People v Burgess |
2021 NY Slip Op 01993 |
Decided on March 31, 2021 |
Appellate Division, Second Department |
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. |
Decided on March 31, 2021 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P.
FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY
VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON
LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.
2018-08188
(Ind. No. 1568/16)
v
Jorge Burgess, appellant.
Stacy Eves, Rockville Centre, NY, for appellant.
Madeline Singas, District Attorney, Mineola, NY (Jason R. Richards and John B. Latella of counsel), for respondent.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (William O'Brien, J.), rendered June 12, 2018, convicting him of manslaughter in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered.
"The purpose of a Sirois hearing is to determine whether the defendant has procured a witness's absence or unavailability through his own misconduct, and thereby forfeited any hearsay or Confrontation Clause objections to admitting the witness's out-of-court statements" (People v McCune, 98 AD3d 631, 631 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Sirois, 92 AD2d 618). The People must "present legally sufficient evidence of circumstances and events from which a court may properly infer that the defendant, or those at defendant's direction or acting with defendant's knowing acquiescence, threatened the witness" (People v Dubarry, 25 NY3d 161, 177). "At a Sirois hearing, the People bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant has procured the witness's absence or unavailability" (People v McCune, 98 AD3d at 632).
Here, the People failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was responsible for procuring a certain witness's refusal to testify at trial (see id.). Specifically, the People's evidence did not establish that the defendant controlled the individuals who threatened the witness or that the defendant influenced or persuaded any individual to threaten the witness or his family (see People v Dubarry, 25 NY3d at 176). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should not have admitted into evidence that witness's out-of-court statement.
The Supreme Court committed reversible error when it permitted the People to exercise peremptory challenges to prospective jurors after the defendant and his codefendant exercised peremptory challenges to that same panel of prospective jurors (see CPL 270.15[2]; People v Nieves, 26 AD3d 519, 520). This procedure violated "the one persistently protected and enunciated rule of jury selection—that the People make peremptory challenges first, and that they never be permitted to go back and challenge a juror accepted by the defense" (People v Alston, 88 NY2d 519, [*2]529). Accordingly, a new trial is required.
In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendant's remaining contention.
RIVERA, J.P., CONNOLLY, BRATHWAITE NELSON and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.
ENTER:Aprilanne Agostino
Clerk of the Court