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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.D-E.L., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: A.L., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1513 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Decree Entered November 5, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2020-0149A
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 14, 2021
Appellant, A.L. (“Father”), files this appeal from the decree dated
November 4, 2020, and entered November 5, 2020, in the York County Court
of Common Pleas, which granted the petition of the York County Offices of
Children, Youth, and Families (“CYF” or “the Agency”) to involuntarily
terminate Father’s parental rights to his minor, dependent daughter, D.D-E.L.
(also known as D.L.), born in October 2010 (“Child”), pursuant to the Adoption
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).1, 2 After a careful review,
we affirm.
The orphans’ court summarized the procedural and factual history as
follows:
[Child] has been an adjudicated dependent since March 25,
2019; however, this case was opened in December of 2018 and
the family has had ongoing involvement with the Agency since
2017.[3] [Father] is the natural father of [Child] who was the
subject of the termination proceedings. On July 27, 2020, the
[c]ourt made the determination at the hearing that it would serve
the best interest of [Child] to change the primary goal to adoption,
with the concurrent goal of reunification. The goal was changed
due to Mother’s continued state of incompliance and Father’s
continuous status of minimal progress toward alleviating the
circumstances that necessitated the placement such as stable
housing and employment following his eight[-]month absence.[4]
On October 20, 2020, a Status Conference was held to determine
the progress of Mother and Father. Mother’s progress remained
the same and Father’s remained the same except for that he
reported that he was trying to obtain appropriate housing. On
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1 The parental rights of M.M.L. (“Mother”) were terminated by the same
decree. Mother did not file a separate appeal or participate in the instant
appeal.
2While not referenced specifically by subsections, we observe that the Agency
used language suggestive of Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8).
3 The Agency dealt with allegations of, among other things, substance abuse,
domestic violence, inadequate shelter, and corporal punishment. See
Stipulation of Counsel, 10/30/20, at ¶¶ 6, 7; Order of Adjudication and
Disposition, 3/25/19, at 1-2.
4 The evidence revealed an eight-month period, concluding in April 2020,
where Father had no contact with Child or the Agency. N.T., 11/4/20, at 81-
82, 104, 117. Evelyn Kunce, Pressley Ridge family advocate, stated, “He told
me that he ran away and he wasn’t there. He was absent because of fear of
being picked up and taken away from his children.” Id. at 81-82.
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[November 4, 2020], a lengthy hearing on the Termination of
Parental Rights was held[5], [6] in which the [c]ourt determined it
was in [Child]’s best interest to involuntary terminate parental
rights due to no advancements of Mother’s or Father’s goals from
the prior hearing. . . .
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/21/20, at 1-2 (footnotes added).
As to its determination with regard to Father, at the conclusion of the
November 4, 2020, termination hearing, the court relevantly stated:
Father does have a better relationship with [Child], but
under the statute, Section 2511, Section 5 is grounds for
termination of parental rights, which I quote, the child be removed
from the care of the parents by the [c]ourt under voluntary
agreement with the agency for a period of at least 6 months, the
conditions which led to removal or placement of the child continue
to exist and the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions
within a reasonable period of time, the services, assistance
reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the
____________________________________________
5 Father was present and represented by counsel. Mother was initially present
but chose to leave the proceedings part-way through. She was represented
by counsel throughout the proceeding. The Agency presented the testimony
of: Cameron Shertzer, York County Adult Probation Officer; Jodi Rupp.,
Families United Network drug and alcohol monitor; Sydney Tamburello,
JusticeWorks family resource therapist; Michael Breeland, Pressley Ridge
therapist; Evelyn Kunce, Pressley Ridge family advocate; Jeanette Nafzinger,
Pressley Ridge family advocate; and Kirk Everts, Agency caseworker. Notably,
Ms. Tamburello’s and Ms. Nafzinger’s testimony related solely to Mother. The
court additionally interviewed Child in camera. Child was represented by legal
counsel as well as a guardian ad litem, both of whom argued in support of
termination of Father’s parental rights. N.T., 11/4/20, at 141-43. Lastly, the
court heard from a CASA (Court Appointed Special Advocate), who reiterated
Child’s desire for adoption. Id. at 143-44.
6The parties incorporated the dependency record as to Child. N.T., 11/4/20,
at 7. It was noted that counsel submitted a joint stipulation on October 30,
2020. Id. We observe that this stipulation covers much of the factual and
procedural history as to the dependency proceedings. See Stipulation of
Counsel, 10/30/20.
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conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child
within a reasonable period of time[,] and termination of parental
rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
Unfortunately for Father[,] that’s Father’s situation. He
cannot or will not remedy the conditions. He’s still living in a
motel. He did have a substantial period of time where he was not
in contact with the child. It’s in the best interest of this child for
her to have permanency.
This is not a situation in which we’ve rushed the process.
When I changed the goal a couple of months ago, we were at the
15[-]month mark. We’re now at the, I think, 20[-]month mark,
if I’m not mistaken, or very close to it.
The child needs permanency and Father has not remedied
the issues that led to the determination of dependency in March
of 2019. I say that with emphasis because that is quite a while
ago. [Child] wants to be adopted. Her counsel agrees, her
guardian [ad litem] agrees[,] and the CASA agrees.
I have a CASA report from a few months ago, July 20, 2020,
and part of the reason why I changed the goal back in July of
2020, we had a hearing right after receiving that report and
CASA’s [sic] talked to this child almost every other day and knows
this child very well.
There is just no doubt in my mind that [Child] wants to be
adopted, so I’m signing the decree of involuntary termination of
parental rights for both the Mother and the Father.
N.T., 11/4/20, at 147-48.
By decree dated November 4, 2020, and entered November 5, 2020,
the court memorialized its decision and terminated Father’s parental rights.
Thereafter, on December 3, 2020, Father, through appointed counsel, filed a
timely notice of appeal, as well as a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The orphans’ court
filed a responsive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
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On appeal, Father raises the following issue for our review: “Did the
[l]ower [c]ourt abuse its discretion and err as a matter of law as the Agency
failed to meet its burden to terminate Father’s parental rights?” Father’s Brief
at 5.
In matters involving the involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.
2012). “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or
abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The
trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. Id. at 827.
We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa.
2010)].
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all
credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G.
& J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f
competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if
the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B.,
835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
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The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis of
the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental
rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have
defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re
C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (citation omitted).
In the case sub judice, the Agency petitioned for termination of parental
rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We have
long held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only
agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well
as Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004)
(en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s termination decree pursuant to
subsections 2511(a)(5) and (b), which provide as follows:
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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
...
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will
not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
available to the parent are not likely to remedy the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child within a reasonable period of time and
termination of the parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5), and (b).
To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(5), the
moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence
regarding the following elements: (1) the child has been removed
from parental care for at least six months; (2) the conditions
which led to the child's removal or placement continue to exist;
(3) the parents cannot or will not remedy the conditions which led
to removal or placement within a reasonable period time; (4) the
services reasonably available to the parents are unlikely to
remedy the conditions which led to removal or placement within
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a reasonable period of time; and (5) termination of parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
In re B.C., 36 A.3d 601, 607 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted).7
In the case at bar, in concluding grounds for termination of Father’s
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(5) exist, the orphans’ court
reasoned:
The [c]ourt did not err or abuse its discretion in terminating
Father’s parental rights under 23 [Pa.C.S. §] 2511(a)(5). The
[c]ourt will address the following sub[-]issues under Father’s
Statement of Matter’s [sic] Complained of issue three: 1) “the
Agency was to provide a team to help Father but as a result of
[COVID-19], the Agency did not provide this team for a number
of months; 2) since a team was assigned, Father has been very
cooperative with the team; 3) [F]ather continues to be employed
on [a] full[-]time basis; 4) the only real goal to obtain is housing
which a team would be able to help him with; 5) under [COVID-
19], it is known that [it] is more difficult to obtain housing due to
regulations regarding evictions and things of that kind; and 6)
there is no basis to find that Father cannot remedy the
circumstances which resulted in placement of the child in a
reasonable amount of time.”
A. The Agency’s Delay in Establishing a Team for Father
The [c]ourt did not err or abuse its discretion in terminating
Father’s parental rights despite the Agency’s delay in establishing
a team for Father. The [c]ourt was not persuaded that having a
team sooner or longer would have enabled Father to accomplish
his goals. Notably, Father was absent for the latter eight months
of the first thirteen months in attempts to avoid incarceration by
law enforcement. Prior to this period, Father was sporadic and
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7 We observe that Sections 2511(a)(5) and (b) both require a court
considering a termination petition to assess the needs and welfare of the
relevant child or children. However, the needs and welfare analysis required
by Section 2511(a)(5) is distinct from the needs and welfare analysis required
by Section 2511(b), and thus, must be addressed separately. See In re
C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc).
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incompliant with the Agency. Additionally, by the time Father did
return the Agency was in midst of widespread shutdowns due to
[COVID-19]. Had Father been compliant or even present during
the latter eight months, the Agency could have provide[d] him the
services in a more timely fashion. Accordingly, placing blame on
the Agency or even [COVID-19] for his own short[-]comings is
misplaced.
Moreover, Father moved for the fifth time to another motel
during the same month that a team was provided for Father.
Further, the advocate team member requested documentation to
determinate Father’s income. While Father did provide a letter
from his boss stating that he was employed, Father refused to
comply with the advocate’s request for a pay stub or some sort of
documentation to determine his income. Accordingly, despite the
team’s efforts for over two months, Father simply would not
provide documentation to verify that he could in fact provide
adequate income for housing and [Child]’s other needs.
Therefore, the [c]ourt did not err or abuse its discretion in
terminating Father’s rights.
B. Father’s Cooperation with the Team and Employment
Compliance
The [c]ourt did not err or abuse its discretion in terminating
Father’s parental rights because Father was not entirely
cooperative with the team. As noted above, Father did not
cooperate by providing documentation to verify approximate
income in order for the team to assist with housing. This was one
of the main reasons a team was put in place. Additionally, the
[c]ourt notes that Father was aware of [] the documentation from
his employer that states that Father is a full-time employee but
did not provide approximate income was insufficient. Yet, Father
did not seek to remedy this problem. Accordingly, the [c]ourt did
not err or abuse its discretion.
C. A Team’s Ability to Remedy Father’s Housing Issues
The [c]ourt did not err or abuse its discretion because the
team could not help Father because he refused to provide the
team with most essential information, income documentation
request, to aid in his housing search. Additionally, testimony was
given that Father’s household has expanded to include his
paramour along with his other two children which seemed to
provide more obstacles in obtaining suitable housing for [Child].
This [c]ourt would opine that given Father’s roadblocks to
appropriate housing appeared to be his own doing in that he did
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not comply with the team’s request for income receipts and that
he has prioritized his paramour over [Child]. Thus, the [c]ourt did
not err or abuse its discretion in terminating Father’s parental
rights.
D. [COVID-19]’s Impact on Father’s Housing Issues
The [c]ourt did not err or abuse its discretion in terminating
Father’s parental rights because [COVID-19] was not the sole
barrier to Father’s housing issues. The [c]ourt was not persuaded
that [COVID-]19 regulations on housing are an appropriate excuse
in this case. As noted above, Father was either incompliant with
the Agency or absent until April 2020. The fifteen[-]month period
for the dependency for [Child] was May 2020. As further
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, Father’s inability to comply
with the team provided by the Agency only bolsters this [c]ourt’s
decision to terminate his parental rights. Accordingly, to claim
that [COVID-19] caused his inability to obtain proper housing is
simply inaccurate. Therefore, the [c]ourt did not err or abuse its
discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights.
E. Father’s Ability to Remedy the Housing Issues within
Reasonable Time
The [c]ourt did not err or abuse its discretion in terminating
Father’s rights because a reasonable time to remedy the housing
issues has expired. Father has had twenty months to meet the
Agency’s goals. Additionally, Father also could not comply with
the team’s request for documentation over the two[-]month
period they were placed with him to assist him with his
environmental conditions. Further, Father’s pattern of bouncing
from one motel to another, running from the law, and placing
blame on other parties simply did not persuade this [c]ourt that
he had the capability of remedying the goals set forth by the
Agency. Accordingly, the [c]ourt did not err or abuse its discretion
in terminating Father’s paternal rights under 23 [Pa.C.S. §]
2511(a)(5).
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/21/20, at 7-10 (citations to record omitted)
(footnotes omitted).
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However, while Father acknowledges that housing still remained an
issue, as he still resided in a motel,8 Father argues that the court erred in
determining that he could not remedy any housing deficiencies within a
reasonable amount of time. Father’s Brief at 18-23. He asserts, “There was
no testimony presented to support the position that the condition cannot be
remedied within a reasonable period of time.” Id. at 20. Father continues,
There is no basis to state that Father could not remedy this
situation within a reasonable period of time. Despite this, that is
exactly what the [l]ower [c]ourt did. Such a determination by the
[l]ower [c]ourt is an error of law or an abuse of discretion. It
appears that the [l]ower [c]ourt disregarded the totality of the
evidence and instead picked out certain statements to support the
decision it wanted to enter.
Id. at 22-23. Father points to the fact that the team, which was supposed to
be assigned in order to help him obtain appropriate housing, did not
materialize until five months after set forth as a goal in a March 2020 Family
Service Plan. Id. at 19. Further, the Agency filed its termination petition one
week after the team opened Father for services. Id. at 19-20. Nonetheless,
Father indicates that the team confirms that he was cooperative and compliant
and made efforts to apply for housing and that any difficulty did not appear to
be related to finances. Id. at 20-21. Further, although he worked “under the
table,” he showed proof of employment in the form of a letter from his
____________________________________________
8Conversely, Father maintains that “the issue of substance abuse has been
addressed by Father.” Father’s Brief at 19.
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employer. Id. at 20. Moreover, Father references difficulties relating to
housing as a result of COVID-19, including obtaining housing. Id. at 21-22.
He therefore contends, “It is unfair to say that if not for [COVID-19], Father
would not have been able to obtain housing.” Id. at 22. Lastly, Father argues
that Child’s needs and welfare do not support termination.9 Id. at 23-24.
A review of the record supports the trial court’s finding of grounds for
termination under Section 2511(a)(5). As we discern no abuse of discretion
or error of law, we do not disturb the court’s findings. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d
at 267.
The record reveals the conditions leading to Child’s removal still existed
and were not likely to be remedied in a reasonable amount of time. Agency
caseworker, Kirk Everts, testified that Father had not obtained or maintained
stable housing. N.T., 11/4/20, at 115. This was confirmed by Pressley Ridge
family advocate, Evelyn Kunce, who categorized Father’s housing progress as
“minimal” and acknowledged that his current housing situation was not
appropriate for Child.10 Id. at 87. Moreover, at the time of the hearing, Child
had been in the care of the Agency for approximately twenty months.
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9 Father presents an argument that combines his discussion of this aspect of
Section 2511(a)(5) with his discussion as to Section 2511(b). Father’s Brief
at 23-24.
10Mr. Everts additionally expressed concerns relating to substance abuse,
specifically, alcohol. N.T., 11/4/20, at 123-24.
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Stipulation of Counsel, 10/30/20, at ¶ 7. Further, the referral to Pressley
Ridge had been made and a team opened for services for approximately four
months, since August 2020.11 N.T., 11/4/20, at 73, 83-84, 122.
As this Court has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance
while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s
need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope
for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super.
2006). Hence, the record substantiates grounds for termination under
subsection (a)(5). See In re B.C., 36 A.3d at 607.
We next turn to whether termination was proper under Section 2511(b).
As to Section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have
been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love,
comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791
(Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)],
this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs and
welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds between
the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to
discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the
____________________________________________
11We further observe that there is an indication that Father was unwilling to
engage in services at or around the time of Child’s adjudication and disposition
and that a June 2019 Status Review Order reflects a prior referral to a Pressley
Ridge Family Engagement Team with reported unsuccessful attempts to
contact Father by the team. Stipulation of Counsel, 10/30/20, at ¶ 6; Status
Review Order, 6/27/19, at 1-2; Order of Adjudication and Disposition,
3/25/19, at 1.
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parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as
discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an
easy task.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any
bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on
the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-
63 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “[T]he court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal
citations omitted).
Moreover,
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have
with the foster parent. . . .
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011)).
In the case sub judice, as to Section 2511(b) and Child’s best interests,
the orphans’ court stated:
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The [c]ourt will address the following sub[-]issues under
Father’s Statement of Matter’s [sic] Complained of issue three: 1)
“visits with the child and Father go well; 2) testimony was
presented that Father complied with the majority of goals set forth
for him in the Family Service Plans; and 3) Father has custody of
two other children and little or no testimony was presented to
show what impact termination would have on the minor child and
her sibling relationships.” As the [c]ourt has already addressed
the relevant sections under to 23 [Pa.C.S. §] 2511(a), the sub[-
]issues will only be addressed as each relates to 23 [Pa.C.S. §]
2511(b).
A. Visits with Father
The [c]ourt did not err or abuse its discretion in terminating
Father’s parental rights because a few visits were positive. While
Father’s initial visits with [Child] dating back to April 2019 to
August 2019 were fairly consistent, from August 2019 to April
2020, there were no visits due to Father’s disappearance.
Following his return in April 2020 to September 2020, Father had
some telephone visits and [Z]oom visits, some of which he failed
to attend. Additionally, Father’s in[-]person visits did not occur
until September 2020 and there were only a handful. Further, the
[c]ourt could not mak[e] a finding in Father’s favor solely on this
assertion because of the following assertions by the child’s CASA
representative:
This CASA believes the familial bond once shared with
[Child] and her paternal family (i.e., [Father, his
paramour,] and [Child’s] three half-siblings) no longer
exists. [Father]’s complete absence from all aspects
of parenting [Child] including visitation and
communication, engagement in [Child]’s education,
and family celebrations have done irreparable harm to
the relationship. Initially, [Child] had expressed on
several occasions to this CASA and others that she
misses her siblings and her father. This CASA spoke
directly with both [Father and his paramour] to
attempt to impress the importance of a continued
relationship with [Child] but [Father] is resistant to
services. [Father] did admit to abusing alcohol to his
CASA. [Child] no longer asks to speak with [Father].
[CASA Report, 7/20/20], at 4.
The caseworker’s testimony also indicated that the positive
visits were not due to a parent[-]child bond.
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Q. And when you weigh the bond the minor child has
with the foster family versus Father, where does the
stronger parental bond lie?
A. That’s a tough question in the respect that I haven’t
seen them as [--] it’s hard to say because I really
haven’t seen them as child/parent. I see them in very
positive visits. However, [Foster Mother] provides a
more, I guess, family[-]oriented bond is a good way
to do it.[12]
THE COURT: Sir, you described [Child]’s bond with her
Father as being a good and positive bond. Do you
think that she would suffer any emotional harm, if that
bond were severed?
A. I think [she] would be upset, but I don’t think there
would be lasting emotional harm.
[N.T., 11/4/20,] at 110, 115. Moreover, Father never made any
other efforts to reach out to the [A]gency to check on her
wellbeing, the progress on her therapy, showed any interest in
attending any medical or extracurricular activities, or sent letters
or gifts to [Child]. Accordingly, to claim that the few visits that
he participated in over the last year went well were not dispositive
to this [c]ourt. Thus, this [c]ourt did not err or abuse its discretion
in terminating Father’s parental rights.
____________________________________________
12Critically, the CASA highlighted and confirmed Child’s positive relationship
with her foster mother and her desire to be adopted. The CASA stated:
So[,] I have the accessibility to [Child] on a regular basis
and I do talk to her far more than the once a month required for
CASA. I speak with her probably almost every other day through
different channels.
But she does -- just to reiterate what everyone else has
said, she definitely wants to be adopted. She does have certain
family members that she feels very connected to and she has
expressed that she wants to maintain that connection to them.
But she is -- I’ve also been able to observe her in the [foster]
home and she’s very bonded with the other children in that home
and definitely [Foster Parents]. I think she’s looking forward to
this being resolved so that she can move forward to continuing to
flourish in that home.
N.T., 11/4/20, at 144. The CASA then responded, “Yes,” when asked by the
court, “So you think that she wants to be adopted?” Id.
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B. Father’s Compliance with the Agency’s Goals.
The [c]ourt did not err or abuse its discretion in terminating
Father’s parental rights because quantity does not equal quality
when a child’s best interests and permanency are at stake. This
[c]ourt would note that despite Father’s completion of some of the
numbered goals items, the crucial goals which would have allowed
Father to properly care for [Child] were not completed. These
goals relate to the housing and employment issues that were
discussed in great detail above. Additionally, this [c]ourt heard
testimony from the caseworker that there was an alcohol concerns
[sic] dating back to September 2020.
Q. As we sit here today, are you concerned about
current drug or alcohol issues with Father?
A. Yes.
Q. Why?
A. I observed a video that occurred on September 10th
thereabout, where [Father] got into a verbal
argument with two individuals in the parking lot of his
motel, and one of the individuals had a firearm on
him. Instead of going into the room and closing the
door and calling the police, he continued to engage.
Q. Was Father charged as a result of this?
A. No.
Q. Were there drugs visible on this video?
A. No.
Q. But you have concerns of drug usage because of
that?
A. I have concerns about alcohol use because of the
sound of his voice.
[Id.] at 123-24. Given Father’s recent DUI and his inability to
comply with major [sic] mentioned above, the [c]ourt found the
Caseworker’s testimony concerning for the stability and safety of
[Child]. Therefore, the [c]ourt did not err or abuse its discretion.
C. [Child]’s Relationship with her Siblings that are still in Father’s
Care
The [c]ourt did not err or abuse its discretion in terminating
Father’s parental rights. In response to Father’s allegations that
no evidence was presented regarding the affect the termination
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would have on [Child]. and her siblings in Father’s care, the
[c]ourt would response that Father did not properly object in order
to preserve this for appeal under [Pa.R.A.P.] 302(a). However,
the [c]ourt would offer that evidence was offered through the
incorporation of the July 20, 2020 CASA Report. Notably, that
report volunteered that there was little bond between [Child],
Father, and the half[-]siblings in Father’s care.
Moreover, the [c]ourt was not persuaded by Father’s
assertion that his rights should not be terminated because he still
has custody of the other two minor children. Specifically, the
Agency currently has an open case with Father and the other two
children in his care. Accordingly, Father’s assertion was
unpersuasive.
Finally, the [c]ourt would reiterate and offer the following
additional rationales:
THE COURT: Unfortunately for Father[,] that’s
Father’s situation. He cannot or will not remedy the
conditions. He’s still living in a motel. He did have a
substantial period of time where he was not in contact
with the child. It’s in the best interest of this child for
her to have permanency.
This is not a situation in which we’ve rushed the
process. When I changed the goal a couple of months
ago, we were at the 15[-]month mark. We’re now at
the, I think, 20[-]month mark, if I’m not mistaken, or
very close to it. The child needs permanency and
Father has not remedied the issues that led to the
determination of dependency in March of 2019. I say
that with emphasis because that is quite a while ago.
[Child] wants to be adopted. Her counsel agrees, her
guardian ad litem agrees and the CASA agrees. I have
a CASA report from a few months ago, July 20, 2020,
and part of the reason why I changed the goal back in
July of 2020, we had a hearing right after receiving
that report and CASA’s [sic] talked to this child almost
every other day and knows this child very well.
There is just no doubt in my mind that [Child] wants
to be adopted, so I’m signing the decree of involuntary
termination of parental rights for both the Mother and
the Father.
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[N.T., 11/4/20,] at 147-48. Therefore, this [c]ourt did not err or
abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental
rights under 23 [Pa.C.S.] § 2511(b).
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/21/20, at 11-16 (some citations to record
omitted) (footnote omitted) (footnote added).
Father, however, argues that the orphans’ court erred in finding that
Child’s needs and welfare favored termination. Father’s Brief at 23-24. He
states:
The [l]ower [c]ourt felt that the best needs and welfare of the
child were met by terminating Father’s parental rights. It is
argued that this is an error. The minor child enjoys seeing her
Father and the visits were very appropriate. The only issue is
that[,] because of [COVID-19], Father was not able to have in-
person visits with the minor child for several months. He was
permitted to have these visits on September 1[,] which happened
to be the day the Agency filed to terminate his parental rights. It
is easy for the caseworker to testify that the minor child has a
stronger bond with the foster family. After all, it is the Agency
that sought termination of parental rights. The Team testified as
to the relationship between Father, the minor child and the
siblings. The [l]ower [c]ourt erred in not giving more weight to
this testimony.
Id. at 23-24.
Upon review, we again discern no abuse of discretion. The record
supports the trial court’s finding that Child’s developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare favor termination of Father’s parental rights
pursuant to Section 2511(b). See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Significantly, the
evidence reveals that Child was placed in a pre-adoptive home where she had
resided for approximately fifteen months and was doing well. N.T., 11/4/20,
at 109, 114-15. Agency caseworker, Keith Everts, described Child as “very
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easy and confident” and “comfortable” in the foster home. Id. at 109, 115.
Despite a bond with Father, Mr. Everts observed a positive bond between Child
and her foster family, particularly a parent-child bond with her foster mother.
Id. at 109-10, 115. Likewise, the CASA recounted a positive bond between
Child and her foster family. Id. at 144. Moreover, as reported by Child,
counsel for Child, and the CASA, Child desired to remain with foster parents
and to be adopted. Id. at 51-54, 58, 141, 144; CASA Report, 7/20/20, at 6
(unpaginated). Hence, Mr. Everts testified that he did not believe any harm
would result from severing any such bond with Father. Id. at 115.
Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion and conclude that the orphans’ court appropriately terminated
Father’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5) and (b).
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 04/14/2021
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