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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-12984
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-01182-KOB
VANN CALDWELL,
Individually and as Administrator of the Estate
of Janice Marrow,
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellant,
versus
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC,
d.b.a. Mr. Cooper,
PEYTON HOMES, LLC,
Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(March 31, 2021)
Before MARTIN, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Vann Caldwell appeals the district court’s order dismissing his complaint
against Nationstar Loan Servicing LLC for failure to state a claim under the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
These are the facts as alleged in Caldwell’s complaint.
Caldwell’s mother, Janice Marrow, bought a home in Eastaboga, Alabama
with money borrowed from her bank. The bank’s loan was secured by a mortgage
and note, which were eventually assigned to Nationstar.
Ms. Marrow passed away in August 2017 and Caldwell, her son, became the
administrator of her estate. The estate stopped paying the mortgage in February
2018 and Nationstar foreclosed on the home.
On May 2, 9, and 16, 2018, Nationstar published notices in the local
newspaper that the home would be sold at a foreclosure sale on June 13, 2018.
Nationstar published another notice in the local paper on June 1, 2018 that the
foreclosure sale was being moved to July 25, 2018. The notices said the sale would
take place “during the legal hours of sale” at the main entrance of the courthouse in
the city of Eastaboga, Alabama in Calhoun County.
The home was sold, as advertised, on July 25, 2018 to Peyton Homes.
Caldwell first learned about the sale the next month when he visited the home. There
were people inside and his mother’s belongings were gone, other than her piano.
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On October 1, 2018, Caldwell wrote to Nationstar, saying that he never
received notice of the foreclosure sale and the lack of notice violated the mortgage
agreement. Caldwell asked for a copy of all notices and the mortgage agreement
and asked how much money the estate owed at the time of the foreclosure sale and
how much Nationstar received at the sale.
On October 22 and 24, 2018, Caldwell again wrote to Nationstar, saying that
he never received notice of the foreclosure sale and the lack of notice violated the
mortgage agreement and Alabama law. Caldwell asked for a copy of any default or
foreclosure notices that had been sent by Nationstar, a copy of the published notices,
and the address of the courthouse in Eastaboga. Nationstar responded that it
investigated the concerns raised in Caldwell’s letters and concluded that “there were
no errors.” Nationstar attached some of the information Caldwell had requested.
Caldwell sued Nationstar for violating the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act. 1 Caldwell alleged that his October 2018 letters to Nationstar were qualified
written requests that required a response under the Act but Nationstar didn’t properly
respond within thirty days as required. Caldwell alleged that he suffered actual
1
Caldwell also alleged several state law violations. After the district court dismissed
Caldwell’s claim under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, it declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.
Caldwell has not argued on appeal that the dismissal of the state law claims was improper, so we
do not address the state law claims on appeal.
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damages from the loss of his mother’s home, loss of her belongings, and his mental
anguish.
Nationstar moved to dismiss Caldwell’s claim because the actual damages he
alleged—losing the home, his mother’s belongings, and his mental anguish—were
not “as a result of” Nationstar’s failure to respond properly to the October 2018
letters, as required by the Act. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1)(A). The estate’s failure to
pay the mortgage and the foreclosure, Nationstar argued—and not its own failure to
respond properly to Caldwell’s letters—caused the home to be sold, his mother’s
things to get thrown away, and his mental anguish. Nationstar argued that there was
no causal link between its failure to respond properly to Caldwell’s letters and the
damages Caldwell alleged in his complaint.
The district court granted Nationstar’s motion to dismiss Caldwell’s claims
under the Act because he did not allege a causal link between his damages—the loss
of the home, loss of his mother’s things, and his mental anguish—and Nationstar’s
improper response to Caldwell’s letters. This is Caldwell’s appeal of the district
court’s dismissal order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6).” Timson v.
Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 872 (11th Cir. 2008). We “accept[] the allegations in the
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complaint as true and constru[e] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only present sufficient facts,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Renfroe v.
Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 822 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
DISCUSSION
Caldwell argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claim under the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act because Nationstar, once it received his
qualified written requests, was required under the Act to rescind the foreclosure sale.
The servicer’s failure to rescind the foreclosure sale, Caldwell argues, caused his
actual damages—the loss of his mother’s home, her belongings, and his mental
anguish. We affirm the dismissal of Caldwell’s complaint because he never asked
Nationstar to rescind the foreclosure sale, and Nationstar’s failure to do what
Caldwell did ask it to do—provide information about the mortgage—did not cause
his damages.
Despite his arguments on appeal, Caldwell never asked Nationstar to rescind
the foreclosure sale. In his complaint, Caldwell alleged that Nationstar violated the
Act because it didn’t properly respond to his requests for information within thirty
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days. But the complaint and the attachments never used the word “rescind”—or
anything like it—and they did not ask to “undo” the sale or “give back my house.”2
Caldwell never asked Nationstar to rescind the foreclosure sale because the
Act doesn’t authorize a borrower to request that the bank rescind a foreclosure sale.
The Act allows a borrower to make “a qualified written request” to the bank for
action based on one of two things: (1) the borrower’s belief “that [his] account is in
error” or (2) the need for “other information sought by the borrower.” 12 U.S.C. §
2605(e)(1)(B)(ii). Caldwell went with the second option—he asked for information.
Caldwell never asked Nationstar to rescind the foreclosure sale because the
Act doesn’t authorize the bank to rescind a foreclosure sale. Once the bank receives
a “qualified written request” from the borrower, the bank has four options under the
Act: (1) make “corrections in the account of the borrower”; (2) explain why it
“believes the account of the borrower is correct”; (3) give the “information requested
by the borrower”; or (4) give “an explanation of why the information requested is
unavailable or cannot be obtained.” Id. § 2605(e)(2)(A)–(C). Rescinding a
foreclosure sale after a home has been foreclosed is not one of the required responses
under the Act.
2
To the extent there’s any tension between Caldwell’s complaint and the attachments
about what Caldwell requested in his letters, the attachments control. See Hoefling v. City of
Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2016) (“A district court can generally consider exhibits
attached to a complaint in ruling on a motion to dismiss, and if the allegations of the complaint
about a particular exhibit conflict with the contents of the exhibit itself, the exhibit controls.”).
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Rescinding a foreclosure sale after the sale has been completed is a matter of
state, not federal, law. In Alabama, for example, “[a] failure to provide proper notice
under the mortgage is a ground for challenging a foreclosure sale within an ejectment
action, and a lack of proper notice renders a foreclosure sale void.” Rosser v. Fed.
Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 2180917, 2020 WL 6372904, at *5 (Ala. Civ. App. Oct. 30,
2020) (citing Ex parte Turner, 254 So. 3d 207 (Ala. 2017)). The Act “does not annul,
alter, or effect . . . the laws of any [s]tate with respect to settlement practices” unless
the state laws are inconsistent with the Act. 12 U.S.C. § 2616. Alabama’s ejectment
procedure for rescinding a foreclosure sale for lack of proper notice is not
inconsistent with the Act.
While Caldwell didn’t request that Nationstar rescind the foreclosure sale, his
October 2018 letters (attached to his complaint) did ask Nationstar for information
about the mortgage and sale. On October 1, 2018, Caldwell requested:
1. A copy of all correspondence, letters and/or notices sent from
[Nationstar] or authorizing representative between January 1,
2018 to August 31, 2018;
2. A copy of the mortgage agreement;
3. The amount the account was in default at the time of foreclosure;
and
4. The amount received in the foreclosure sale.
On October 22, 2018, Caldwell requested: “A copy of any and all default and/or
foreclosure notices sent from [Nationstar] and/or authorizing representative between
January 1, 2018 to July 25, 2018.” And on October 24, 2018, Caldwell made an
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additional request for “1. A copy of all published notices of the foreclosure sale;
and 2. The address to the Courthouse in the City of Eastaboga, Calhoun County,
Alabama.”
To state a claim under the Act, Caldwell had to allege that he suffered “actual
damages . . . as a result of the failure” by Nationstar to respond properly to
Caldwell’s October 2018 requests for information. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1)(A); see
also Renfroe, 822 F.3d at 1246 (“[D]amages are an essential element in pleading a
RESPA claim. . . . [T]here must be a ‘causal link’ between the alleged violation and
the damages.” (citations omitted)). But, as the district court concluded, Caldwell did
not plausibly allege a “causal link” between Nationstar’s failure to respond properly
to Caldwell’s requests for information within thirty days and the actual damages he
alleged in his complaint—losing his mother’s home, losing her belongings, and his
mental anguish.
Caldwell’s mother’s home was sold and her belongings were removed
(causing Caldwell’s mental anguish) because the estate didn’t pay the mortgage,
Nationstar foreclosed for lack of payment, and the home was sold at a foreclosure
sale on July 25, 2018. These things didn’t happen because Nationstar violated the
Act by not properly responding to requests for information. Caldwell didn’t request
information from Nationstar until three months after the mortgage was foreclosed
and the home sold. We agree with the district court that “none of [Caldwell’s]
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asserted damages occurred ‘as a result of’ Nationstar’s alleged failure to adequately
respond” to the qualified written requests.
Caldwell argues that his allegations are no different than ones we found
sufficient in Renfroe. But, unlike here, the Renfroe borrower asked Nationstar for a
remedy to fix an account error in her monthly mortgage payments. Renfroe, 822
F.3d at 1242–43. Her qualified written request told Nationstar that it had
“mistakenly charg[ed] her for property taxes or had miscalculated her loan
amortization schedule” and “requested an investigation, a ‘detailed explanation,’
certain account information, and a refund if appropriate.” Id. The Renfroe
borrower’s request fits squarely within the possible remedial actions authorized
under the Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2)(A) (requiring that a servicer “make
appropriate corrections in the account of the borrower”). The Renfroe borrower sued
Nationstar because it did not correct her account or refund her money in response to
her request and the borrower suffered actual damages by overpaying on her
mortgage. Renfroe, 822 F.3d at 1244–46. There was a causal link between her
overpayment damages and Nationstar’s “fail[ure] to refund her mortgage
overpayments,” which would have been refunded “if Nationstar had heeded its
statutory duties.” Id. at 1246.
Caldwell, unlike the Renfroe borrower, did not ask Nationstar for the remedy
he now seeks, to rescind the foreclosure sale, in his letters. Rescinding a foreclosure
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sale is not an authorized “action” under the Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2).
Instead, Caldwell only asked—as he was allowed to do under the Act—for
information about the mortgage and his mother’s account. Nationstar’s failure to
respond to Caldwell’s requests for information did not cause the loss of his mother’s
home, the loss of his mother’s belongings, and his mental anguish, all of which
happened months before and were unconnected to his “qualified written requests.”
CONCLUSION
Without plausible allegations of a causal link between the alleged violation of
the Act and his actual damages, Caldwell’s complaint fails to state a claim. For that
reason, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing his claim under the Act. 3
AFFIRMED.
3
Because Caldwell was not personally obligated under the loan, he likely was not a
“borrower” under the Act. See 12 U.S.C § 2605(f) (“Whoever fails to comply with . . . this section
shall be liable to the borrower for . . . any actual damages to the borrower . . . .” (emphasis added));
see also Keen v. Helson, 930 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that “a ‘borrower’ under [section]
2605(f) is someone who is personally obligated under a ‘federally related mortgage loan.’”). But
because he failed to allege a causal link between the alleged violation of the Act and his actual
damages, we don’t have to decide the “borrower” issue.
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