FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY 3 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PASKENTA BAND OF NOMLAKI No. 17-15486
INDIANS; PASKENTA ENTERPRISES
CORPORATION, D.C. No.
2:15-cv-00538-MCE-CMK
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
UMPQUA BANK; UMPQUA
HOLDINGS CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 26, 2021
San Francisco, California
Before: KLEINFELD, RAWLINSON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
This appeal by Appellants-Plaintiffs Paskenta Band of Nomlaki Indians and
Paskenta Enterprises Corporation (collectively, Paskenta) seeks to reverse the
district court’s dismissal of Paskenta's third amended complaint asserting claims
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
for negligence, breach of contract and aiding and abetting against
Appellees-Defendants Umpqua Bank and Umpqua Holdings Corporation
(collectively, Umpqua Bank). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Reviewing de novo, we affirm. See Northstar Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Schwab
Invests., 904 F.3d 821, 828 (9th Cir. 2018).
1. Negligence Claim
Paskenta’s complaint does not plausibly allege facts to support a claim for
negligence. The duty to investigate and discover the wrongdoing of Paskenta’s
authorized signatories fell to Paskenta, and not to Umpqua Bank. See Cal. Fin.
Code§ 1451 (providing that banks may assume that any activity initiated by an
authorized signer is for a valid purpose unless the bank receives written notice
from the debtor otherwise); see also Chazen v. Centennial Bank, 61 Cal. App. 4th
532, 537 (1998) (holding that “commercial banks have no duty to police their
fiduciary accounts . . . and are not liable for the misappropriation of trust funds by
the trustee”) (citations and alteration omitted); Desert Bermuda Props. v. Union
Bank, 265 Cal. App. 2d 146, 150 (1968) (holding that a bank “was not required to
inquire into the financial relationship of [the corporation] and its officers and
directors acting within the scope of their conferred authority until Bank received
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notice that their authority had been revoked or Bank officially learned that
authorization never existed”).
2. Breach of Contract Claim
The contract between Umpqua Bank and Paskenta imposed no obligation on
Umpqua Bank to monitor transactions by authorized signatories on Paskenta’s
accounts at Umpqua Bank. See Chazen, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 537 (explaining that
“the relationship of bank and depositor is founded on contract . . . which is
ordinarily memorialized by a signature card that the depositor signs upon opening
the account”); see also Blackmon v. Hale, 463 P.2d 418, 422 (Cal. 1970) (in bank)
(holding that the signature card “serves as a contract between the depositor and the
bank for the handling of the account”). Umpqua Bank was not notified of any
change in account authorization until Paskenta’s May 30 cease and desist letter,
which Paskenta acknowledges that Umpqua Bank honored.
3. Aiding and Abetting Claim
Paskenta’s complaint does not sufficiently allege a claim for aiding and
abetting. Specifically, Paskenta failed to plausibly allege that Umpqua Bank
actually knew that processing transactions requested by Paskenta’s authorized
signatories, assisted those employees in committing a specific tort. See Das v.
Bank of Am., N.A., 186 Cal. App. 4th 727, 745 (2010). Instead, Paskenta alleged
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that various irregularities required further investigation by Umpqua Bank to
determine whether Paskenta employees were engaged in wrongdoing. However,
actual knowledge is required to establish an aiding and abetting claim. See Das,
186 Cal. App. 4th at 745 (affirming dismissal of an aiding and abetting claim
because plaintiff failed to allege that “the bank had actual knowledge of the
underlying wrong it purportedly aided and abetted”); see also Chavez v. United
States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108-10 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that “conclusory
statements . . . are not entitled to the presumption of truth”).
Because Paskenta failed to state any plausible claim against Umpqua Bank,
the district court did not err in dismissing Paskenta’s third amended complaint.
AFFIRMED.
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