Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
April 20, 2021
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 54182-3-II
Respondent,
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CLIFF MAYNARD,
Appellant.
SUTTON, A.C.J. — Cliff Maynard appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his Writ of
Error Coram Nobis. The State concedes that the dismissal was an error. We accept the State’s
concession, vacate the trial court’s order, and remand to the trial court to enter an order complying
with CrR 7.8(c)(2).
FACTS
On July 18, 2018, Maynard was sentenced following a guilty plea he entered as part of a
global resolution of charges in Kitsap and Cowlitz Counties. The Cowlitz County court imposed
77 months of confinement to run concurrently with the Kitsap County charges, and ordered that
Maynard receive credit for time served under only the Cowlitz County counts. The court ordered
the jail to compute time served.
On July 8, 2019, Maynard filed a Writ of Error Coram Nobis pro se, arguing that because
his guilty plea was based on a global resolution, he was entitled to credit for time served for the
counts from both counties. Maynard argued that the Department of Corrections (DOC) had not
credited him with that total, and he asked that the court order DOC to correct the number of days
No. 53952-7-II
he served.
The superior court denied Maynard’s motion, stating, “This appears to the court to be an
administrative issue that may be better handled via administrative appeal.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at
42. Maynard appeals.
ANALYSIS
Maynard argues that the trial court’s order denying his motion should be vacated and the
case remanded because the trial court failed to comply with CrR 7.8(c)(2)’s requirements. The
State concedes that the trial court erred. We accept the State’s concession.
CrR 7.8(c)(2) applies to writ petitions filed in the superior court that seek post-conviction
relief, “if not directly then by analogy.” Toliver v. Olsen, 109 Wn.2d 607, 612-13, 746 P.2d 809
(1987). CrR 7.8(c)(2) establishes the procedure for addressing CrR 7.8 motions:
The court shall transfer a motion filed by a defendant to the Court of Appeals for
consideration as a personal restraint petition unless the court determines that the
motion is not barred by RCW 10.73.090 and either (i) the defendant has made a
substantial showing that he or she is entitled to relief or (ii) resolution of the motion
will require a factual hearing.
Accordingly, the trial court may rule on the merits of a CrR 7.8 motion only when the motion is
timely filed and either “(a) the defendant makes a substantial showing that he is entitled to relief,
or (b) the motion cannot be resolved without a factual hearing.” State v. Smith, 144 Wn. App. 860,
863, 184 P.3d 666 (2008). If these prerequisites are absent, the trial court must transfer the motion
to the Court of Appeals for consideration as a personal restraint petition. Smith, 144 Wn. App. at
863.
Here, the trial court denied Maynard’s motion by claiming it “may be better handled via
administrative appeal.” CP at 42. Under CrR 7.8(c)(2), the trial court did not have the authority
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No. 53952-7-II
to decide the motion and, instead, was required to follow the procedures under that rule.
Accordingly, the trial court erred. We accept the State’s concession.
CONCLUSION
We vacate the trial court’s order and remand to the trial court to enter an order complying
with CrR 7.8(c)(2).
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
SUTTON, A.C.J.
We concur:
GLASGOW, J.
VELJACIC, J.
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