FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 5, 2021
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 20-1266
(D.C. No. 1:12-CR-00140-CMA-1)
MICHAEL DESTRY WILLIAMS, (D. Colo.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before HOLMES, MATHESON, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Michael Destry Williams challenges as substantively unreasonable the two years’
imprisonment imposed for his violations of supervision. For the reasons below, we affirm
the district court.
BACKGROUND
In 2014, after a jury found Williams guilty of ten counts of tax-evasion and fraud
offenses, the district court sentenced him to seventy-one months’ imprisonment and five
years’ supervised release. Williams began the five-years’ supervision on August 22, 2018
and was set to end it on August 21, 2023. But he lasted under supervision only a year. On
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
August 27, 2019, a probation officer filed a Petition for Summons on Person Under
Supervision, alleging three violations of Williams’s supervision.
All three violations allegedly stemmed from Williams’s asserted belief that he is
an American National and is not subject to the same legal system as United States
citizens. First, Williams had allegedly stopped submitting monthly reports to probation.
Probation alleged that this noncompliance began after April 2019, when Williams had
sent a “‘Notice and Demand to Cease and Desist’ letter, in which [he had] indicate[d] that
he is recognized as an ‘American National and not a US citizen’” and had asked to “be
removed from the docket and registry” and for probation to “‘Cease and Desist all
trespasses’ upon him.” R. vol. I at 47. Second, Williams had allegedly refused to pay his
monetary penalties and restitution. Allegedly, after his release from custody, Williams
had not complied with probation’s request that he complete a payment plan and a
financial statement, and he had been writing this on his monthly reports, instead of
making payments: “NO Lawful Bill Under Article 1 section 10 has been served upon me
the Sole foreign Beneficiary.” Id. at 48 (internal quotation marks omitted). Third,
probation alleged that Williams had not obtained a substance-abuse and mental-health
assessment, despite having been ordered to do so. He allegedly had reported as directed
to a treatment agency but once there, had insisted on signing all required paperwork by
adding “under threat, duress, coercion.” Id. Because of this, the provider would not treat
him. So the probation officer had given Williams sixty days to obtain an assessment
elsewhere, but Williams did not do so.
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After reviewing these allegations, the district court summoned Williams to appear
in court on September 13, 2019. When probation officers attempted to serve this
summons at Williams’s residence, he refused to accept it, claiming that it was not issued
by the correct court. Again, he maintained that he was an American National, not a
United States citizen. Then, because Williams was displeased that the officers were there,
he announced that as an American National, he had a lifetime right to bear arms and that
the officers were trespassing. If they returned, “he would see to it that [they] would be
charged with treason and would be publicly hung.” R. vol. IV at 58.
After Williams failed to appear in court as directed, the court issued a warrant,
leading to his arrest on October 15, 2019. At the initial appearance before Magistrate
Judge S. Kato Crews, Williams repeated his claims about being an American National
and about the court lacking “lawful jurisdiction,” R. vol. V at 57. He repeatedly called
Magistrate Judge Crews, “Trustee Crews,” see, e.g., id. at 57, 60; accused Magistrate
Judge Crews of violating his rights, “personally, commercially and criminally,” id. at 59,
and of “being rude and committing liability and fraud” on him, id. at 66; and told
Magistrate Judge Crews to contact his consulate.
These arguments gave Magistrate Judge Crews pause regarding Williams’s
competency. So at the beginning of the October 21 preliminary hearing, he explained
why he would proceed on the assumption that Williams was competent, reasoning that
Williams was exhibiting the same behavior that he had when the district court had found
him competent to stand trial. Magistrate Judge Crews quoted in part this from the earlier
findings:
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Although this Court was concerned about Mr. Williams’[s] bizarre filings
and refusal to accept mail from the court, the Government and his own
attorney, Dr. Fukutaki’s conclusion was that defendant’s disinclination to
adhere to the Court’s instructions and to courtroom protocol [w]as the result
of his belief that he is not subject to the rule of law of the United States of
America or to the authority of this Court, rather than to a mental illness or
cognitive impairment.
Id. at 71.
Through the course of this hearing, Williams demonstrated the same behavior as
before, stating at one point that “at no time” would he “appear to participate in [the
court’s] corporate rules” or “corporate procedures.” Id. at 73–74. Although Magistrate
Judge Crews attempted to give a Faretta1 advisement after Williams refused the
appointment of counsel, Williams’s constant interruptions forced the magistrate judge to
reference the underlying record on this issue, from which he concluded that the district
court had previously given this advisement. The magistrate judge did appoint standby
counsel. Given Williams’s behavior and the events preceding his appearance, the
magistrate judge authorized detention, finding Williams a flight risk because of his belief
that he was not subject to the proceedings in court and a danger to the community
because of his threats to law officers.
1
We refer to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). A Faretta hearing is
“the tried-and-true method for establishing that a waiver [of counsel] was knowing
and intelligent” and involves “a thorough and comprehensive formal inquiry of the
defendant on the record to demonstrate that the defendant is aware of the nature of
the charges, the range of allowable punishments and possible defenses, and is fully
informed of the risks of proceeding pro se.” United States v. Vann, 776 F.3d 746, 763
(10th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
4
At the January 23, 2020 revocation hearing, Williams made similar statements as
before but this time, he was so disruptive that the district court had to continue the
hearing. Before adjournment, Williams’s original standby counsel withdrew, after
explaining that she was unable to effectively represent him.
On July 9, 2020, the court proceeded with the revocation hearing. Now, COVID
precautions were in place and the court had Williams removed after he refused both to
wear a face mask and as before, to answer questions about his waiver of counsel. After
finding that Williams had not waived his right to counsel, the court asked that the
replacement standby counsel step in for him. At this point, the court observed that
Williams had refused to speak with this attorney and that both Williams and his family
had told her that he was an American National over whom this court lacked jurisdiction.
After the court found the alleged violations of supervision established by a
preponderance of the evidence, the court turned to the question of sentencing. The court
deemed Williams’s violations to be Grade C, his criminal history category to be III, and
the resulting advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range to be five to eleven months. The
court also concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) permitted imposing up to three
additional years’ imprisonment plus additional supervised release and that although under
the sentencing guidelines, violations of supervision are to be sentenced as breaches of
trust, courts may consider the seriousness of the violations and the violator’s criminal
history when sentencing.
For the term of imprisonment, Williams sought time served, which would have
been approximately eight-and-a-half months, and the United States sought eleven
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months. The parties agreed that because Williams would not comply with supervision,
none should be imposed. Although the United States was “loathe to reward” Williams’s
behavior and complained that “that is sort of what it feels like to say that we don’t want
to impose additional supervised release,” id. at 38–39, it explained its position like this:
[I]t is my view, and I assume it is also the view of the probation department,
that supervised release is a time-consuming resource that should be reserved
for releasees who actually want to benefit from the services the probation
officers provide.
And, here, it is clear from [the probation officer’s] testimony that he
went above and beyond, and gave Mr. Williams chance and chance to comply
with the terms of this Court’s judgment, and he just refused.
Id. at 39.
After Williams reentered the courtroom and repeated, again, his arguments about
being an American National, the court issued its sentence. Although the court agreed that
it “ma[de] no sense to reimpose a sentence of supervised release,” id. at 45, it found
eleven months’ imprisonment insufficient, explaining this:
I refuse to reward him for flaunting the law. And an order sanctioning him
only to 11 months of imprisonment and then letting him walk free is not a
sufficient sentence.
I have seen so many defendants come through this courtroom on
supervised release violation petitions who have tried to comply with the
conditions but they may be drug addicts or they may be mentally ill, and they
find their way back to me on violations, and they have been sentenced to
higher sentences.
Someone like Mr. Williams, who reaps the benefits and privileges of
living here in the United States should not be allowed to flaunt the law and
ignore the law in the way that he has. To give him 11 months would be a slap
on the wrist, and then he is allowed to go his merry way.
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Id. at 46. The court ordered a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment, with credit for time
served. On appeal, Williams challenges this sentence. We review, exercising jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
DISCUSSION
Williams challenges his sentence as substantively unreasonable. “We review this
issue for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Peña, 963 F.3d 1016, 1024 (10th Cir.
2020) (citation omitted), cert. denied, No. 20-6437, 2021 WL 78456 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2021).
“Applying this standard, we give substantial deference to the district court and will only
overturn a sentence that is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.”
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Substantive reasonableness involves
whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in
light of [a number of] the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”2 United States v.
Conlan, 500 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see United States v.
McBride, 633 F.3d 1229, 1231 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Before deciding whether to revoke a
2
These factors include:
[T]he nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and
characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed to
afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and provide the defendant
with needed educational or vocational training, medical care or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner; pertinent guidelines;
pertinent policy statements; the need to avoid unwanted sentence
disparities; and the need to provide restitution.
United States v. Cordova, 461 F.3d 1184, 1188–89 (10th Cir. 2006) (alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Contreras-Martinez, 409 F.3d 1236, 1242 n.3
(10th Cir. 2005)).
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term of supervised release and determining the sentence imposed after revocation, the
district court must consider the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. §[§] 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B),
(a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e))
(footnote omitted)).
We have reviewed the district court’s opinion and find no abuse of discretion.
When Williams was arrested, he had close to four years remaining on his initial term of
supervision. But because of his non-compliance, he is not being asked to serve any more
supervision after his current term of custody. The district court was reasonably concerned
that this would reward his bad behavior and did not abuse its discretion in imposing two
years’, rather than eleven months’, imprisonment. Williams argues that the sentence is
more than double the top of the guidelines range even though his violations were only
technical and the world is in the middle of a pandemic. But even so, this doesn’t show an
abuse of discretion. Cf. United States v. Bullcoming, 579 F.3d 1200, 1206–07 (10th Cir.
2009) (“Mr. Bullcoming also contends that the district court abused its discretion in
varying upward to impose a sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment—double that of the
top of the applicable guidelines range. . . . We have reviewed the district court’s
explanation for the sentence it imposed and discern no abuse of discretion.”).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court.
Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips
Circuit Judge
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