J-A04045-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
REGINALD BRYANT :
:
Appellant : No. 3371 EDA 2019
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 19, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-1206841-1997,
CP-51-CR-1206851-1997
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: Filed: May 13, 2021
Reginald Bryant (Bryant) appeals the order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia County (PCRA court) denying his second petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 He argues that the PCRA
court erred in denying his after-discovered evidence claim that a recently
obtained ballistics report would have been exonerating. We affirm.2
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
2 “The standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is whether
that determination is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal
error.” Commonwealth v. Weimer, 167 A.3d 78, 81 (Pa. Super. 2017).
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I.
Bryant was convicted of first-degree murder, third-degree murder and
other related offenses in 2001 following a jury trial. 3 He was sentenced to a
prison term of life as to the first-degree murder count and an aggregate term
of 17.5 to 35 years on the remaining offenses. The facts adduced at the trial
were summarized by this Court as follows:
In the summer of 1997 [Bryant and his co-defendant Lamont
Taylor] were dealing drugs in the one hundred block of North 62nd
Street in West Philadelphia. Leonard Wright (aka “Patrick”)
moved into their territory and began selling drugs out of Allen
Gibson and Madeline Carter’s residence on 121 North 62” Street.
On July 25, 1997, Taylor entered this house with a gun strapped
to his waist and threatened Carter with harm if she did not stop
selling drugs. She screamed to the neighbors that Taylor was
there and that if she was killed, he was the perpetrator.
Several hours later, Taylor returned to the house with [Bryant] in
order to prevent Patrick, Gibson, and Carter from moving in on
their drug operation. Upon entering the house, they demanded
to see Patrick, who eventually came downstairs to talk with them.
He and [Bryant and Taylor] got into a heated argument over his
right to sell drugs in the neighborhood. [Bryant] told Taylor to
“bust him” (kill him), and both [Bryant and Taylor] began shooting
at Patrick. Gibson immediately shielded Carter until they could
safely duck behind a living room sofa. Patrick returned fire, but
sustained a gunshot wound to his chest. [Either Bryant or
Taylor’s] bullets also struck and killed Charles Sipes, a friend of
Gibson and Carter who was visiting at the time.
[Bryant and Taylor] fled the scene and sped off in a white Lexus
owned by [Bryant’s] sister. Patrick told Gibson to hide his gun in
the basement, and then he staggered off the front porch in time
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3We decide this appeal in conjunction with Bryant’s related matter at appellate
docket number 3370 EDA 2019, which arises from the same underlying facts
and legal issues.
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to see [Bryant and Taylor] enter the car and drive off. He told
police that two black men shot him and drove off in the “white
Lexus.” Katrese Watts, a neighbor, confirmed Patrick’s statement
and identified [Bryant and Taylor] as the men who forcibly entered
the house before gunfire erupted.
On August 3, 1997, just a week after the shooting, Carter told a
homicide detective that ... Taylor had threatened her earlier in the
day on July 25th and that both [Bryant and Taylor] later shot Sipes
and Patrick. She told the detective that she was afraid [Bryant
and Taylor] would retaliate against her for talking to the police.
Carter did not return home until approximately 3 a.m. the
following morning. Gibson was still awake and accompanied her
into the kitchen. About five to ten minutes later, someone
knocked on the door and Carter went to answer it. [Bryant and
Taylor] pushed their way into the house, knocked [Carter] down,
and then shot her in the chest. They proceeded to pour gasoline
over her paralyzed body and light her and the entire house on fire.
Taylor turned himself into police, and [Bryant] was arrested at his
residence on September 23, 1997. A search of [Bryant’s]
residence yielded the key to a safe containing a loaded .40 caliber
Smith and Wesson handgun, a large quantity of heroin, and
$2,200.
Commonwealth v. Bryant, 1151 EDA 2001 (Pa. Super. Sept. 13, 2002)
(unpublished memorandum) (affirming judgment of sentence).
Bryant was charged with the murder Sipes and Carter, but the ballistics
expert who testified at trial could not link those shootings with the weapon
found in Bryant’s safe. The jury found Bryant guilty of first-degree murder,
third-degree murder, arson, aggravated assault, conspiracy and possession of
an instrument of crime. Bryant appealed and this Court affirmed the judgment
of sentence. See id.
Bryant’s first PCRA petition was denied in 2015 and the denial was
affirmed by this Court in 2017. See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 2455 EDA
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2015 (Pa. Super. Dec. 2, 2016) (unpublished memorandum). On March 9,
2018, Bryant moved to retest the .40 caliber firearm found in his safe, as well
as projectiles and cartridge casings found at the scenes of the subject
incidents. The motion was granted, and in a supplemental PCRA petition,
Bryant cited the results of the new testing, which purported to prove that the
.40 caliber firearm was not a murder weapon.
The PCRA court sent timely notice to Bryant that it would be finding that
his most recent PCRA petition was without merit. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.
Bryant responded to the notice and the petition was summarily denied. A
timely notice of appeal was filed4 and the PCRA court submitted a 1925(a)
opinion outlining why the denial of relief should be affirmed. See 1925(a)
Opinion, 4/21/2020, at 6-10.
As to Bryant’s claim that the ballistics report would have reasonably
altered the outcome of his trial had it been introduced, the PCRA court found
that it had no merit.5 At trial, the Commonwealth presented no direct
evidence that the .40 caliber weapon taken from Bryant’s safe was used to kill
____________________________________________
4 Bryant filed two notices of appeal, each of which were captioned with two
related case numbers that appear on the PCRA court’s order denying relief.
These notices comported with Pa.R.A.P. 341. See generally
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc
panel holding that identical notices of appeal with multiple docket numbers
are sufficient as long as a separate notice is filed at each docket number).
5 Bryant had asserted additional claims of after-discovered evidence which he
does not raise in this appeal. Accordingly, the scope of our review is limited
to the sole issue that appears in the briefing.
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either of the victims. Rather, a ballistics expert only testified that the weapon
could not definitely be excluded as the murder weapon. More importantly,
the PCRA court found that the new ballistics report would not at all have
diminished the weight of the substantial evidence linking Bryant to the two
murders, including the testimony of several eyewitnesses.
II.
A PCRA petition must be filed within one year from the date that the
judgment of sentence became final. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b); see also
U.S.Sup.Ct.Rule 13.1 (allowing 90 days for the filing of a writ of certiorari in
the Supreme Court of the United States). The PCRA enumerates three
exceptions to this jurisdictional time-bar:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
To successfully assert the after-discovered evidence exception of
subsection (ii) above, a petitioner must satisfy 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vi)
which requires a showing that these new facts constitute “exculpatory
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evidence” that “would have changed the outcome of the trial if it had been
introduced.” Commonwealth v. Palmer, 814 A.2d 700, 706 (Pa. Super.
2002) (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(2)(vi)). Moreover, the petitioner must
file the claim within one year from the date that it could have been presented.
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
A petitioner must then prove that such evidence:
(1) has been discovered after the trial and could not have been
obtained at or prior to the conclusion of the trial by the exercise
of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or
cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach the credibility
of a witness; and (4) is of such nature and character that a
different verdict will likely result if a new trial is granted.
Commonwealth v. Randolph, 873 A.2d 1277, 1283 (Pa. 2005) (quoting
Commonwealth v. McCracken, 659 A.2d 541, 545 (Pa. Super. 1995)). If
any of these elements cannot be established, the after-discovered evidence
claim must be denied. See Commonwealth v. Pagan, 950 A.2d 270, 292-
93 (Pa. 2008).
III.
First, Bryant’s claim is time-barred. He filed his second PCRA petition
well over ten years after the date on which his judgment of sentence became
final. In that petition, Bryant relied on a ballistics report obtained in 2018.
The petition was untimely and he cannot satisfy the after-discovered evidence
exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar because he did not exercise
“reasonable diligence” in obtaining the ballistics report.
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Bryant’s trial was in 2001 and his judgment of sentence became final in
2003. He had roughly until the end of 2004 to petition for PCRA relief, but did
not initially move for further ballistics testing until eight years later, in 2012,
and the motion was never ruled on. These efforts were not resumed until
2018, with the filing of a renewed request, which was granted. However,
Bryant has given no explanation for why he could not seek, much less obtain,
this evidence earlier – either in time for his trial, within a year from the
judgment of sentence, or even a year from the date he first filed his motion
for further testing in 2012. Although the first motion was apparently never
ruled upon, it was still incumbent on Bryant to demonstrate that he was
reasonably diligent at all relevant times. He has not done so.
Even if Bryant’s claim could satisfy an exception to the PCRA’s
jurisdictional time-bar, no relief would be due. The claim fails on the merits
because the ballistics report is not reasonably likely to have affected the
outcome of his jury trial. Numerous witnesses identified Bryant at trial as one
of the perpetrators who shot the two decedents. No direct evidence was
introduced showing that Bryant’s .40 caliber firearm was the weapon used in
the shootings. Thus, the ballistics report showing that Bryant’s .40 caliber
weapon did not match the murder weapon does little to exculpate Bryant or
undermine the incriminating evidence admitted at trial. His petition was
properly denied.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/13/21
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