USCA11 Case: 20-13026 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-13026
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 9:12-cr-80182-DPG-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CAREY LUNSFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(April 30, 2021)
Before MARTIN, JORDAN and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
USCA11 Case: 20-13026 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 2 of 4
Carey Lunsford, through counsel, appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion for compassionate release under the First Step Act and 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A). He argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his motion by failing to properly consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors
and erroneously determining that he was a danger to the community.
Mr. Lunsford is currently serving a 188-month sentence for armed bank
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d). He pled guilty to this charge
in November 2012. For sentencing purposes, he was classified as a career offender
based on his long-running criminal history, which began in the 1970s and included
prior federal and state robbery convictions, attempted robbery convictions, and a
conviction for receiving stolen property.
Mr. Lunsford is currently incarcerated at FCI Danbury and is scheduled for
release on June 27, 2025. It is undisputed that he suffers from several serious
medical conditions, including bladder cancer (he is currently in remission), Type 2
diabetes, hypertension, and obesity. The government conceded below that Mr.
Lunsford’s Type 2 diabetes constitutes “an extraordinary and compelling reason
allowing compassionate release” in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless,
the government opposed Mr. Lunsford’s motion on the basis that he remained a
danger to the community if released. The government also asserted that the § 3553
sentencing factors strongly disfavored a sentence reduction.
2
USCA11 Case: 20-13026 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 3 of 4
The district court ultimately agreed with the government. Although it found
that Mr. Lunsford’s medical conditions were extraordinary and compelling, it issued
an order denying his motion for compassionate release as a matter of discretion.
We review for abuse of discretion the denial of an eligible movant’s request
for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act and § 3582(c)(1)(A). See United
States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). A district court abuses its
discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in
making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous. See
id.; United States v. Khan, 794 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2015). A factual finding
is not clearly erroneous if it represents a choice between two permissible views of
the evidence. See United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006).
In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act, which, in part, amended 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to increase the use and transparency of compassionate
release of federal prisoners. See First Step Act of 2018 § 603, Pub. L. No. 115-391,
132 Stat. 5194. In the context of compassionate release, the Act provides that “the
court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the
defendant . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . if it finds that extraordinary
and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
The weight given to each of the § 3553(a) factors for sentencing is generally left to
3
USCA11 Case: 20-13026 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 4 of 4
the district court’s discretion. See United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1327
(11th Cir. 2013).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Lunsford’s
motion for compassionate release because the record demonstrates that the court
thoroughly considered several § 3553(a) factors. The court found that Mr. Lunsford
would pose a danger if he were released early given his criminal history. The court
also noted that he had served only seven and a half years of his fifteen-year term.
The court’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors did not support granting Mr.
Lunsford’s motion and that he posed a danger to the community were supported by
the nature and circumstances of his instant offense and his extensive criminal
history, which is described in detail in the district court’s order.
We therefore find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mr. Lunsford’s motion for compassionate release. See Harris, 989 F.3d at 911.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
4