United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 7, 2006
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-31080
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
THOMAS CHRISTIE
Defendant - Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
No. 5:04-CR-50140
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Defendant-Appellant Thomas Christie (“Christie”) appeals his
child pornography conviction and sentence that followed his
conditional plea of guilty after the district court denied his
motion to suppress evidence seized from a computer located in a
business office in his residence. Christie challenges the
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress and the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
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validity of his conditional plea. For the reasons that follow,
we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
In March 2004, James Podboy (“Podboy”), a special agent with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement of the Department of Homeland
Security, presented an application for a search warrant to a
federal magistrate judge. In the affidavit submitted in support
of the application, Podboy described the government’s
investigation that revealed that Christie had purchased access to
Internet web sites containing child pornography. Podboy stated
in his affidavit that he had probable cause to believe that
evidence of child pornography would be found at Christie’s
residence located at 3418 Seminole Drive, Shreveport, Louisiana
71107. An attachment to the application described 3418 Seminole
Drive as “a single family, one level home” and detailed the
exterior of the premises.
Podboy’s affidavit further stated that he had checked
Louisiana motor vehicle records to verify that Christie lived at
3418 Seminole Drive and that surveillance of the premises in the
previous month had revealed two vehicles registered to Christie
parked in the driveway. Podboy averred that the cable company
records showed Christie was receiving high speed Internet service
at 3418 Seminole Drive using the same email address contained in
transactional information discovered in the government’s
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underlying investigation. Podboy also attested that a criminal
history check revealed that Christie had prior convictions for
oral sexual penetration of a child less than thirteen years old
and interstate transportation of child pornography.
On March 25, 2004, the magistrate judge signed a search
warrant permitting police to search and seize, inter alia,
computer equipment, data and memory storage devices, computer
files, photographs, or any other visual depictions of minors
engaging in sexually explicit conduct, found in the “[r]esidence
of Thomas Christie at 3418 Seminole Drive, Shreveport, Louisiana
71107.” The following morning, agents executed the search
warrant. Instead of entering by force, agents called Christie
who returned home and, after being told that the agents had a
search warrant, opened the garage door and allowed the agents to
enter the residence through a door in the garage leading to the
interior of the home. Once inside, agents seized three hard
drives from two computers, all of which contained child
pornography. Two of the hard drives were from a computer located
in the living room/guest bedroom area; the third hard drive was
from a computer located in an interior room that was used as a
business office. On October 13, 2004, Christie was indicted on
one count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).1
1
There was also a count in the indictment alleging
forfeitures of certain property, but it was later dismissed by
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On June 3, 2005, Christie moved to suppress the evidence of
child pornography discovered on the computer located in the
business office within his residence. In support of his motion,
Christie testified that the office was for Creative Home
Improvement Services (“CHIS”), a construction business in which
he was a fifty-percent owner. He testified that the business
office had two entrances, one exterior door in the garage and one
interior door in the residence, both of which were marked with
placards identifying the room as a business office. He conceded
that the sign on the exterior door in the garage “probably fell
off” because it was secured with scotch tape “and it does fall
down.” He also admitted that if the interior door was open,
agents would not have seen the business placard on the outside of
the interior door because the door opens against the wall.
Christie testified, however, that there were other indications
that a business was being conducted in his residence, including a
trailer with a sign on it parked outside the residence, vehicles
with signs on them parked in the driveway, and construction-
related tools and equipment located on the side of the house.
In opposition to Christie’s motion to suppress, the
government introduced Agent Podboy. Podboy testified that he
entered the residence directly through the garage and did not
recall seeing the exterior door leading from the garage directly
the government pursuant to Christie’s plea agreement.
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into the business office. He also testified that he did not see
any type of business sign inside the garage. As for the interior
door in the residence displaying a business sign, Podboy
testified that the door was open and unlocked. When questioned
about the exterior indications of a business being operated out
of the residence, including vehicles displaying the business logo
and business equipment and a trailer in the yard, Podboy
responded that he was not aware there was a business inside the
residence.
On August 12, 2005, the magistrate judge issued a Report and
Recommendation denying the motion to suppress. The magistrate
judge found, as an initial matter, that the office was not a
separate structure but was simply a room within the same
structure. He further found that if the garage door to the
residence is pulled down in the closed position, as it was when
the agents conducted surveillance of the property prior to the
search, “there is nothing apparent from viewing the residence
which would indicate to anyone that a construction company is
operated from an office within the residence.” The magistrate
judge rejected the evidence introduced by Christie that there
were indications of a business from the exterior of the home. He
found that none of the equipment was inconsistent with that found
in other yards in the area. With regard to the vehicles, he
found that “many employees bring their work-related vehicles home
in the evenings, and the mere presence of a vehicle or small
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flatbed trailer bearing a company’s designation would not
necessarily lead a reasonable agent to believe that a business is
being conducted from a home office within the residence.”
The magistrate judge made several findings of fact related
to Christie’s argument that the agents knew or should have known
there was a business office once they were inside the garage of
the residence. First, he found that “[i]f there was a sign on
that exterior door [from the garage into the home office] at any
time prior to the search, the sign was removed or had fallen off
(as it was prone to do) before the search.” Second, he found
that the sign on the interior door leading into the office “is
not visible if that interior door is left open, and there is no
evidence in this case that the door was closed.” Finally, he
found that “the videotape of the home office at the time of the
search shows that the layout and items located in the home office
are similar to many spare rooms in homes that contain computer
desks, recliners, televisions, family photographs and the like.”
He concluded that even if the interior door to the office was
closed and locked and even if the agents saw the business sign,
“a search warrant supported by probable cause to search the
residence for child pornography included authorization to enter
and search that room.” On September 27, 2005, the district court
concurred with the findings of the magistrate judge and denied
Christie’s motion to suppress.
On August 29, 2005, Christie entered a guilty plea
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conditioned on his right to appeal the district court’s denial of
his motion to suppress evidence from the business office. The
district court accepted the conditional plea and sentenced
Christie to the statutory minimum of ten years in prison and five
years of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2).
Christie filed this timely appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Denial of Motion to Suppress
Christie claims that the agents exceeded the scope of the
search warrant by searching the CHIS business office located
within his residence. He argues that the agents knew or should
have known the office was a distinct unit separate from the
residence because there were signs on the exterior and interior
doors to the office and on the vehicles and a trailer outside the
house indicating it was for business and not personal use. In
reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we
review questions of law de novo and the district court’s findings
of fact for clear error. United States v. Carrillo-Morales, 27
F.3d 1054, 1060-61 (5th Cir. 1994).
Christie has not demonstrated that any of the district
court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous. Although he
argues that the district court failed to make a specific fact
finding on whether the agents who conducted the initial sweep of
his residence opened the interior door to the office, and thus
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concealed to the searching agents that the room belonged to a
business, he has pointed to no record evidence refuting the
district court’s finding that “there is no evidence in this case
that the door was closed.” To the extent Christie is arguing
that the district court should have made a specific finding on
the activities of the sweeping officers, we find no merit in this
contention. The trial court is not required to make findings on
all facts presented or to make detailed evidentiary findings.
Rather, “if the findings are sufficient to support the ultimate
conclusion of the court they are sufficient.” Strickland v. W.
Horace Williams Co., 230 F.2d 793, 798 (5th Cir. 1956) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).2
The district court’s findings support its conclusion that
the agents reasonably searched the office as part of the premises
described in the search warrant. The garage, which served as the
entrance to both the residence and the office, did not bear
separate municipal numbers or identifying marks to indicate the
existence of two separate premises. The office was part of the
2
Christie also appears to be arguing that if the sweeping
agents opened the interior door to the office, then the
“collective knowledge” of law enforcement personnel at the site
would have provided notice that the scope of the warrant was
being exceeded. Christie does not point to any authority to
support his contention. The only case cited by Christie, United
States v. Waldrop, 404 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2005), does not support
Christie’s ultimate conclusion regarding the collective knowledge
doctrine. We therefore decline to visit this issue any further
on appeal. See Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., 985 F.2d 824, 831
(5th Cir. 1993) (“Questions posed for appellate review but
inadequately briefed are considered abandoned.”).
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residence; it was simply a room within the same structure. The
address in the warrant, 3418 Seminole Drive, served as the
address for the residence and the office. On these facts, we
hold that the agents did not exceed the scope of the warrant by
searching the CHIS office. Our conclusion is supported by cases
with similar facts before the Supreme Court and this circuit.
See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987) (concluding that
the officers’ search of the defendant’s apartment was reasonable
where the objective facts available to the officers at the time
of the search suggested no distinction between another
individual’s apartment and the defendant’s apartment located on
the same floor); Carrillo-Morales, 27 F.3d at 1064 (holding that
the officers acted reasonably and in good faith in assuming the
warrant to search the defendant’s body shop covered the
defendant’s residence where the residence was inside the same
building as the body shop, the outside of the building displayed
only the municipal number for the body shop, and the buildings
were similar in appearance and separated by an awning); United
States v. Prout, 526 F.2d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1976) (rejecting the
defendant’s argument that the description in the warrant
authorized only a search of the realty office and was
insufficient for the search of an upstairs apartment where,
although the business and residence had separate addresses and
separate utility meters, there were no identifying marks to
indicate the existence of two separate premises). Accordingly,
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we affirm the district court’s order denying Christie’s motion to
suppress evidence from the office located in his residence.
B. Validity of Conditional Plea
In his supplemental brief before this court, Christie
challenges for the first time the validity of his conditional
plea agreement. He argues that his guilty plea conditioned on a
non-case-dispositive pretrial motion is invalid and must be
vacated. Because Christie did not present this issue in his
original brief before this court, he has waived it, and we cannot
consider it on appeal. See United States v. Ogle, 415 F.3d 382,
383 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 837 (2005) (“Our cases
make it clear that an argument not raised in appellant’s original
brief as required by FED. R. APP. P. 28 is waived.”); see
also United States v. Cruz-Barraza, 157 F. App’x 768, 770 (5th
Cir. 2005) (unpublished), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1814 (2006)
(refusing to consider issues raised in the defendant’s
supplemental brief “because issues not raised in an appellant’s
initial brief as required by FED. R. APP. P. 28 are deemed
waived”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Christie’s judgment of
conviction and sentence as imposed by the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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