NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 23 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DILBERJIT JOHAL SINGH, No. 20-70922
Petitioner, Agency No. A061-825-157
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 20, 2021**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Dilberjit Johal Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of an
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision finding him removable and denying his
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We
review de novo questions of law, including whether a state statutory crime
qualifies as an aggravated felony. Jauregui-Cardenas v. Barr, 946 F.3d 1116,
1118 (9th Cir. 2020). We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual
findings. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006). We
review de novo claims of due process violations in immigration proceedings.
Jiang v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2014). We deny in part and dismiss in
part the petition for review.
The agency did not err in concluding that Singh’s conviction under
California Penal Code (“CPC”) § 273.5(a) constitutes a categorical crime of
violence aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (defining the term
aggravated felony to include a “crime of violence . . . for which the term of
imprisonment [is] at least one year”); Banuelos-Ayon v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1080,
1086 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a conviction under CPC § 273.5(a) constitutes a
categorical crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)). Thus, the agency did not
err in concluding that Singh’s offense rendered him removable, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and ineligible for asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii),
(B).
We reject as unsupported by the record Singh’s contentions that the agency
applied an incorrect legal standard or otherwise erred in determining removability.
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In his opening brief, Singh does not challenge the agency’s determination
that his offense was a particularly serious crime that rendered him ineligible for
withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the CAT.
See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013) (issues not
specifically raised and argued in a party’s opening brief are waived).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of deferral of removal
under CAT because Singh failed to show it is more likely than not he would be
tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to
India. See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009); see also
Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (agency must
consider possibility of relocation within country of removal as part of CAT
analysis).
We lack jurisdiction to consider Singh’s contention that the IJ failed to
properly develop the record as to evidence of hardship. See Barron v. Ashcroft,
358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (court lacks jurisdiction to review claims not
presented below).
Singh’s contentions that the IJ violated his due process rights fail. See Lata
v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error and prejudice to
prevail on a due process claim).
3 20-70922
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the
mandate. The motion for a stay of removal (Docket Entry No. 1) is otherwise
denied.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part, DISMISSED in part.
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