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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-12295
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:05-cr-00268-ODE-JSA-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KENDRICK TERRELL,
a.k.a. Kendrick,
a.k.a. Robert Smith,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(April 13, 2021)
Before JILL PRYOR, LAGOA and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Kendrick Terrell appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to
reduce his sentence under § 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018. Because the
district court lacked the authority to reduce his sentence, we affirm.
I.
In 2006, Terrell pled guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute at least one kilogram of heroin and at least 50
grams of crack cocaine and one count of distributing at least 50 grams of crack
cocaine. Because Terrell had at least one prior conviction for a felony drug
offense, he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment on
each count. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii) (2006).
At the sentencing hearing, the district court calculated Terrell’s guidelines
range as 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment but explained that he was subject to a
minimum sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment on each count. The district court
ultimately sentenced him to two concurrent terms of 240 months.
In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act to address disparities in
sentences between offenses involving crack cocaine and those involving powder
cocaine. See Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010); see also Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 97–100 (2007) (providing background on disparity).
The Fair Sentencing Act increased the quantity of crack cocaine necessary to
trigger the highest statutory penalties from 50 grams to 280 grams and the quantity
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of crack cocaine necessary to trigger intermediate statutory penalties from 5 grams
to 28 grams. See Fair Sentencing Act § 2; 21 U.S.C § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii).
But the Fair Sentencing Act’s reduced penalties applied only to defendants who
were sentenced on or after the Fair Sentencing Act’s effective date. Dorsey v.
United States, 567 U.S. 260, 264 (2012).
Recently, Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391
§ 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). Among other things, the First Step Act gives
district courts the discretion “to apply retroactively the reduced statutory penalties
for crack-cocaine offenses in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to movants
sentenced before those penalties became effective.” United States v. Jones,
962 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2020).
After the First Step Act went into effect, Terrell filed a motion in the district
court seeking a sentence reduction. After considering submissions from Terrell
and the government, the district court denied Terrell’s motion with respect to the
conspiracy count. The court found that Terrell was ineligible for a reduction on
this count because the conspiracy involved heroin and thus did not qualify as a
covered offense under the First Step Act.1
1
The district court found that Terrell was eligible for a sentence reduction for the
distribution offense, which involved only crack cocaine, and reduced his sentence on this count
to 120 months. But this reduction had no effect on the total length of Terrell’s sentence because
the sentence for the distribution offense ran concurrently with the sentence for the conspiracy
offense, which remained unchanged.
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This is Terrell’s appeal.
II.
We review de novo whether a district court had authority to modify a term of
imprisonment under the First Step Act. Jones, 962 F.3d at 1296.
III.
District courts generally lack the authority to modify a term of imprisonment
once it has been imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). But the First Step Act permits
district courts to reduce some previously-imposed terms of imprisonment for
offenses involving crack cocaine. See First Step Act § 404. When a movant has a
“covered offense,” a district court has discretion to grant a sentence reduction and
shall impose a sentence “as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010
. . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” Id. § 404(b).
In Jones, we addressed when the First Step Act authorizes a district court to
reduce a movant’s sentence. We explained that to be eligible for a sentence
reduction, a movant must have a “covered offense,” meaning he has to have been
sentenced for a crack-cocaine offense that triggered the higher penalties in
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) or (B)(iii). Jones, 962 F.3d at 1298. But even when a movant
has a conviction for a covered offense, a district court is not necessarily authorized
to reduce his sentence because the First Step Act specifies that the district court has
to impose a reduced sentence “as if” the Fair Sentencing Act had been in effect at
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the time the covered offense was committed. Id. at 1303 (internal quotation marks
omitted). When a movant’s sentence is already equal to what his mandatory-
minimum sentence would have been under the Fair Sentencing Act, he is ineligible
for a sentence reduction because his “sentence would have necessarily remained
the same had the Fair Sentencing Act been in effect.” Id.
On appeal, Terrell argues that the district court erred in concluding that his
conspiracy conviction did not qualify as a covered offense under the First Step Act.
Because we recently held that a multi-drug conspiracy offense that includes both
crack cocaine and another controlled substance qualifies as a covered offense,
United States v. Taylor, 982 F.3d 1295, 1299–1300 (11th Cir. 2020), we conclude
that the conspiracy conviction was a covered offense.
Even though Terrell had a covered offense, the district court still lacked the
authority to reduce Terrell’s sentence for the conspiracy conviction. If Terrell had
been sentenced under the Fair Sentencing Act, given his prior conviction for a
felony drug offense and the fact that the conspiracy involved at least one kilogram
of heroin, the statutory penalty range for the conspiracy offense would have been
20 years to life. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(1) (2011). Because Terrell’s
current sentence of 20 years is equal to the lowest statutory penalty that would
have been available under the Fair Sentencing Act, the district court lacked the
authority to reduce his sentence. See Jones, 962 F.3d at 1303.
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AFFIRMED.
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