NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 16 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: BRANDON SATTLER, No. 20-60029
Debtor, BAP No. 19-1174
------------------------------
MEMORANDUM*
BRANDON SATTLER,
Appellant,
v.
JAMES RUSSELL; et al.,
Appellees.
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Lafferty III, Brand, and Gan, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Submitted March 12, 2021**
Las Vegas, Nevada
Before: CLIFTON, NGUYEN, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Debtor Brandon Sattler seeks the reconsideration of various orders entered
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
against him in involuntary bankruptcy proceedings, none of which he timely
appealed. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002. Instead, after the appeal deadlines had run,
he moved to vacate the orders under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”)
60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6),1 alleging several mistakes of law committed by the
bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, and the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel (“BAP”) affirmed. We review the BAP decision de novo, In re
Cherrett, 873 F.3d 1060, 1064 (9th Cir. 2017), and the decision of the bankruptcy
court for abuse of discretion, In re Int’l Fibercom, Inc., 503 F.3d 933, 939 (9th Cir.
2007).
“[U]nder Rule 60(b)[,] the [lower court] can, within a reasonable time not
exceeding the time for appeal, hold a rehearing and change [its] decision.” Gila
River Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 368 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1966) (emphasis
added). While this rigid timeliness requirement does not apply to “mistakes” other
than mistakes of law that go to the merits of a case, see Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga
Ma Corp., 387 F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004) (mistake in post-judgment interest
rate), that does not help Sattler here, see, e.g., SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 666 F.2d 414,
415–16 (9th Cir. 1982) (courts should not grant a Rule 60(b) motion based only on
alleged legal errors, if the motion comes after the time to appeal has expired).
1
Originally, Sattler also brought this motion under FRCP 59(e), but it was untimely
under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9023, as he seems to concede on
appeal.
2
Granting motions to vacate orders involving alleged legal errors on the merits, “after
a deliberate choice has been made not to appeal, would allow litigants to circumvent
the appeals process and would undermine greatly the policies supporting finality of
judgments.” Plotkin v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 688 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1982)
(alleged mistake in granting summary judgment). “The uncertainty resulting from
such a rule would be unacceptable.” Id.
We make an exception when the movant can “establish the existence of
extraordinary circumstances which prevented or rendered him unable to prosecute
an appeal.”2 Id. Sattler tries to analogize his case to Fibercom, in which we did find
extraordinary circumstances when the bankruptcy court entered an order that
violated the Bankruptcy Code after being misled by the opposing party’s failure to
comply with the court’s notice and conspicuousness requirements. 503 F.3d at 941–
45. Fibercom does not help Sattler, as he alleges only that the bankruptcy court
legally erred in ruling on several motions.
Sattler’s pro se status at certain stages of the proceedings is not by itself an
extraordinary circumstance, and Sattler offered no evidence that anything about his
2
Any motion brought under FRCP 60(b)(6) requires proof of extraordinary
circumstances. See Fibercom, 503 F.3d at 941. However, other Rule 60(b) motions,
including those brought under Rule 60(b)(1), require extraordinary circumstances
only if they are based on alleged legal errors that go to the merits and are brought
after the deadline to appeal. See Plotkin, 688 F.2d at 1293.
3
pro se status prevented him from timely prosecuting appeals. See United States v.
Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Rule 60(b)(6)
relief normally will not be granted unless the moving party is able to show both
injury and that circumstances beyond its control prevented timely action to protect
its interests.”).
Because Sattler moved to vacate after the deadlines to appeal had expired, and
because he has shown no extraordinary circumstances excusing his failures to timely
appeal, the bankruptcy court properly denied the motion.3
AFFIRMED.
3
We need not and do not reach whether the bankruptcy court legally erred in any of
the challenged rulings.
4