NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 14 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AVTAR SINGH DHINDSA, No. 17-70153
Petitioner, Agency No. A088-703-629
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 12, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER and BADE, Circuit Judges, and JACK,*** District Judge.
Avtar Singh Dhindsa, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Janis Graham Jack, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence
the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility
determinations under the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-
40 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination
based on inconsistencies between Dhindsa’s asylum application, supplementary
statement, and testimony concerning his date of entry into the United States; his
departure from India; and his journey to the United States. See id. at 1048 (holding
that in the totality of circumstances, substantial evidence supported the agency’s
adverse credibility determination). Dhindsa’s explanations do not compel a
contrary conclusion. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000). We
reject as unsupported by the record Dhindsa’s contentions that the agency failed to
consider his explanations or otherwise erred in its credibility analysis.
The agency did not err in assigning limited weight to the corroborating
affidavits Dhindsa submitted. See Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir.
2014) (concluding that agency reasonably assigned corroborating documents
limited weight, where the authors were not available for cross examination and the
authenticity of the documents relied on the applicant’s discredited testimony).
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Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the affidavits were
insufficient to independently establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of
removal. See id. (holding that documentary evidence was insufficient to
rehabilitate credibility or independently support claim, where the “documents do
not reveal any independent knowledge of [the applicant’s] alleged abuse”).
To the extent Dhindsa argues that the country conditions evidence
independently establishes a well-founded fear of persecution, we lack jurisdiction
to consider the argument. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review claims not presented to
the agency).
Thus, in the absence of credible testimony, in this case, Dhindsa’s asylum
and withholding of removal claims fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153,
1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Dhindsa’s CAT claim
because it was based on the same testimony found not credible, and Dhindsa does
not point to any other evidence in the record that compels the conclusion that it is
more likely than not he would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence
of the government if returned to India. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048-49; see also
Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (stating
that generalized evidence of violence and crime was not particular to the petitioner
3 17-70153
and insufficient to establish eligibility for CAT relief).
As stated in the court’s March 7, 2017 order, the temporary stay of removal
remains in place until issuance of the mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED, in part.
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