Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
May 11, 2021
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 54095-9-II
Respondents,
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JAMEZ EDWARD BROWN,
Appellant.
MAXA, P.J. – Jamez Brown appeals his sentence for felony violation of a domestic
violence no-contact order and two gross misdemeanors: fourth degree assault – domestic
violence and obstruction of a law enforcement officer. He also challenges his convictions in a
statement of additional grounds (SAG).
We hold that (1) the record is unclear whether the trial court intended to impose as legal
financial obligations (LFOs) community custody supervision fees as determined by the
Department of Corrections (DOC) and collection costs, (2) there are scrivener’s errors on a
document attached to the judgment and sentence for the gross misdemeanors, and (3) Brown’s
SAG claims have no merit. Accordingly, we affirm Brown’s convictions, but we remand to the
trial court to consider whether to impose supervision fees and collection costs and to correct any
scrivener’s errors in the document attached to the gross misdemeanors judgment and sentence.
FACTS
The State charged Brown with violation of a domestic violence no-contact order, a
felony; fourth degree assault – domestic violence, a gross misdemeanor; and obstruction of a law
No. 54095-9-II
enforcement officer, a gross misdemeanor. The trial court granted Brown’s motion to represent
himself with the assistance of standby counsel.
Brown’s felony charge was predicated on two prior convictions of violating domestic
violence no-contact orders. Before trial, the court explained to Brown that he could stipulate to
his two prior offenses or the jury could decide if he had committed the offenses. Brown agreed
to stipulate to the prior offenses.
The jury found Brown guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Brown to 60 months
in confinement for the felony, the statutory maximum. The court imposed zero months of
community custody, but imposed up to 12 months of community custody for any earned release
time. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that Brown was indigent. The court also
stated that “the only financial obligation imposed with the [felony] offense is going to be the
crime victim penalty assessment.” 5 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 451.
The judgment and sentence imposed the crime victim penalty assessment and stated,
“The following extraordinary circumstances exist that make payment of nonmandatory legal
financial obligations inappropriate: Indigency.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 56. However, a separate
section of the judgment and sentence required Brown to “pay supervision fees as determined by
DOC” as a condition of community custody. CP at 61. The judgment and sentence also required
Brown to pay collection costs on unpaid LFOs.
The judgment and sentence for the gross misdemeanors provided that Brown was
sentenced to 364 days with zero days suspended, which was consistent with what the trial court
stated at sentencing. But the court attached a document to the judgment and sentence that stated
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that the 364 days were suspended.1 Also on this document, the court listed a $500 victim penalty
assessment and stated that it was “concurrent” with the felony conviction. CP at 76. But the
court stated at sentencing that it was not imposing any financial obligations on the gross
misdemeanors. Finally, this document contained boilerplate language that any financial
obligation imposed in the judgment and sentence would bear interest from the date of the
judgment.
Brown appeals his conviction and sentence.
ANALYSIS
A. STATE’S PROCEDURAL ARGUMENTS
Initially, the State makes two procedural arguments. First, the State argues that Brown is
not an aggrieved party under RAP 3.1 because community custody supervision fees and LFO
collection costs may never be incurred. This essentially is a ripeness claim. However, the
State’s argument fails because Brown is currently aggrieved if there is an error in his judgment
and sentence. Further, this is Brown’s opportunity to challenge all aspects of his judgment and
sentence that he finds objectionable. He cannot wait until these challenged LFOs are incurred
because an appeal at that time would be untimely.
Second, the State argues that this court should not consider Brown’s LFO claims because
he did not object in the trial court. There is no explanation for Brown’s failure to object in the
trial court to the imposition of supervision fees and collections costs. Defense counsel had an
obligation here to raise the issue so the trial court could clarify whether it intended to impose
1
This document was titled “Conditions on Suspended Sentence,” but the court crossed off the
title. CP at 75.
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those fees. Our inclination is to decline to consider Brown’s challenge to the imposition of
supervision fees and collection costs.
However, under State v. Blazina, we may exercise our discretion under RAP 2.5(a) to
consider the imposition of LFOs. 182 Wn.2d 827, 834-36, 344 P.3d 680 (2015). The Supreme
Court repeatedly has signaled that we should exercise our discretion to address LFO issues. See
State v. Lee, 188 Wn.2d 473, 501-02, 396 P.3d 316 (2017). Therefore, we consider the
imposition of community custody supervision fees and collection costs.
B. IMPOSITION OF SUPERVISION FEES AND COLLECTION COSTS
Brown argues that the trial court erred in failing to waive the requirement to pay
community custody supervision fees and collection costs after finding him indigent. We
conclude that although the trial court had authority to impose these fees, the record is unclear
whether the court actually intended to impose them.
1. Community Custody Supervision Fees
RCW 9.94A.703(2)(d) states that “[u]nless waived by the court, as part of any term of
community custody, the court shall order an offender to: . . . [p]ay supervision fees as determined
by [DOC].” Because supervision fees are waivable by the trial court, they are discretionary
LFOs. State v. Spaulding, 15 Wn. App. 2d 526, 536, 476 P.3d 205 (2020). But a discretionary
supervision fee is not a “cost” as defined in RCW 10.01.160(2), and therefore the prohibition in
RCW 10.01.160(3) of imposing “costs” on an indigent person is inapplicable. Id. Therefore, the
trial court had authority to impose supervision fees as an LFO even though Brown was indigent.
Here, the judgment and sentence section regarding community custody imposed
supervision fees as determined by DOC as a condition of community custody. However, in
discussing the imposition of LFOs, the trial court stated “the only financial obligation
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imposed . . . is going to be the crime victim penalty assessment.” 5 RP at 451. In addition, the
judgment and sentence stated that Brown’s indigency was an “extraordinary circumstance” that
made “payment of nonmandatory legal financial obligations inappropriate.” CP at 56. These
statements suggest that the court did not intend to impose these fees.
On the other hand, the supervision fee provision was in a separate part of the judgment
and sentence dealing with community custody. Even though the trial court waived other
discretionary LFOs, it is possible that the court intended to impose supervision fees as a
condition of community custody.
The record is unclear whether the trial court intended to impose supervision fees.
Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to consider in its discretion whether to impose
supervision fees.
2. Collection Costs
RCW 36.18.190 provides that “[t]he superior court may, at sentencing or at any time
within ten years, assess as court costs the moneys paid for remuneration for services or charges
paid to collection agencies or for collection services.” We assume without deciding that
collection costs, like community custody supervision fees, are not costs within the meaning of
RCW 10.01.160(2) and therefore can be imposed on an indigent defendant.
However, as with supervision fees, it still is unclear from our record whether the trial
court intended to impose collection costs. Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to consider
in its discretion whether to impose collection costs.
C. SCRIVENER’S ERRORS
Brown argues there are several scrivener’s errors on the document attached to the gross
misdemeanors judgment and sentence. The State partially concedes there are inconsistencies
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between the documents. We conclude the documents contain scrivener’s errors and accept the
State’s partial concession.
A scrivener’s error is one that, when amended, would correctly convey the intention of
the trial court as expressed in the record at trial. State v. Davis, 160 Wn. App. 471, 478, 248
P.3d 121 (2011).
The trial court sentenced Brown to 364 days “with zero suspended” for the misdemeanor
assault and obstruction convictions. The court properly noted this on the misdemeanors
judgment and sentence. But on the attached document, the court stated that the 364 days were
suspended. Also on this document, the court listed a $500 victim penalty assessment that was
concurrent with the felony conviction.
This attached document also contained boilerplate language that any financial obligation
imposed in the judgment and sentence will “bear interest from the date of the judgment.” CP at
76. However, RCW 10.82.090(1) prohibits interest accrual on nonrestitution LFOs. State v.
Johns, 15 Wn. App. 2d 775, 777, 477 P.3d 522 (2020).
We conclude that there are some inconsistencies between the gross misdemeanors
judgment and sentence and the attached document. On remand, Brown may raise these issues to
the trial court for correction.
D. SAG CLAIMS
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Brown asserts that evidence was insufficient to convict him of felony violation of a
domestic violence no-contact order because the State failed to prove that his prior convictions
involved qualifying orders. We disagree.
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The test for determining sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d 243, 265, 401 P.3d 19 (2017).
In a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the defendant admits the truth of the evidence and the
court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence in the light
most favorable to the State. Id. at 265-66.
If a defendant stipulates to facts that establish an element of a charged crime, he or she
“waives ‘the right to require the State [to] prove that element beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
State v. Case, 187 Wn.2d 85, 91, 384 P.3d 1140 (2016) (quoting State v. Humphries, 181 Wn.2d
708, 715, 336 P.3d 1121 (2014)).
Under RCW 26.50.110(5),2 violation of a no-contact order is a felony if “the offender has
at least two previous convictions for violating the provisions of an order issued under this
chapter.” Chapter 26.50 RCW concerns domestic violence matters.
Brown asserts that although he stipulated to the existence of two prior court order
violations, this was not sufficient to establish that the violations were of qualifying orders. But
the record shows that Brown stipulated that they were domestic violence no contact orders issued
under “chapter 26.50.” CP at 22. Under RCW 26.50.110(5), the orders would be qualifying
orders. This stipulation established an element of the charged crime.
Accordingly, we hold that sufficient evidence supports Brown’s felony violation of a
domestic violence no-contact order conviction.
2
RCW 26.50.110 was amended in 2020, but that amendment is not material to this case.
Therefore, we cite to the current version of the statute.
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2. Admission of Prior No-Contact Orders
Brown asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the prior no-contact orders into
evidence based on ER 403 after he stipulated to violating the orders. But Brown fails to explain
this alleged error as required under RAP 10.10(c). The record does not show that the State
submitted these orders to the jury; rather, the State presented the orders at a pretrial hearing to
the trial judge, but that was before Brown stipulated to the prior violations. Accordingly, we
reject Brown’s claim.
CONCLUSION
We affirm Brown’s convictions, but we remand to the trial court to consider whether to
impose supervision fees and collection costs and to correct any scrivener’s errors.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
MAXA, P.J.
We concur:
CRUSER, J.
VELJACIC, J.
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