People v. Jones

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Appellate Court Date: 2021.04.15
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People v. Jones, 2020 IL App (3d) 170674

Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption EMANUEL W. JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Third District
No. 3-17-0674

Filed April 13, 2020

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, No. 16-CF-727; the
Review Hon. Kevin Lyons, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further
proceedings.

Counsel on James E. Chadd, Peter A. Carusona, and James Wozniak, of State
Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.

Jodi Hoos, State’s Attorney, of Peoria (Patrick Delfino, Thomas D.
Arado, and Nicholas A. Atwood, of State’s Attorneys Appellate
Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
 Panel JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Lytton and Justice McDade concurred in the
judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 After being charged with offenses relating to his possession of cocaine, defendant,
Emanuel W. Jones, filed a motion to quash a search warrant and suppress evidence. That
motion was ultimately denied, and defendant was found guilty following a stipulated bench
trial. On appeal, he argues that the Peoria County circuit court’s denial of his motion to quash
the search warrant and suppress evidence was in error. We reverse the court’s ruling on
defendant’s motion to quash the search warrant and suppress evidence, vacate defendant’s
conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and remand
the matter for further proceedings.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 The State charged defendant by indictment with unlawful possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 2016)) and unlawful
possession of a controlled substance (id. § 402(a)(2)(A)). Both counts originally alleged that
defendant possessed more than 15 grams of cocaine. The State would later add two charges
via indictment, charging lesser versions of those offenses based on the allegation that defendant
possessed between 1 and 15 grams of cocaine. id. § 401(c)(2) (possession with intent to
deliver); id. § 402(c) (possession).
¶4 Defendant subsequently filed a motion to quash search warrant and suppress evidence
illegally seized. In the motion, defendant alleged that the search warrant in the case was “bare
bones” in nature and therefore lacked the probable cause required for its issuance.
¶5 The complaint for search warrant was filed on September 24, 2016, by Jared Fuller of the
Peoria County Sherriff’s Office. The complaint requested a search warrant for the premises
located at 3003 West Proctor Street in Peoria, as well as for defendant’s person. Fuller, a
member of the Multi-County Narcotics Enforcement Group, averred that he expected to find
cocaine, currency, paraphernalia, and other evidence of possession with intent to deliver. He
continued:
“Complainant states that he does believe that the above listed items to be seized
will be located on the premises described above, because on at least two occasions the
complainant has caused the confidential source (C/S) to arrange for the purchase of
crack cocaine from [defendant]. On each occasion [defendant] was observed leaving
the above described residence and delivering crack cocaine to the C/S. The following
facts describe such:
The first occasion, I caused a reliable confidential source to arrange the purchase
of crack cocaine from [defendant]. Agents met with the C/S at a pre-determined
location and provided the C/S with $60.00 USC/OAF. Agents followed the C/S to the
pre-determined buy location, Peoria, IL (observed entire time driving). Agents
observed [defendant] leave the residence of 3003 W. Proctor St, Peoria, IL. [Defendant]

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 was observed entering the driver seat of his vehicle and drive and meet the C/S.
[Defendant] drove directly to the C/S (observed the entire time). [Defendant] exited his
vehicle and met the C/S through the front passenger seat of the C/S vehicle for a brief
time. [Defendant] then entered his vehicle and drove away. The C/S drove to a pre-
determined meet location to meet with Agents (observed entire time driving). The C/S
gave me 0.48 grams of crack cocaine that was purchased with $60.00 USC/OAF. The
C/S advised [defendant] arrived in his vehicle and exited. The C/S said [defendant]
handed him/her the 0.48 grams of crack cocaine in exchange for the $60.00 USC/OAF.
The crack cocaine was field tested with positive results for cocaine. The C/S was
searched before and after the transaction and no illegal contraband was located.
The second occasion, with the last 72 hours, I again caused the same reliable
confidential source to arrange for the purchase of crack cocaine from [defendant].
Agents met with the C/S at a pre-determined location and provided the C/S with $40.00
USC/OAF. Agents followed the C/S to the predetermined buy location [in] Peoria, IL
(observed entire time driving). Agents observed [defendant] leave the residence of
3003 W. Proctor St, Peoria, IL. [Defendant] was observed to walk North through the
yards to meet with the C/S at the buy location (observed the entire time). [Defendant]
was observed entering the front passenger seat of the C/S vehicle. The C/S then drove
a very short distance and [defendant] exited the C/S vehicle. [Defendant] was then
observed walking back to the residence of 3003 W. Proctor St, Peoria, IL. The C/S
drove to a pre-determined meet location to meet with Agents (observed the entire time
driving). The C/S gave me 0.46 grams of crack cocaine that was purchased with $40.00
USC/OAF. The C/S advised [defendant] arrived on foot and entered the front passenger
seat of the C/S vehicle. The C/S said [defendant] had him/her drive a very short
distance. The C/S said [defendant] handed him/her the 0.46 grams of crack cocaine in
exchange for the $40.00 USC/OAF. The C/S advised [defendant] then exited the C/S
vehicle and walked away. The crack cocaine was field tested with positive results for
cocaine. The C/S was searched before and after the transaction and no illegal
contraband was located.”
The complaint went on to attest to the basis for the reliability of the confidential source. It also
detailed Fuller’s experience in narcotics trafficking and investigation. Fuller explained his
awareness that drug traffickers often maintain, inter alia, “additional amounts of narcotics at
their residences or other safe places for future sales.”
¶6 A hearing was held on the motion on December 15, 2016. The State argued that the
complaint was sufficient to establish probable cause in part because “defendant was observed
directly leaving his house and going to the location of the drug sale.” The State also asserted
that the investigating officers otherwise acted in good faith in relying upon the search warrant.
¶7 In issuing its ruling, the court observed that defendant had exited from and returned to his
home before and after a drug sale. It commented: “There was no information about why the
Court or officer would think that drugs are in the home other than he has left his home and
made a transaction on the street.” The court granted defendant’s motion, finding that the
complaint for search warrant had been “bare bones.”
¶8 The State filed a motion to reconsider. In the motion, the State urged that even if the
complaint for search warrant was insufficient, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
should apply, such that the evidence seized in the case should not be suppressed at trial.

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¶9 Following a hearing on the motion, the court reiterated that the complaint had been bare
bones, as it contained no nexus between defendant’s conduct and the potential for additional
drugs to be found in the house. The court found, however, that the warrant had nevertheless
been reasonably relied upon. It therefore found that the good faith exception applied and
reversed its previous ruling on the motion to quash search warrant and suppress evidence.
¶ 10 Defendant proceeded by way of a stipulated bench trial. The stipulated evidence contained
multiple references to 3003 West Proctor Street as defendant’s home or residence. The court
found defendant guilty of unlawful possession with intent to deliver between 1 and 15 grams
of cocaine and sentenced defendant to an agreed term of five years’ imprisonment.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 On appeal, defendant argues that the court’s ultimate denial of his motion to quash search
warrant and suppress evidence was erroneous. He maintains that the complaint for a search
warrant failed to establish the probable cause required for its issuance. He also argues that the
complaint was so insufficient that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule may not be
applied.

¶ 13 A. Probable Cause
¶ 14 The United States and Illinois Constitutions both require “that searches and seizures must
be reasonable and that probable cause must support search warrants.” People v. Manzo, 2018
IL 122761, ¶ 28. In determining whether probable cause exists to support a search warrant, a
court must make a “practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before [it] ***, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
¶ 15 A court of review will not substitute its own judgment for that of the court that previously
issued a search warrant. People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 153 (2006). Rather, this court need
only decide whether the warrant-issuing court had a “substantial basis” for concluding that
probable cause existed. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. A court of review will not defer
to a warrant premised on a complaint that does not provide a substantial basis for probable
cause. See People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 219 (2006).
¶ 16 The facts in the present case are strikingly similar to those set forth in our supreme court’s
recent decision in Manzo, 2018 IL 122761. We find Manzo to be highly relevant here, nearly
to the point of being controlling. Accordingly, our analysis must begin with a discussion of the
court’s opinion in that case.
¶ 17 The complaint for search warrant in Manzo was targeted at Ruben Casillas, a black Ford
Explorer, and the residence at 701 West Marion Street in Joliet. Id. ¶ 4. The defendant was not
named in the complaint, but lived at that residence with Leticia Hernandez, Casillas’s cousin.
Id. In the complaint, the swearing officer explained that he had purchased cocaine from Casillas
three times in the prior 20 days, including twice “in the vicinity of 701 West Marion Street.”
Id. ¶ 5.
¶ 18 Casillas arrived at the first of the three transactions in a black Ford Explorer that was
registered to Hernandez. Id. ¶ 6. While an officer was texting Casillas to arrange the third
transaction, other officers observed Casillas leaving the residence at 701 West Marion Street
and proceeding directly to the arranged meeting location. Id. ¶ 8. The complaint included an

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 allegation that law enforcement records showed Casillas to be “an associate of Leticia
Hernandez who resided at 701 West Marion Street in Joliet.” Id. ¶ 9. The warrant judge issued
the warrant. Id. ¶ 10. The circuit court denied the defendant’s motion to quash the search
warrant. Id. ¶¶ 18-19.
¶ 19 Our supreme court found that there was no substantial basis to conclude that probable cause
existed to believe that contraband would be found in the residence. 1 Id. ¶ 61. The court found
that the facts found in the complaint failed “to establish a sufficient nexus between Casillas’s
criminal activities and the residence at 701 West Marion Street,” in part because insufficient
details connecting Casillas to Hernandez—and thus, the residence—had been provided. Id.
¶ 39. The court also rejected the notion that the proximity of the residence to the first two
transactions supported an inference that the residence was a reasonable place for Casillas to
store drugs. Id. ¶¶ 42-43. To that point, the court wrote:
“No evidence was presented that defendant lived at 701 West Marion Street, nor was
there evidence that Casillas was a frequent visitor to 701 West Marion Street. Casillas
was seen at 701 West Marion Street one time. The affidavit did not specify defendant’s
legal address, although the complaint stated that Officer Harrison had identified
Casillas from his Illinois Secretary of State driver’s license. It is possible Casillas also
lived in the neighborhood and, for that reason, was familiar with the area.” Id. ¶ 43.
¶ 20 Especially relevant to the instant matter, the State in Manzo insisted that the fact that
Casillas left the residence at 701 West Marion Street and proceeded directly to the third
transaction served to support the inference that additional drugs were stored at the residence.
Id. ¶ 47. In rejecting that inference, the court wrote:
“The three drug sales took place over a period of 19 days. With regard to the third drug
sale, there was no evidence indicating how long Casillas had been at defendant’s home
before he left the home and walked to the drug sale. While Casillas apparently had the
drugs on his person when he left 701 West Marion Street to meet Officer Harrison for
the third drug sale, it does not follow that Casillas obtained those drugs from
defendant’s home as opposed to any other place. Without more information connecting
defendant’s home to the drug sale, it is equally possible to infer that Casillas had the
drugs on his person when he arrived at defendant’s home.” Id. ¶ 48.
¶ 21 Finally, the State in Manzo contended that each of Casillas’s deliveries to the undercover
officer occurred on the same day as the officer’s request. Id. ¶ 50. It maintained that this “ability
to produce drugs soon after receiving a request for them suggests he has a ready supply and
that a drug dealer who has participated in multiple drug sales is far likelier to have access to
large quantities of drugs and other tools of the trade.” Id. Again, the court rejected that
argument. Id. ¶ 51. The court wrote:
“The facts and inferences as set forth in Officer Harrison’s sworn complaint were more
suggestive of an occasional sale than a full-scale drug operation, much less a drug
operation run out of defendant’s home. There was no allegation in the complaint that
the amount of drugs sold to Officer Harrison was indicative of a large-scale drug
operation, nor was there an allegation that Casillas was a known drug dealer. Even
assuming Casillas had access to a ready supply of drugs, the sworn complaint fails to

1
A divided panel of this court had affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motion to quash the
search warrant. People v. Manzo, 2017 IL App (3d) 150264, ¶ 24.

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 create a nexus between defendant’s home and that supply. There certainly was no
evidence in the sworn complaint supporting an inference that defendant’s home was a
‘stash house.’ ” Id.
¶ 22 The complaint for a search warrant in the present case provides even less of a substantial
basis for probable cause than did the facts in Manzo.
¶ 23 Among the biggest issues with the complaint in this case is the complete failure to establish
the time that the first transaction occurred. While the complaint stated that the second
transaction had occurred within the 72 hours prior to the filing of the complaint itself, all that
is known of the first transaction is that it occurred at some unknown point in the past. The
doctrine of staleness prevents law enforcement from relying upon old or outdated information
in establishing probable cause. See People v. Beck, 306 Ill. App. 3d 172, 179 (1999)
(“ ‘Staleness’ refers to the amount of time that has elapsed between the facts alleged in the
affidavit in support of the search warrant and issuance of the warrant.”). Where simply no
information is provided regarding when an activity took place, however, neither this court nor
any other court is able to conduct a staleness analysis. Under these circumstances, it is difficult
to ascribe any probative value to the first transaction. It could have happened the day before
the second transaction. It could have happened a decade earlier. 2
¶ 24 Also problematic is the lack of connection in the complaint between defendant himself and
the residence at 3003 West Proctor Street. At no point does the complaint, either explicitly or
implicitly, state that defendant lived at 3003 West Proctor Street. The complaint never even
refers to that residence in the possessive, such as “defendant’s residence” or “his residence.”
While the complaint explains that officers were observing defendant as he left the house, there
is no explanation for how the officers knew he was there or how he came to be there. There
was nothing in the complaint to indicate that defendant had anything more than a passing
familiarity with the residence in question. At most—including the unknown-in-time first
transaction—the complaint establishes that defendant has been to the residence at 3003 West
Proctor Street twice in his life. See Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 43 (“No evidence was presented
that defendant lived at 701 West Marion Street, nor was there evidence that Casillas was a
frequent visitor to 701 West Marion Street.”).
¶ 25 To be sure, a judge issuing a search warrant is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from
the complaint. People v. Moser, 356 Ill. App. 3d 900, 908 (2005). However, the complaint here
contained no information from which that inference could be reasonably drawn. See Black’s
Law Dictionary 897 (10th ed. 2014) (defining inference as “[a] conclusion reached by
considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them”). The conclusion that
defendant lived at 3003 West Proctor Street would be nothing more than an assumption. We
recognize that the stipulated trial evidence established that defendant did, in fact, live at the
address in question. That fact, however, does not impact our analysis. “[P]robable cause exists
in a particular case when the totality of the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s
knowledge at the time the warrant is applied for” allow a person of reasonable caution to
believe contraband will be found on the premises in question. (Emphasis added.) Manzo, 2018

We note that, in any event, defendant’s entry into his vehicle prior to the first transaction tends to
2

undermine the nexus between that transaction and the residence, as it raises the equal possibility that
defendant kept drugs in the vehicle.

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 IL 122761, ¶ 29. If Fuller knew that defendant lived at 3003 West Proctor Street, he never
conveyed that information to the court.
¶ 26 Next, the complaint in the present case contained no information concerning the passage
of time between the arrangement of the drug transactions and their actual execution. In other
words, once the confidential source arranged to purchase drugs from defendant, it is unknown
whether weeks, days, hours, or mere moments passed before the confidential source actually
met with defendant. Such a time frame would be highly relevant in potentially connecting
defendant to the residence at 3003 West Proctor Street; the greater the passage of time between
arrangement and execution, the greater the potential that defendant retrieved the drugs from
any of innumerable places prior to leaving the residence to conduct the transaction. On that
same point, the complaint fails to detail how long officers were positioned in surveillance on
defendant at 3003 West Proctor Street.
¶ 27 Of course, that fact stands in stark contrast to the facts set forth in Manzo. In that case, the
complaint stated that the transactions had occurred on the same day as the request for drugs.
The State argued that that immediacy lended itself to an inference that Casillas had a “ready
supply.” Id. ¶ 50. Of course, the Manzo court rejected that argument: “Even assuming Casillas
had access to a ready supply of drugs, the sworn complaint fails to create a nexus between
defendant’s home and that supply.” Id. ¶ 51. Here there are no facts to imply that defendant
had any such sort of “ready supply.”
¶ 28 The crux of the State’s argument, both on appeal and below, is that defendant twice left
3003 West Proctor Street to sell drugs and that must give rise to an inference that he kept his
drugs there. But the Manzo court rejected such an inference. To reiterate, the Manzo court
wrote:
“[T]here was no evidence indicating how long Casillas had been at defendant’s home
before he left the home and walked to the drug sale. While Casillas apparently had the
drugs on his person when he left 701 West Marion Street to meet Officer Harrison for
the third drug sale, it does not follow that Casillas obtained those drugs from
defendant’s home as opposed to any other place. Without more information connecting
defendant’s home to the drug sale, it is equally possible to infer that Casillas had the
drugs on his person when he arrived at defendant’s home.” Id. ¶ 48.
That same passage applies with equal force to the present case. The complaint contained no
evidence indicating how long defendant had been at 3003 West Proctor Street prior to leaving
to sell drugs. While defendant must have had the drugs on his person when he walked to the
second transaction, it does not follow that he obtained those drugs from the residence as
opposed to any other place. To be sure, we do not doubt that a sufficient pattern of leaving the
same house to attend drug transactions may give rise to probable cause to search that house.
Here, however, defendant left the residence in question one reliable time to sell drugs. See
supra ¶ 24. This does not create a nexus between the drugs and that residence.
¶ 29 Finally, we note that the Manzo court’s observation with regard to the amount of drugs sold
also applies in this case. The Manzo court wrote:
“The facts and inferences as set forth in Officer Harrison’s sworn complaint were more
suggestive of an occasional sale than a full-scale drug operation, much less a drug
operation run out of defendant’s home. There was no allegation in the complaint that
the amount of drugs sold to Officer Harrison was indicative of a large-scale drug

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 operation, nor was there an allegation that Casillas was a known drug dealer.” Manzo,
2018 IL 122761, ¶ 51.
In making its point, the Manzo court expressly adopted the view of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals: “[T]he sale of drugs out of a residence ‘exists upon a continuum ranging from an
individual who effectuates the occasional sale from his or her personal holdings of drugs to
known acquaintances, to an organized group operating an established and notorious drug
den.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Hython, 443 F.3d 480, 485 (6th Cir. 2006)).
¶ 30 Similarly, all that was established in this case was that defendant sold drugs one time
recently, and another time in the unknown past. While the complaint did state that the two
transactions were for 0.48 and 0.46 grams of crack cocaine, it did nothing to contextualize that
information. Nor did the complaint allege that defendant was a known drug dealer. In short, as
in Manzo, nothing in the complaint tended to establish that defendant was running a drug
operation of the magnitude where he would be expected to have some sort of stored supply, as
opposed to simply dealing out of his “personal holdings.” See Hython, 443 F.3d at 485.
¶ 31 Our supreme court in Manzo found that a substantial basis for probable cause did not exist,
and our determination can be no different here. However, our finding that there was not a
substantial basis for probable cause supporting the search at 3003 West Proctor Street does not
end our review. We must next consider whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule applies.

¶ 32 B. Good Faith Exception
¶ 33 In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the United States Supreme Court recognized
a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Under this doctrine, evidence illegally seized
need not be suppressed at trial where officers acted in good faith reliance on a search warrant
that was subsequently found to have not been supported by probable cause. Id. at 922. The
Leon Court also found that the good faith exception would be inapplicable where a search
warrant was issued based on an affidavit or complaint “ ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause
as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ” Id. at 923 (quoting Brown
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part, joined by Rehnquist,
J.)).
¶ 34 Illinois has codified the good faith exception in subsections 114-12(b)(1) and (b)(2) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/114-12(b)(1), (b)(2) (West 2016)).
Section 114-12(b)(1) provides that a court should not suppress otherwise admissible evidence
if a police officer seized that evidence in good faith. Id. § 114-12(b)(1). Section 114-
12(b)(2)(i), in turn, defines good faith:
“(2) ‘Good faith’ means whenever a peace officer obtains evidence:
(i) pursuant to a search or an arrest warrant obtained from a neutral and detached
judge, which warrant is free from obvious defects other than non-deliberate errors
in preparation and contains no material misrepresentation by any agent of the State,
and the officer reasonably believed the warrant to be valid[.]” Id. § 114-12(b)(2)(i).
¶ 35 Notably, the Manzo court held that the complaint in that case was so lacking as to fall
outside the scope of the good faith exception. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 69 (“[W]e ***find
that the affidavit in this case was bare-bones and failed to establish the required minimal nexus
between defendant’s home and the items sought in the search warrant.”). The court observed

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 that the statements in the complaint were “completely devoid of facts to support Officer
Harrison’s judgment that probable cause to search defendant’s home existed.” Id.
¶ 36 As we have noted, the present complaint presented even less of a basis for probable cause
than did the complaint in Manzo. The complaint here presented such a lack of indicia of
probable cause that official belief in the existence of probable cause for the search was entirely
unreasonable. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. We therefore find the good faith exception inapplicable
here.
¶ 37 In reaching this conclusion, we are compelled to point out that the complaint was, in the
terms employed by the Code, not free from obvious errors. See 725 ILCS 5/114-12(b)(2)(i)
(West 2016). In fact, the errors and omissions detailed above were fundamental in nature. The
complaint failed to state defendant’s relationship to the residence to be searched. It failed to
detail how much time passed between arrangement of the drug deals and the execution. It failed
to provide any significant details concerning defendant’s actions before or after the
transactions, which might tend to connect him to the residence. It failed to even state when one
of the two transactions took place. These were not minor, technical errors or omissions. They
were fundamental facts needed to establish a nexus between defendant and the residence. See
Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 69.
¶ 38 Where a search warrant is unsupported by probable cause, and the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule does not apply, the fruits of the search based on that warrant must be
suppressed at trial. We therefore reverse the circuit court’s ruling on defendant’s motion to
quash search warrant and suppress evidence. As a result, we also vacate defendant’s conviction
for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and remand the matter
for further proceedings. See id. ¶ 73.

¶ 39 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 40 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is reversed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded for further proceedings.

¶ 41 Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

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