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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-10366
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-00111-JPB
ROBERT A. DOANE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TELE CIRCUIT NETWORK CORPORATION,
ASHAR SYED,
in his Individual Capacity and in his Capacity
as Officer of Tele Circuit Network Corporation,
JOHN(S) AND OR JANE(S) DOE 1-100,
JOHN DOE(S) AND OR JANE DOES(S)
in their Individual Capacities and/or in their Capacities
as Officers or Employees of Tele Circuit Network Corporation,
XYZ COMPANIES 1-100,
Defendants-Appellees.
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________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(March 24, 2021)
Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Robert Doane filed suit in federal court against Tele Circuit
Network Corporation and its sole owner Ashar Syed (“Defendants”), alleging that
Defendants had unlawfully “spoofed” his phone number during a telemarketing
campaign, causing Plaintiff to receive numerous angry calls from Defendants’
prospective customers. After dismissing Plaintiff’s federal claims for lack of
standing, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s Massachusetts state-law claims. As to those state-law claims, the court
further ruled sua sponte that it lacked diversity jurisdiction to entertain the state-
law claims because it was “clear” to the court that the amount-in-controversy
requirement was not satisfied. After careful consideration, we vacate the district
court’s ruling and remand for further consideration as to whether diversity
jurisdiction exists.
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I. BACKGROUND
In 2017, Plaintiff sued Defendants in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts. Plaintiff alleged that, as part of an unlawful
telemarketing scheme, Defendants had “spoofed” Plaintiff’s name and cellphone
number, making it appear to thousands of call recipients that Plaintiff was the
caller. According to Plaintiff, Defendant’s conduct resulted in him receiving
hundreds of angry and threatening calls from Defendant’s prospective customers,
many of whom were on the do-not-call registry.
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserted numerous claims arising under
federal statutes, Massachusetts statutes, and Massachusetts common law. Plaintiff
alleged that the district court had federal-question jurisdiction over his federal
claims and supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims. He also alleged
that diversity jurisdiction existed because “Plaintiff is a resident of a different state
from each defendant,” Massachusetts and Georgia, respectively, and “the value of
the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000.” In a first amended complaint, Plaintiff
realleged the same.
In 2018, Defendant Tele Circuit Network Corporation filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy in the Northern District of Georgia, resulting in an automatic stay of
the Massachusetts litigation. The Bankruptcy Court then modified the automatic
stay to permit Plaintiff to continue the lawsuit if he sought to transfer the case to
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Georgia. Accordingly, Plaintiff filed a motion to lift the stay and transfer the case
to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, which the
Massachusetts district court granted.
Following the transfer to the Northern District of Georgia, Plaintiff filed a
second amended complaint. Plaintiff asserted federal claims for violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act and the Truth In Caller ID Act. He also
asserted numerous state-law claims for violations of Massachusetts statutes
regarding the unlawful use of blocking devices or services, identity fraud,
violations of the right to privacy, unauthorized use of a person’s name, and
unlawful business practices. Finally, Plaintiff asserted Massachusetts common law
claims for defamation, trespass and nuisance, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
Plaintiff alleged that Defendants caused him to suffer “severe emotional
distress with physical manifestations” and “monetary losses” resulting in damages
“exceed[ing] $75,000.00.” Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that he had previously
been diagnosed with chronic pain and sleep disorders, and that, as a result of
receiving angry and threatening calls, he had suffered “tension,” “interference with
sleep,” “exacerbation of his chronic pain,” “exacerbation of sleep disturbance,” and
“increased daytime somnolence, requiring him to increase his medications and
supplements.” As for financial losses, Plaintiff alleged that he had incurred
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“attorney fees,” “wear and tear on his cellphone,” “[cellphone] battery depletion
and electricity used for recharge,” and “the expense of software to track the calls of
those angry callers.” Plaintiff sought “actual, compensatory, and special damages
to be determined at trial in an amount exceeding $500,000.00,” “statutory damages
of not less than $500 for each of the negligent violations of the [Telephone
Consumer Protection Act], subject to trebling for knowing and willful violations
thereof,” “punitive damages . . . in the amount of not less than twice and up to
three times his actual damages,” and attorney’s fees.
Defendants each filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint,
arguing that it failed to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). The district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The court
first concluded that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring his federal claims.
Accordingly, it dismissed those claims with prejudice. The court then sua sponte
concluded that it lacked diversity jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims
because “it is clear to this Court that the amount in controversy requirement is not
satisfied.” Although the court noted that it had supplemental jurisdiction over the
state-law claims, it declined to exercise that jurisdiction because discovery had not
yet commenced and the claims would be best resolved by a state court.
Accordingly, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s state-law claims without
prejudice. This appeal followed.
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II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Plaintiff does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of his
federal claims or its decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining Massachusetts state-law claims. Instead, Plaintiff contends that the
district court erred in determining that the amount-in-controversy requirement was
not satisfied and thus that it lacked original jurisdiction under the diversity
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.1 Plaintiff further argues that the district
court erred in sua sponte dismissing his state-law claims for lack of diversity
jurisdiction without giving him notice and an opportunity to be heard on the
matter. Because the basis for the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s claims
did not satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement is unclear and the court did
not give the parties an opportunity to weigh in on whether the amount in
controversy exceeded $75,000, we vacate the district court’s dismissal and remand
for further proceedings.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, LLC,
329 F.3d 805, 807 (11th Cir. 2003). The diversity jurisdiction statute grants
original jurisdiction to district courts in cases where the parties are “citizens of
1
There is no dispute that the parties are diverse for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. According to
Plaintiff’s pleadings, Plaintiff is a citizen of Massachusetts while Defendants are citizens of
Georgia.
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different States” and “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Unlike the
supplemental jurisdiction statute, which allows district courts to decline to exercise
jurisdiction over state-law claims if certain conditions are met, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c), exercising jurisdiction under the diversity jurisdiction statute “is not
discretionary,” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 356 (1988).
“Ordinarily, a plaintiff need only plead an amount sufficient to satisfy the
amount-in-controversy requirement in good faith.” Fastcase, Inc. v. Lawriter,
LLC, 907 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2018). “The plaintiff’s good-faith pleading
will be second guessed only if it appears to a legal certainty that the claim is really
for less than the jurisdictional amount.” Id. (alteration accepted) (quotation marks
omitted). “However, when the plaintiff pleads an unspecified amount of damages,
[he] bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the claim
on which jurisdiction is based exceeds the jurisdictional minimum.” Id.
Here, the district court’s assertion that “it is clear to this Court that the
amount in controversy requirement is not satisfied” does not indicate how the court
reached its conclusion. The amount in controversy, however, was indeterminate
because Plaintiff made no effort to quantify his damages. In conclusory fashion,
Plaintiff merely speculated in his pleadings that his damages would “well exceed
$75,000.00” because his actual, compensatory, and special damages “to be
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determined at trial” would “exceed[] $500,000.00,” and he was entitled to statutory
damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. See Federated Mut., 329 F.3d at
808–09 (holding that the damages the insured might recover for a bad-faith-failure-
to-pay claim were “indeterminate” because the insured “ha[d] not placed any dollar
amount on the various damages it [was] seeking” for that claim, and the insurer’s
speculation that damages would be “well in excess of $75,000” based on damages
awards in other bad-faith cases did not render the amount in controversy
determinate); Fastcase, 907 F.3d at 1339, 1343 (holding that the plaintiff’s
allegation that potential liability “exceeded $75,000” was “a claim for an
indeterminate amount of damages” but that the plaintiff had carried his burden of
showing that the amount-in-controversy requirement was satisfied based on a
liquidated-damages provision). Accordingly, Plaintiff had the burden to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.
Fastcase, 907 F.3d at 1342.
Although “a plaintiff must have ample opportunity to present evidence
bearing on the existence of jurisdiction,” Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d
1255, 1273 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted), the district court gave
Plaintiff no chance to show that his claims exceeded the jurisdictional minimum.
In their motions to dismiss, Defendants did not argue that Plaintiffs claims failed to
satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, and the district court dismissed for
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lack of diversity jurisdiction sua sponte, without allowing Plaintiff to weigh in on
the issue.
While it may be true that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding emotional distress
and minor monetary loss do not credibly support his contention that he is entitled
to “actual, compensatory, and special damages . . . in an amount exceeding
$500,000.00,” additional analysis is required to determine whether there is more
than $75,000 is in controversy. “The determination of whether the requisite
amount in controversy exists is a federal question; however, state law is relevant to
this determination insofar as it defines the nature and extent of the right plaintiff
seeks to enforce.” Broughton v. Fla. Int’l Underwriters, Inc., 139 F.3d 861, 863
(11th Cir. 1998) (alteration accepted) (quotation marks omitted). On appeal,
Plaintiff argues that juries routinely award more than $75,000 based on lesser
showings of emotional injury, and that he can recover treble damages and
attorney’s fees for each of his claims under the Massachusetts Consumer
Protection Act, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A. See Boyd v. Homes of Legend,
Inc., 188 F.3d 1294, 1299–1300 (11th Cir. 1999) (looking to state law to determine
whether punitive damages were recoverable and thus could be counted toward the
amount in controversy); see also Federated Mut., 329 F.3d at 808 n.4 (noting that
whether attorneys’ fees count toward the amount in controversy depends upon
whether they are provided for by statute or contract).
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Defendant has not responded to these arguments and we decline to address
them here. Instead, following briefing by the parties, the district court should
determine in the first instance whether Plaintiff can show that the amount in
controversy satisfies the jurisdictional minimum. We therefore vacate the district
court’s dismissal and remand for the court to further consider whether diversity
jurisdiction exists over Plaintiff’s state-law claims. See Morrison, 228 F.3d at
1273 (remanding to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to show that the amount-in-
controversy requirement was satisfied where the issue was first raised on appeal).
III. CONCLUSION
We vacate the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s state-law claims and
remand for the court to determine in the first instance whether Plaintiff can prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000 for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.2
VACATED and REMANDED.
2
The district court’s order dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims with prejudice. A dismissal for
lack of standing, however, is a jurisdictional ruling that is entered without prejudice. Stalley ex
rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008).
Accordingly, on remand, the district court should reenter its dismissal order without prejudice as
to the federal claims. Id. at 1234–35 (affirming the district court’s dismissal for lack of standing
but remanding for the court to dismiss the complaint without prejudice).
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