In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided March 1, 2021
S20A1245. JONES v. THE STATE.
LAGRUA, Justice.
Delaljujuan 1 Jones was tried by a Grady County jury and
convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with a shooting
that killed Stanley Hill and wounded three others. Jones appeals,
contending that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient
to sustain three of his convictions, that the trial court erred when it
denied his request to charge the jury on the defense of justification,
and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his
trial counsel failed to present evidence that Hill and others at the
1Though Jones’s first name is spelled “Delajujuwan” in the notice of
appeal and some of the briefing in this Court, we use the spelling used in the
indictment, Final Disposition, and trial transcript.
scene of the shooting were members of a gang.2 Having identified no
reversible error, we affirm.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence presented at trial shows the following. On January 17,
2015, Jones and his stepbrother, Alvin Price, along with several
others, drove from Havana, Florida to Cairo, Georgia to attend a car
show. After the car show, a crowd of attendees gathered in the
parking lot of the Cairo Mart gas station to continue the festivities.
As one witness described it, “[t]here was a lot of music, dancing,
drinking, [and] people showing off their cars.”
2 Hill was killed on January 17, 2015. On March 23, 2015, a Grady
County grand jury indicted Jones, charging him with malice murder, murder
in the commission of a felony (aggravated assault), aggravated assault of Hill,
aggravated assault of Kentrail Brown, aggravated assault of Shontarius
Brown, and aggravated assault of Martravione Moore. Jones was tried in
September 2015, and the jury found him guilty on all counts. The trial court
sentenced Jones to life in prison without parole for malice murder and three
consecutive 20-year terms of imprisonment for the aggravated assaults of the
three surviving victims. The other counts merged or were vacated by operation
of law. Jones filed a timely motion for new trial in October 2015, and he
amended the motion in July 2019. After a hearing, the trial court denied his
motion for new trial in January 2020. Jones timely appealed, and this case was
docketed to the August 2020 term of this Court and orally argued in September
2020.
2
At one point that evening, an argument broke out among some
of the people gathered next to the gas pumps, including Price. Some
evidence suggests that this argument arose because Price had been
throwing money into the crowd, angering some of the local residents.
During the ensuing tension, Hill punched Price, and Jones
immediately pulled out a gun and fired several shots in Hill’s
direction. A bystander video-recorded most of the incident on his cell
phone, and this video was played at trial.
The video shows a crowd gathered at the gas pumps, with
some people arguing, but without much animosity. Less than 30
seconds before the shooting, Price is seen standing in the middle of
the crowd, smiling and holding a beer, while engaging in a low-key
argument with someone. Jones also appears in the video, standing
near Price in a calm manner, not saying anything. As the argument
with Price appears to intensify, Hill suddenly comes from the side
and punches or shoves Price, who falls back toward Jones.
Immediately, Jones pulls out a gun and starts firing at Hill. The
camera moves away from the scene as soon as the first shot is fired,
3
but a total of seven shots, in quick succession, are heard on the video.
An autopsy revealed that Hill was hit twice. One bullet struck him
in the arm, and the other entered his lower abdomen, causing a
massive hemorrhage and resulting in his death.
The three other victims — Kentrail Brown, his brother
Shontarius Brown, and Martravione Moore — were not involved in
the altercation but were struck by stray bullets, and each of them
testified at trial. Kentrail testified that he was sitting on the roof of
his car, parked next to the Cairo Mart, when he was shot in the
thigh. Before the shooting, Kentrail said, he saw a “little”
commotion, but “nothing major at the time.” Kentrail testified that
the shots were coming from the gas pump area.
Shontarius testified that he was standing by Kentrail’s car
when he was shot in the right foot. Prior to the shooting, Shontarius
said, he saw some people arguing, and he specifically noticed Jones
because “everybody else was arguing and he was the only one that
was calm.” Shontarius testified that he did not see Hill or anyone
else with a gun that night.
4
Moore testified that he was standing right beside the gas
pumps when he was shot in the thigh. He did not see who shot him,
as the whole event happened “so fast.” Moore started running as
soon as he heard gunshots, but then he collapsed from the gunshot
wound. As he lay on the ground, he heard another series of gunshots,
which occurred about 15 minutes after the first.
One of the bystanders, Lakeisha Cooper, also heard two
distinct rounds of gunshots. She testified that she was leaning
against Kentrail’s car when she heard several gunshots, and about
two minutes later, she heard more gunshots—“some other dudes
[were] shooting in the air.” According to Cooper, the second round of
gunshots occurred after Hill, Kentrail, and Shontarius had been
shot. Cooper also testified that Hill did not have a firearm that
night. Another bystander, Nicholas Harden, identified Jones in
court as the person who shot Hill and testified that he did not see
anyone with a gun that night other than Jones. Crime scene
investigators found two bullet fragments near the Cairo Mart store
and six shell casings scattered near the gas pumps. All six shell
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casings were of the same brand and caliber, and no other shell
casings were found at the crime scene.
1. Jones first contends that the evidence was insufficient as a
matter of Georgia statutory law to sustain his aggravated assault
convictions for the shootings of Kentrail, Shontarius, and Moore.
Jones argues that those convictions were based on circumstantial
evidence and that the State failed to exclude the reasonable
hypothesis that other shooters were involved. See OCGA § 24-14-6
(“To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved
facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but
shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the
guilt of the accused.”). We disagree.
Although some evidence suggests that someone other than
Jones may have been responsible for the second round of gunfire
that occurred minutes after the first, testimony from the three
aggravated assault victims, as well as other evidence, indicates that
they were shot during the initial round of gunfire and that Jones
was solely responsible for that initial round. Among other things,
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the video reflects that Jones fired the first shot and that six more
shots followed in quick succession. All of the shell casings found in
the area where Jones was standing were of the same caliber and
from the same manufacturer, and there was no evidence indicating
that anyone else fired a gun at the same time as Jones. So the jury
was free to reject as unreasonable the hypothesis that Kentrail,
Shontarius, and Moore were shot by some person other than Jones.
See Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 781, 783 (1) (822 SE2d 203) (2018) (“[I]t
is principally for the jury to determine whether an alternative
hypothesis is reasonable.”). See also Graham v. State, 301 Ga. 675,
677 (1) (804 SE2d 113) (2017) (“[I]t is the role of the jury to resolve
conflicts in the evidence and to determine the credibility of
witnesses, and the resolution of such conflicts adversely to the
defendant does not render the evidence insufficient.” (Citation and
punctuation omitted.)). Thus, we conclude that the evidence
supporting Jones’s aggravated assault convictions was sufficient as
a matter of Georgia statutory law. And, though Jones does not
assert insufficiency of the evidence as a matter of constitutional due
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process, we also conclude that the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient for purposes of constitutional due process to authorize a
rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones
was guilty of all the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)
(1979).3
2. Jones next contends that the trial court erred when it denied
his request to instruct the jury on the defense of justification. Jones
specifically identifies three instructions that, he argues, the trial
court erroneously failed to provide: that a person may be justified in
using force to defend himself or a third person if he reasonably
believes such force is necessary; that the State must disprove a
justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt; and that a person
who is not the aggressor is not required to retreat before using force
in self-defense. We need not decide, however, whether the trial court
3 We remind litigants that, beginning with cases docketed to the term of
this Court that begins in December 2020, we will end our practice of
considering sufficiency sua sponte in non-death penalty cases. See Davenport
v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 399 (4) (b) (846 SE2d 83) (2020). This Court began
assigning cases to the December Term on August 3, 2020.
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erred when it refused to provide these requested instructions,
because any such error was harmless. See McClain v. State, 303 Ga.
6, 9 (2) (810 SE2d 77) (2018) (“[T]he failure to give a requested
charge which is authorized by the evidence can be harmless error.”
(Citation and punctuation omitted.)). “The test for determining
whether a nonconstitutional instructional error was harmless is
whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the
verdict.” Hatney v. State, 308 Ga. 438, 441 (2) (841 SE2d 702) (2020)
(citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, to the extent there was any evidence supporting a charge
on defense of self or a third person, it was meager at best. Our law
makes clear that the use of deadly force to defend oneself or another
person is justified only if a person “reasonably believes that such
force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury . . . or to
prevent the commission of a forcible felony.” OCGA § 16-3-21 (a).
The jury here saw the video recording depicting Jones opening fire,
amidst a crowd of people talking, dancing, and mingling, the
moment after Price was shoved or punched. Nothing in the video
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suggests that either Price or Jones was in such danger that Jones
“reasonably” believed it was necessary to immediately fire his gun
at Hill, much less to fire it in such a manner as to injure multiple
bystanders. And while Jones argues that there was an air of tension
between the Florida men and the local residents and that there was
some evidence of gang affiliations among members of the crowd, he
offers no evidence that he himself observed or perceived any threat,
gang-related or otherwise, that would have justified the use of
deadly force. Accordingly, it is highly probable that the jury’s verdict
was unaffected by any error in the trial court’s refusal to give all of
Jones’s requested instructions. See Calmer v. State, 309 Ga. 368,
372-373 (2) (c) (846 SE2d 40) (2020) (any error in the trial court’s
failure to give jury instructions on self-defense and no duty to retreat
was harmless where the evidence supporting these instructions was
weak); Hatney, 308 Ga. at 442 (any error in failure to give requested
instruction was harmless where, weighing the evidence as
reasonable jurors would, it was highly probable jury would have
rejected defense’s theory). Accordingly, this claim fails.
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3. Lastly, Jones contends that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to discover and
present evidence that Hill and other individuals were gang
members. To obtain relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant generally must show both that his counsel’s
performance was deficient and that this deficient performance
prejudiced his defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). An attorney performs
deficiently under Strickland if he discharges his responsibilities at
trial in an “objectively unreasonable way considering all the
circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”
Thomas v. State, 303 Ga. 700, 702 (2) (814 SE2d 692) (2018) (citation
and punctuation omitted). “A strong presumption exists that
counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of professional
conduct.” Lopez v. State, __ Ga. __ (3) (852 SE2d 547) (2020) (citation
and punctuation omitted). Prejudice is shown by demonstrating “a
reasonable probability[,] sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome[,] that, but for counsel’s alleged unprofessional errors, the
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result of the proceeding would have been different.” Miller v. State,
285 Ga. 285, 286 (676 SE2d 173) (2009) (citation and punctuation
omitted). “If either Strickland prong is not met, this Court need not
examine the other prong.” Palmer v. State, 303 Ga. 810, 816 (IV)
(814 SE2d 718) (2018).
At trial, in her opening and closing remarks, Jones’s counsel
argued that several people seen in the video standing at the
periphery of the crowd and wearing red hoodies were members of
the Bloods gang, which presented a threat to Jones and his group.
But, aside from testimony that some people at the gathering were
flashing gang signals, the defense presented no evidence that any of
the attendees was a gang member. In addition, the State countered
the defense’s argument with evidence that the red clothing merely
represented the colors of Cairo High School.
At the motion for new trial hearing, Jones (through new
counsel) presented the testimony of a private investigator who was
retained after trial by Jones’s mother. The investigator testified that
she discovered a number of photographs on social media showing
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Hill posing with other people, wearing red clothes or red bandanas,
and making certain hand signs. These photos (16 in total) were
introduced into evidence at the hearing. Jones also presented the
testimony of a crime intelligence analyst, who was tendered without
objection as an expert on gangs. This witness testified that the red
clothing and bandanas and the hand signs seen in the photos showed
an association with the Bloods gang; that, in gang culture, if anyone
shows disrespect to even a single gang member, the entire gang will
“respond in force”; and that a gang member’s failure to respond to
disrespect, especially in public, will be perceived as a weakness that
warrants punishment. On cross-examination, the expert
acknowledged that his opinion about Hill’s gang affiliation was
formed solely from the social media photos and that he had never
talked to Jones nor seen the video or any other evidence in the case.
Jones argues that the photographic evidence of Hill’s gang
membership was necessary to support his defense of justification —
to give the jury a full picture of the threat Jones and his associates
faced from the crowd gathered at the Cairo Mart and to counter the
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State’s argument that the red clothing seen in the video merely
represented the colors of the local high school. However, the mere
fact that this evidence might have been marginally helpful in
establishing facts that the defense elicited other evidence to
establish is not sufficient to render trial counsel’s performance in
this regard deficient. “[D]eficiency cannot be demonstrated by
merely arguing that there is another, or even a better, way for
counsel to have performed.” Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 140, 144 (3) (829
SE2d 321) (2019).
This is particularly true given that the evidence Jones now
claims counsel should have discovered would have offered only
minimal additional support for his self-defense theory. No evidence
was presented at trial or the motion for new trial hearing that Jones
knew Hill or believed that he was a gang member, and there was no
evidence showing that any of the people depicted in the photos with
Hill were present at the scene of the shooting, that those people were
the same individuals seen in the video wearing red clothing, or that
the red clothing seen in the video was in fact associated with the
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Bloods gang. Thus, given the marginal probative value of the photos,
trial counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to discover them. 4
For the same reasons, it is highly unlikely that the evidence in
question, even if admitted, would have persuaded the jury that
Jones was justified in shooting Hill, and thus Jones has failed to
show prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (III) (B). This
enumeration is thus without merit.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
4 Indeed, it is not clear whether Jones’s trial counsel, had she discovered
the photos and obtained the expert’s opinion, would even have sought to
introduce this evidence, or whether, even if she had, the trial court would have
admitted it. See, e.g., Walton v. State, 303 Ga. 11, 15 (3) (810 SE2d 134) (2018)
(trial court did not plainly err in excluding evidence that victim was gang
member because “any such affiliation was irrelevant and had no connection to
the shooting”).
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