In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-19-00379-CV
__________________
PHILLIP SNEED, Appellant
V.
MARGARITA STAMAT, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 279th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. F-226,497
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Phillip Sneed appeals the trial court’s Final Decree of Divorce. The
decree appointed Sneed and Appellee Margarita Stamat joint managing conservators
of their minor child, with Stamat having the exclusive right to designate the child’s
primary residence and to make educational and medical decisions for the child. Both
parties were represented by counsel in the trial court.
The underlying divorce proceeding was originally filed by Appellant against
Appellee, Appellee was served by publication, and Appellant received a default
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judgment of divorce and was appointed as sole custodian of the minor child.
Appellee filed a motion for new trial, which was granted. Appellee also filed a
general denial and a counterpetition for divorce. The trial court put temporary orders
in place pending the final hearing. Both parties were represented by attorneys during
the underlying proceedings.
After a bench trial, the judge found that the parties were divorced, Appellee
was named the conservator with the right to designate the residence of the child,
make educational decisions, medical and psychological decisions for the child, and
Appellant was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $500 per month.
Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal wherein he stated he was appealing the
“order and judgment divorce” entered on “September 30, 2019.” According to the
record before us, the Judgment entered of record on September 30, 2019 states
therein that the divorce was “judicially PRONOUNCED AND RENDERED in court
at Beaumont, Jefferson County, Texas, on August 30, 2019 and further noted on the
court’s docket sheet on the same date[] but signed on September 30, 2019.”
Appellant’s pro se “brief” on appeal identifies the following as issues:
(1) What is considered the best interest of the Child in Texas?
(2) In Texas when you file a lawsuit do you have the right to unbiased
justice?
(3) When you work with a lawyer, do you have the right to adequate
and competent legal representation?
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Appellant seeks the following relief: to reverse the trial court’s decision or to be
granted another trial, to be granted sole managing conservator of his minor child,
that his ex-wife be ordered to pay child support, and that his ex-wife be given
visitation on the first, third, and fifth weekends of the month.
We construe an appellant’s pro se brief liberally. See Giddens v. Brooks, 92
S.W.3d 878, 880 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied) (“pro se pleadings and
briefs are to be liberally construed[]”); see also Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767
S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989) (a reviewing court construes points of error liberally
to obtain a just, fair, and equitable adjudication of the parties’ rights). Nevertheless,
a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply
with applicable laws and rules of procedure. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573
S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978). Pro se parties must comply with the rules
governing preservation of error and requiring adequate briefing and citations to the
record. Redmond v. Kovar, No. 09-17-00099-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 925, at
**5-7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Ramey v.
Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 14-14-00147-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 6039,
at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)). “The
appellate court has no duty to brief issues for an appellant.” In re A.E., 580 S.W.3d
211, 219 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2019, pet. denied) (citing Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d
851, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.)).
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An appellate brief “‘must contain a clear and concise argument for the
contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.’” See
Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 500 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Tex.
R. App. P. 38.1(i)). The failure to provide citations, argument, and analysis as to an
appellate issue may waive the issue. Id. (citing ERI Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v.
Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 880 (Tex. 2010)).
In this case, Appellant’s brief identifies three alleged issues, but the brief fails
to identify the applicable law or legal standard for each issue and then also fails to
explain how the trial court erred with reference to the record or applicable law.
Appellant generally describes what he believes happened at the trial court, complains
about the trial court’s rulings, and alleges some type of bias of the trial court, but he
fails to provide record references, legal citations, and analysis applying the facts to
the law. The Appellant’s brief fails to satisfy Rule 38.1. His brief generally contains
bare assertions of error or allegations, and we conclude that he has presented nothing
for review on appeal and waived our review of those complaints. See Washington v.
Bank of N.Y., 362 S.W.3d 853, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (bare
assertions of error, without argument or authority, present nothing for review on
appeal); Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 118, 128
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); see also Fredonia State Bank v.
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Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994) (“a point may be waived
due to inadequate briefing[]”).
To the extent Appellant’s brief asserts a claim that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel, we have previously explained that “‘[t]he doctrine of
ineffective assistance of counsel does not extend to most civil cases, including
divorce cases.’” Jackson v. Jackson, No. 09-16-00189-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS
1908, at **1-2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 15, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting
Sherwood v. Sherwood, No. 09-15-00133-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1939, at *2
(Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 25, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)); Blair v. McClinton, No.
01-11-00701-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8048, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] July 2, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also Chrisman v. Chrisman, 296
S.W.3d 706, 707 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.).
We overrule all of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
AFFIRMED.
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LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on March 4, 2021
Opinion Delivered March 18, 2021
Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
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