United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT November 15, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-60936
Summary Calendar
RAUL SEGOVIA-PLATA,
Petitioner,
versus
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
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Petitions for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A41-277-069
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Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Raul Segovia-Plata (Segovia) filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241
petition challenging decisions of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) affirming the Immigration Judge’s determination
that he is not eligible for relief from cancellation under former
§ 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and denying his
motion to reopen the proceedings. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas transferred Segovia’s
§ 2241 petition to this court. See Jama v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d
230, 232 (5th Cir. 2005); Rosales v. Bureau of Immigration and
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 05-60936
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Customs Enforcement, 426 F.3d 733, 736 (5th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 1055 (2006).
Segovia argues that he is not subject to removal because the
definition of “conviction” in the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) cannot constitutionally be
applied to his deferred adjudication. Segovia’s deferred
adjudication falls clearly under the IIRIRA’s definition of
conviction, and the application of that definition does not
violate his constitutional rights. See Madriz-Alvarado v.
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir. 2004); Moosa v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service, 171 F.3d 994, 1001-02 (5th Cir.
1999); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A).
Segovia’s alternative argument that he is eligible for
§ 212(c) relief from removal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.44(b) is
unavailing because Segovia was convicted of an aggravated felony,
as that term was defined when his request for § 212(c) relief
was adjudicated. Salazar-Regino v. Trominski, 415 F.3d 436,
447 (5th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed (Dec. 22, 2005)
(No. 05-830); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.44(c).
Segovia’s second alternative argument that his offense for
simple possession, which was only a misdemeanor under federal
law, is not a “drug-trafficking” crime, and, therefore, not an
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) or 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) is also unavailing. Segovia’s contention that the
retroactive application of this court’s interpretation of
No. 05-60936
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§ 1101(a)(43)(B) in United States v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d
505 (5th Cir. 2001), to define his state-court offense as a drug
trafficking offense violates the Ex Post Facto, Due Process, and
Equal Protection Clauses was squarely rejected by this court in
Salazar-Regino, 415 F.3d at 448-49, 451-52. One panel of this
court may not overrule another. See id. at 448; Williams v.
Blazer Fin. Servs., Inc., 598 F.2d 1371, 1374 (5th Cir. 1979).
This court has also rejected Segovia’s argument that the
deportation, resulting exile, and permanent separation from an
alien’s family violates the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR). See Martinez-Lopez v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 502-03 (5th
Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, Segovia’s petition for review is DENIED.