Case: 20-10441 Document: 00515809616 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/06/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
April 6, 2021
No. 20-10441 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
Blanca Estella Cantu,
Petitioner—Appellant,
versus
Michael Carr, Warden,
Respondent—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:20-CV-67
Before Jolly, Elrod, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Blanca Estella Cantu, federal prisoner # 14220-078, was convicted of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, resulting in serious
bodily injury from the use of the heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. She
appeals the district court’s denial of her 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, arguing
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 20-10441
that she is entitled to relief under Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204
(2014). We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its
factual findings for clear error. Padilla v. United States, 416 F.3d 424, 425
(5th Cir. 2005).
The primary vehicle for collateral attacks on a federal conviction or
sentence is 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d
893, 900–01 (5th Cir. 2001). However, under the savings clause of § 2255(e),
a federal prisoner may assert a collateral challenge in a § 2241 petition if the
remedy provided by § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality
of his detention.” Id. at 901 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)). It is the
prisoner’s burden to demonstrate the inadequacy of § 2255, and that burden
“is a stringent one.” Christopher v. Miles, 342 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir. 2003).
A prisoner shows the § 2255 remedy is inadequate or ineffective if “(1) the
petition raises a claim ‘that is based on a retroactively applicable Supreme
Court decision’; (2) the claim was previously ‘foreclosed by circuit law at the
time when [it] should have been raised in petitioner’s trial, appeal, or first
§ 2255 motion’; and (3) that retroactively applicable decision establishes that
‘the petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense.’” Garland
v. Roy, 615 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at
904).
Cantu fails to satisfy the third prong of this test. As Burrage explained,
its holding reflects the “ordinary meaning” of the phrase “results from” in
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Burrage, 571 U.S. at 210. Cantu has not shown,
and the record does not suggest, that this phrase was used and understood in
her case in any but its ordinary, Burrage-approved sense. As for the argument
that her plea agreement and guilty plea are now void because she would have
assessed the risks of going to trial differently in view of Burrage, the district
court was correct that it is unavailing. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 757 (1970); Morse v. Texas, 691 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1982) (“A formal
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No. 20-10441
admission of guilt by a plea of guilty, if voluntarily made and with the effective
assistance of counsel, cannot subsequently be invalidated on contentions that
it was made through subjective fear of receiving a heavier penalty if convicted
after trial . . . .”). Because Cantu has not met the requirements of the savings
clause, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
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