IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0382
Filed March 17, 2021
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF CHRISTOPHER DAUTERIVE
AND TRICIA DAUTERIVE
Upon the Petition of
CHRISTOPHER DAUTERIVE,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
TRICIA DAUTERIVE,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. Rosenberg,
Judge.
Tricia Dauterive appeals from an order recalculating child support
obligations. AFFIRMED.
Jessica A. Millage of Cordell Law, LLP, Des Moines, for appellant.
Karen A. Taylor of Taylor Law Offices, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and May and Schumacher, JJ.
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MAY, Judge.
Tricia Dauterive appeals from an order recalculating child support. She
argues the district court (1) misunderstood the cost of health insurance for a child
and, as a result, miscalculated child support; and (2) erred by failing to state an
effective date for the revised child support calculation. We affirm.
Tricia and Christopher Dauterive have one minor child, L.D. They divorced
in 2014. In 2015, Tricia filed a modification action. In its modification decree, the
district court revised Christopher’s child support obligation. Tricia appealed. The
supreme court transferred the case to us. We ordered a limited remand. We
stated, in pertinent part:
[W]e must remand for recalculation of child support as
specified by the present-day child support guidelines. . . . [T]he
district court should clarify which party is responsible for maintaining
health insurance for L.D. and consider those premiums when
calculating child support.
In re Marriage of Dauterive, No. 18-0381, 2019 WL 1056816, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App.
Mar. 6, 2019).
After procedendo issued, both parties filed revised child support guidelines
worksheets in the district court. Through these worksheets, the parties provided
the court with their proposed calculations of child support.
The district court held a brief hearing. Both parties provided argument. But
neither party provided evidence to support their proposed child support
calculations. For example, although each party’s calculation included—indeed,
relied upon—an estimate of the cost for L.D.’s health insurance, neither party
provided evidence of the actual cost to insure L.D.
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Consistent with our remand instructions, the district court entered an order
(1) specifying which parent (Tricia) must maintain health insurance for L.D; and
(2) setting a revised amount for Christopher’s monthly child support payment. The
order did not explain what assumptions the court had relied on when recalculating
child support. For example, the order included no finding as to the actual cost of
L.D.’s health insurance. Nor did the order state an effective date for its revised
child support calculation. But neither party filed a motion asking the court to
address these issues or to otherwise change its order.
Now Tricia appeals. She argues the district court (1) relied on an incorrect
assumption about the cost of L.D.’s health insurance and (2) should have stated
an effective date for the revised child support calculation. Our review is de novo.
In re Marriage of Smith, 501 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993).
We begin by considering Tricia’s argument about the cost of health
insurance. Tricia contends the district court erroneously relied on Christopher’s
proposed child support worksheet, which claimed that L.D.’s health insurance
costs $75.00 per month. Instead, Tricia argues the district court should have relied
on her child support guidelines sheet, which claimed that L.D.’s health insurance
costs $241.67 per month.
Before reaching the merits of Tricia’s argument, however, we must consider
error preservation. See State v. Tidwell, No. 13-0180, 2013 WL 6405367, at *2
(Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2013) (noting “our error preservation rules are, arguably,
statutorily required” (citing Iowa Code § 602.5103(1) (2011))); see also Top of Iowa
Co-op. v. Sime Farms, Inc., 608 N.W.2d 454, 470 (Iowa 2000) (noting appellate
courts may raise error preservation on their own motion). “It is a fundamental
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doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily[1] be both raised and
decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v.
Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). This doctrine applies equally to
equity cases. In re Marriage of Full, 255 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Iowa 1977) (“In equity
matters, such as this, where our review is de novo, . . . it is our responsibility to
review the facts as well as the law and determine from the credible evidence rights
anew on those propositions properly presented, provided issue has been raised
and error, if any, preserved in the trial proceedings.” (emphasis added)); accord In
re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 270 (Iowa 2005) (refusing to consider
unpreserved argument in appeal from modification orders); In re Marriage of
Greenspon, No. 19-1382, 2020 WL 5650479, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2020)
(declining to address unpreserved issue on appeal from modification order); In re
Marriage of Hoffmeyer, No. 19-1427, 2020 WL 1887954, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr.
15, 2020) (“Because Carl’s due process argument was not raised or ruled on by
the district court, it was not preserved for our review.”); In re Marriage of
Tieskoetter, No. 16-2111, 2018 WL 558509, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2018)
(concluding the husband “failed to preserve the issue for our review” because he
1 Like many legal doctrines, our error preservation doctrine has exceptions. See,
e.g., State v. Boldon, 954 N.W.2d 62, 70 (Iowa 2021) (“While some forms of
sentencing error require a timely objection or challenge to preserve an issue for
appellate review, an allegation the prosecutor breached the plea agreement at the
time of sentencing is a species of sentencing error to which the traditional rules of
error preservation are inapplicable.”). For example, in In re Marriage of Huston,
the court held that our ordinary error preservation rules do not apply to “[a]ppellate
review of default divorce decrees” because “[n]aturally, when a default judgment
is involved no specific issues could have been preserved.” 263 N.W.2d 697, 699–
700 (Iowa 1978). Because there was no default here, the Huston exception does
not apply.
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did not raise the argument in his Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) motion
before the district court); In re Marriage of Hansen, 886 N.W.2d 868, 871 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2016) (“We also note that Andy has not preserved error on this issue as the
district court did not address who may be entitled to a surplus or who may be
obligated to pay a deficiency.”); In re Marriage of McGachey, No. 14-2086, 2015
WL 4642602, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2015) (declining to reverse modification
based on a procedural defect that was never raised in the district court).
Here Tricia asks us to consider the cost of L.D.’s health insurance. As Tricia
acknowledges in her brief, though, the district court’s order was “silent” on this
issue. The order included no finding about the actual cost to insure L.D. And Tricia
did not ask for a ruling on the issue, either by filing a motion under Iowa Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.904(2) or otherwise. See Okland, 699 N.W.2d at 270. So, at
least at first glance, it is not clear the district court “decided” the cost of L.D.’s health
insurance, as would be required to preserve the issue for appeal. Cf. 33
Carpenters Constr., Inc. v. State Farm Life & Cas. Co., 939 N.W.2d 69, 75 (Iowa
2020) (“We routinely hold that when an issue is raised in a motion but not decided
in the district court ruling, the issue is not preserved for review.”).
But we also recognize that, under Lamasters v. State, we can find error is
preserved if the “trial court’s ruling . . . expressly acknowledge[d] that an issue
[was] before the court and then the ruling necessarily decide[d] that issue.” 821
N.W.2d 856, 864 (Iowa 2012). Here, the trial court’s ruling clearly acknowledged
that, through our prior decision, we had directed the court to “clarify which party is
responsible for maintaining health insurance for L.D. and consider those premiums
when calculating child support.” Dauterive, 2019 WL 1056816, at *6. We read
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these words as an “express acknowledgement” that the cost of L.D.’s health
insurance was among the “issue[s] before the court.” See Lamasters, 821 N.W.2d
at 864. We also read these words to mean that the trial court followed our
directions by actually “consider[ing] those premiums when calculating child
support.” So, in the words of Lamasters, it appears the trial court “necessarily
decide[d]” the cost of L.D.’s insurance when the court recalculated child support.
See 821 N.W.2d at 864; see also Iowa Child Support Guidelines R. 9.14 (directing
use of health insurance premiums when calculating child support). Accordingly,
we assume error is preserved as to this issue.
Turning to the merits: As noted, each party provided the court with child
support guideline worksheets. Through these worksheets, the parties made
markedly different claims about the cost of providing health insurance for L.D.2
While Christopher’s worksheets claimed the cost was $75.00 per month, Tricia’s
worksheets claimed the cost was $241.67 per month. But the parties provided no
evidence about the actual cost. They provided no statements from insurers; they
provided no pay stubs; they provided no testimony. This left the district court to
choose between the numbers on the parties’ worksheets. And it leaves us with no
basis to fault the court for choosing Christopher’s number rather than Tricia’s. Cf.
In re Marriage of Keener, 728 N.W.2d 188, 194 (Iowa 2007) (“Because of the
difficulty surrounding valuation, appellate courts give much leeway to the trial court.
A trial court’s valuation will not be disturbed when it is within the range of
2These claims are labelled “Allowable Children’s Portion of Health Insurance
Cost.”
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evidence.”) (internal citation omitted)). So we find no grounds to disturb the district
court’s child support calculation.
We turn next to the district court’s failure to specify an effective date for its
revised child support calculation. Again we start by considering error preservation.
As explained, Iowa law requires issues to be “both raised and decided by
the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Munger, Reinschmidt &
Denne, L.L.P. v. Lienhard Plante, 940 N.W.2d 361, 372 (Iowa 2020) (quoting
Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 537). Here, the parties and the court certainly discussed the
effective-date issue at the remand hearing. Even so, the effective-date issue “is
not preserved for review” unless it was ultimately “decided in the district court
ruling.” See 33 Carpenters Constr., Inc., 939 N.W.2d at 75. And it was not. The
district court ruling did not mention the issue. See id. And no party filed a rule
1.904(2) motion. So it appears the effective-date issue was not preserved.
As with the health-insurance issue, however, we have considered
Lamasters’s teaching that error can be preserved when the “trial court’s ruling . . .
expressly acknowledges that [the] issue is before the court and then the ruling
necessarily decides that issue.” See 821 N.W.2d at 864 (emphasis added). Unlike
with the health-insurance issue, though, our prior decision did not direct the
remand court to address the effective-date issue. Put another way, we did not
place the effective-date issue “before the court” on remand. And we find no
acknowledgement in the trial court’s ruling that the effective-date issue was “before
the court.” See id. Rather, and unlike in Lamasters, “[t]his is . . . one of those
cases where the court failed to mention” the effective-date issue at all. See id. at
864 (emphasis added). Therefore, error was not preserved.
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We note both parties have requested an award of appellate attorney fees.
Fees are awarded upon our discretion and are not a matter of right. See Okland,
699 N.W.2d at 270. We decline to award fees here. But we tax all costs of this
appeal to Tricia.
AFFIRMED.