United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT December 5, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-61054
Summary Calendar
DAWOOD AKRAM MIR,
Petitioner,
versus
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
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Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A79 008 186
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Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Dawood Akram Mir seeks a petition for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of his motion to reopen. This
court reviews the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of
discretion and will not find such abuse of discretion unless the
denial is “capricious, racially invidious, utterly without
foundation in the evidence, or otherwise so aberrational that it
is arbitrary rather than the result of any perceptible rational
approach.” Pritchett v. INS, 993 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1993)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The BIA may
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 05-61054
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deny a motion to reopen if the evidence submitted does not
establish a prima facie claim for relief. INS v. Doherty, 502
U.S. 314, 323 (1992).
Mir concedes that “the newly submitted evidence does not in
itself make out a case for withholding,” but he urges that, if
considered in conjunction with the evidence originally submitted,
he has shown a clear probability of future persecution which
entitles him to relief. Mir also contends that the BIA’s denial
of the motion to reopen was an abuse of discretion because it
erroneously found the new evidence to be incredible, erroneously
relied on the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) original negative
credibility determinations to so find, and failed to examine the
requisite factors for assessing credibility on the record.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion
to reopen. Even without reference to credibility issues, the
evidence Mir submitted in support of his motion does not
establish a clear probability that he would be persecuted by
governmental authorities specifically on account of his political
opinions if he returns to Pakistan. The assertion that the BIA
erred in referring to the IJ’s original negative credibility
determination is without merit. Mir’s complaint that the BIA
erred in failing to explain its rejection of the new evidence in
greater detail in the order denying the motion to reopen is
similarly unavailing as the BIA “has no duty to write an exegesis
on every contention.” Osuchukwu v. INS, 744 F.2d 1136, 1142-43
No. 05-61054
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(5th Cir. 1984). Moreover, any error was cured by the detailed
explanation the BIA gave for finding the new evidence to be
unreliable in its subsequent order denying reconsideration.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.