NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 21a0154n.06
No. 20-4110
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED
Mar 23, 2021
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff–Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
) DISTRICT OF OHIO
HECTOR J. LEBRON, )
)
OPINION
Defendant–Appellant. )
)
Before: COLE, Chief Judge; MOORE and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Hector Lebron appeals the district court’s
denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Because the district
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weighed against
granting relief, we AFFIRM the district court’s order denying Lebron’s compassionate-release
motion.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2018, Lebron pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled
substance, in violation of § 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). R. 40 (Plea Agreement at 2) (Page
ID #111). On April 1, 2019, the district court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of eighty-two
months’ imprisonment. R. 59 (Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 18–19) (Page ID #303–04). Because Lebron
has been in federal custody since December 8, 2016, he had, at the time of his sentencing, already
No. 20-4110, United States v. Lebron
served approximately one-third of his custodial sentence due to credit given for his pretrial
detention. To date, he has completed almost two-thirds of his sentence.
On May 1, 2020, Lebron moved for compassionate release, arguing that the COVID-19
pandemic posed a serious health risk to him during incarceration because of his underlying medical
conditions. He claimed that the confluence of these circumstances served as an extraordinary and
compelling circumstance justifying his release. Lebron’s motion solely relied on his changed
circumstances due to the pandemic, and Lebron did not argue that any other factor weighed in
favor of his release. The government opposed Lebron’s motion.
The same district court judge who sentenced Lebron also denied Lebron’s motion for
compassionate release. United States v. Lebron, --- F.Supp.3d ----, No. 3:16-cr-00382-JGC-1,
2020 WL 5824399, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 1, 2020) (order). After finding that Lebron had
exhausted his applicable administrative remedies, the district court applied the standard set out in
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), noting that it could reduce Lebron’s sentence if it found that “extraordinary
and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and if the relevant § 3553(a) factors weighed in
favor of release. The district court also relied on the criteria set out in the Sentencing
Commission’s policy statement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 1B1.13.
The district court found that the combination of Lebron’s underlying medical conditions and the
COVID-19 pandemic could serve as an extraordinary circumstance counseling in favor of a
sentence reduction. Nonetheless, the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors led it
to conclude that Lebron’s circumstances did not warrant relief.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s denial of a compassionate-release motion under the abuse-of-
discretion standard. United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir. 2020). “A district court
abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, applies the law improperly,
or uses an erroneous legal standard.” United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1112 (6th Cir. 2020)
(quoting United States v. Pembrook, 609 F.3d 381, 383 (6th Cir. 2010)). When considering
motions for compassionate release, “‘[a] court might abuse its discretion, for example, if it
misreads the meaning of the extraordinary-reason requirement’ or ‘if it interprets the law to bar it
from granting a reduction when, in fact, it has discretion to do so.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
Keefer, 832 F. App’x 359, 363 (6th Cir. 2020)).
B. Analysis
Pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may grant a compassionate-release motion by
engaging in a three-step inquiry. First, the court “must ‘find’ whether ‘extraordinary and
compelling reasons warrant’ a sentence reduction.” Jones, 980 F.3d at 1107–08 (alteration and
footnote omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). Second, the court “must ‘find’ whether
‘such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.’” Id. at 1108 (alteration and emphasis omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)).
Finally, the court must “consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its
discretion, the reduction . . . is warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of
the case.” Id. (quoting Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010)). However, we recently
clarified how courts should apply § 3582(c)(1)(A) when, as here, an imprisoned person files a
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motion in district court requesting compassionate release. In such cases, because the Sentencing
Commission’s policy statement in § 1B1.13 is not applicable, “federal judges may skip step two
of the § 3582(c)(1)(A) inquiry and have full discretion to define ‘extraordinary and compelling’
without consulting the policy statement § 1B1.13.” Id. at 1111 (footnote omitted); United States
v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 518–19 (6th Cir. 2021).1
Lebron contends that the district court committed several errors that merit remand when it
denied his compassionate-release motion based on its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. “[A]
district court might abuse its discretion if it engaged in a substantively unreasonable balancing of
the § 3553(a) factors.” Ruffin, 978 F.3d at 1005. “District courts should consider all relevant
§ 3553(a) factors before rendering a compassionate release decision.” Jones, 980 F.3d at 1114.
When reviewing the district court’s decision, “we consider the entire record,” Ruffin, 978 F.3d at
1008, “including the records from the original sentencing, records on the modification motion, and
the final compassionate release decision,” Jones, 980 F.3d at 1112; see also Elias, 984 F.3d at 520.
A district court adequately explains its decision to deny a compassionate-release motion when “the
record as a whole satisfies us that [it] ‘considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis
for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.’” Ruffin, 978 F.3d at 1008 (quoting
Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1967 (2018)).
1
The government argues that § 1B1.13 remains applicable in this case and that our decision to treat it as
inapplicable in Jones is non-binding dicta and incorrectly decided. Appellee Br. at 22–24. The government ignores
that we have followed and reaffirmed our decision in Jones in case after case. See Elias, 984 F.3d at 519, United
States v. Hampton, 985 F.3d 530, 533 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Sherwood, 986 F.3d 951, 953–54 (6th Cir.
2021); United States v. Rafidi, No. 20-3749, 2021 WL 424443, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 08, 2021); United States v. Pegram,
No. 20-1906, 2021 WL 499572, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2021); United States v. Sorrell, No. 20-1832, 2021 WL
807867, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 3, 2021). The government might not like our conclusion in Jones, but it is the governing
law of this circuit.
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No. 20-4110, United States v. Lebron
First, Lebron argues that the district court erred by giving “outsized weight” to Lebron’s
“potential danger to the community” when considering the § 3553(a) factors. Appellant Br. at 8.
The district court cited § 1B1.13 in its discussion of the legal standard for granting a
compassionate-release motion. And § 1B1.13(2) mandates that a district court must find that
“[t]he defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community” to grant
relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court’s citation to § 1B1.13 as the correct legal standard
was erroneous. However, this is not a case where the district court solely relied on § 1B1.13(2)’s
dangerousness requirement to deny relief. See United States v. Sherwood, 986 F.3d 951, 954 (6th
Cir. 2021). Instead, the district court permissibly considered Lebron’s potential dangerousness
alongside several other relevant § 3553(a) factors, including “the nature and circumstances of the
offense” and Lebron’s “history and characteristics,” as well as the need for deterrence, to protect
the public, “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide
just punishment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2); see also Sherwood, 986 F.3d at 954 (noting that
district courts may consider a defendant’s “propensity to be a danger to the community upon
release” in their balancing of the § 3553(a) factors). The district court detailed Lebron’s criminal
history, noted that Lebron previously served a ten-year sentence for a prior conviction for
possession with intent to distribute that did not deter him from committing his current offense, and
highlighted the severity of his current offense conduct due to the serious harm that a kilogram of
fentanyl could cause to so many people. The district court also found that Lebron demonstrated
“a capacity for violence” due to his possession of a firearm in connection with his prior drug
offense and a domestic violence conviction. Lebron, 2020 WL 5824399, at *3. The court
determined that Lebron’s repeated violations of supervised release and probation demonstrated
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contempt for the law, and the court was concerned that granting a reduced sentence in these
circumstances would not protect the public or deter Lebron or others. The court also concluded
that granting relief so soon after sentencing would not adequately reflect the seriousness of
Lebron’s conduct, promote respect for the law, or constitute just punishment for Lebron’s offense.
Consequently, the district court found that the § 3553(a) factors “strongly support Lebron’s
continued incarceration.” Id. Based on this record, we cannot say that the district court’s weighing
of the § 3553(a) factors was an abuse of discretion. Jones, 980 F.3d at 1114 (“The district court
is best situated to balance the § 3553(a) factors.”) (quoting United States v. Kincaid, 802 F. App’x
187, 189 (6th Cir. 2020)).
Lebron contends that the district court failed to consider any new facts that arose after his
original sentencing hearing and that the district court failed to consider Lebron’s need for medical
treatment when weighing the § 3553(a) factors. Both arguments are unavailing. First, Lebron
never presented any new facts, such as evidence related to his rehabilitation or good behavior in
prison, for the district court to consider. We cannot transform Lebron’s failure to introduce new
evidence into an error by the district court. Second, the district court acknowledged Lebron’s
medical conditions and need for treatment during the original sentencing. See R. 59 (Sentencing
Hr’g Tr. at 12–14) (Page ID #297–99). In its order denying Lebron’s compassionate-release
motion, the court accepted that his conditions resulted in a greater risk of serious illness if Lebron
contracted COVID-19. Lebron, 2020 WL 5824399, at *2. But the court concluded that
“[Lebron’s] record strongly argues against release.” Lebron, 2020 WL 5824399, at *3. The entire
record makes clear that the district court did not abuse its discretion, but instead fully considered
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all relevant § 3553(a) factors. See also Jones, 980 F.3d at 1114 (explaining that a district court
need not detail “its analysis of every single § 3553(a) factor”).
Finally, Lebron argues that the district court relied on three erroneous findings of fact in
its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. First, Lebron correctly notes that the district court
erroneously stated that Lebron currently is imprisoned in Federal Correctional Institution Canaan
(“FCI Canaan”). Compare Lebron, 2020 WL 5824399, at *1 (noting that Lebron is imprisoned in
FCI Canaan), with R. 71 (Def.’s Mot. for Ruling at 2) (Page ID #385) (noting that Lebron has been
moved to Metropolitan Detention Center Brooklyn (“MDC Brooklyn”) at or around September
25, 2020). However, because the district court did not rely on the conditions of the facility in
which Lebron is incarcerated to determine that the § 3553(a) factors preclude relief, this error does
not merit remand.2
Second, Lebron contends that the district court improperly gave significant negative weight
to the fact that Lebron pleaded guilty to possessing a kilogram of fentanyl. During sentencing, the
district court agreed not to infer that Lebron purposefully intended to distribute fentanyl because
there was no indication that Lebron knew that the controlled substance he possessed contained
fentanyl and not a different opioid. R. 59 (Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 15) (Page ID #300). But the
court also stressed that it was Lebron’s “responsibility to find out just what was go[ing] on,” id. at
9, 19 (Page ID #294, 304), and emphasized the seriousness of Lebron’s conduct regardless of
whether Lebron knew that he possessed fentanyl, id. at 8, 10, 18–19 (Page ID #293, 295, 303–04).
2
We also take judicial notice of the fact that the number of incarcerated persons at MDC Brooklyn that have
contracted COVID-19 (364) is not grossly dissimilar from the number at FCI Canaan (307). COVID-19 Coronavirus:
COVID-19 Cases Full breakdown and additional details, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last visited March 9, 2021).
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In light of the district court’s comments during sentencing, its reiteration of the seriousness of
Lebron’s offense conduct was not at odds with its finding that Lebron did not purposefully intend
to distribute fentanyl.
Lastly, Lebron claims that the district court erroneously relied on the fact that only a year
had passed since the court sentenced Lebron, which counseled against granting relief. At the time
of the district court’s compassionate-release decision, Lebron functionally had served more than
half of his sentence due to credit for pre-trial detention. However, under the deferential standard
of review that we apply to these decisions, we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the
district court to determine that granting relief only a year after imposing an eighty-two-month
sentence would not serve the relevant factors set out in § 3553(a)(2)(A). See United States v.
Austin, 825 F. App’x 324, 326 (6th Cir. 2020) (order).
In sum, we cannot conclude on this record that the district court abused its discretion when
weighing the § 3553(a) factors.
III. CONCLUSION
Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s order denying Lebron’s motion for
compassionate release.
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