NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 14 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES VAN TASSEL; JEREMY No. 20-35121
PLANK,
D.C. No. 3:15-cv-05508-BHS
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 19, 2021
San Francisco, California
Before: MURGUIA and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and LYNN,** District Judge.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Charles Van Tassel and Jeremy Plank (“Plaintiffs”)
sought to certify a class of State Farm insureds in the state of Washington, alleging
that State Farm breached its contracts with the class members and violated state
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Barbara M. G. Lynn, Chief United States District
Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
consumer-protection laws by failing to properly compensate class members for
“diminished value” damages after auto accidents. The district court denied class
certification, and Plaintiffs prevailed on their individual breach-of-contract claims
against Defendant-Appellee State Farm after a two-day jury trial. After entry of the
final judgment, Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s order denying class
certification, the order denying Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the case schedule, and
several orders denying Plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration. Because the parties
are familiar with the facts, we do not recite them here. We have jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445
U.S. 326, 336 (1980) (holding that denial of class certification is appealable after
entry of final judgment); see also Hall v. City of L.A., 697 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir.
2012) (explaining that other earlier, non-final orders are reviewable after a final
judgment).
1. Plaintiffs primarily challenge the district court’s denial of class
certification. We review the denial of class certification for abuse of discretion and
the district court’s underlying factual findings for clear error. Ruiz Torres v. Mercer
Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs sought to certify a class of State Farm insureds in the state of
Washington who purportedly suffered diminished value damages covered under
their underinsured motorist policies. To obtain class certification, they were
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required to satisfy the four threshold requirements of Rule 23(a)—numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(1)–(4); Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 674 (9th Cir. 2014). In addition,
because Plaintiffs sought certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), they were required
to demonstrate predominance of common questions over individualized ones and
superiority of a class action over individual litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3);
Castillo v. Bank of Am., NA, 980 F.3d 723, 730 (9th Cir. 2020). Failure to establish
any one of these requirements defeats class certification. See Castillo, 980 F.3d at
726–27 (affirming denial of class certification where plaintiff had established
commonality and typicality, but not predominance).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that individualized
questions, rather than common questions, predominated. The district court
determined that State Farm processed claims on a case-by-case basis depending on
the documentation insureds submitted, resulting in a number of individualized
questions regarding liability for diminished value damages. This individualized
process for identifying and calculating diminished value damages distinguishes
Plaintiffs’ case from Moeller v. Farmers Insurance Co. of Washington, 267 P.3d
998, 1003 (Wash. 2011), in which the insurer took the position that its policy
excluded coverage of diminished value across the board, and Achziger v. IDS
Property Casualty Insurance Co., 772 F. App’x 416, 418–19 (9th Cir. 2019), in
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which the insurer conceded at oral argument that it used a universal formula to
calculate diminished value damages. Because the district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate predominance, it
follows that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class
certification. See Castillo, 980 F.3d at 726–27.
2. Plaintiffs also appeal the district court’s order denying Plaintiffs’ motion
to amend the case schedule. A party seeking modification of a scheduling order
must generally show “good cause,” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d
604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)), and we review a district
court’s refusal to modify a scheduling order for abuse of discretion, see Zivkovic v.
S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002). The district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend the case schedule, which State
Farm opposed, because Plaintiffs failed to establish good cause for delaying the trial.
Plaintiffs’ reliance on our decision in Achziger is misplaced because that case is
distinguishable on its facts. Achziger, an unpublished memorandum disposition, did
not change the applicable law regarding class certification, which Plaintiffs had
ample opportunity to brief in the district court. See 772 F. App’x at 419.
3. Finally, Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s orders denying reconsideration
of the class certification issue and the case-schedule issue. We review the district
court’s denial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. See Sch. Dist. No.
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1J, Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262–63 (9th Cir. 1993).
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion
for class certification and motion to amend the case schedule, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration, which
essentially presented the same arguments as the initial motions the district court
denied. See id.
AFFIRMED.
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