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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ANTWAIN WELLS :
:
Appellant : No. 1034 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 18, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0000120-2018
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: Filed: April 8, 2021
Appellant, Antwain Wells, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 20-
50 years’ imprisonment, imposed after a jury convicted him of involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse with a person less than 16 years of age (IDSI), 18
Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(7); aggravated indecent assault of a person less than 16
years of age, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a)(8); and unlawful contact with a minor as
a sexual offense, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(1). We affirm.
The trial court summarized the background of this case as follows:
Procedural History
On April 23, 2019, Appellant … proceeded to trial before this
[c]ourt, sitting without a jury. He was convicted of [the above-
stated offenses]. Sentencing was deferred for a presentence
report and mental health evaluation.
A sentencing memorandum, with exhibits, was filed by counsel for
Appellant on October 16, 2019. A sentencing memorandum, with
exhibits, was filed by the Commonwealth on October 17, 2019.
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On October 18, 2019, Appellant was sentenced to 8-20 years[’]
incarceration on the IDSI conviction[,] 8-20 years[’] incarceration
on the [u]nlawful [c]ontact with a [m]inor conviction, and 4-10
years[’] incarceration on the [a]ggravated [i]ndecent [a]ssault
conviction. All of the sentences were imposed consecutively, for
an aggregate sentence of 20-50 years[’ imprisonment].
On October 25, 2019, Appellant filed a timely motion for
reconsideration of sentence. That motion was denied by operation
of law on February 24, 2020.
A timely notice of appeal was filed on March 12, 2020.
Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2) and (3), the [c]ourt entered an
order on June 8, 2020, directing the filing of a [s]tatement of
[e]rrors complained of on [a]ppeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),
not later than [21] days after entry of the order, or after
preparation of all necessary transcripts.
A timely [Rule] 1925(b) statement of errors was filed on July 7,
2020.[1, 2]
____________________________________________
1 The trial court subsequently issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion.
2 The record does not conform to the trial court’s statements regarding its
Rule 1925(b) order and Appellant’s response. Our review of the record shows
that, on June 8, 2020, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement within 21 days after entry of its order, i.e., on or before June 29,
2020, and warned that any issue not properly included in the statement,
timely filed and served, would be deemed waived. See Rule 1925(b) Order,
6/8/20, at 1. In that order, the court additionally directed that Appellant file
within 10 days, a certification, with supporting documents, attesting that he
ordered and paid for the relevant transcripts. Id. The court’s order also
stated that, “upon filing of the foregoing certification, Appellant is granted
leave to file a Supplemental Statement of Errors not later than [21] days after
all ordered transcripts have been posted to the Court Reporting System….”
Id. Subsequently, Appellant filed his certification on June 17, 2020,
representing that he was still waiting for certain transcripts. He did not file a
Rule 1925(b) statement until July 7, 2020, about a week after he said he
received the transcripts.
Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was facially untimely; he did not file
it within 21 days of the trial court’s order and then supplement it after he
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Factual History
Trial Evidence1
1 On [a]ppeal, Appellant only raises issues relating to
sentencing. Accordingly, the recitation of the trial evidence
will, for the most part, be limited to a summary of the
conduct giving rise to the offenses or otherwise relevant to
sentencing.
The complainant, A.D., was a 15-year old, ninth grade high school
student in November of 2017. She lived with her mother, and
younger brother and sister. A.D. had an older sister who did not
live with her. A.D. travel[ed] to and from school by trolley and
bus. The trip to school took A.D. about an hour and a half.
At the time of the incident, Appellant had been the boyfriend of
A.D’s[] mother for several years. Appellant lived with A.D. and
her family at a prior address, but he was not living with them at
____________________________________________
received the transcripts, as directed. However, the docket does not set forth
the date of service of the trial court’s Rule 1925(b) order. Pa.R.Crim.P.
114(C)(2) (providing that docket entries shall contain, inter alia, the date of
service or court notice). Consequently, we cannot conclude that Appellant
failed to timely comply with the court’s order and, therefore, we do not find
waiver. See Commonwealth v. Andrews, 213 A.3d 1004, 1009-10 (Pa.
Super. 2019) (“[I]f the [trial court] docket does not show that notice of the
entry of a Rule 1925(b) order was provided to an appellant, then we will not
conclude that the appellant’s issues have been waived for failure to file a Rule
1925(b) statement. The fact that the appellant actually received notice of the
Rule 1925(b) order is irrelevant if the docket does not reflect that notice was
sent.”) (cleaned up); Commonwealth v. Chester, 163 A.3d 470, 472 (Pa.
Super. 2017) (“Based upon the lack of recordation in the docket, we are
unable to determine the date of service of the Order, as required under
Criminal Rule 114, and cannot conclude that [the appellant] failed to comply
with the … court’s directive to file a concise statement.”). Moreover, even if
the docket indicated proper service, we would still not find Appellant’s issue
waived due to his untimely Rule 1925(b) statement. It is well-established
that, “if there has been an untimely filing, this [c]ourt may decide the appeal
on the merits if the trial court had adequate opportunity to prepare an opinion
addressing the issues being raised on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Burton,
973 A.2d 428, 433 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc). Thus, Appellant’s untimely
filing of his Rule 1925(b) statement is of no moment here.
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their then[-]current address. Although Appellant was not her
biological father, A.D. called Appellant “Dad” for a time.
On the morning of November 29, 2017, A.D. left home to catch
the trolley to school. While walking to the trolley, Appellant called
out to A.D. from his car and offered her a ride to school. While en
route, Appellant told A.D. [that] he had to make a stop. He pulled
into a parking area and left the car for about two minutes, while
A.D. remained in the car playing a game on her phone.
Upon returning to the car, Appellant spoke on his phone for a
minute, and then locked the car doors. Feeling uncomfortable,
A.D. started talking nervously about the game she was playing, to
which Appellant responded, [“Y]ou’re not advanced enough for the
game I want to play.[”] Appellant then said to A.D.: “[Y]ou’re
about to suck my dick.” When A.D. said she was not, Appellant
pulled out a screwdriver, which he held to A.D.’s neck. He then
demanded that A.D. perform oral sex. Appellant pulled his pants
down[,] and A.D. then proceeded to do so. As she was describing
these events at trial, A.D. stopped and asked the [c]ourt[,] “[C]an
we take a break?”
At some point, Appellant told A.D. to pull her pants down and then
to get in the back seat of the car, which she did. Appellant went
to the back seat with A.D., said he was going to make her vagina
wet[,] and proceeded to put his mouth on her vagina. Appellant
then placed his fingers in A.D.’s vagina, before attempting to place
his penis in her vagina. Appellant’s efforts were extremely painful
to A.D.[,] and he was not able to insert his penis into her vagina.
Appellant then ordered A.D. to turn around and he stood behind
her, outside the car, as she lay face-down on the back seat, with
her lower body outside of the car.
Appellant then inserted his penis into A.D.’s rectum and proceeded
to move it back and forth inside her. Appellant then made A.D.
suck his penis again, at which point he ejaculated.
Appellant then ordered A.D. into the back seat of the car, and told
her to lie flat. At some point[,] she climbed back into the front
seat. Appellant then drove A.D. to school and dropped her about
a block from school. On the way, Appellant asked A.D. if she was
mad at him and told her that if she said anything he will [sic] kill
her mother. Appellant then gave A.D. $12 or $13. He also told
A.D. that if she didn’t say anything, he would give her money and
get her the iPhone he knew she wanted.
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When A.D. arrived at school, she told her older sister, who was
also a student there, that a friend had been raped and that the
man threatened to kill her mother, and asked for advice on what
to do. Her sister advised A.D. to tell the friend to tell someone,
then they parted. After about 20 minutes, A.D. texted her sister
that the friend was actually her. Also, while A.D. was in school,
Appellant was texting her that she was a liar. He continued to
text A.D., saying he was sorry, then calling her a liar and
reminding her of a deal she had made, apparently referring to
getting her the iPhone and giving her money if she didn’t tell
anyone what happened.
A.D. left school and went with her sister to her sister’s
godmother’s house. From there[,] the police were called. A.D.
was taken to the hospital for an examination and [was] later
interviewed by the Philadelphia Children’s Alliance…. Appellant’s
DNA was found in … A.D.’s pants and underwear, with protein from
seminal fluid.
Sentencing
Prior to sentencing, the [c]ourt received the [p]re[-s]entence
[i]nvestigation [r]eport, the [m]ental [h]ealth [e]valuation, and
the sentencing memorandum of each side. Additionally, the
[c]ourt heard the arguments of counsel, heard from Appellant’s
mother, and heard a letter written by A.D. Appellant declined the
opportunity for allocution.
A.D.’s letter was read at sentencing as follows:
Dear Judge Campbell, my name is [A.D.], and I’m about to
be 17 years old. Currently, I’m living in the foster care
system after I was sexually abused by [Appellant] just after
my 15th birthday. I’m here today because I want you to
know how it[ has] affected my life so that you understand
why I would like to see [Appellant] locked up for as long as
possible. I met [Appellant] from my mother. That was her
boyfriend and I knew him for some time. My mom didn’t
have a job so every time she needed money[,] she would
run to him. He used to pay most of the bills. When there
was no food in the house, he’d bring us food. As time went
on, we got really close and we developed a bond. I called
him dad and I really trusted him. When the assault
happened, it took a toll on my life. I became very depressed
and not myself. I was happier before. I now have my wall
up and I find it hard to trust people. I always feel mad now
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and I’m easily irritated. I didn’t think about what people
thought of me before, but now I have to. I could wear what
I wanted and not be worried. Now I feel very sensitive and
cry very easily. Since this happened[,] I don’t like being
home alone. I can’t be around men without feeling
uncomfortable. It’s affected my ability to be in a
relationship because when other men try to touch me[,] I
think of [Appellant]. I also get triggered by shows and
hearing other stories of sexual assault. Before this
happened[,] I was living with my family and not feeling like
an orphan. Now I am in foster care where I worry about
where I’m going to live and who I’m going to live with. I
haven’t seen my younger sister or brother for two years. I
think they’re mad at me for telling the truth about what
happened. This changed my relationship with my mother
too. I am unable to forgive her for not believing me and
putting things in people’s head[s] about me that weren’t
true. This ruined her too because now she’s homeless, sad,
and saying she wants to kill herself. It[ has] led to her
depression and need for medication. She hasn’t been able
to recover enough to do what’s needed so that we can go
home if we wanted to. When I found out that I had to testify
in front of the judge, the man that did this to me, and
everybody, I felt really scared and emotional. I didn’t want
to talk about it. I wanted to push it to the back of my head
and pretend it never happened. When I found out I had to
testify, I felt broke[n]. I wanted to kill myself. I felt that
everyone will [sic] look at me different[ly]. It was really
stressful. I didn’t want to see his face. I was also scared to
testify because [Appellant] told me that if I said anything[,]
there would be consequences. He said he would kill my
family and even if he was in jail[,] he knew people to do his
dirty work. The reason I did testify is because I wanted
[Appellant] to be in jail. I don’t want him on the street. I
know what kind of person he is, and I didn’t want him out
there, out so that he could do this to other people like his
nieces and nephews. I was scared but I had to get through
it because I needed him to pay for what he did. He’s messed
up my whole life and I don’t know if I’ll ever feel normal
again. Thank you for taking this into consideration when
sentencing [Appellant]. [Signed, A.D.]
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Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 8/3/20, at 1-6 (internal citations omitted; most
brackets added).
On appeal, Appellant raises a single issue for our review:
Did not the lower court impose a manifestly excessive and
unreasonable sentence of 20 to 50 years[’] confinement, which
was contrary to the fundamental norms that underlie the
sentencing process and to a specific provision of the Pennsylvania
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9721(b), which requires in part
that a sentencing court consider a defendant’s background and
rehabilitative needs?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Appellant’s claim implicates the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v.
Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). An appellant
challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke
this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
[the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the]
appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence
appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing
Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006),
appeal denied, … 909 A.2d 303 ([Pa.] 2006). Objections to the
discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if they
are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify
the sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788,
794 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, … 831 A.2d 599 ([Pa.]
2003).
The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul,
925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). A substantial question
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exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable argument
that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent
with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary
to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.”
Sierra, supra at 912–13.
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
Here, the record demonstrates that Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal, properly preserved this claim in his post-sentence motion, and
included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief in compliance with our
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, we proceed to determining whether
Appellant has raised a substantial question to meet the fourth requirement of
the four-part test set forth above.
Appellant advances in his Rule 2119(f) statement that the trial court
“imposed a manifestly excessive and unreasonable sentence that runs
contrary to the fundamental norms that underlie the sentencing process and
misapplied provisions of … 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b)[,] and the Sentencing Code,
204 Pa. Code § 303.13.” Appellant’s Brief at 12; see also 42 Pa.C.S. §
9721(b) (providing general standards for sentencing); 204 Pa. Code § 303.13
(addressing guideline sentence recommendations for aggravated and
mitigated circumstances). He says that “[t]he lower court imposed a statutory
maximum sentence of 50 years (with a minimum of 20 years or 240 months),
outside of the Sentencing Guidelines, based solely on the nature of the crime
and ignored both Appellant’s mitigation and rehabilitative needs.” Appellant’s
Brief at 12-13. We determine that Appellant’s claim that the trial court
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imposed a manifestly excessive sentence, based solely on the nature of the
crime he committed and outside of the Sentencing Guidelines, raises a
substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 152 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (“In [the a]ppellant’s [Rule] 2119(f) statement[,] he alleges that
the trial court imposed a manifestly excessive sentence and focused solely on
the serious nature of the crimes he committed. We find that [the a]ppellant
has raised a substantial question….”) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v.
Hanson, 856 A.2d 1254, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“Under 42 Pa.C.S.[] §
9781(c)(3), a claim that ‘the sentencing court sentenced outside the
sentencing guidelines,’ … presents … a substantial question.”) (citation
omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(3) (“The appellate court shall vacate
the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court with instructions if
it finds … the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines
and the sentence is unreasonable.”).
Accordingly, we will review the merits of Appellant’s claim, mindful of
the following standard of review:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Johnson-Daniels, 167 A.3d 17, 28 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(citation omitted).
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Further, our Supreme Court has stated:
Through the Sentencing Code, the General Assembly has enacted
a process by which defendants are to be sentenced. As a
threshold matter, a sentencing court may select one or more
options with regard to determining the appropriate sentence to be
imposed upon a defendant. These options include probation, guilt
without further penalty, partial confinement, and total
confinement. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(a). In making this selection, the
Sentencing Code offers general standards with respect to the
imposition of sentence which require the sentencing court to
impose a sentence that is “consistent with the protection of the
public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the
life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative
needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Thus, sentencing
is individualized; yet, the statute is clear that the court must also
“consider” the sentencing guidelines adopted by the Pennsylvania
Commission on Sentencing. Id. If the court imposes a sentence
outside of the sentencing guidelines, it must provide a written
statement setting forth the reasons for the deviation and the
failure to do so is grounds for resentencing.
The Sentencing Code also sets forth express standards regarding
appellate review of a defendant’s sentence. As is apparent from
the statutory provision setting forth the parameters of appellate
review, the central focus of substantive appellate review with
respect to a sentence outside of the guidelines is whether the
sentence is “unreasonable”:
(c) Determination on appeal.—The appellate court shall
vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing
court with instructions if it finds:
***
(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing
guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.
In all other cases[,] the appellate court shall affirm the
sentence imposed by the sentencing court.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c) (emphasis supplied).
In making this “unreasonableness” inquiry, the General Assembly
has set forth four factors that an appellate court is to consider:
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(d) Review of record.—In reviewing the record the
appellate court shall have regard for:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
defendant, including any presentence investigation.
(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).
Thus, under the Sentencing Code[,] an appellate court is to
exercise its judgment in reviewing a sentence outside the
sentencing guidelines to assess whether the sentencing court
imposed a sentence that is “unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c),
(d).
Yet, what makes a sentence “unreasonable” is not defined in the
statute. Generally speaking, “unreasonable” commonly connotes
a decision that is “irrational” or “not guided by sound judgment.”
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2084 (2nd
ed. 1987); see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903 (words to be construed according
to their common and approved usage). While a general
understanding of unreasonableness is helpful, in this context, it is
apparent that the General Assembly has intended the concept of
unreasonableness to be a fluid one, as exemplified by the four
factors set forth in Section 9781(d) to be considered in making
this determination. Indeed, based upon the very factors set out
in Section 9781(d), it is clear that the General Assembly intended
the concept of unreasonableness to be inherently a circumstance-
dependent concept that is flexible in understanding and lacking
precise definition. Cf. United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103,
115 (2[d] Cir. 2005) (explaining concept or reasonableness in
context of sentencing matters).
Thus, given its nature, we decline to fashion any concrete rules as
to the unreasonableness inquiry for a sentence that falls outside
of applicable guidelines under Section 9781(c)(3). We are of the
view, however, that the Legislature intended that considerations
found in Section 9721 inform appellate review for
unreasonableness. That is, while a sentence may be found to be
unreasonable after review of Section 9781(d)’s four statutory
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factors, in addition a sentence may also be unreasonable if the
appellate court finds that the sentence was imposed without
express or implicit consideration by the sentencing court of the
general standards applicable to sentencing found in Section 9721,
i.e., the protection of the public; the gravity of the offense in
relation to the impact on the victim and the community; and the
rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).
Moreover, even though the unreasonableness inquiry lacks precise
boundaries, we are confident that rejection of a sentencing court’s
imposition of sentence on unreasonableness grounds would occur
infrequently, whether the sentence is above or below the guideline
ranges, especially when the unreasonableness inquiry is
conducted using the proper standard of review.
Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 962-64 (Pa. 2007) (footnote
omitted).
Here, Appellant — who had a prior record score of zero and was 36 years
old at the time of sentencing — complains that he received “virtually a life
sentence[,] as the lower court’s fifty[-]year sentence likely extends beyond
his life expectancy.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. He characterizes this sentence
as “disproportionate and unreasonable.” Id. at 15. In addition, he states that
the trial court sentenced him “based solely on the severity of the offense,
despite [his] substantial rehabilitative needs due to his childhood trauma as a
result of the extreme violence that he witnessed, the parental violence he
endured, and his own alcohol abuse and unchecked bipolar disorder.” Id.
In sentencing Appellant, the trial court explained:
This court has considered the arguments of both counsel,
the presentence report, the mental health evaluation report,
the sentencing guidelines form, the sentencing
memorandums of both parties; this court[] considered the
testimony of Linda Wells, [Appellant’s] mother; this court[]
considered the victim impact statement; this court[] also
considered [Appellant’s] criminal history as a whole; this
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court[] considered a number of mitigating factors including
[Appellant’s] tragic personal history, his consistent work
history, his good behavior and engagement while in custody
so far; this court has also considered aggravating factors,
which are numerous in this case. They include[,] but are
not necessarily limited to[,] the impact on the victim in
multiple ways. The circumstances of this offense are
particularly troubling. Any rape case is troubling but this
situation is distinguished from many other rapes in multiple
ways that includes [Appellant’s] abuse of his custodial
authority and trust to accomplish his crimes, his behavior of
constant humiliation not only during the act but afterwards,
his demonstrated manipulation, and his threats and
everything that he did to keep this incident from coming to
court. His behavior[] also confirms his lack of remorse,
depravity of heart, and the danger that he does pose to
society. [Appellant’s] rehabilitative needs will require
substantial confinement although that purpose, admittedly,
will be overcome by the need to protect society.
N.T.[,] 10/18/19[, at] 31-32.
The record is clear that the [c]ourt considered all relevant factors
in imposing [the] sentence. The sentence imposed was not unduly
harsh under the circumstances, and was based on careful
consideration of the factors for sentencing under 42 Pa.C.S. §
9721.
TCO at 7-8.3
We discern no manifest abuse of discretion. Despite Appellant’s
assertions, the trial court considered his background and rehabilitative needs
in rendering its sentence. We also point out that it reviewed Appellant’s pre-
sentence investigation report prior to sentencing him, and note that, “where
the sentencing judge had the benefit of a pre[-]sentence investigation report,
____________________________________________
3We note that, for the most serious offenses, IDSI and unlawful contact with
a minor, the parties agreed at sentencing that the offense gravity score was
a 12, and the guidelines were 48 to 66 months, plus or minus 12 months’
confinement. See TCO at 7 (citing N.T. at 4); Appellant’s Brief at 9.
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it will be presumed that he or she was aware of the relevant information
regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along
with mitigating statutory factors.” Boyer, 856 A.2d at 154 (citation omitted).
In addition, the trial court provided a reasonable explanation for why it
imposed a substantial term of imprisonment, noting the abuse of trust,
threats, and remorselessness of Appellant, as well as the danger he poses to
society. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not manifestly abuse
its discretion in sentencing Appellant and, therefore, we affirm his judgment
of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/8/21
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