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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: K.F., MOTHER : No. 1226 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Dated October 15, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000213-2019
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: March 31, 2021
Appellant, K.F. (“Mother”), appeals from the order entered in the
Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ Court, which granted the
petition of Children Youth and Families (“CYF”) for involuntary termination of
Mother’s parental rights to her minor child, A.D. (“Child”). We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows:
Mother’s first child was born [in] August…2010. [CYF] was
briefly involved but the case closed successfully. [CYF]
received another referral in 2013 after receiving reports that
Mother was due to give birth to her second child and had
become homeless. Mother’s second child was born [in]
February…2013. After receiving this referral, and assessing
Mother, the agency discovered that she suffered from
untreated mental health issues and had been the victim of
domestic violence in both her past and present
relationships. At that time, the case became court active
and goals were set for Mother that included engaging in
mental health treatment consistently and attending intimate
partner violence (hereinafter “IPV”) counseling. Mother’s
third child was born [in] June…2014. Mother reported
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domestic violence between her and that father. She sought
a [protection from abuse (“PFA”) order] against him in fall
of 2015. Mother’s fourth child was born [in] April…2016.
There was also domestic violence in this relationship and
Mother sought a PFA against this father in April of 2016.
One of Mother’s older children reported sexual abuse by this
Father as well. Mother made little progress with respect to
her goals of attending mental health treatment and IPV
counseling. As a result, [CYF] filed Petitions to Terminate
Mother’s parental rights with respect to all four of the older
children. Shortly thereafter, Mother began an online
relationship with D.D. (hereinafter “[F]ather”). He resided
in Virginia and the two never met in person until he moved
in with her in September of 2017. Mother was [allusive]
about this relationship and continued to deny that the two
were a couple for some time. This was obviously troubling
to [CYF] given Mother’s history of unhealthy and abusive
relationships. Mother became pregnant with A.D. in the
spring of 2018. Mother was somewhat more truthful about
the nature of the relationship after [CYF] learned of the
pregnancy. Mother obtained a temporary PFA order against
Father on June 1st, 2018 alleging that he had shoved her
against the wall and that she was in fear for her and her
unborn child’s safety. Mother did not pursue a final PFA
against Father and continued the relationship despite
[CYF’s] and the court’s concerns.
Mother’s parental rights [to] her four older children were
terminated on December 21, 2018. [Child] was born [in]
January…2019. [CYF] obtained an Emergency Custody
Authorization on January 23rd, 2019 and [Child] was placed
in foster care upon his release from the hospital on January
24th, 2019. [Child] was adjudicated dependent on March
6th, 2019, and Mother was ordered to continue mental
health treatment and to attend consistently. Visitation was
permitted to be liberal but supervised. On April 9th, 2019
Mother sought a secondary temporary PFA against [Child’s]
Father[,] alleging that he was “verbally abusive” and had
threatened to kill her. She did not obtain a final PFA order.
The parties appeared for a Permanency Review Hearing on
June 19th, 2019 and Mother was found to be in moderate
compliance as she had been attending mental health
treatment. However, the court noted that she had missed
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nineteen visits during that reporting period. The court
ordered Mother’s visits be reduced if she missed two
consecutive days of visitation. The court also ordered
Mother to follow through with a final PFA against [F]ather
and to undergo an updated mental health evaluation to
determine if she was receiving the correct level of
treatment. The court granted [CYF] permission to place
[Child] in an appropriate foster home and he was
subsequently placed in the foster home of S.I. and J.I. that
month.1
1 The child currently resides in this foster home.
The parties appeared for a Permanency Hearing on
September 18th, 2019. Mother was found to be in minimal
compliance as she had only attended eleven out of thirty-
four visits during that reporting period and was not engaged
in mental health treatment. The court ordered Mother to
engage in mental health treatment. Mother’s visits were to
remain status quo but the court granted [CYF] permission
to reduce visits to once a week if Mother missed two
consecutive visits. [CYF] filed the Petition to Involuntarily
Terminate Mother’s Rights on December 9th, 2019.
The parties appeared for a Permanency Hearing on January
21st, 2020. Mother was found to be in minimal compliance
as she had not yet signed releases for [CYF] to verify her
attendance in mental health treatment and had missed
eleven out of twenty-six visits during that reporting period.
The court ordered Mother to engage in mental health
treatment and to sign releases for [CYF] so that they could
verify her attendance. Mother’s visits were ordered to
remain status quo and [CYF] was again given permission to
reduce the visitation if Mother missed two consecutive visits.
An amended Termination Petition was filed on February
18th, 2020 adding subsection 8 to the pleadings. The
parties appeared for a Permanency Hearing on June 9th,
2020. Mother was found to be in minimal compliance as she
had not remained in contact with [CYF] and had not
attended mental health treatment. The court ordered
Mother to re-engage in mental health treatment, participate
in [IPV] counseling, and to undergo a drug and alcohol
evaluation. The court ordered Mother to have one
supervised visit a week once in-person visitation resumed.2
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2Visits were not permitted to be in-person and were
done virtually due to the pandemic.
Dr. Bliss was the court-appointed psychologist assigned to
evaluate the family. She conducted individual psychological
evaluations of Mother as well as interactional evaluations of
Mother and [Child] on August 17th, 2017, May 10th, 2018,
October 19th, 2018, December 24th, 2019 and August 16th,
2020. Mother’s mental health issues and her lack of
consistent treatment were a concern in every individual
evaluation that Dr. Bliss conducted. Dr. Bliss reported that
Mother eventually began to gain insight into the reasons
that she continued to seek out unhealthy relationships.
Throughout her history of evaluating Mother, Dr. Bliss has
consistently recommended that Mother attend mental
health and [IPV] counseling consistently. Dr. Bliss has
repeatedly concluded that Mother’s mental health diagnosis
of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (hereinafter [“PTSD”])
and a personality disorder have prevented her from
breaking the cycle of engaging in unhealthy and abusive
relationships. It was reported that despite these long-
standing [diagnoses] and the termination of her parental
rights to the older four children, Mother continued to believe
that she did not have any problems. Dr. Bliss also concluded
on multiple occasions, this cycle of jumping into unhealthy
romantic relationships and maintaining unhealthy
relationships with family members would continue if Mother
did not address her issues with consistent mental health
treatment and IPV counseling. In her last evaluation of
Mother in August of 2020, Dr. Bliss opined that Mother was
not in a position to reunify with her son.
Dr. Bliss was also able to evaluate [Child’s] foster family
twice. She reported that he is attached and bonded to all
of his foster family members. She noted that he was closely
bonded to his foster mom and opined that he appeared to
view her as his psychological parent.
(Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed 12/14/20, at 2-6).
The court held a hearing on the termination petition on August 28, 2020.
In addition to the testimony of Dr. Bliss, CYF presented the testimony of
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Brittany Weaver, Mother’s outpatient therapist, and David Sprague, CYF
caseworker. (N.T. Termination Hearing, 8/28/20, at 9-66). Mother testified
on her own behalf. (Id. at 67-73).
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court held the matter under
advisement. On October 15, 2020,1 having determined that CYS proved all
necessary elements of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b), the court
entered an order involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child.
On November 12, 2020, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal.2
Mother raises the following issue for our review:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter
of law in concluding that termination of [Mother’s] parental
rights would serve the needs and welfare of [Child] pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?
(Mother’s Brief at 6).
Appellate review in termination of parental rights cases implicates the
following principles:
In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our
standard of review is limited to determining whether the
order of the trial court is supported by competent evidence,
and whether the trial court gave adequate consideration to
the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the child.”
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1 The order is dated August 28, 2020, but was not filed until October 15, 2020.
2Although Father’s parental rights were terminated the same day, he is not a
party to the instant appeal and did not file a separate appeal.
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In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972
A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)).
Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient
evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree
must stand. ... We must employ a broad, comprehensive
review of the record in order to determine whether the trial
court’s decision is supported by competent evidence.
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied,
581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder
of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of
witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be
resolved by [the] finder of fact. The burden of proof
is on the party seeking termination to establish by
clear and convincing evidence the existence of
grounds for doing so.
In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super.
2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The
standard of clear and convincing evidence means testimony
that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable
the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. In re
J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We may
uphold a termination decision if any proper basis exists for
the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201
(Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the court’s findings are
supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the
court’s decision, even if the record could support an opposite
result. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191[-92] (Pa.Super.
2004).
In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16, (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d
1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165
(2008)).
CYF petitioned for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental
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rights to Child on the following grounds:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to
a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
* * *
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
* * *
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not
remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
time, the services or assistance reasonably available to
the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which
led to the removal or placement of the child within a
reasonable period of time and termination of the parental
rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
child.
* * *
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the
date of removal or placement, the conditions which led
to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist
and termination of parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
* * *
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(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating
the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
* * *
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). “Parental rights may be
involuntarily terminated where any one subsection of Section 2511(a) is
satisfied, along with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In
re Z.P., supra at 1117. When conducting a termination analysis:
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only
if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of ... [her] parental rights does the court
engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to
Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of
the child under the standard of best interests of the child.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
On appeal, Mother concedes that grounds for termination existed
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). (Mother’s Brief at 12-13). However,
she contends that termination is not in the best interests of Child and that the
court erred by focusing its analysis on Mother’s failure to address her goals
appropriately, rather than Child’s needs and welfare. (Id. at 15-16). Mother
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insists that she has a bond with Child which the court acknowledged, but
discounted based upon Dr. Bliss’ recommendations. (Id. at 16). Mother
concludes the court erred in terminating her parental rights under Section
2511(b), and this Court must reverse. We disagree.
Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination
will meet the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520
(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability
are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The
court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying
close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond.”
Id. Significantly:
In this context, the court must take into account whether a
bond exists between child and parent, and whether
termination would destroy an existing, necessary and
beneficial relationship.
When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not
required to use expert testimony. Social workers and
caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally,
Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.
In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted). The mere existence
of a bond between a parent and child does not preclude termination. In re
N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011). Even where the court
acknowledges that a parent and child share a bond, termination is still
appropriate where termination will not be detrimental to the child and will
serve the child’s best interests by allowing him to find permanency with an
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adoptive family. See In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1220
(Pa.Super. 2015).
Instantly, the court observed that Mother’s goals have remained the
same over the last several years: namely, to attend mental health and IPV
counseling on a consistent basis, and to make visitation with Child a priority.
(See Orphans’ Court Opinion at 7-8). Mother’s mental health diagnoses of
PTSD and a personality disorder require consistent treatment to manage.
(Id.) Mother’s failure to manage her conditions, and her resulting tendency
to engage in a cycle of abusive relationships, are the primary obstacle to
reunification. (Id.) With regard to Mother’s attempts to meet her goals, the
court noted:
It is also concerning that Mother has not made her visits
with [Child] a priority. The court recognizes that the
pandemic has created unique challenges for families
involved with the juvenile court system. The court cannot
punish Mother for failing to attend her visits and mental
health treatment if she did not have access to the internet.
However, these issues occurred before March of 2020. The
pandemic further exacerbated Mother’s poor attendance at
visitation and treatment.
Mother has also been recommended and court[-]ordered to
attend IPV counseling in the hopes that she could begin to
recognize the impact of these abusive relationships on not
only herself but her children. Mother did not avail herself of
this service until very recently. Mother continued to engage
in a romantic relationship with Father despite multiple
incidents of domestic violence. She never followed through
with a final PFA against Father despite being recommended
from the court to do so. The court has no doubt that [Child]
would have been exposed to domestic violence had [CYF]
not sought removal from Mother’s care. Mother has not
been able to put her son’s needs ahead of her own in this
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regard. Even in her most recent evaluation with Dr. Bliss,
Mother was asked why she needs to better understand how
to know if someone is taking advantage of her, she reported
a desire to not have her heart broken again as a reason to
refrain from engaging in unhealthy relationships. Mother
never mentioned concerns for her children’s safety. Given
Mother’s history, the court has no doubt that these issues
would persist into the future. It is clear that Mother does
not possess the insight needed to keep [Child] out of harm’s
way present or in the future. She has not even been able
to progress to unsupervised visitation because of these
issues.
Dr. Bliss has consistently reported that Mother has done well
in all of her interactional evaluations. There have been no
concerns during Mother’s visits when she has attended. It
has been reported that Mother can attend to [Child’s] basic
needs during visits and interactional evaluations. In her
final evaluation of Mother, Dr. Bliss opined that if “it wasn’t
for the other dangerous or unhealthy people potentially
being involved in her life in the past, now and future,
[Mother] otherwise could safely and appropriately parent”
[Child]. This court finds this observation to be true and also
what makes this case particularly sad. There is a bond
between Mother and [Child] and their relationship is a
positive one. Dr. Bliss has opined in the majority of her
reports that Mother and [Child] share a positive bond.
Unfortunately for Mother, Dr. Bliss reports that the bond is
not a necessary one. To support her conclusion, Dr. Bliss
noted that [Child] had gone a significant period of time
without seeing Mother without any traumatic effect.3 It was
her ultimate conclusion that if the relationship between
Mother and [Child] were severed, there would not be a
traumatic effect to the child.
3[CYF] offices were shut down from March until July
due to Covid-19 restrictions. Mother was offered
virtual visits with the child but declined because of
connectivity issues.
[Child] has been in his current foster home since June of
2019. [Child] recognizes his foster parents as his
psychological parents and his primary bond and attachment
is with them. [CYF] Casework Supervisor, David Sprague,
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testified that caseworkers have observed [Child] in his
foster home and reported that the child appears bonded to
everyone in his foster family. Dr. Bliss conducted two
interactional evaluations of the foster family with [Child].
She opined that [Child] appeared attached and bonded to
all three of his foster family members, especially foster
mother. Dr. Bliss concluded that permanency with the
foster family would best suit [Child’s] needs and welfare.
Additionally, Dr. Bliss reported that due to [Child’s] young
age and the fact that he spent the majority of his life placed
with this foster family, that adoption would best suit his
needs and welfare. This court concurs with that conclusion.
While Mother has recently gained insight into her proclivity
to engage in relationships with men who are both physically
and emotional[ly] abusive, she has not done the internal
work to end the cycle of placing herself and her children in
unsafe situations. [Child] is in a foster home that provides
him with safety and stability.
(Orphans’ Court Opinion at 8-10).
The record supports the court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental
rights under Section 2511(b). While Child shares a bond with Mother, he also
is strongly bonded with his foster family, whom he relies upon to fulfill his
physical, developmental, and emotional needs. Child is particularly bonded to
his foster mother. Additionally, despite Child’s positive bond with Mother, Dr.
Bliss made it clear that Mother was likely to engage in the same cycle of violent
relationships and did not fully appear to understand the impact domestic
violence has had upon her children. The court concluded that as a result,
Mother did not possess the insight needed to keep Child safe and would likely
not gain that insight in a reasonable time period. Thus, termination would
further Child’s best interests by allowing him to gain stability through adoption
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by his foster family. See In re C.D.R., supra; In re N.A.M., supra. As the
record supports the court’s conclusions under Sections 2511(a) and (b), we
see no reason to disturb its decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
See In re Z.P., supra. Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/31/2021
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