NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 16 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GABRIELA GUADALUPE SALGADO- No. 18-73152
SARAVIA,
Petitioner, Agency No. A208-759-709
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted January 12, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: BYBEE, R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and WHALEY,*** District Judge
Partial Dissent by Judge WHALEY
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Robert H. Whaley, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
Petitioner Gabriela Guadalupe Salgado-Saravia, a native and citizen of El
Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) (collectively, “Agency”) denial of her application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”), and the BIA’s denial of a motion to remand. We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “We review the denial of asylum, withholding
of removal and CAT claims for substantial evidence.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr,
918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). We review for abuse of discretion the denial
of a motion to remand. Taggar v. Holder, 736 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2013). We
deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the Agency’s determination that Salgado-
Saravia failed to establish membership in her proposed particular social group. See
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (providing that an applicant must be a member of her
proposed social group). Assuming without deciding that Salgado-Saravia’s
proposed particular social group (“women in El Salvador unable to leave their
relationship”) is cognizable1, the evidence in the record does not compel the
conclusion that Salgado-Saravia fits within this definition because she was able to
1
The Agency relied on the reasoning articulated in Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N.
Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), and distinguished, based on immutability grounds, the
proposed group formulated as “married women in Guatemala who are unable to
leave their relationship” from Salgado-Saravia’s proposed group.
2
leave her relationship with her former partner. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s factual
determination that Salgado-Saravia was not a member of her proposed particular
social group because she was not married to or in a long-term relationship with her
former partner. The IJ found that Salgado-Saravia engaged in a short-term
intimate relationship that lasted approximately 5 months during which time she left
him on two different occasions. Salgado-Saravia testified2 that after living with
him for about a month or month and a half, she left him to reside with her family.
She returned to live with her partner for several months and subsequently left him
a second time to live with her uncle. When her former partner tried to force her to
return, bystanders intervened and threatened to call law enforcement, after which
her former partner fled and subsequently left her alone. The record does not
compel a finding contrary to the BIA’s.3 See I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.
478, 481 (1992).
Because Salgado-Saravia has not shown eligibility for asylum, she
necessarily fails to meet the more stringent standard to be eligible for withholding
of removal. See Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).
2
The IJ found that the petitioner testified credibly.
3
Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Salgado-Saravia
was not a member of her proposed particular social group, we do not reach the
other grounds discussed by the BIA.
3
Substantial evidence also supports the Agency’s denial of CAT relief
because Salgado-Saravia failed to show that it is more likely than not that upon
removal to El Salvador she will be tortured by or “at the instigation of, or with the
consent or acquiescence of, a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.” 8 C.F.R. §1208.l8(a)(l); see also Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207,
1216–18 (9th Cir. 2005). The Agency reasoned there was inadequate evidence of
government “acquiescence” in torture specified by Salgado-Saravia based on the
entire record, which includes Salgado-Saravia’s testimony that her former partner
(who is not a public official) had an uncle in the local police department. The
Agency weighed this factor against evidence demonstrating the Salvadorian
government “actively, albeit not entirely successfully, combats” the illegal
activities she fears. The record does not compel a contrary finding.
Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to remand.
See Angov v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2015). A motion to remand is a
substantive motion and the BIA must address and give specific, cogent reasons for
its grant or denial. Narayan v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004).
Salgado-Saravia argued the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of A-B- was an
“unprecedented” decision that represented a fundamental change in the law. See
27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). She explained that “remand is appropriate” to
permit her the “opportunity to submit evidence” showing the “formulation of her
4
particular social group to be in line with Matter of A-B-.” The Agency, however,
articulated reasons supporting its denial of a remand. See Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr,
968 F.3d 1070, 1080–82 (9th Cir. 2020).
PETITION DENIED.
5
FILED
MAR 16 2021
Salgado-Saravia v. Garland, No. 18-73152
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
WHALEY, J., dissenting in part:
Although I agree with the majority’s disposition on Salgado-Saravia’s CAT
claim and motion to remand, I respectfully disagree with denying the petition for
review on Salgado-Saravia’s asylum and withholding of removal claims.
The majority denies the petition for review on Salgado-Saravia’s asylum and
withholding of removal claims based on the determination that Salgado-Saravia is
not a member of her proposed social group. However, this is not a basis on which
the BIA denied these claims. Rather, the BIA determined that Salgado-Saravia’s
proposed social group was not cognizable because it lacked immutability and was
impermissibly circular. This Court “cannot affirm the BIA on a ground upon
which it did not rely.” Arrey v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). For this reason, the scope of this Court’s
inquiry into whether Salgado-Saravia has a viable social group should be limited to
the BIA’s immutability and circularity determinations.
As to the grounds on which the BIA did rely—immutability and
circularity—I would grant the petition for review and remand in light of this
Court’s recent intervening decision in Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070 (9th
Cir 2020). In Diaz-Reynoso, we concluded the BIA’s analysis of whether the
petitioner’s social group was impermissibly circular was legally deficient based on
language identical to the BIA’s language in this case. See Diaz-Reynoso, 968 F.3d
at 1082. We also determined that not every element of a proposed social group
must be immutable, explaining that “the BIA’s precedent establishes that we may
consider the entirety of a proffered social group to determine whether the petitioner
has established all of the requirements for a cognizable group: an immutable
characteristic, particularity, and social distinction.” Id. at 1084.
Because the BIA did not have the benefit of Diaz-Reynoso when it rendered
its decision, I would grant the petition and remand to allow the BIA to address in
the first instance the application of Diaz-Reynoso to Salgado-Saravia’s asylum and
withholding of removal claims.
2