmother started coming up
the stairs from the house’s first floor. There was blood on the
sheets and a towel and when asked by her grandmother where the
blood had come from, L.R. falsely told grandmother that she was
menstruating.
While still in her home[,] L.R. often saw [A]ppellant
physically assault her mother. At some point she was removed
from her home by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services
(hereinafter DHS) because of the conditions of the home and was
placed in a foster home. Once so placed, L.R. told her foster
mother, Vonna Jones, and Ms. Jones’ daughter about the rape.
After doing so, authorities were contacted and L.R. provided
statements to the police and others recounting the incident.
Ms. Jones confirmed that L.R. told her daughter and then her
about the incident. She further related that she contacted
authorities and relayed what L.R. had told her.
Philadelphia Police Detective Linda Blowes, assigned at the
time to the Special Victim’s Unit, interviewed L.R. who, when
interviewed, could not recall Appellant’s name. Through
investigation, she uncovered information indicating that L.R.’s
mother had obtained a Protection from Abuse order against
Appellant and then showed his photograph to L.R., who identified
him as the male who raped her. The detective also obtained L.R.’s
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school records and noted that L.R. missed school several times in
the fall of 2014, the year the incident occurred.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/2/20, at 1-3 (footnote omitted). Following a jury trial,
Appellant was found guilty of Rape-Forcible Compulsion; Unlawful Contact
with Minor-Sexual Offenses; Endangering Welfare of Children; Corruption of
Minors; and Aggravated Indecent Assault (Complainant Less than 16). On
September 20, 2019, the court sentenced Appellant to ten to twenty years of
incarceration on the rape conviction, ten to twenty years of incarceration on
the unlawful contact with a minor conviction, to be served consecutively, and
ten years of probation for indecent aggravated assault–complainant under
sixteen years old.2
Appellant filed his timely notice of appeal on September 27, 2019. Both
the trial court and Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents the following questions for our review:
A. Did the trial court err, when it granted the Commonwealth’s
motion to admit other crimes, wrongs, or acts pursuant to
Pa.R.E. 404(B) (also known as “prior bad acts” evidence) in the
form of allegations that [Appellant] was physically abusive
towards [] mother of Complainant L.R., as the probative value
of this evidence was outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice. (See Pa.R.E. 404(B)(2)).
B. Did the trial court err, when it granted the Commonwealth’s
motion in limine to exclude allegations of abuse by third parties,
specifically with regard to allegations of physical abuse of
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2 The court did not impose any further sentence on the convictions for
corruption of minors or endangering welfare of children. Appellant’s charges
of indecent exposure, indecent assault, sexual assault, aggravated indecent
assault (without consent), and terroristic threats were nol prossed.
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Complainant L.R., by her mother [], as this evidence was
relevant under Pa.R.E. 401, due to the fact that L.R. was
removed from her mother’s home by the department of human
services because she was physically abused by her mother?
C. Did the trial court err, when it denied the defense petition for
dismissal of a case pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A) as, even
taking excludable time into consideration, [Appellant] was not
brought to trial within 365 days of the filing of the criminal
complaint (December 17, 2015)?
Appellant’s Brief at 2 (full capitalization omitted).
In his first issue on appeal, Appellant argues that the court erred when
it granted the Commonwealth’s Motion in Limine to Admit Other Acts/Crimes
Evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 19. In that motion, the Commonwealth sought
the admission of testimony from L.R. that Appellant was physically abusive
toward L.R.’s mother, as the evidence was relevant to show why L.R. waited
to report the sexual assault until after January of 2015, when L.R. was no
longer living in her mother’s home. Commonwealth’s Motion to Admit Other
Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts Pursuant to Rule 404(b), 10/12/17. For the first time
before this Court, Appellant argues that the probative value of the evidence
was outweighed by the potential for prejudice. In its opinion, the trial court
found that Appellant waived this issue because he objected to its admission
on the ground that there was no tie between the alleged abuse of L.R.’s
mother and the sexual assault, not on the ground that the prejudice
outweighed the probative value of the evidence. Trial Court Opinion, 3/2/20,
at 3-4 (citing Commonwealth v. Cousar, 928 A.2d 1025, 1040-1041 (Pa.
2007) (finding the appellant failed to preserve the argument that the
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evidence’s probative value was outweighed by prejudice for purposes of
appeal, where the only objection lodged before the trial court was to the
relevance of the evidence)). We agree with the trial court. Thus, Appellant
has waived this argument.
Moreover, we note that even if Appellant had not waived this argument,
he would be due no relief. Our standard of review when ruling on a trial court’s
decision to grant or deny a motion in limine is as follows:
[W]e apply an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of
review. The admission of evidence is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and a trial court’s ruling regarding the
admission of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that
ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice,
bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous.
Commonwealth v. Danzey, 210 A.3d 333, 337 (Pa. Super. 2019). The
admissibility of prior bad acts is addressed by Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence
404(b), which states in relevant part:
(b) Crimes, Wrongs or Other Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is
not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that
on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.
(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.
In a criminal case this evidence is admissible only if the probative
value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.
(3) Notice in a Criminal Case. In a criminal case the prosecutor
must provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial
if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the
general nature of any such evidence the prosecutor intends to
introduce at trial.
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Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(3). With regard to prior bad acts, our Supreme Court has
held as follows:
Generally, evidence of prior bad acts or unrelated criminal activity
is inadmissible to show that a defendant acted in conformity with
those past acts or to show criminal propensity. Pa.R.E. 401(b)(1).
However, evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible when
offered to prove some other relevant fact, such as motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and
absence of mistake or accident. Pa.R.E. 401(b)(2). In determining
whether evidence of other prior bad acts is admissible, the trial
court is obliged to balance the probative value of such evidence
against its prejudicial impact.
Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 497 (Pa. 2009) (some
citations omitted).
In support of his appeal, Appellant highlights L.R.’s testimony that she
witnessed Appellant punch her mother “a lot,” that she saw her mother with
black eyes, that her mother went to the hospital “a couple times,” and that
the police arrived at the house “a couple times” as a result of Appellant hitting
L.R.’s mother. Appellant’s Brief at 25 (citing N.T., 7/9/19, 36-37, 40).
Appellant argues this testimony describes violent acts, whereas the crimes for
which Appellant was on trial were sexually related offenses. Id. He further
asserts that the victim of these alleged assaults was an adult woman, and L.R.
was a minor at the time of the alleged rape. Id. at 25-26. Finally, Appellant
argues, “[I]n hearing the testimony of [L.R.] that [Appellant] was physically
abusive towards her mother … it was impossible for the jury to be fair and
impartial.” Id.
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The Commonwealth, relying on our Supreme Court’s decision in
Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131 (Pa. 2007), argues that the
evidence of the physical abuse of a family member was properly admitted.
Specifically, the Commonwealth argues that L.R.’s testimony “is probative of
the reasons for the victim’s significant delay in reporting the alleged sexual
assaults—i.e., the evidence tends to show that her experiences with the
appellant, including those assaults on family members, caused her to fear
making a prompt report.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 9 (citing Dillon, 925 A.2d
at 139). The Commonwealth further argues that the evidence is relevant
under the res gestae exception to complete the story of a sexual assault.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 9 (citing Dillon, 925 A.2d at 139).
If we were to address this issue, we would conclude that there was no
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Indeed, the instant case is
controlled by Dillon, wherein our Supreme Court found that the introduction
of evidence of the appellant’s physical abuse of the victim’s mother and
brother was relevant for purposes other than to show the appellant’s bad
character. Dillon, 925 A.2d at 139. In this case, L.R. testified that Appellant
threatened to kill her if she told anyone about the rape, and she did not tell
anyone because she was afraid Appellant would kill her. N.T., 7/9/19, at 34,
37. Pursuant to Dillon, the evidence that Appellant had physically abused
L.R.’s mother tended to show that L.R.’s interactions with Appellant caused
her to fear making a prompt report. Dillon, 925 A.2d at 139. The Court in
Dillon further noted that revealing the reason for the delay in reporting
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allowed the factfinder to better assess the victim’s credibility. Id. See also
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 112 A.3d 1232, 1237-1238 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(applying Dillon and finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
permitting testimony from victim and her sister regarding the appellant’s
physical abuse of their mother to explain the delay in reporting sexual abuse).
The Court also noted that the Commonwealth need not wait until the defense
raises the issue of a delay in reporting before introducing evidence of an
appellant’s behavior.3 Dylan, 925 A.2d at 140. Appellant fails to address
Dillon in his brief before this Court, and we find Dillon controlling. The trial
court did not err in allowing evidence of Appellant’s physical abuse of L.R.’s
mother, and Appellant is due no relief on these grounds.
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred when it granted the
Commonwealth’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Allegations of Abuse
by Third Parties. Appellant’s Brief at 27. Specifically, Appellant avers that the
trial court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence that L.R. was
removed from her mother’s home by DHS because she was physically abused
by her mother. Id. As discussed supra, we will reverse the trial court if it is
shown that the trial court abused its discretion. Danzey, 210 A.3d at 337.
In support of this argument, Appellant relies on Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence
401, which states in relevant part:
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3 In this case, Appellant’s counsel raised the delay in L.R.’s disclosure of the
sexual assault as an issue during his opening statement. N.T., 7/9/19, at 19,
21.
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Evidence is relevant if:
(a) It has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence; and
(b) The fact is of consequence in determining the action.
Pa.R.E. 401(a) and (b). Although Appellant claims that the evidence that L.R.
was removed from her mother’s home from DHS due to physical abuse by her
mother is relevant, he fails to set forth how the evidence is relevant to the
charges brought against him. Appellant makes no effort to connect the alleged
abuse by L.R.’s mother to the crimes for which he was convicted. Indeed,
Appellant fails to set forth which fact is more or less probable by the inclusion
of the evidence that L.R.’s mother was physically abusive toward her. “Where
an appellate brief fails to provide discussion of a claim with citation to relevant
authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable
of review, that claim is waived.” Commonwealth v. Rahman, 75 A.3d 497,
504 (Pa. Super. 2013). It is not the role of this Court to formulate Appellant’s
arguments for him. Commonwealth v. Donoughe, __A.3d__, 2020 PA
Super 288, at *4 (Pa. Super. filed December 18, 2020). For this reason, we
find the issue waived.
Finally, in support of his third issue, Appellant argues that the trial court
erred when it denied his Petition for Dismissal of Case Pursuant to Rule 600(A).
Appellant’s Brief at 29. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 states in
relevant part:
(A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial
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(1) For the purpose of this rule, trial shall be deemed to commence
on the date the trial judge calls the case to trial, or the defendant
tenders a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
(2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.
(a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint
is filed against the defendant shall commence within
365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.
* * *
(C) Computation of Time
(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage
of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the
Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be
included in the computation of the time within which trial must
commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the
computation.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (B), only periods of delay caused
by the defendant shall be excluded from the computation of the
length of time of any pretrial incarceration. Any other periods of
delay shall be included in the computation.
* * *
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(1), (2) and (C)(1), (2). Our standard of review is well
established.
We review an order denying a Rule 600 motion to dismiss for an
abuse of discretion, considering only the evidence of record at the
Rule 600 hearing, and the trial court’s factual findings. Further, an
appellate court must view the facts in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party, which, in this case, is the Commonwealth.
Commonwealth v. Dixon, 140 A.3d 718, 723 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation
omitted).
When deciding whether there has been a violation of Rule 600, the
reviewing court must determine whether the delay was caused by the
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Commonwealth and whether the Commonwealth failed to exercise due
diligence. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, cmt. The court must further determine what time
was excludable and/or excusable. “Per the associated computational
guidance, periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the
Commonwealth when it has failed to exercise due diligence are to be counted
in the 365-day tally.” Commonwealth v. Mills, 162 A.3d 323, 324 (Pa.
2017). “Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
In support of his appeal, Appellant argues that he was not brought to
trial within 365 days of the filing of the criminal complaint, which occurred on
December 17, 2015. Appellant’s Brief at 29. In his brief, Appellant admits
that the defense made several “request[s] for further investigation,” and
sought to have the trial rescheduled because defense counsel was unavailable.
Id. at 32. Specifically, Appellant argues,
While there is a considerable amount of excludable time which can
be attributed to continuance requests by the defense in this
matter, the focus of [defense counsel’s] petition that he filed on
behalf of [Appellant], is that the first trial date in this matter was
scheduled for April 26, 2017 (with a trial readiness conference
scheduled for April 24, 2017). As this is the case, the first trial
date that this matter was scheduled for was considerably later
than 365 days from the date on which the complaint was filed,
which was December 17, 2015, even taking excludable time into
consideration.
Appellant’s Brief at 33.
In this case, the trial court set forth the following discussion of the time
between the filing of the criminal complaint and Appellant’s trial:
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Instantly, the complaint against Appellant was filed on December
17, 2015 and his trial commenced on July 8, 2019. Thus, 1299
days elapsed between the filing of the complaint and the
commencement of trial. A review of the record herein indicated
that conservatively 983 days were excludable from the Rule 600
calculation. This included the 365 days between April 26, 2016,
and April 26, 2017, time taken due to busy court calendars; the
182 days between April 26, 2017, and October 23, 2017, the next
trial date; the 2 days between October 23, 2017 and October 25,
2017, for a defense continuance request; the 80 days between
October 25, 2017 and February 12, 2018, for a defense
continuance request, the 182 days between February 12, 2018
and August 13, 2018, for a defense continuance request; the 7
days between August 13, 2018 and August 20, 2018, for a defense
continuance request; the 74 days between August 20, 2018 and
November 2, 2018, for a defense continuance request; the 84
days between November 20, 201[8], and March 15, 2019, for a
defense continuance request; and, the 7 days for a defense
continuance request … between July 1, 2019 and July 8, 2019.
Adding up all of this excludable time equals 983 days, which when
subtracted from the 1299 days it took to bring [Appellant] to trial
brings the total number of days it took to bring Appellant to trial
to 316 days. Given this, it is clear that Rule 600 was not
violated … .
Trial Court Opinion, 3/2/20, at 12-13.
Pursuant to the trial court’s calculations, which this Court has confirmed
via review of the relevant docket, taking the excludable time into
consideration, Appellant was brought to trial within the 365 days required by
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.4 Appellant does not argue that the trial court erred in its
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4 As noted above, the trial court determined that 983 days of the 1299 days
were excludable. Our review and calculation of the relevant dates resulted in
a finding that 1042 days were excludable. The trial court listed the time from
April 26, 2017, through October 23, 2017, as 182 days, whereas our
calculation resulted in the sum of 180 days. The trial court listed the time
from October 25, 2017, through February 12, 2018, as eighty days, whereas
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determination of excludable time and specifically does not aver that the trial
court erred when it determined the time between April 26, 2016, and April 26,
2017, were excludable due to the trial court’s busy calendar.5 Thus, it is
unclear how the trial court allegedly abused its discretion or otherwise erred
when it denied Appellant’s Rule 600 Motion. As we have repeatedly held, “This
Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an
appellant.” Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 331 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Appellant is due no relief on these grounds.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Strassburger did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case.
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our calculation resulted in the sum of 110 days. The trial court listed the
excludable time from November 20, 2018, through March 15, 2019, as eighty-
four days, where as our calculation resulted in the sum of 115 days. Thus,
pursuant to this Court’s calculation, Appellant was brought to trial within 257
days as opposed to the trial court’s calculation of 316 days. Regardless,
Appellant was brought to trial within 365 days as required by Rule 600.
5 Periods of delay that are attributable to the judiciary are excludable from
calculations under Rule 600. Mills, 162 A.3d at 325.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/16/2021
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