March 19, 2021
Supreme Court
No. 2018-340-Appeal.
(NC 05-177)
IDC Clambakes, Inc. :
v. :
Dennis J. Carney, in his capacity as :
Trustee of the Goat Island Realty
Trust, et al.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2018-340-Appeal.
(NC 05-177)
IDC Clambakes, Inc. :
v. :
Dennis J. Carney, in his capacity as :
Trustee of the Goat Island Realty
Trust, et al.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Robinson, for the Court. The plaintiff, IDC Clambakes, Inc.
(Clambakes), appeals from an October 29, 2018 final judgment of the Newport
County Superior Court following a grant of a motion for summary judgment filed
by the defendants—viz., the individual unit owners of the Goat Island South
Condominium (GIS Condominium) 1 and the Goat Island South Condominium
Association, Inc. (GISCA). On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the hearing justice
erred in his September 26, 2018 written decision, wherein he held that the
1
Given the fact that the list of names of the individual unit owners is lengthy
and is already a part of the record in this case, we will not recite it here.
-1-
defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted on the basis of: (1) the
hearing justice’s conclusion that Clambakes had “failed to demonstrate that it would
be unjust for the Defendants to receive any benefit or that it conferred a benefit upon
the Defendants;” and (2) his conclusion that Clambakes’ quasi-contract claims were
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. This case came before the Supreme Court
pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues
raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After a close review of the
record and careful consideration of the parties’ arguments (both written and oral),
we are satisfied that cause has not been shown and that this appeal may be decided
at this time.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the
Superior Court.
I
Facts and Travel
The conflict which forms the basis of the dispute between the parties in this
case is not new to this Court. The seemingly eternal saga surrounding these
condominiums and their common elements—including the event space at issue in
this case—has come before this Court on numerous occasions. See, e.g., IDC
Properties, Inc. v. Goat Island South Condominium Association, Inc., 128 A.3d 383
(R.I. 2015); America Condominium Association, Inc. v. IDC, Inc., 844 A.2d 117
-2-
(R.I. 2004) (hereinafter referred to as America I), aff’d on reh’g by America
Condominium Association, Inc. v. IDC, Inc., 870 A.2d 434 (R.I. 2005) (hereinafter
referred to as America II). Because the facts have been presented in painstaking
detail in our previous opinions, we will recount only those facts that are absolutely
necessary to the resolution of this case. In so doing, we rely primarily on the decision
of the hearing justice, our previous opinions, and other documents in the record.
On January 13, 1988, Globe Manufacturing Co. (Globe) recorded a
declaration of condominium, which created the GIS Condominium that is at issue in
this case. According to the trial justice’s decision in the instant case, Thomas Roos
is the president, vice president, director, and sole shareholder of Globe’s successor
declarants—Island Development Corporation, Inc. (IDC) and IDC Properties, Inc.
(Properties).2 He is likewise the president and sole shareholder of Clambakes. The
GIS Condominium included three undeveloped parcels. It is the unit entitled “the
North Development Unit,” sometimes referred to in this litigation as “the Reserved
Area,” which forms the basis of this dispute. The Reserved Area is a waterfront
parcel of land with an unobstructed view of Narragansett Bay.
2
According to defendants’ memorandum of law in support of their motion for
summary judgment, Thomas Roos is also the owner of an entity entitled IDC, Inc.
There is some confusion or lack of symmetry between and among certain statements
in the record in this case, the previous opinions of this Court, and the trial justice’s
decision in this case with respect to the roles of Island Development Corporation,
Inc. and IDC, Inc. However, that does not in any way affect the substantive outcome
of this case.
-3-
In March of 1988, Globe and GISCA amended and restated the original
condominium declaration (the master declaration). The master declaration reserved
certain of Globe’s development rights which had been provided for in the original
declaration, including the right to convert the Reserved Area to a master unit and to
construct improvements on it or to withdraw it completely from the GIS
Condominium. The master declaration provided that those rights expired on
December 31, 1994.
“After passage of the 1988 master declaration, Globe’s interests were
transferred to [Island Development Corporation, Inc.], and [ultimately] thereafter to
[Properties], through a series of sales and assignments.” America I, 844 A.2d at 122.
During this time, Globe (or its successor declarants) was attempting to amend the
master declaration to extend the deadline by which it was required to exercise its
rights to develop the Reserved Area. The proposed amendments were ultimately
passed by the master executive board of the GIS Condominium, and they purported
to extend the development rights of Properties until December 31, 1999. Several
unit owners objected to the validity of the amendments.
Despite that fact, Properties constructed an event facility on the Reserved
Area, which bore the name the “Newport Regatta Club” (the Regatta Club).
Clambakes was incorporated to operate the Regatta Club. From December of 1998
until April 8, 2005, Properties leased the Reserved Area, including the Regatta Club,
-4-
to Clambakes. According to defendants’ memorandum of law in support of their
motion for summary judgment in the instant case, IDC, Inc. was the entity with
which clients wishing to host events at the Regatta Club actually contracted; IDC,
Inc. would then hire Clambakes to run the events. According to Clambakes, it
“worked to market the venue through advertising, attending bridal shows, and
conducting individualized marketing and sales;” and, through its efforts, it had
increased its profits “exponentially” from the early years of running the Regatta
Club. Clambakes also contends that it spent significant amounts of money on
maintenance and improvements, licenses and permits, related legal expenses, and
developing and building the reputation of the Regatta Club as a “premier event
venue * * *.”
In 1999, a state court action was filed against IDC, Properties, and Mr. Roos
by the three condominium associations that GISCA oversees—America
Condominium Association, Inc., Capella South Condominium Association, Inc., and
Harbor Houses Condominium Association, Inc. America I, 844 A.2d at 119, 125.
The plaintiffs in that case alleged that the amendments to the master declaration at
issue, which (among other things) purported to extend the development rights of
Properties with respect to the Reserved Area until December of 1999, were in
violation of the Rhode Island Condominium Act. Id. at 119; see G.L. 1956 chapter
36.1 of title 34. Clambakes was not a party to that suit. See America I, 844 A.2d at
-5-
119. It is with respect to that suit that this Court eventually opined in America I and
America II.
In America I and America II, we held that the amendments to the master
declaration, including the amendment extending the expiration date for Properties’
development rights over the Reserved Area, were not in conformity with the
requirements of the Rhode Island Condominium Act; accordingly, it was our holding
that Properties’ development rights to the Reserved Area had expired in December
of 1994 before Properties attempted to exercise those rights by constructing the
Regatta Club. America II, 870 A.2d at 441-42; America I, 844 A.2d at 130-31. We
also held, in America II, that title to the Reserved Area was vested in the “unit owners
in common ownership from the creation of the condominium,” subject to the
development rights of Properties. America II, 870 A.2d at 443. Therefore, because
Properties’ rights had expired in 1994, the unit owners, rather than Properties, held
title to the Reserved Area. This Court additionally held, in America I, that Properties
was not entitled to any equitable relief based on a laches defense because it had built
the Regatta Club when it knew that the ownership of the Reserved Area was being
contested. America I, 844 A.2d at 134.
Subsequent to the issuance of our opinion in America II, which did not depart
from our holding in America I, GISCA sought, on behalf of the unit owners, to evict
Clambakes from the Regatta Club. Clambakes then sought protection in the United
-6-
States Bankruptcy Court.3 It is undisputed: (1) that Clambakes ultimately turned
over possession of the Reserved Area to defendants pursuant to a consent order
entered into by the parties in Bankruptcy Court; and (2) that defendants thereafter
rented the Regatta Club facilities to a new tenant, which continues to run events at
that location. In its Second Amended Disclosure Statement to Debtor’s Second
Amended Plan of Reorganization filed in the Bankruptcy Court, Clambakes stated
that it would reserve all of its business assets including its “personal property,
intangible and intellectual property, cash on hand, * * * and all * * * licenses
pertaining to its operations * * *.” It also reserved the right to pursue any and all
claims regarding the Regatta Club. It further stated that it would be “assessing
various options to enable it to resume conducting banquet functions in the future at
levels similar to those conducted by [Clambakes] pre-petition.”
On April 19, 2005, Clambakes filed the original complaint in the instant action
against the unit owners individually; that complaint contained three counts for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief; one count for unjust enrichment; one
3
In making its argument to this Court, especially with respect to the issue of
whether or not Clambakes conferred a benefit on defendants, Clambakes relies
heavily on the proceedings that ensued in the United States Bankruptcy Court and
subsequently on appeal to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode
Island and to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Given our
holding in this case, we need not delve into the bankruptcy proceedings in any detail.
See infra. We refer the interested reader to the First Circuit’s opinion in In re: IDC
Clambakes, Inc., 852 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2017), for a more detailed discussion of the
bankruptcy proceedings.
-7-
count sounding in quasi-contract; one count for tortious interference with
prospective business relations; and one count for specific performance. On
December 28, 2006, Clambakes amended its first complaint, adding counts for
breach of contract, misrepresentation, and tortious interference with contract.
Thereafter, on June 12, 2014, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of all counts
except the counts for misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and quasi-contract.
On February 26, 2016, the unit owners moved for summary judgment. On
June 28, 2016, the justice considering that motion issued an order granting the
motion with respect to the count for misrepresentation and allowing additional time
for discovery and briefing on the remaining two counts. Clambakes then moved, on
July 22, 2016, to amend its complaint to include GISCA as an additional defendant;
that motion was granted on September 29, 2016.
On January 19, 2018, defendants filed a new motion for summary judgment
on all remaining claims. The defendants contended, among other things, that
summary judgment was appropriate because: (1) Clambakes was barred from
pursuing its claims in view of the doctrine of res judicata; and (2) Clambakes could
not prevail on its unjust enrichment and quasi-contract claims due to the fact that it
could not demonstrate that it conferred any benefit on defendants “nor that any
inequity will result if Clambakes is not compensated for leaving the Regatta Club
location in November of 2005.” Clambakes then filed its objection, averring that
-8-
defendants “consented to Clambakes’ establishment of a landmark business at the
Regatta Club, then reaped the benefits of Clambakes’ investment by ousting
Clambakes from the location and leasing it to Clambakes’ biggest competitor.”
Clambakes further posited that its claims were not barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
A hearing on defendants’ motion for summary judgment and Clambakes’
objection thereto was conducted on July 2, 2018. The hearing justice proceeded to
issue a written decision on September 26, 2018, granting defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on the remaining two counts. An order to that effect entered on
October 29, 2018, and final judgment entered on the same day. Clambakes filed a
notice of appeal to this Court.
II
Standard of Review
This Court has stated that it “will review the grant of a motion for summary
judgment de novo, employing the same standards and rules used by the hearing
justice.” Correia v. Bettencourt, 162 A.3d 630, 635 (R.I. 2017) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “We will affirm a [hearing justice’s] decision only if, after
reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks
-9-
omitted). It is the nonmoving party who “bears the burden of proving by competent
evidence the existence of a disputed issue of material fact and cannot rest upon mere
allegations or denials in the pleadings, mere conclusions or mere legal opinions.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, we have stated that “summary
judgment should enter against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case * * *.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
III
Analysis
We must begin our assessment with a discussion of this Court’s jurisprudence
with respect to unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and quasi-contract.4
We have repeatedly stated that “claims for unjust enrichment sound in
equity * * *.” United Lending Corp. v. City of Providence, 827 A.2d 626, 632 (R.I.
2003); see also Fondedile, S.A. v. C.E. Maguire, Inc., 610 A.2d 87, 97 (R.I. 1992)
(stating that cases of quasi-contract arise from “the law of natural immutable justice
4
The counts remaining in this action at the time when the motion for summary
judgment at issue was decided were for unjust enrichment and quasi-contract.
However, the hearing justice noted in his decision that, in Superior Court, the parties
referred to the counts as unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. Additionally,
Clambakes refers to unjust enrichment and quantum meruit in its memorandum filed
before this Court in accordance with Article I, Rule 12A of the Supreme Court Rules
of Appellate Procedure. Whether the second count was actually for quasi-contract
or quantum meruit has no bearing on the outcome of this appeal.
- 10 -
and equity”) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have explained that “[u]njust
enrichment is ‘[t]he retention of a benefit conferred by another, who offered no
compensation, in circumstances where compensation is reasonably expected.’”
South County Post & Beam, Inc. v. McMahon, 116 A.3d 204, 210 (R.I. 2015)
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1771 (10th ed. 2014)). “The fact that a recipient
has obtained a benefit without paying for it does not itself establish that the recipient
has been unjustly enriched.” Restatement (Third) Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment § 2(1) (2011). Rather, unjust enrichment occurs “when a benefit is
conferred deliberately but without a contract[;] * * * [t]he resulting claim of unjust
enrichment seeks to recover the defendant’s gains.” South County Post & Beam,
Inc., 116 A.3d at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted). In order “[t]o recover for
unjust enrichment, a claimant must prove: (1) that he or she conferred a benefit upon
the party from whom relief is sought; (2) that the recipient appreciated the benefit;
and (3) that the recipient accepted the benefit under such circumstances that it would
be inequitable for [the recipient] to retain the benefit without paying the value
thereof.” Id. at 210-11 (quoting Emond Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. BankNewport,
105 A.3d 85, 90 (R.I. 2014)).
In contrast, “[q]uantum meruit is a slightly different, but closely related, cause
of action * * *.” Id. at 211. It is “a Latin term for ‘as much as he has deserved,’”
and is defined as “[a] claim or right of action for the reasonable value of services
- 11 -
rendered.” Process Engineers & Constructors, Inc. v. DiGregorio, Inc., 93 A.3d
1047, 1052 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1361, 1362 (9th ed. 2009)).
An action for quantum meruit “permits recovery of damages in an amount
considered reasonable to compensate a person who has rendered services in a quasi-
contractual relationship.” South County Post & Beam, Inc., 116 A.3d at 211 (internal
quotation marks omitted). In order to recover under the doctrine of quantum meruit,
a plaintiff would need to show that there was some benefit conferred upon the
defendant from services rendered by the plaintiff and that the defendant “would be
unjustly enriched without making compensation therefor.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
“While the term ‘unjustly enriched’ is included as a requirement for recovery
under a quantum meruit theory, we have described the nuanced distinction between
unjust enrichment and quantum meruit as follows: While unjust enrichment focuses
on the propriety of a payee or beneficiary retaining funds or a benefit, quantum
meruit’s primary focus is on the value of services rendered.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Generally, quantum meruit applies “in a situation in which the
plaintiff has provided services to the defendant for which the defendant has refused
to pay.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
- 12 -
Unjust enrichment and quantum meruit are “both * * * quasi-contractual
theories.”5 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]ctions brought upon theories
of unjust enrichment and quasi-contract are essentially the same.” Id. (quoting
Multi-State Restoration, Inc. v. DWS Properties, LLC, 61 A.3d 414, 418 (R.I. 2013)).
Thus, despite the subtle distinction we have just discussed between unjust
enrichment and quantum meruit, the three elements necessary to recover under a
theory of unjust enrichment are identical to the elements required to recover under a
quantum meruit theory. See id.
5
In discussing the doctrines of unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and quasi-
contract, we have previously noted the following:
“[C]laims for the redress of unjust enrichment did not fit
comfortably into either the category of contract or that of
tort, they came to be described as claims in quasi-contract.
Some of them were originally characterized as being in
quantum meruit (as much as he deserved), a form of action
used for claims to payment for services. This procedural
term has persisted and is sometimes used inexactly as a
synonym for the more general term quasi-contract, which
refers to any money claim for the redress of unjust
enrichment.” Process Engineers & Constructors, Inc. v.
DiGregorio, Inc., 93 A.3d 1047, 1053 n.7 (R.I. 2014)
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 370 (9th ed. 2009)); see
also R & B Electric Co., Inc. v. Amco Construction Co.,
Inc., 471 A.2d 1351, 1355 (R.I. 1984) (“One of the
theoretical bases underlying the doctrine of quasi-contract
states, that for quasi contract neither an actual promise nor
privity is necessary.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
- 13 -
We have stated that “[t]he third prong of the analysis is the most important”—
namely, that “the recipient accepted the benefit under such circumstances that it
would be inequitable for [the recipient] to retain the benefit without paying the value
thereof.” Id. at 211, 212 (quoting Emond Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 105 A.3d at
90); see also R & B Electric Co., Inc. v. Amco Construction Co., Inc., 471 A.2d 1351,
1356 (R.I. 1984). “[T]he court must look at the equities of each case and decide
whether it would be unjust for a party to retain the benefit conferred upon it without
paying the value of such benefit.” South County Post & Beam, Inc., 116 A.3d at 112
(quoting R & B Electric Co., Inc., 471 A.2d at 1356). In determining what is, and
what is not, an unjust result, the hearing justice must “examine the facts of the
particular case and balance the equities.” Id. (quoting Emond Plumbing & Heating,
Inc., 105 A.3d at 90).
For the purposes of this case, we will assume without deciding that the first
two elements of the unjust enrichment analysis have been satisfied. We do so
because, in our judgment, the third element of the unjust enrichment analysis is
dispositive of the case. Thus, we will focus our analysis on a determination as to the
existence vel non of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether or not
it would be inequitable for defendants to retain any benefit that may have been
conferred upon them by Clambakes. We will also consider whether or not
- 14 -
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the quasi-
contractual claims at issue.
A
The Hearing Justice’s Decision
The hearing justice held that Clambakes’ quasi-contract claims “must fail”
because it had been unable to point to the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact as to two essential elements: (1) that a benefit was conferred on defendants; and
(2) that, even if there were such a conferred benefit, it would be unjust for defendants
to retain the benefit.
With respect to the issue of whether or not any alleged enrichment was unjust,
the hearing justice summed up Clambakes’ contention as follows: “[Clambakes]
essentially claims that the Defendants were unjustly enriched because they were able
to benefit by receiving a premium rental price for the Reserved Area inasmuch as
[Clambakes’] reputation imparted an increased value upon the res of the Reserved
Area.” He stated that Clambakes ignored the fact that it lost the Reserved Area
because Properties, its landlord, did not prevail in the litigation culminating in
America I and America II; he added that Clambakes should not now be allowed to
profit from Properties’ lack of success in America I and America II. He then opined
as follows:
“How can it be unjust when any alleged benefit received
by the Defendants was solely a result of winning the legal
- 15 -
battle concerning its ownership of the Reserved Area?
How can the consequence of a final judicial determination
be deemed unjust? It cannot.”
The hearing justice added that, in America I, Properties was found not to be
entitled to equitable relief because it built the Regatta Club on land the ownership of
which Properties knew was still in dispute. He stated that it “ma[de] no sense that
the Defendants would unjustly retain the benefit of their own property when
[Clambakes] operated the Regatta Club over the years with full knowledge that the
America litigation was ongoing which was contesting its landlord’s ownership of the
Reserved Area.” He further stated that Clambakes was not “entitled to the
application of unjust enrichment when its landlord, [Properties], was not entitled to
relief based upon the application of equitable principles, especially considering that
Mr. Roos is the president and sole shareholder of both corporations.”6
6
We need not recount the decision of the hearing justice as to whether or not a
benefit was conferred since we are of the opinion that the third element of the
applicable analysis—namely, whether it would be inequitable for defendants to
retain the benefit—is dispositive. See Grady v. Narragansett Electric Co., 962 A.2d
34, 42 n.4 (R.I. 2009) (referencing “our usual policy of not opining with respect to
issues about which we need not opine”). We also need not delve into his discussion
of the issue of whether or not the doctrine of res judicata acted as a bar to
Clambakes’ claims. See id.
- 16 -
B
Discussion
Clambakes contends before this Court that “[t]he Superior
Court * * * committed reversible error by failing to acknowledge the federal courts’
holdings in the Bankruptcy Litigation regarding the benefits Defendants received
from Clambakes.” (Emphasis in original.) It posits that defendants never objected
to Clambakes’ use of the Reserved Area and only revoked that consent after
Clambakes had made the Regatta Club a profitable business. It adds that
“Defendants appreciated a much more valuable benefit from Clambakes than
Clambakes did from Defendants which necessitates, at minimum, a trial in which
factual findings can be made as to the associated value.” It further avers that
“[w]hether it would be unjust for [defendants] to retain a substantial benefit
conferred by Clambakes without compensation, and the value of that benefit were
both questions of fact to be determined by a jury.”
Clambakes seems to focus much of its argument before this Court on the
benefit conferred—i.e., goodwill, reputation, and increased rental value—rather than
on whether or not it would be inequitable for defendants to retain that benefit without
paying for it. We, on the other hand, focus on the latter consideration.
We begin by noting that it is clear to this Court that no genuine issue as to
material fact exists in this case; indeed, the parties do not dispute the facts which
- 17 -
form the basis of this case. What is more, in our opinion, the weighing of the equities
in this case to determine whether or not defendants’ retaining of any benefit
conferred would be equitable, is not, as Clambakes avers, a factual question which
defeats summary judgment. See, e.g., Emond Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 105 A.3d
at 86, 89-92 (affirming the grant of a motion for summary judgment because, under
the theory of unjust enrichment, it would not have been inequitable for the moving
party to retain any benefit that may have been conferred).
After our thorough review of the record in this case and the parties’ arguments
on appeal, we are in wholehearted agreement with the following cogent statement
by the hearing justice which bears repeating:
“How can it be unjust when any alleged benefit received
by the Defendants was solely a result of winning the legal
battle concerning its ownership of the Reserved Area?
How can the consequence of a final judicial determination
be deemed unjust? It cannot.”
If a benefit were conferred by Clambakes in this case, defendants would be merely
retaining a benefit which was conferred as a direct result of having another entity
use defendants’ property inappropriately for a little over six years; and, it is worth
noting that defendants only regained title and control of their property through an
extended court battle. There is certainly nothing unjust or inequitable about
defendants reclaiming their property and putting it to beneficial use.
- 18 -
What is more, we made it clear in America I that IDC, Properties, and Mr.
Roos could not prevail on their equitable claims because they had constructed the
Regatta Club on land concerning which they knew there was a dispute with respect
to title. America I, 844 A.2d at 134. IDC, Properties, and Mr. Roos entered the
Reserved Area and built on it at considerable risk. It would be nonsensical for this
Court to now permit Clambakes to pursue its equitable claims, especially given the
fact that Mr. Roos is the president and sole shareholder of the two entities involved
in America I (IDC and Properties) and is the president and sole shareholder of
Clambakes. We certainly cannot now say that the wrongdoer should be permitted
to benefit through a quasi-contractual theory.7
Accordingly, in our judgment, there is no genuine issue of material fact
remaining in this case, and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because it would not be inequitable for the defendants to retain any benefit that may
have been conferred on them by Clambakes.8 See Correia, 162 A.3d at 635.
7
Our conclusion is not affected by the fact that IDC, Properties, and Clambakes
are separate and distinct legal entities.
8
Given our holding, we need not address the res judicata arguments raised on
appeal. See Grady, 962 A.2d at 42 n.4.
- 19 -
IV
Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. We remand the
record to that tribunal.
Justice Flaherty participated in the decision but retired prior to its publication.
Justice Lynch Prata and Justice Long did not participate.
- 20 -
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
IDC Clambakes, Inc. v. Dennis J. Carney, in his
Title of Case capacity as Trustee of the Goat Island Realty Trust, et
al.
No. 2018-340-Appeal.
Case Number
(NC 05-177)
Date Opinion Filed March 19, 2021
Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice William P. Robinson III
Source of Appeal Newport County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Brian Van Couyghen
For Plaintiff:
William P. Devereaux, Esq.
Matthew C. Reeber, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendants:
Charles D. Blackman, Esq.
Adam Ramos, Esq.
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)