IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 19–1219
Submitted December 16, 2020—Filed May 14, 2021
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
BRIAN De ARRIE McGEE,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William Price
(motion to suppress), Senior Judge, Becky Goettsch (trial) and Christopher
Kemp (sentencing), District Associate Judges.
A defendant appeals his conviction for operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated, contending that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the results of a blood test. REVERSED AND
REMANDED.
Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, McDonald, and McDermott, JJ., joined.
McDermott, J., filed a special concurrence in which Christensen, C.J., and
Waterman, J., joined. Appel, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Oxley, J., filed
a dissenting opinion in which Appel, J., joined.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy
(argued), Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
2
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Louis S. Sloven (argued),
Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, Maurice
Curry and Kailyn Heston, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
3
MANSFIELD, Justice.
“Affirm if you can, reverse if you must, but never remand.” We
receive this advice often from our colleagues on the trial bench. Here,
however, the law changed after this case was heard in the district court.
In June 2019, the United States Supreme Court decided that the Fourth
Amendment “almost always” permits warrantless blood draws from
unconscious drivers when the police have probable cause to believe the
driver was operating while under the influence of alcohol. Mitchell v.
Wisconsin, 588 U.S. ___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2539 (2019) (plurality
opinion). The Court allowed for an exception in the “unusual case” where
the defendant can “show that his blood would not have been drawn if
police had not been seeking BAC information, and that police could not
have reasonably judged that a warrant application would interfere with
other pressing needs or duties.” Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2539. As we
discuss herein, this significant development in the law necessitates a
remand.
The defendant caused a two-vehicle accident by driving recklessly.
The occupants of both vehicles were injured. The defendant was rendered
unconscious, suffered a head injury, and was taken to the hospital
smelling strongly of marijuana. A police officer was dispatched to the
hospital to arrange for blood testing of the defendant. The defendant had
been sedated for treatment and a medical professional certified pursuant
to Iowa Code section 321J.7 (2018) that the defendant was unable to
consent or refuse blood testing. Testing was performed, therefore, without
the defendant’s permission. It confirmed that the defendant had both THC
and THC metabolites in his system. The defendant’s motion to suppress
this testing was overruled and the defendant was convicted of operating
while intoxicated (OWI) in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2.
4
On appeal, the defendant argues that this warrantless blood draw
violated Iowa Code section 321J.7, the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. We
find the State complied with section 321J.7. Regarding the Fourth
Amendment, we hold that Mitchell applies to cases of suspected driving
while under the influence of controlled substances, in addition to alcohol-
related cases. However, because the parties did not have an opportunity
to make a record under the Mitchell standard, we must utilize that dreaded
remand. We also hold that article I, section 8 does not provide greater
protection from warrantless blood draws than the Mitchell standard.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below and remand for further
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
I. Facts and Procedural Background.
On the afternoon of Saturday, December 8, 2018, at around 2 p.m.,
a call went out to Des Moines police to alert them of a vehicle collision on
Euclid Avenue. Dispatch indicated there were numerous injuries and one
person unconscious. Brian McGee was extracted from the driver’s seat of
one of the vehicles at the scene and taken to the hospital in critical
condition, having suffered a head injury and having been rendered
unconscious from the accident. Witnesses at the scene of the accident
indicated to police that McGee had been traveling at a high rate of speed
and failed to yield before making a left turn. This led to the collision with
the other vehicle. Five occupants of the other vehicle were injured and
had to be transported by medics to the hospital as well. It was determined
when they reached the hospital that their injuries were not life-
threatening.
Traffic was diverted away from the collision area. Both vehicles were
towed away. It took until 4:30 p.m. to restore traffic. As police officers
5
and medics tended to McGee, they noticed a strong odor of marijuana
coming from his person. An on-call Des Moines police officer—Tim
Fricke—was summoned to report for duty and assigned the task of
arranging for testing of McGee based on suspicions that he had been
driving while impaired.
Upon arriving at the hospital, Officer Fricke was informed by medical
staff that McGee had been sedated and would be unable to perform any
initial screening tests for impairment or to provide a refusal or consent for
blood testing. Also, Officer Fricke could see that McGee was unresponsive.
Officer Fricke did not attempt to obtain a warrant. He later testified that
he could have done so, but the Des Moines Police Department policy was
to obtain a warrant for blood testing of a nonresponsive driver only if the
offense would be a third or subsequent OWI or there was a serious injury
or death.
Shortly before 4 p.m., Officer Fricke handed an official request for
blood testing and a certification form to an advanced registered nurse
practitioner who was present. The nurse completed and signed the
certification that McGee was presently unable to give consent or refusal
for testing. At this point, the medical staff initiated the steps necessary to
draw blood from McGee. While this was going on, McGee suddenly awoke
in a muddled state. McGee repeated the word “pee” frantically and began
to urinate on himself as medical staff and his family attempted to help him
sit up and urinate into a receptacle. During this time, McGee did not
respond or even attempt to answer questions asked about his condition.
He passed out again after being calmed by family and further attended to
by medical staff. At around 4:10 p.m., McGee’s blood was drawn. Results
from the tests showed traces of lorazepam and delta-tetrahydrocannabinol
6
(THC) along with the presence of both the impairing and nonimpairing THC
metabolites.1
On March 13, 2019, the State filed a trial information in the Polk
County District Court charging McGee with OWI first offense. On April 11,
McGee filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the
warrantless blood draw, arguing the State needed “a warrant or exigent
circumstances.”
An evidentiary hearing took place on May 7 and 8 at which Officer
Fricke testified and both his body cam video and the certification form
were received in evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district
court denied McGee’s motion to suppress. The district court ruled the
State had complied with Iowa Code section 321J.7 in undertaking the
warrantless blood draw and that neither the United States Constitution
nor the Iowa Constitution required the State to obtain a warrant for the
blood draw.
Thereafter the parties stipulated to a trial on the minutes. The
district court found McGee guilty of first-offense OWI under the Iowa Code
section 321J.2(1)(c) alternative (“any amount of a controlled substance is
present in the person, as measured in the person’s blood”). The district
court expressly declined to find McGee guilty under section 321J.2(1)(a)
(the “under the influence” alternative). McGee was sentenced to one year
in jail with all but seven days suspended, fined $1250, and ordered to pay
over $10,000 in restitution to various victims.
II. Standard of Review.
McGee’s motion to suppress raised both statutory and
constitutional grounds. As to the statutory ground, our review is for
1The tests showed 15 ng/mL lorazepam, 17 ng/mL THC, 3 ng/mL hydroxy-THC,
and 59 ng/mL carboxy-THC.
7
correction of errors at law and the district court’s findings of fact are
binding if supported by substantial evidence. See State v. Smith, 926
N.W.2d 760, 762 (Iowa 2019). With respect to the constitutional grounds,
our review is de novo. State v. Fogg, 936 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Iowa 2019).
III. Legal Analysis.
Iowa Code section 321J.7 provides,
A person who is dead, unconscious, or otherwise in a
condition rendering the person incapable of consent or refusal
is deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided
by section 321J.6, and the test may be given if a licensed
physician, physician assistant, or advanced registered nurse
practitioner certifies in advance of the test that the person is
unconscious or otherwise in a condition rendering that person
incapable of consent or refusal.2
In this case, an advanced registered nurse practitioner certified at
3:59 p.m. on December 8, 2018, that McGee was incapable of consent or
refusal, having received intravenous injections of Ativan, Fentanyl, and
Haldol. McGee maintains that the blood draw was unlawful and violated
both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article
I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.
A. Compliance with Iowa Code Section 321J.7. Before getting to
the constitutional questions, we will address McGee’s claim that the blood
2Iowa Code section 321J.7 incorporates by reference the notion of implied consent
set forth in section 321J.6. That latter section provides in part,
A person who operates a motor vehicle in this state under
circumstances which give reasonable grounds to believe that the person
has been operating a motor vehicle in violation of section
321J.2 or 321J.2A is deemed to have given consent to the withdrawal of
specimens of the person’s blood, breath, or urine and to a chemical test or
tests of the specimens for the purpose of determining the alcohol
concentration or presence of a controlled substance or other drugs, subject
to this section.
Iowa Code § 321J.6(1). “Iowa’s implied consent law ‘is based on the premise “that a driver
impliedly agrees to submit to a test in return for the privilege of using the public
highways.” ’ ” State v. Garcia, 756 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 2008) (quoting State v.
Knous, 313 N.W.2d 510, 512 (Iowa 1981)).
8
draw did not comply with the statute. When the nurse completed the
certification at 3:59 p.m., McGee was sedated and appeared to be asleep.
As preparations were being made for the blood draw around 4:04 p.m.,
McGee stirred. He made some irregular movements and indicated he had
to “pee.” With assistance he sat up at the front of the hospital bed. He
urinated—initially on himself and on the floor of the hospital room and
later into a urinal that was held for him. At approximately 4:06 p.m.,
McGee was helped to lie back down. He appeared to fall back asleep. The
actual blood draw occurred four minutes later at 4:10 p.m.
McGee claims that a new certification should have been obtained in
light of his waking up temporarily to urinate. The district court disagreed,
finding that McGee’s condition did not materially change during the eleven
minutes between the certification and the actual blood draw. The court
noted that McGee remained “totally unresponsive to the questions of the
medical professionals [during the blood draw].” The recording on Officer
Fricke’s body cam shows the full sequence of events from 3:59 to 4:10 p.m.
The district court’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.
See State v. Axline, 450 N.W.2d 857, 859–60 (Iowa 1990) (stating that
“[c]onsiderable deference should be given to a trial court’s factual findings”
under Iowa Code § 321J.7, and that a person who is conscious can
nevertheless be “in a condition rendering him incapable of giving or
refusing consent”).
As a matter of statutory interpretation, we agree that Iowa Code
section 321J.7 does not usually require recertification when the blood
draw occurs within eleven minutes of the initial certification.
Certifications do not expire in eleven minutes, at least without clearer
evidence that the driver has become capable of refusing or consenting in
the meantime. Statutes come with a presumption of reasonableness, see
9
Iowa Code § 4.4(3), and this is a reasonable approach. We hold that the
blood draw complied with section 321J.7.
B. Constitutionality of the Blood Draw Under the Fourth
Amendment. We now turn to McGee’s Fourth Amendment objection to
the admission of the blood test results. In a series of recent decisions, the
United States Supreme Court has applied the Fourth Amendment to blood
alcohol testing. Its opinions, somewhat like the allegedly intoxicated driver
whose rights they have sought to define, have twisted and turned
somewhat. They have not necessarily hewed to a straight path.
In Missouri v. McNeely, the Court rejected the proposition that the
dissipation of alcohol in the blood justified a per se exigent-circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement. 569 U.S. 141, 152, 156, 165, 133
S. Ct. 1552, 1561, 1563, 1568 (2013). As the Court put it,
In short, while the natural dissipation of alcohol in the
blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific case, . . .
it does not do so categorically. Whether a warrantless blood
test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be
determined case by case based on the totality of the
circumstances.
Id. at 156, 133 S. Ct. at 1563.
This then led to the question whether other exceptions to the
warrant requirement might apply. In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Court
held that the search-incident-to-arrest (SITA) exception to the warrant
requirement authorized breath tests, but not blood tests, for alcohol. 579
U.S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016). The Court reasoned,
Blood tests are significantly more intrusive, and their
reasonableness must be judged in light of the availability of
the less invasive alternative of a breath test. Respondents
have offered no satisfactory justification for demanding the
more intrusive alternative without a warrant.
10
Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 2184. Addressing the situation where the driver
might not be capable of performing a blood test, the Court commented,
It is true that a blood test, unlike a breath test, may be
administered to a person who is unconscious (perhaps as a
result of a crash) or who is unable to do what is needed to take
a breath test due to profound intoxication or injuries. But we
have no reason to believe that such situations are common in
drunk-driving arrests, and when they arise, the police may
apply for a warrant if need be.
Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 2184–85.
Lastly, in June 2019, one month after the suppression ruling in this
case, the Court decided Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct.
2525. Mitchell seemingly walked back (1) McNeely’s rejection of categorical
exigent-circumstances exceptions and (2) Birchfield’s endorsement of
warrant applications for blood tests of incapacitated persons. Mitchell
presented the question of whether a warrant was needed for a blood draw
from an unconscious driver. Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2529–30. The Mitchell
plurality opinion concluded as follows:
When police have probable cause to believe a person
has committed a drunk-driving offense and the driver’s
unconsciousness or stupor requires him to be taken to the
hospital or similar facility before police have a reasonable
opportunity to administer a standard evidentiary breath test,
they may almost always order a warrantless blood test to
measure the driver’s BAC without offending the Fourth
Amendment. We do not rule out the possibility that in an
unusual case a defendant would be able to show that his
blood would not have been drawn if police had not been
seeking BAC information, and that police could not have
reasonably judged that a warrant application would interfere
with other pressing needs or duties. Because Mitchell did not
have a chance to attempt to make that showing, a remand for
that purpose is necessary.
Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2539 (plurality opinion).
The Mitchell plurality reached back toward the reasoning in
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966), a case the
11
Supreme Court had decided over a half-century earlier. See Mitchell, 588
U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2537 (“Schmerber controls.”). In Schmerber, the
Court had upheld a warrantless blood draw from a conscious, suspected
drunk driver. 384 U.S. at 772, 86 S. Ct. at 1836. It did so on the basis
that blood alcohol “begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops” and
“where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to
investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a
magistrate and secure a warrant.” Id. at 770–71, 86 S. Ct. at 1836.
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, provided the
necessary fifth vote in Mitchell. See Mitchell, 588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at
2539 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). He had dissented in
McNeely. See 569 U.S. at 176, 133 S. Ct. at 1574 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Concurring in the result only in Mitchell, Justice Thomas reiterated his
view that the natural metabolization of alcohol in the blood stream creates
a per se exigency and a per se exception to the warrant requirement
whenever law enforcement have probable cause to believe a driver is
drunk. See 588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2539.
“Under the narrowest grounds doctrine, the holding of a fragmented
Supreme Court decision with no majority opinion ‘may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.’ ” State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 801 N.W.2d 513, 522 (Iowa
2011) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S. Ct. 990,
993 (1977)). Hence, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the Mitchell
plurality opinion controls.
The Mitchell plurality stated,
[E]xigency exists when (1) BAC evidence is dissipating and
(2) some other factor creates pressing health, safety, or law
enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant
application. Both conditions are met when a drunk-driving
12
suspect is unconscious, so Schmerber controls: With such
suspects, too, a warrantless blood draw is lawful.
588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2537. Thus, Mitchell stands for a rule that
whenever probable cause exists to believe an unconscious driver has
committed drunk driving, a warrantless blood draw would “almost always”
be acceptable. Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2539. The only exception arises
where law enforcement “could not have reasonably judged that a warrant
application would interfere with other pressing needs or duties.” Id. at ___,
1139 S. Ct. at 2539. Exigent circumstances, in other words, is defined
generously, and is based on law-enforcement workload.3
If McGee had smelled of an alcoholic beverage rather than
marijuana, there would be no doubt that Mitchell applies to this case. But
those are not the facts. McGee’s erratic driving, combined with the “strong
odor” of burnt marijuana coming from him at the scene and at the hospital,
gave the police probable cause to conclude that he had violated the
controlled substance prongs of Iowa Code section 321J.2(1). See Iowa Code
§ 321J.2(1)(a) & (c); State v. Watts, 801 N.W.2d 845, 854 (Iowa 2011) (“[A]
trained officer’s detection of a sufficiently distinctive odor, by itself or when
accompanied by other facts, may establish probable cause.”); State v.
McMullen, 940 N.W.2d 456, 461 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019) (“McMullen points to
no authority requiring the officer to describe the odor with the specificity
of a sommelier.”). However, there was not enough here for a drunk driving
probable cause determination. So the question we need to answer is
whether Mitchell extends to controlled substances.
3As we discuss below, this Mitchell rule shares some characteristics with our 1966
holding under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 in a case involving an
unconscious driver suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. See State v.
Findlay, 259 Iowa 733, 743, 145 N.W.2d 650, 656 (1966).
13
We think it does. At least one commentator has expressed this view:
Mitchell could also provide justification for warrantless blood
draws in cases where someone is suspected of driving under
the influence of drugs, which also present a continuous risk
that evidence is being destroyed through the suspect’s
metabolic processes. . . . Mitchell will likely play a role in
future cases with drivers who are under the influence of
drugs, which present similar, if not elevated, potential health,
safety, and law enforcement needs.
The Supreme Court, 2018 Term—Leading Cases, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 302,
310 n.86 (2019).
Additionally, the South Carolina Supreme Court utilized the Mitchell
plurality’s standard in a case of controlled substances. See State v. McCall,
839 S.E.2d 91 (S.C. 2020). In McCall, the driver was involved in a very
serious accident. Id. at 92. Officers “quickly believed that [the driver] was
impaired by a substance other than alcohol.” Id. at 95. The court found
that exigent circumstances existed for a warrantless blood draw given the
other duties of the officers and the likelihood that it would have taken
ninety minutes to obtain a warrant. Id. at 95. The court added, “While
alcohol has a relatively steady dissipation rate, other substances dissipate
much faster.” Id. In a footnote, the court adverted to expert testimony
that the active ingredient in marijuana (THC) metabolizes more rapidly
than alcohol. Id. at 95 n.2.
We have noted in our cases that “nonimpairing metabolites” of
marijuana can remain in the body for some time and that any amount of
these metabolites in blood or urine can constitute a violation of Iowa Code
section 321J.2. See State v. Childs, 898 N.W.2d 177, 184 (Iowa 2017); see
also State v. Newton, 929 N.W.2d 250, 256–59 (Iowa 2019). THC itself
apparently dissipates much more quickly. See Andrea Roth, The Uneasy
Case for Marijuana as Chemical Impairment Under a Science-Based
Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 103 Calif. L. Rev. 841, 885 (2015) (“THC
14
from smoked cannabis is ‘detectable in plasma within seconds after the
first puff,’ with peak plasma concentration generally happening within
three to ten minutes.” (quoting Priyamvada Sharma et al., Chemistry,
Metabolism, and Toxicology of Cannabis: Clinical Implications, 7 Iran J.
Psychiatry 149, 151 (2012))). While THC can be found in the body “several
hours or even days after consumption, depending on the frequency and
amount of usage,” id., and “marijuana’s unpredictable properties render
nearly impossible any inference about the likely psychoactive effect on the
brain of a specific THC blood level,” id. at 887, the presence of THC in the
blood makes the case for impairment stronger than it otherwise would be.
Law enforcement is not required to settle for the minimum in
suspected OWI drug cases. Detection of the nonimpairing and long-lasting
metabolite carboxy-THC is enough to establish OWI under Iowa law. See
Newton, 929 N.W.2d at 256–59; Childs, 898 N.W.2d at 184. That’s the
bare minimum. But there are legitimate reasons why law enforcement
would want more—namely, proof that fast-dissipating THC itself was in
the driver’s system. For one thing, evidence that the driver actually had
the active ingredient and not merely an inert byproduct in their system
might help avoid jury nullification in an era when criminalization of
marijuana use has become increasingly controversial.
Also, if the driver unintentionally caused a serious injury to another
person by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, that’s a class “D”
felony. See Iowa Code § 707.6A(4). In State v. Adams, a prosecution for
the related crime of causing someone’s death while intoxicated, we
indicated that the State has the burden “to prove a causal connection
between the defendant’s intoxicated driving and the victim’s death.” 810
N.W.2d 365, 371 (Iowa 2012). So, if there is a potential for serious injuries,
the State needs proof that the defendant was actually under the influence,
15
and not merely had vestiges of past marijuana use in their bloodstream.
We recognize that a report had come back from the hospital that the five
occupants of the other vehicle had not suffered serious injuries. Still,
situations like this can be fluid. Here, one of the injured children needed
thirteen stitches, missed two weeks of school, and was still scared of
traveling in a car three and a half months later.
Additionally, from a victim restitution standpoint, it matters whether
the defendant was under the influence of THC or just technically had a
nonimpairing metabolite in their system. See Iowa Code § 910.1(6)
(defining “pecuniary damages” for purposes of victim restitution as
damages “which a victim could recover against the offender in a civil action
arising out of the same facts or event”); State v. Shears, 920 N.W.2d 527,
539 (Iowa 2018) (“[M]any of our criminal restitution cases employ the
causation test applicable in ordinary tort settings.”). Notably, the
restitution award here amounted to more than $10,000.
We have ourselves analogized the body’s natural elimination of
drugs to its natural elimination of alcohol, and upheld a warrantless
stomach pump for drug evidence on that basis. See State v. Strong, 493
N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1992). Thus, in Strong, we explained,
[I]t is common knowledge that cocaine, once ingested orally,
is absorbed into the blood and, like alcohol, is eliminated by
the body. Therefore, the passage of time alone will operate to
destroy the evidence. We conclude, under the rationale
of Schmerber, that exigent circumstances existed here which
justified a warrantless search.
Id. at 837. Notably, the rationale of Schmerber, which we relied upon in
Strong, is essentially the rationale of Mitchell. See Mitchell, 588 U.S. at ___,
139 S. Ct. at 2537.
For all these reasons, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment
standards in Mitchell apply when law enforcement has probable cause to
16
believe that an incapacitated person committed OWI with respect to
marijuana instead of alcohol.4 This then leads to the question whether we
should apply those standards ourselves or remand for the district court to
do so. With verve and gusto, the State has gone through the minutes in
its appellate briefing and detailed for us how it believes the Mitchell
exigent-circumstances standard was met. In the State’s view, this was a
very busy Saturday afternoon for the Des Moines police.
But no one had a real opportunity to make a record in the district
court because the Supreme Court had not decided Mitchell yet.
Accordingly, we think the appropriate course under the Fourth
Amendment is to reverse and remand with directions to conduct a
suppression hearing under the Mitchell test: Is this a situation where
Officer Fricke “could not have reasonably judged that a warrant
application would interfere with other pressing needs or duties”? Id. at
___, 139 S. Ct. at 2539. Other state appellate courts have followed this
course of action in light of Mitchell. See, e.g., McGraw v. State, 289 So. 3d
836, 838–39 (Fla. 2019); State v. Chavez-Majors, 454 P.3d 600, 607–08
4One of the dissenting opinions argues that the State had to “present[] facts to the
district court to support the compelling need to obtain evidence of active THC.” This
would be inconsistent with Mitchell, where the plurality instead relied on legislative facts
to establish a general rule upholding warrantless blood draws from incapacitated drivers
suspected of drunk driving, subject only to an exception where the “police could not have
reasonably judged that a warrant application would interfere with other pressing needs
or duties.” Mitchell, 588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2539. As the plurality elaborated in a
footnote,
[W]e adopt a rule for an entire category of cases—those in which a motorist
believed to have driven under the influence of alcohol is unconscious and
thus cannot be given a breath test. This rule is not based on what
happened in petitioner’s particular case but on the circumstances
generally present in cases that fall within the scope of the rule.
Id. at ___ n.2, 139 S. Ct. at 2534 n.2.
17
(Kan. 2019); State v. Key, 848 S.E.2d 315, 349 (S.C. 2020).5 Now we do
so as well.
C. Constitutionality of the Blood Draw Under Article I, Section
8. We believe State v. Findlay provides the starting-point for article I,
section 8 analysis of warrantless blood draws of allegedly intoxicated but
incapacitated drivers. 259 Iowa 733, 145 N.W.2d 650 (1966).6 In Findlay,
the defendant was traveling down an Iowa highway northbound when his
vehicle collided with another automobile traveling in the opposite
direction. Id. at 735, 145 N.W.2d at 652. All occupants of both
automobiles were injured. Id. At the scene of the accident, witnesses
observed a semi-conscious defendant who smelled strongly of liquor. Id.
Upon arriving at the hospital, the sheriff asked the attending doctor to
obtain a blood sample from the defendant, who was now unconscious. Id.
The physician refused, but did sign the certification form that the
defendant was unconscious and not capable of consenting. Id. On the
sheriff’s order, a registered nurse took the blood sample. Id. It was sent
5McGee asserts that the State did not argue exigent circumstances below. That
is correct but not surprising since Mitchell had yet not been decided. Instead, McGee
argued there were no exigent circumstances. However, he did not utilize the definition
which Mitchell later gave to that term, but a narrower meaning taken from McNeely,
Birchfield, and State v. Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2017). The State countered that the
Iowa Code section 321J.7 procedure for incapacitated drivers was constitutional and its
constitutionality had not been affected by McNeely, Birchfield, or Pettijohn. The fact that
neither party had a chance to make a record on the Mitchell standard highlights, again,
why a remand would be appropriate.
6The State discussed Findlay at some length in its briefing. McGee did not even
cite Findlay. We caution parties that the vintage of an Iowa constitutional precedent is
not, in itself, a reason to forgo discussion of that precedent. For example, in 2014 we
treated State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1970), as the governing precedent in an
article 8, section 1 case. See State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 506 (Iowa 2014) (discussing
and relying on Cullison). We did so even though Cullison does not mention article I, section
8, and even though our court had not cited Cullison for any reason between 1970 and
2010.
18
for testing where results indicated the defendant was intoxicated. Id. at
735–36, 145 N.W.2d at 652.
Following his OWI conviction, the defendant appealed, raising the
inadmissibility of the blood test. Id. We found the statute had been
complied with. Id. at 737–38, 145 N.W.2d at 653. We observed that Iowa’s
implied-consent law for driving, which was then only three years old,
“properly and clearly provides a workable rule governing ‘searches and
seizures,’ which rule takes into account the ‘practical demands of effective
criminal investigation and law enforcement.’ ” Id. at 737, 145 N.W.2d at
653 (quoting Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1630
(1963)). We also concluded that neither the Fourth Amendment nor article
I, section 8 had been violated, noting that blood tests “are recognized as
commonplace in these days of periodic physical examinations, the
quantity of blood needed for the test is minimal, and for most people the
procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma or pain.” Id. at 739, 145
N.W.2d at 654. We added,
The public interest requires a holding that the disappearing
evidence due to bodily assimilation created an emergency
requiring prompt action. Under these conditions we find no
unreasonable search and seizure and no substantial violation
of defendant’s constitutional right of due process.
Id. at 740, 145 N.W.2d at 655. Our analysis on this point rested heavily
on Schmerber. See id. at 738–39, 741–42, 744, 145 N.W.2d at 654–57.
Thus, Findlay upheld a warrantless blood draw performed on an
incapacitated driver against both state and federal constitutional
challenges. At its core, Findlay largely forecasts the plurality opinion in
Mitchell. We say “largely” because the exigent-circumstances discussions
in the two opinions are not exactly the same. Mitchell adopts a rule that
exigent circumstances are “almost always” present, with the only
19
exception being a light police workload. Findlay likewise gives leeway to
the State, but focuses on the potential loss of evidence. Hence, Findlay
indicates that when the officer “reasonably believed he was confronted
with an emergency, a situation in which the delay necessary to obtain a
warrant threatened ‘the destruction of evidence,’ he can rightfully order
the blood withdrawal and complete the test.” Id. at 742, 145 N.W.2d at
656 (citation omitted) (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367,
84 S. Ct. 881, 883 (1964)). Moreover, Findlay implies that when two hours
and ten minutes have passed since the accident, exigent circumstances
are per se present. See id. at 743, 145 N.W.2d at 656.7
Despite the existence of the Findlay precedent, and its heuristic
resemblance to Mitchell, each side in this case prefers that we not follow
Mitchell under the Iowa Constitution. McGee urges us to apply State v.
Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2017), to his case. Pettijohn held that a
warrant is ordinarily required under article I, section 8 before taking a
breath test for blood alcohol from a suspected drunken boater. Id. at 22–
25. We indicated that any exigent-circumstances exception to this warrant
requirement under the Iowa Constitution should be available only rarely:
[W]hen unusual circumstances arise that make an officer
obtaining a warrant within two hours of witnessing the
arrestee operating a boat impracticable, they may support the
determination that exigent circumstances exist to justify the
administration of a warrantless breath test.
Id. at 24 (emphasis added). Although decided under the Iowa Constitution,
Pettijohn borrowed from the discussions of exigent circumstances in
McNeely and Birchfield and suggested that the scope of that exception
7Notably,
the lapse of time between the accident and the blood draw at the hospital
was two hours and ten minutes both in Findlay and in the present case.
20
would dwindle in OWI cases as electronic warrants became more
widespread. See id. at 23–25.
Invoking Pettijohn, McGee argues that a warrant should be required
for a blood draw from an allegedly intoxicated driver except in the
infrequent situation when the State cannot feasibly get a warrant on time.
We decline to adopt that position for two reasons. First, in Pettijohn, we
expressly limited our decision to boating while intoxicated. Id. at 38. To
make this clear, we devoted a separate section of the opinion and a
separate heading to this point. Id.8 Second, if we extended Pettijohn to
driving, there would be no principled way to limit the extension to blood
tests. Pettijohn, after all, involved a breath test. And we believe there
would be significant practical costs in presumptively requiring warrants in
OWI driving cases—without any corresponding gains in civil liberties.
Intoxicated driving often occurs when intoxication occurs, that is, at
night and on weekends. And it is unfortunately rather prevalent. In 2019,
the Iowa Department of Transportation reported 14,395 OWI revocations
statewide. Iowa DOT, Iowa OWI Revocations by Year and County 2001–
2020 (2021), https://iowadot.gov/mvd/stats/owirevocations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/69FP-4825]. So if warrants were presumptively
required, we expect thousands of off-hours warrant applications every
year. It is true that some drivers might consent, but the scales of the
consent law could no longer be tipped with adverse consequences for not
consenting. The typical driver suspected of OWI would therefore have
8A special concurrence articulated reasons why Pettijohn would not apply to
driving. 899 N.W.2d at 40–41 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially). A dissent criticized
these distinctions as unsound. Id. at 42–43 (Waterman, J., dissenting). Yet the dissent
also stated, “Trial judges should accept the word of the majority and Chief Justice Cady’s
special concurrence that today’s decision is limited to drunken boaters. The door is
closed to any effort to extend this decision to drunken drivers.” Id. at 42.
21
every incentive to buy time by not consenting, thereby forcing law
enforcement to go through the hoops of obtaining a warrant.
And to what gain in civil liberties? Independent review by a judicial
officer of the asserted grounds for searching a house, an apartment, a
computer, or a cellphone matters. A wide variety of reasons for such
searches exist, and there is no single formula that separates the proper
from the improper search. Someone needs to sift through the asserted
grounds for the search, make sure there is probable cause, and limit the
search appropriately. With OWI, however, there are few if any judgment
calls by the time a chemical test would be administered. Notably, in this
case, McGee has not argued that probable cause for a blood draw was
lacking. That is typical; only in the rare case does the defendant argue
that implied consent was improperly invoked due to the lack of probable
cause. More often, the defendant challenges the initial vehicle stop or
alleges a violation of some statutory procedure. Here the police could have
obtained a warrant and, according to Officer Fricke, would have done so if
they had been investigating a more serious crime such as OWI third.
Moreover, with OWI, the relevant events giving rise to probable cause
happen over a matter of minutes. Recording of those events is feasible,
unlike with the events allegedly supporting probable cause for search of a
home. Law enforcement has the incentive to record encounters with
drivers suspected of OWI under the existing implied-consent regime, and
those recordings provide more protection to defendants than a formalistic
warrant requirement would.9
Once a warrant had issued based on law enforcement’s
representations about signs of intoxication, which we believe would
9See Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d at 52 (Waterman, J., dissenting) (questioning the value
of “assembly-line warrants” in OWI cases).
22
routinely occur, the defendant would have great difficulty challenging the
test results. See State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 132 (Iowa 2006)
(noting that once a warrant issues “[w]e do not attempt to independently
determine probable cause but rather ‘merely decide whether the issuing
judge had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed’ ”
(quoting State v. Gogg, 561 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 1997))). By contrast,
“[t]he State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that a warrant was not needed to authorize a warrantless search.” State
v. Jackson, 878 N.W.2d 422, 429 (Iowa 2016).
In sum, a presumptive warrant requirement for cases under Iowa
Code section 321J.2, similar to the one we recognized in Pettijohn for
section 462A.14 cases, would consume significant resources, both for the
police and the courts. At the same time, we doubt it would add
meaningfully to the existing protections for drivers derived from the
implied-consent law.
Implied-consent laws have been present in all fifty states since the
1960s and they have not changed all that much during those six decades.
Their universal adoption suggests that they work and that they aren’t
viewed as especially controversial. This may explain why the Supreme
Court in Mitchell seemingly pulled back from its tone in McNeely and
Birchfield, while gesturing as to the importance of blood alcohol testing.
See Mitchell, 588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2535–38 (plurality opinion). The
Mitchell plurality opinion is inelegant, it reads more like a debater’s
pamphlet than a tightly written legal analysis, and yet to us it generally
makes sense.
At the same time that we are reluctant to tow Pettijohn onto dry land
as McGee asks, we must also decline the State’s invitation to hold Iowa
Code section 321J.7 per se compliant with the Iowa Constitution. The
23
State wants us to recognize implied consent as a “free-standing exception”
to the article I, section 8 warrant requirement. The Supreme Court has
not taken this step in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. We agree
with the State that, in theory, nothing prevents us from adopting a
narrower interpretation of article I, section 8 than the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Still, in this case, at this time,
we are not inclined to do so.
Warrant exceptions need to be grounded in an underlying purpose
or principle. One such principle is that warrantless searches are
permissible when it would be impractical or unduly formalistic to obtain a
warrant. This has led us to recognize warrant exceptions for exigent
circumstances, searches incident to arrest, automobile searches, and
consent. However, an exception needs to be based on something other
than the legislation that created the exception. The problem with implied
consent is that it is an artificial construct of Iowa Code chapter 321J. As
the State acknowledges, implied consent “is not actual consent.” See also
Mitchell, 588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2533 (“[O]ur decisions have not
rested on the idea that these laws do what their popular name might seem
to suggest—that is, create actual consent to all the searches they
authorize.”).
For now, therefore, we agree with the State’s fallback position.
Article I, section 8 does not demand a more rigorous standard than the
Mitchell plurality imposed for warrantless blood draws on incapacitated
drivers. Mitchell is a workable state constitutional standard. Accordingly,
the Fourth Amendment remand we have ordered will resolve any issues
under article I, section 8.
D. Equal Protection Issues. Finally, McGee argues that it violates
both the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 6 equal protection
24
for unconscious drivers suspected of OWI to be treated differently from
conscious drivers. We disagree. Since neither a suspect class nor a
fundamental right is involved, we apply the rational basis test.10 There are
rational reasons for treating the two categories of motorists differently.
Someone who is conscious can decide whether to consent or not to consent
to testing. So it is logical to give them the choices delineated in Iowa Code
sections 321J.6 and 321J.9. An unconscious driver by definition can’t
consent, and it would be unfair to allow such a driver to refuse. Unfair to
the driver, who would suffer license revocation under section 321J.9; and
unfair to the State, which would be unable to put the refusal into evidence
because there had been no exercise of a choice. The Colorado Supreme
10McGee argues that there is a fundamental right involved because a blood draw
implicates his article I, section 8 right to be free from unreasonable searches of his body.
This approach is off the mark because it muddles the distinction between equal protection
and other express constitutional guaranties. The fundamental rights analysis is most
gainfully employed when a classification impinges upon the exercise of a fundamental
right that lacks its own explicit constitutional guaranty—such as the right to marry or
the right to travel. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322 (1969). Where, however, a law has
already been found not to violate an explicit constitutional guaranty, it usually does not
add to the analysis to argue that the classification drawn by the law should be subject to
strict scrutiny because it affects the fundamental right shielded by that same guaranty.
Instead, at that point, the rational basis test is typically applied.
A good example of this approach is Baker v. City of Iowa City, 867 N.W.2d 44 (Iowa
2015). After determining that the Iowa City Civil Rights Ordinance did not infringe the
Bakers’ freedom of association, we then rejected their argument that their equal
protection claim should reviewed under strict scrutiny. Id. at 57. As we put it,
In their brief, the Bakers argue the ordinance infringes on their
fundamental right to freedom of association under the First Amendment,
and we should apply a strict scrutiny analysis. However, we have
previously decided in this opinion the ordinance does not infringe on their
fundamental right to freedom of association. Thus, we will not apply strict
scrutiny. Therefore, rational basis review applies to the Bakers’ federal
equal protection claim.
Id.
In sum, the fundamental rights branch of equal protection analysis is usually not
viewed as a way to expand the recognized substantive scope of other express
constitutional guaranties. If it were, litigants would be raising it in just about every case
involving alleged infringement of some other express constitutional provision.
25
Court recently explained these points well in rejecting a similar challenge
to Colorado’s OWI law:
When drivers are unconscious, law enforcement officers are
deprived of the evidence they typically rely on in drunk-driving
prosecutions: unlike conscious drivers, unconscious drivers
cannot perform roadside maneuvers, display speech or
conduct indicative of alcohol impairment, or admit to alcohol
consumption. In order to effectively combat drunk driving,
the state needs some means of gathering evidence to deter and
prosecute drunk drivers who wind up unconscious. Section
42–4–1301.1(8) satisfies that need. Therefore, Hyde’s equal
protection challenge, like his Fourth Amendment claim, fails.
People v. Hyde, 393 P.3d 962, 969 (Colo. 2017) (en banc); see also People
v. Kates, 428 N.E.2d 852, 855 (N.Y. 1981) (“[D]enying the unconscious
driver the right to refuse a blood test does not violate his right to equal
protection.”). Accordingly, we hold that section 321J.7 does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment or article I, section 6.
IV. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse McGee’s judgment and
conviction and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, McDonald, and McDermott, JJ.,
join this opinion. McDermott, J., files a special concurrence in which
Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, J., join. Appel, J., files a dissenting
opinion. Oxley, J., files a dissenting opinion in which Appel, J., joins.
26
#19–1219, State v. McGee
McDERMOTT, Justice (concurring specially).
I join the majority opinion, but I write separately because I believe
the Iowa Constitution’s search and seizure protections in article I, section
8 do not mandate the procedures to establish “exigent circumstances” that
the United States Supreme Court announced in its plurality opinion in
Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019).
We generally interpret the search and seizure provisions in the Iowa
Constitution to track with federal interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Brown, 930
N.W.2d 840, 847 (Iowa 2019). Yet we nonetheless have a duty to interpret
provisions of the Iowa Constitution independently, even when two
constitutional provisions “contain nearly identical language and have the
same general scope, import, and purpose.” State v. Brooks, 888 N.W.2d
406, 410–11 (Iowa 2016) (quoting State v. Jackson, 878 N.W.2d 422, 442
(Iowa 2016)).
As the majority points out, the United States Supreme Court’s recent
decisions applying the Fourth Amendment to blood alcohol testing have
wound a twisted path culminating most recently in Mitchell. The plurality
opinion in Mitchell permits a warrantless draw of blood from an
unconscious driver based on probable cause except—and here’s the
catch—where law enforcement “could not have reasonably judged that a
warrant application would interfere with other pressing needs or duties.”
588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2539. Stated differently, under the federal
application of the probable cause requirement, in cases involving an
unconscious driver suspected of alcohol intoxication, a blood draw from
the driver is permissible without a warrant only if some other circumstance
27
“creates pressing health, safety, or law enforcement needs that would take
priority over a warrant application.” Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2537.
Under the Mitchell plurality’s holding, when the police come upon
the scene of a crash and find an unconscious driver, whether probable
cause exists to conduct a blood draw without a search warrant doesn’t
depend on circumstances inherent to the driver or the crash but on
whether the police have some other more important task that takes priority
over getting a warrant. Our constitution provides protection from
“unreasonable” searches and seizures. But I find nothing in the Iowa
Constitution’s search and seizure protections that would require us to
adopt the Supreme Court’s difficult-to-administer rule from Mitchell to
ensure “reasonableness.” State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 294 (Iowa 2013)
(referring to reasonableness as “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534
U.S. 112, 118, 122 S. Ct. 587, 591 (2001))); see also Kentucky v. King, 563
U.S. 452, 460, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011).
The “exigent circumstances” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement applies when law enforcement’s need to prevent the
imminent destruction of evidence is so compelling that a warrantless
search is “objectively reasonable” under constitutional search and seizure
protections. State v. Watts, 801 N.W.2d 845, 850 (Iowa 2011); see also
King, 563 U.S. at 460, 131 S. Ct. at 1856. In a drunk-driving investigation,
evidence erodes with each passing moment as alcohol dissipates naturally
from the driver’s bloodstream. State v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 340, 342–43
(Iowa 2008). The imminent destruction of evidence of suspected
intoxicated driving implicates the exigent-circumstances doctrine. Id.; see
also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1834
(1966).
28
But instead of holding simply that exigent circumstances exist to
conduct a blood draw of an unconscious driver suspected of alcohol
intoxication only if law enforcement’s to-do list contains some other
pressing tasks (as the plurality in Mitchell held), I would adopt the
reasoning of Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion that exigent
circumstances exist in these situations regardless of whatever other work
police officers might have on their plates. Mitchell, 588 U.S. at ___, 139
S. Ct. at 2539–40 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). Probative
evidence of intoxication dissipates at the same rate regardless of whether
a warrant application would interfere with an officer’s other
responsibilities. Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2540–41. The “other pressing
needs or duties” inquiry has nothing to do with whether probable cause
exists to support the unconscious driver’s blood draw. If a blood draw is
per se reasonable based on an officer’s finding of probable cause of
intoxicated driving when the police have other pressing duties, then there
should be an equal quantity of probable cause supporting the blood draw
when the police do not have other pressing duties.
Requiring a law enforcement officer dealing with an unconscious
driver to ponder and measure the fuzzy question “Just how pressing are
my other job responsibilities right now?” in deciding whether it’s necessary
to get a warrant will expose the officer to protracted second-guessing in
later court proceedings. In the relatively short time since Mitchell came
down, other jurisdictions have already started grappling with these
questions. See, e.g., McGraw v. State, 289 So. 3d 836, 839 (Fla. 2019)
(remanding for a determination of whether the search fell within the “other
pressing needs or duties” exception); State v. Chavez-Majors, 454 P.3d
600, 608 (Kan. 2019) (same); State v. Key, 848 S.E.2d 315, 321 (S.C. 2020)
(same). In some cases, the exercise required in Mitchell will allow evidence
29
essential to enforcement of intoxicated driving laws to erode while officers
assess their other pressing needs or wait for a warrant to issue.
And to what end? The “other pressing needs or duties” inquiry
comes with negligible upside for the protection of a suspect’s civil liberties.
When an officer attests to an unconscious driver’s suspected intoxication,
an overwhelming percentage of the time the court will find probable cause
exists and issue a warrant for the blood draw. We should not, and need
not, adopt as a matter of constitutional “reasonableness” the Mitchell
plurality’s complicated rule that secures virtually no protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures yet constrains enforcement of
intoxicated driving laws. As a matter of Iowa constitutional law, I would
thus hold that law enforcement’s investigation of an unconscious driver
suspected of alcohol intoxication meets the exigency exception to the
warrant requirement to permit a blood draw consistent with Iowa Code
section 321J.11 without the need for a warrant.
The majority decides this case under the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, and correctly so. When the Iowa Constitution
provides less protection than the Federal Constitution, government
officials must nonetheless comply with the more stringent provisions of
the Federal Constitution. I thus join the majority opinion but urge our
court to adopt, for purposes of Iowa’s constitutional search and seizure
protections, the straightforward per se rule described above in place of the
Mitchell plurality’s test.
Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, J., join this special concurrence.
30
#19–1219, State v. McGee
APPEL, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The preserved issue in this case is whether
Iowa’s implied-consent statute provides a constitutional justification for a
warrantless search of an unconscious driver suspected of drugged driving.
Because of the lack of voluntary consent, the unconstitutional nature of
the condition in the statute, and the similarity of the implied-consent
statute to a general warrant, I think the answer to this question is firmly
no under the search and seizure provision of article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution, and alternatively, under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
The majority seeks a work-around to avoid the question regarding
Iowa’s implied-consent statute by answering a second question, namely,
whether the warrantless search in this case could be justified under a
modified version of the exigent-circumstances exception recently
developed by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Mitchell v.
Wisconsin, 588 U.S. ___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2534–37 (2019).
There are two problems with the majority approach. First, the State
did not pursue the fact-bound exigent-circumstances exception before the
district court. As a result, the question is not preserved in this case. State
v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 789–90 (Iowa 2013).
In any event, I would not adopt the innovations to the traditional
exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement cobbled
together by a narrow majority of the United States Supreme Court in
Mitchell under the search and seizure provision of the Iowa Constitution.
As in this case, the question of exigent circumstances in Mitchell was not
raised below. Nonetheless, apparently to avoid the implied-consent issue
similar to the one in this case, the Mitchell Court announced modification
31
of the exigent-circumstances exception for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment in cases involving blood draws, without the benefit of briefs
of the parties or amici on the issue. In my view, by adopting Mitchell on
the unpreserved issue, the majority has uncritically adopted a flawed
Federal Court decision when a better model is available, specifically, the
approach of the Supreme Court only a few years earlier in Missouri v.
McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).
Because the State loses on the merits of the only preserved claim, I
would reverse and remand the case to the district court. In the alternative,
if we were to consider the proposed reconstruction of the exigent-
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement under a second bite
of the apple theory, I would require on remand that the State prove what
it has always been required to prove under the exigent-circumstances
exception, namely, a compelling need and a showing that obtaining a
warrant in a timely fashion was impracticable. In caselaw shorthand, I
would follow the approach of the United States Supreme Court in McNeely,
and not that developed in Mitchell.
The majority suggests that a Mitchell-type approach is especially
necessary where drugged driving involving marijuana is involved. I view
Mitchell as objectionable for a host of reasons as will be explained below.
In my view, however, whether to adopt a new and specialized regime for
blood draws seeking evidence of marijuana consumption should await a
case where the record is fully developed both with respect to the toxicology
involved and the ability of the state to obtain a warrant.
The specific issues posed in this case might be characterized as quite
narrow, and, indeed they seem to be. But we have learned in search and
seizure law that it is very important to keep exceptions to the warrant
requirement narrow and disciplined. Or, to put it colloquially, in the law
32
of search and seizure, one thing leads to another. I write with some energy
to prevent erosion of search and seizure rights under article I, section 8 of
the Iowa Constitution.
I. Background.
A. Facts. This case involves a traffic accident that occurred on
December 8, 2018, at 1:59 p.m. in Des Moines. Brian McGee, a driver of
one of the vehicles, was taken to the hospital in an unconscious state.
About two hours after the accident, a Des Moines police officer, Tim Fricke,
asked a nurse for a certification that the patient was “in a condition
rendering [him] incapable of consent or refusal” under Iowa Code section
321J.7 (2018). The nurse signed the certification and a blood draw was
taken about ten minutes later. Just prior to the blood draw, McGee
aroused enough to urinate but then returned to bed. The results of the
blood draw showed traces of lorazepam and delta-tetrahydrocannabinol
(THC) along with the presence of both the impairing and nonimpairing THC
metabolites.
B. Motion to Suppress. McGee was charged with OWI, first
offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2. The trial information
charged McGee with two alternatives under the statute: driving while
under the influence and driving with any amount of a controlled substance
in his bloodstream.
McGee filed a motion to suppress, and argued the search was
conducted without a warrant and that under Iowa law, such a search is
unconstitutional absent a “jealously and carefully drawn exception.”
McGee argued that the blood draw in his case was not a search incident
to arrest, no exigent circumstances were present, and he did not consent
to the chemical testing.
33
The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress on May 7
and 8, 2019. At the hearing, McGee asserted that the warrantless blood
draw was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and article I,
section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. McGee argued that the blood draw was
a search, that the warrant requirement applied, and that the exigent
circumstances and consent exceptions to the warrant requirement did not
apply. McGee further argued that the blood draw was improper because
he had gained consciousness after the nurse had signed the certification
but prior to the blood draw. In addition, McGee asserted at the hearing
that it would violate equal protection to require a warrant in a case
involving a conscious driver but not in a case involving an unconscious
driver.
The State responded to McGee’s legal arguments by asserting that
the blood draw pursuant to the implied-consent scheme of Iowa Code
chapter 321J fell within the consent exception to the warrant requirement.
The State did not claim that the blood draw could be supported by the
exigent-circumstances or search-incident-to-arrest exceptions to the
warrant requirement.
The district court opened the hearing as follows:
[THE COURT:] The motion to suppress in general is
based on the warrantless taking of Mr. McGee’s blood in
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.
That would appear to put the burden on the State to go
forward with the evidence. Are you in agreement with that,
Mr. Curry, or not?
MR. CURRY: Yes, your Honor.
Consistent with its stipulated burden, the State proceeded to offer
evidence at the hearing. The State’s first witness was Fricke, who was an
eleven-year veteran of the traffic unit at the time of the accident. His
34
training included attendance at the Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving
Enforcement program (ARIDE).
Fricke testified that he received a call regarding a serious injury
accident and that he was to proceed to the hospital to obtain testing of a
suspected impaired driver. Fricke testified regarding events at the
hospital, including the sedated condition of McGee and his obtaining a
certificate under Iowa Code section 321J.7 because the suspect was not
able to consent due to his medical condition.
On cross-examination, Fricke was asked about his failure to obtain
a warrant before the blood draw was taken. Below are all of the relevant
transcript passages on the issue of failure to obtain a warrant:
Q. Officer, was there anything preventing you from
getting a warrant in this case? A. No. This is a -- for an OWI
first that did not result in a fatality with this case, no.
Q. So you concede that you could have obtained a
warrant, correct? A. I don’t believe that you can get a warrant
for a first offense for an OWI.
Q. Do you think that the procurement of a warrant
depends on the number of offense on the OWI, that’s your
understanding? A. My understanding is that for an OWI first
that does not result in a serious injury or a traffic fatality, that
I would not be able to get a warrant for that.
....
Q. You wouldn’t dispute though the legal certainty that
you can get a warrant based on probable cause, correct?
A. No, I don’t dispute that.
Q. But you didn’t get a warrant here? A. I did not.
....
Q. Now, officer, one further point from the video, you
would agree that blood was withdrawn at 1610, correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And at that time you did not have a warrant,
correct? A. I did not.
35
Q. You hadn’t made any efforts to procure a warrant,
is that correct? A. No.
Q. You didn’t think you needed one? A. No.
....
Q. As you began your OWI investigation, in that 30 to
40 minutes that it took you to get to the hospital, did you
make any efforts during that time to secure a warrant? A. No.
Q. How about in terms of the officer that initially called
you, did you instruct that officer to make efforts to secure a
warrant? A. No.
....
Q. Did you instruct that officer, the officer with whom
you spoke with at the hospital, to make any efforts to get a
warrant? A. No, I did not.
Q. And the officer that you spoke with at the hospital,
is that the officer who would have followed Brian to the
hospital, followed my client to the hospital? A. Yes.
Q. So I know I am kind of hammering it home. Safe to
say no one involved in this OWI investigation made any efforts
to procure a warrant, correct? A. Correct.
Fricke was also examined about the passage of twelve minutes
between the signing of the certificate by medical personnel and the actual
blood draw. The defense offered into evidence a video of officer Fricke’s
body camera that showed McGee arising from his bed and urinating during
this time frame.
Aside from the testimony of Fricke and the admission of the
certification, the State offered no further evidence. The defense rested
without the introduction of evidence.
At the close of evidence, the district court heard oral arguments from
the parties. The State argued that “implied consent is an exception to the
warrant requirement.” According to the State, the provision of Iowa Code
section 321J.7 (providing a certification process where a driver is
incapable of consent) is “the crux of the case before the court today.” The
36
State argued that once a certification pursuant to Iowa Code section
321J.7 is obtained, “[t]here is nothing more needed.” The State closed its
argument by emphasizing that “[t]he scheme itself[, Iowa Code section
321J.7,] is [the] exception.”
McGee argued that the implied-consent statute did not provide a
basis for a warrantless blood draw. According to McGee, “the person who
is asked to provide consent must be able to provide consent and when you
have someone who is by definition incapable of providing consent, you
cannot proceed under a consent-based exception.” McGee further argued
that if the implied-consent provisions of Iowa Code section 321J.7 were a
stand-alone exception to the warrant requirement, a serious equal
protection argument would be raised. According to McGee, conscious
persons would be entitled to the protection of the warrant requirement,
while unconscious persons would not. McGee also attacked the
certification in the case in light of the twelve-minute gap and the video
showing that McGee arose and urinated after the certification was
executed.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court denied the motion
from the bench. The district court found that 321J cases are an “exception
to the warrant requirement.” The district court further held that the State
met its burden of showing that the statutory requirements of section
321J.7 were met and that there was no requirement of recertification
because of the delay in obtaining the blood draw. The district court
explicitly stated that the testimony of Fricke regarding whether he could
get a warrant was “immaterial to this matter as none was required.” The
district court concluded that the State had met its burden of showing that
the requirements of 321J were properly complied with by a preponderance
of the evidence and, as a result, the motion to suppress was denied.
37
The district court did not discuss, and made no factual findings
regarding, the possible application of the exigent-circumstances exception
to the warrant requirement—a claim that the State did not make before
the district court.
C. Trial on the Minutes. After the motion to suppress was denied,
the parties agreed to a bench trial on the minutes of testimony. The
district court convicted McGee under the alternative of the statute that
prohibited driving with any trace of a controlled substance, see Iowa Code
§ 321J.2(1)(c). The district court concluded, however, that there was
insufficient evidence to support a conviction on driving under the
influence, see id. § 321J.2(1)(a).
D. Issues Raised on Appeal. McGee appealed his conviction. On
appeal, McGee contends that a warrant to draw blood was required under
both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. He attacks head-on the
district court’s conclusion that the certification provisions of Iowa Code
section 321J.7 provides an exception to the warrant requirement.
McGee asserts that any claim that the evidence was admissible
under the exigent-circumstances exception was not relied upon by the
State and was thus not preserved. In the alternative, however, McGee
asserts that exigent circumstances were not demonstrated in this case.
McGee again asserted that any approach that permitted a conscious
person to insist on a warrant but denied the same right to an unconscious
person would violate equal protection. Finally, McGee raises the statutory
assertion that the terms of Iowa Code section 321J.7 were not complied
38
with because of the approximately twelve-minute delay between the
certification and the blood draw.11
II. Overview of Applicable Search and Seizure Principles.
A. Introduction. In considering any important legal issue, it is
important to establish the legal context. By legal context I mean the larger
environment of concepts and principles that touch upon and relate to the
specific question at hand. If we immediately “cut to the chase,” we may
decide a case that is at odds with the larger legal environment. Further,
our caselaw will become transactional, result-oriented, less coherent, and
provoke unintended consequences. Only when the general legal principles
governing search and seizure are canvassed and understood can we drill
down and apply those general principles to the specific issue at hand.
Below is a summary of the legal principles that set the framework
for the decision in this case. The concepts presented below have a
relatively high degree of generality. I have made no attempt to compare or
contrast the potentially different doctrines of search and seizure under the
Iowa Constitution compared to the Fourth Amendment. We are free, of
course, to depart from federal caselaw under the Fourth Amendment when
interpreting the search and seizure provisions of the Iowa Constitution.
B. Generally Applicable Constitutional Principles of Search and
Seizure.
1. The purpose of search and seizure law is to protect individuals
from overreaching government action. As is apparent from the history of
search and seizure law, the purpose of the constitutional protections is to
prevent governmental overreach. Search and seizure law is designed to
11On appeal, McGee claimed that under the statute his prior certification was no
longer valid after a twelve-minute delay and that the results of the blood draw should be
suppressed on statutory grounds. On this point, I concur with the majority opinion
rejecting McGee’s claim.
39
draw boundaries around permissible government action. Constitutional
protections against unlawful searches and seizures are not a minor
inconvenience but play a crucial role in our constitutional governance by
drawing lines that protect individuals from arbitrary government invasions
of their privacy and dignity. As noted by Justice Jackson after his return
from Nuremberg, search and seizure rights
are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of
indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none
is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of
the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled
search and seizure is one of the first and most effective
weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1313 (1949)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
It is true that search and seizure restrictions complicate the job of
law enforcement. But as noted by one state court, “Duties of law
enforcement officials are extremely demanding in a free society. But that
is as it should be. A policeman’s job is easy only in a police state.” People
v. Spinelli, 315 N.E.2d 792, 795 (N.Y. 1974).
Our Iowa constitutional history demonstrates the importance of bill
of rights protections against government overreach. George Ells, Chair of
the Committee on the Preamble and Bill of Rights, declared, “[T]he Bill of
Rights is of more importance than all the other clauses in the Constitution
put together, because it is the foundation and written security upon which
the people rest their rights.” 1 The Debates of the Constitutional Convention
of the State of Iowa, 103 (W. Blair Lord rep. 1857),
http://www.statelibraryofiowa.org/services/collections/law-library/iaconst.
Ells cautioned that “[t]he annals of the world . . . furnish many instances
in which the freest and most enlightened governments that have ever
existed upon earth, have been gradually undermined, and actually
40
destroyed, in consequence of the people’s rights.” Id. at 100–01. In order
to protect the nascent state democracy, Ells stated the express desire
to put upon record every guarantee that could be legitimately
placed [in the constitution] in order that Iowa not only might
be the first State in the Union, unquestionably as she is in
many respects, but that she might also have the best and
most clearly defined Bill of Rights.
Id. at 100. Of course, article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures
and searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons and things to be seized.
Given the importance of the search and seizure provisions of the
United States and Iowa Constitutions, they are not designed to be efficient.
Without question, in all cases, they make the ability of the state law
enforcement to engage in searches and seizures somewhat less efficient.
But that is true with many precious rights. The right to a jury trial, with
careful procedures to ensure representation of a fair cross section of the
community in jury panels, is hardly efficient. So, the importance or value
of a constitutional protection is not determined by efficiency
considerations. Indeed, by placing the protections in the constitutional
firmament, the founders desired to ensure that specifically enumerated
constitutional rights remained firmly entrenched notwithstanding their
inefficient characteristics. The scope of the bill of rights was not to be
subject to periodic pragmatic adjustments by the legislature.
2. The generally applicable bright-line search and seizure rule is “get
a warrant.” Like its federal counterpart, article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution has a “reasonableness” clause and a “warrant clause.” We
have repeatedly stated that the reasonableness clause is informed by or
41
linked to the warrant clause. See, e.g., State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260,
268–69 (Iowa 2010). In other words, subject to certain narrow exceptions,
the general rule is that a warrant is required to conduct a search or
seizure. Id. at 269.
The strong warrant preference approach was outlined decades ago
by the United States Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire:
[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that
“searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well delineated exceptions.” The
exceptions are “jealously and carefully drawn,” and there
must be “a showing by those who seek exemption . . . that the
exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.”
403 U.S. 443, 454–55, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2032 (1971) (omission in original)
(footnotes omitted) (first quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357,
88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967); then quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S.
493, 499, 78 S. Ct. 1253, 1257 (1958); and then quoting McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456, 69 S. Ct. 191, 193 (1948)).
While the United States Supreme Court cases began to undercut the
tradition of the warrant requirement in cases like Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 107 S. Ct. 3164 (1987), United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112,
122 S. Ct. 587 (2001), and Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S. Ct.
2193 (2006), there seems to have been a resurgence in at least some
Supreme Court cases. In a memorable recent phrase, Chief Justice John
Roberts declared in a search and seizure context that the applicable
approach, at least in the case at hand, was to “get a warrant.” Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. 373, 403, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
Our cases demonstrate that “get a warrant” is the general command
of the search and seizure provisions of article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution, subject to certain exceptions. E.g., State v. Coleman, 890
42
N.W.2d 284, 286 (Iowa 2017). We have stated that Iowa courts “strongly
favor the warrant requirement, subject only to ‘jealously and carefully
drawn exceptions.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Strong, 493 N.W.2d 834, 836
(Iowa 1992)); see also State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2015) (“ ‘A
warrantless search is presumed unreasonable’ unless an exception
applies.” (quoting State v. Moriarty, 566 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1997)));
Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 285 (“We have also generally endorsed the
warrant-preference requirement.”).
3. The generally applicable bright-line “get a warrant” rule is subject
to narrow and well-defined exceptions that should be “jealously guarded”
against even small incursions. “[T]he basic rule [is] that ‘searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.’ ” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716
(2009) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357, 88 S. Ct. at 514). Although the
general rule is get a warrant, we have recognized that there are certain
exceptions to the warrant requirement. Two exceptions to the warrant
requirement are consent and exigent circumstances.
These exceptions, however, must be tightly controlled lest they
overcome the general rule that search warrants are required. The risk of
encroachment was recognized by the Supreme Court in its first major
search and seizure case, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633–35,
6 S. Ct. 524, 534–35 (1886). In Boyd, the Court declared:
[C]onstitutional provisions for the security of person and
property should be liberally construed. A close and literal
construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to
gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in
sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be
43
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and
against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
Id. at 635, 6 S. Ct. at 535.
And, as stated by Justice Jackson in his classic discussion of search
and seizure law, “any privilege of search and seizure without warrant” will
be “push[ed] to the limit.” Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 182, 69 S. Ct. at 1314
(Jackson, J., dissenting). As observed in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States: “The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the
Constitution’s protections of the individual against certain exercises of
official power. It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that
counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards.” 413 U.S. 266,
273, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 2540 (1973).
Any exceptions to the warrant requirement thus must be “jealously
and carefully drawn” and subject to strict judicial oversight. Jones, 357
U.S. at 499, 78 S. Ct. at 1257. As noted by Justice Stevens, “The
ascendancy of the warrant requirement in our system of justice must not
be bullied aside by extravagant claims of necessity.” California v. Carney,
471 U.S. 386, 401, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2075 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4. The taking of a blood draw by the state is a search involving
invasions of a person’s most personal and deeply rooted expectations of
privacy. There is no serious doubt that the taking of a blood draw is a
search. See, e.g., Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct.
2160, 2173 (2016). It involves an invasion of “an individual’s ‘most
personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.’ ” McNeely, 569 U.S. at
148, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 105
S. Ct. 1611, 1616 (1985)). A blood draw places in the hands of the state a
very large amount of private medical facts, for instance, whether a person
“is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.” See Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs., 489
44
U.S. 602, 617, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1413 (1989). Just as a cell phone is now
a repository of huge amounts of personal information, the materials
obtained in a blood draw can tell us many highly personal things about
the individual. See State v. Martines, 331 P.3d 105, 111 (Wash. Ct. App.
2014) (“Testing of a blood sample can reveal not only evidence of
intoxication, but also evidence of disease, pregnancy, and genetic family
relationships or . . . [other] ‘private medical facts.’ ” (quoting Skinner, 489
U.S. at 617, 109 S. Ct. at 1413)). Because of the invasive nature of the
intrusion and the vast amount of private information that is subject to
exposure, a blood test presumptively requires a search warrant based on
probable cause. See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 148, 152, 133 S. Ct. at 1558,
1561.
5. When applying the narrow and well-defined exceptions to the
warrant requirement, per se rules are disfavored. As a general proposition,
exceptions to the warrant requirement are fact-based, not rule-based. The
determination of whether a warrantless search meets a narrow and
jealously guarded exception is not subject to “Procrustean application” of
reasonability. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1630
(1963). “[T]here is no formula for the determination of reasonableness.
Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.” Id.
(quoting Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357, 51
S. Ct. 153, 158 (1931)). Thus, the Supreme Court has stated “that for the
most part per se rules are inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment
context.” United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201, 122 S. Ct. 2105,
2111 (2002). As noted in United States v. Banks,
[T]he facts of cases so various that no template is likely to
produce sounder results than examining the totality of
circumstances in a given case; it is too hard to invent
categories without giving short shrift to details that turn out
45
to be important in a given instance, and without inflating
marginal ones.
540 U.S. 31, 36, 124 S. Ct. 521, 525 (2003). This observation applies in
the context of determining whether a warrantless search may be justified
based on a narrow and jealously guarded exception.
6. The burden is on the state to show the circumstances necessary
to support the narrow exceptions to the “get a warrant” requirement. In
applying exceptions to the warrant requirement, the burden is on the state
to show that an exception applies. See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 454–55, 91
S. Ct. at 2032; Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34, 90 S. Ct. 1969, 1972
(1970).
The rationale for placing the burden with the state is double-
barreled. First, as a general matter, the party seeking an exception to a
general rule carries the burden of proof. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.
740, 749–50, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2097 (1984) (stating that the government
bears a “heavy burden” to show exigent circumstances). Second, the
evidence that might support the fact-intensive features of the exception
rests with the state. Cf. United States v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R.,
355 U.S. 253, 256 n.5, 78 S. Ct. 212, 214 n.5 (1957) (“The ordinary rule,
based on considerations of fairness, does not place the burden upon a
litigant of establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his
adversary.”). With these two well-established principles related to
allocation of the burden of proof, it would be odd indeed to shift the burden
of proof to a defendant to establish that the exception does not apply.
7. A warrant is not required under the “jealously and carefully”
applied concept of voluntary consent. For many years, the Supreme Court
had not discovered a consent doctrine to avoid the warrant requirement.
However, in Bumper v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court stated, “When
46
a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a
search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely
and voluntarily given.” 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1792 (1968).
The Supreme Court elaborated on the consent doctrine in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, noting that “whether a consent to a search was in fact
‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is
a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances.” 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047–48 (1973). Just
as an unconscious person cannot consent to sexual relations, Schneckloth
recognized that if “a person is unconscious or drugged or otherwise lacks
capacity for conscious choice,” there can be no voluntary consent. Id. at
224, 93 S. Ct. at 2046 (quoting Paul M. Bator & James Vorenberg, Arrest,
Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and
Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 62, 72 (1966)). And, if an
individual is told he has no right to resist the search, the resulting search
is not a result of voluntary consent. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548–49, 88
S. Ct. at 1791–92.
The consent doctrine has been characterized by the Supreme Court
as “jealously and carefully drawn.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103,
109, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (2006) (quoting Jones, 357 U.S. at 499, 78
S. Ct. at 1257); see also State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 572 (Iowa 2012)
(“The State has the burden to prove the consent was voluntary, and
voluntariness is a ‘question of fact to be determined from the totality of all
the circumstances.’ ‘The State is required to establish the consent was
voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” (citations omitted) (first
quoting State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 378 (Iowa 2007); and then quoting
State v. Reinier, 628 N.W.2d 460, 465 (Iowa 2001) (en banc))). Plainly,
consent is not created by law—it arises from facts.
47
Once given, however, consent to search may be withdrawn. Florida
v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1804 (1991) (“A suspect
may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he
consents.”); see also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on
the Fourth Amendment § 8.2(f), at 124 (6th ed. 2020) (“A consent to search
is not irrevocable, and thus if a person effectively revokes his prior consent
prior to the time the search is completed, then the police may not
thereafter search in reliance upon the earlier consent.” (footnote omitted)).
The right to revoke consent to search is consistent with other areas of the
law where consent may be revoked. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 469–79, 8 S. Ct. 1602, 1625–30 (1966) (describing that there is a
right to revoke waiver of the right to counsel). The state has the burden of
proving that consent had been “freely and voluntarily given.” Bumper, 391
U.S. at 548–50, 88 S. Ct. at 1792.
A number of state courts have rejected the Schneckcloth “totality of
the circumstances” test in favor of the more stringent standard of knowing
and voluntary waiver announced in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464–
69, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023–25 (1938). In State v. Pals, we found it
unnecessary to address the question of a more stringent standard under
article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. 805 N.W.2d 767, 782 (Iowa
2011). Both tests, however, are fact-based and must be determined in
each individual case.
8. Exigent circumstances have been recognized as a narrow and
jealously guarded exception to the warrant requirement where the state
makes a factual showing of compelling need and obtaining a warrant is
impracticable. The exigent-circumstances exception applies where “ ‘the
exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the
48
Fourth Amendment.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460, 131 S. Ct.
1849, 1856 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, 394, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1978)). In order to invoke the exigent-
circumstances exception, the state must show a “compelling need for
official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499, 509, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1949 (1978).
The exigent-circumstances exception has been applied where police
need to provide help to a “seriously injured” occupant of a house or there
is an imminent threat of such injury to that person, Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006), when officers are in “hot
pursuit” of a fleeing suspect, United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–
43, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 2409–10 (1976), and to enter a burning building to put
out a fire, Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509, 98 S. Ct. at 1950. The threat of
destruction of evidence may give rise to exigent circumstances. See
Santana, 547 U.S. at 43, 96 S. Ct. at 2410.
Like other exceptions to the warrant requirement, the state bears
the burden of proof on the exigent-circumstances exception. See, e.g.,
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749–50, 104 S. Ct. at 2097. The warrant requirement
cannot be excused absent a showing that “the exigencies of the situation
made [the search] imperative.” McDonald, 335 U.S. at 456, 69 S. Ct. at
193.
9. Administrative convenience can never by itself justify disregard of
search and seizure principles. In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme
Court observed that “the inconvenience to the officers and some slight
delay necessary to prepare papers and present the evidence to a
magistrate[] . . . are never very convincing reasons and, in these
circumstances, certainly are not enough to bypass the constitutional
requirement [of a warrant].” 333 U.S. 10, 15, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369 (1948).
49
A few years later, the Supreme Court stated that the warrant requirement
was not “an inconvenience to be somehow ‘weighed’ against the claims of
police efficiency.” Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 481, 91 S. Ct. at 2046. And, in
Mincey v. Arizona, the Supreme Court again emphasized that “the mere
fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself
justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.” 437 U.S. at 393, 98 S. Ct. at
2414. Obviously, “the investigation of crime would always be simplified if
warrants were unnecessary.” Id. But, “the Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656,
92 S. Ct. 1208, 1216 (1972).
10. The Iowa Supreme Court “zealously” protects authority to engage
in independent search and seizure analysis. It is well established that a
state supreme court has the ultimate authority to determine the meaning
of state constitutional provisions and that there is no obligation to simply
follow federal precedent even where the federal and state constitutional
provisions are nearly identical. We have departed from federal search and
seizure precedents on a number of occasions. See, e.g., State v. Ingram,
914 N.W.2d 794, 799–801, 820–21 (Iowa 2018); State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d
474, 492, 506 (Iowa 2014); Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 790–91, 802–03; Ochoa,
792 N.W.2d at 267; State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 285 (Iowa 2000). We
have stated that we zealously reserve the right to engage in independent
analysis. See, e.g., Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 267; Zaber v. City of Dubuque,
789 N.W.2d 634, 654–55 (Iowa 2010); State v. Hoskins, 711 N.W.2d 720,
725 (Iowa 2006). This court has canvassed in detail the rationale for
independent state constitutional analysis and that need not be reprised in
detail here. See, e.g., Short, 851 N.W.2d at 481–92; Baldon, 829 N.W.2d
at 789–91; Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 264–68.
50
C. Statutory Provisions of Iowa Code Chapter 321J. Iowa Code
chapter 321J, entitled “Operating While Intoxicated,” has various
statutory provisions relating directly to the authority of police officers to
obtain warrantless blood draws of nonconsenting persons. The provisions
relate to implied consent, the testing of dead or unconscious persons, the
consequences of refusal to submit to testing, written or telephonic search
warrants, and obtaining samples without a warrant. See Iowa Code
§§ 321J.6, .7, .9, .10, .10A.
Three provisions are particularly germane to this case. Iowa Code
section 321J.6 provides that “a person who operates a motor vehicle in
this state . . . is deemed to have given consent to the withdrawal of
specimens of the person’s blood . . . for the purpose of determining the
alcohol concentration or presence of a controlled substance or other
drugs.”
Iowa Code section 321J.7 provides that “a person who is dead,
unconscious, or otherwise in a condition rendering the person incapable
of consent or refusal is deemed not to have withdrawn the consent
provided by section 321J.6.”
Iowa Code section 321J.10 provides for, among other things,
telephonic warrants where “[a] traffic accident has resulted in a death or
personal injury reasonably likely to cause death.”
Iowa Code section 321J.10A states that a police officer may obtain
a sample without a warrant if the person is under arrest for operating a
vehicle unlawfully and the police “officer reasonably believes the blood
drawn will produce evidence of intoxication,” the method used is
reasonable and “performed in a reasonable manner,” and the officer
“reasonably believes the officer is confronted with an emergency situation
51
in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant . . . threatens the
destruction of the evidence.”
III. Overview of Applicability of the Warrant Requirement for
Bodily Intrusions of Unconscious Suspects.
A. Introduction. Having examined the generally applicable search
and seizure principles and relevant statutory provisions, I now consider
whether the state may engage in warrantless blood draws of unconscious
persons either based on “implied consent” (i.e., implied by law under
Iowa’s implied-consent statute) or based on exigent circumstances that
make application for a warrant impracticable.
Before diving into the caselaw, it is important to distinguish between
two distinctly different consent issues under implied-consent laws. The
first question is whether actual consent given by a suspect pursuant to an
implied-consent statute is “voluntary” under search and seizure law. That
was a key issue in State v. Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d 1, 25–38 (Iowa 2017), and
has proven controversial. There is authority in the cases that tends to
indicate that the state may place some level of pressure on a suspect to
obtain consent for a blood draw, but there is a question of where to draw
the line. Some courts, including recently the United States Supreme
Court, have determined that consent is not involuntary for Fourth
Amendment purposes if the consequence of refusal is an administrative
penalty and not a criminal sanction. See, e.g., Birchfield, 579 U.S. at ___,
136 S. Ct. at 2185; McNeely, 569 U.S. at 159–61, 133 S. Ct. at 1565–66.
In Pettijohn, the majority considered whether “implied consent” to a blood
draw obtained by law enforcement without a warrant was voluntary.
Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d at 25–38. For the purposes of a boating implied-
consent statute, consent was not deemed voluntary in light of
52
administrative sanctions imposed by the statute and other relevant
factors. Id. at 29, 36–38.
While the fact-based question in Pettijohn involved, in part, whether
the civil sanctions threated by Iowa’s implied-consent statute applicable
to boating rendered the consent involuntary, the issue in this case is
whether the State can “deem” a driver consented to waiver of search and
seizure rights by merely driving on the roads of the state.
B. United States Supreme Court Precedent Regarding
Unconsented and Warrantless Bodily Invasions by the State. The trail
of United States Supreme Court cases dealing with blood draws begins
with two due process cases. In Rochin v. California, law enforcement
forcibly broke into the home of the accused and observed him place
something in his mouth. 342 U.S. 165, 166, 72 S. Ct. 205, 206 (1952).
The police unsuccessfully tried to pry the material out of his mouth. Id.
The officers then took the accused to the hospital where a doctor pumped
the suspect’s stomach without his consent. Id. The pumping succeeded
and the suspect regurgitated narcotic pills. Id. The Rochin Court
concluded that the coerced body invasion “shocks the conscience” and was
“too close to the rack and the screw” to avoid condemnation under the Due
Process Clause. Id. at 172, 72 S. Ct. at 209–10.
In a second due process case, Breithaupt v. Abram, the Supreme
Court considered the validity of a manslaughter conviction based, in part,
on a blood draw obtained from an unconscious defendant without a
warrant after a traffic accident. 352 U.S. 432, 433, 77 S. Ct. 408, 409
(1957). The Breithaupt majority rejected a due process challenge to the
search on the merits, concluding that blood draws were not “brutal” or
“offensive.” Id. at 435, 77 S. Ct. at 410. With respect to a potential search
and seizure violation, the Breithaupt Court held that no relief was available
53
because the exclusionary rule was not incorporated against the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 434, 77 S. Ct. 409–10 (citing
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 1364 (1949)).
Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justice Black and Justice Douglas,
dissented. The Chief Justice found little meaningful difference between a
stomach pump and an invasion of the skin through a needle. Id. at 440–
42, 77 S. Ct. at 412–14 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). The searches in both
Rochin and Breithaupt were involuntary. Id. The fact that Rochin was able
to physically resist, while Breithaupt could not, was not consequential. Id.
In a separate dissent, Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, observed
that the indignity of an invasion is the same whether a person is conscious
or unconscious. Id. at 442–44, 77 S. Ct. at 414 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
In Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court considered the
validity of a blood draw taken involuntarily from an arrested but
hospitalized driver without a warrant. 384 U.S. 757, 758–59, 86 S. Ct.
1826, 1829 (1966). The defendant challenged the blood draw on Fourth
and Fifth Amendment grounds. Id. at 759, 86 S. Ct. at 1829.
By a narrow 5–4 margin, the Schmerber Court sustained the
warrantless blood draw as a search incident to arrest. Id. at 770–71, 86
S. Ct. at 1835–36. The Schmerber majority emphasized that ordinarily the
involvement of a “neutral and detached magistrate” is required before
allowing a law enforcement officer to “invade another’s body in search of
evidence of guilt is indisputable and great.” Id. at 770, 86 S. Ct. at 1835
(quoting Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14, 68 S. Ct. at 369).
Nonetheless, the Schmerber majority emphasized that the officer
reasonably believed, under the circumstances, that there was a threatened
“destruction of evidence” based on the elimination of alcohol from the
accused’s system. Id. at 769, 86 S. Ct. at 1835. The Schmerber Court
54
stated that “[p]articularly in a case such as this, where time had to be
taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the
accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a
warrant.” Id. at 770–71, 86 S. Ct. at 1836. The majority explained that
the police officer “might reasonably have believed that he was confronted
with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant,
under the circumstances, threatened ‘the destruction of evidence.’” Id. at
770, 86 S. Ct. at 1835 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364,
367, 84 S. Ct. 881, 883 (1964)).
Yet, the Schmerber Court did not want to give law enforcement
sweeping authority or permit warrantless, unconsented bodily intrusions.
According to the Schmerber majority:
It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only
on the facts of the present record. The integrity of an
individual’s person is a cherished value of our society. That
we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States
minor intrusions into an individual’s body under stringently
limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more
substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.
Id. at 772, 86 S. Ct. at 1836.
Chief Justice Warren, Justice Black, and Justice Douglas dissented
on Fifth Amendment grounds. Id. at 773, 86 S. Ct. at 1837 (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas separately dissented on Fourth Amendment
grounds. Id. at 778, 86 S. Ct. at 1839–40 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He
was having none of it. He wrote that “the Fourth Amendment . . .
guarantees the right of the people to be secure ‘in their persons.’ No clearer
invasion of this right of privacy can be imagined than forcible bloodletting
of the kind involved here.” Id. at 778–79, 86 S. Ct. at 1840 (citation
omitted) (quoting U.S. Const., amend. IV).
55
In 2013, the Supreme Court in McNeely, returned to the question of
unconsented blood draws. 569 U.S. 141, 133 S. Ct. 1552. In McNeely, a
speeding driver crossed the center line and was stopped by a police officer.
Id. at 145–46, 133 S. Ct. at 1556–57. The driver declined a preliminary
blood test and was taken to a nearby hospital for a blood draw. Id. The
police officer never attempted to secure a warrant. Id. The state trial court
granted a motion to suppress, concluding that there were no exigent
circumstances justifying the warrantless search. Id. The state supreme
court agreed, finding that there were no factors justifying a warrantless
search other than the natural dissipation of blood alcohol and that
dissipation alone was insufficient to meet the exigent-circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 147, 133 S. Ct. at 1557. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, the state urged the adoption of a per se rule
for intoxicated driving, namely, that exigent circumstances are always
present in drunk-driving cases due to the dissipation of alcohol from the
blood stream. Id. at 151–52, 133 S. Ct. at 1560.
The Supreme Court was fractured in McNeely. Writing for a
majority, Justice Sotomayor rejected the state’s per se rule for suspected
drunk drivers. Id. at 165, 133 S. Ct. at 1568. Justice Sotomayor
repeatedly emphasized the fact-based nature of the inquiry. Id. at 150–
51, 133 S. Ct. at 1559–60. She noted that Schmerber relied on “special
facts.” Id. (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771, 86 S. Ct. at 1836). She
canvassed Fourth Amendment caselaw that demonstrated each case must
be evaluated based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
Id. at 148–51, 133 S. Ct. at 1558–60. According to Justice Sotomayor:
In short, while the natural dissipation of alcohol in the
blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific case . . .
it does not do so categorically. Whether a warrantless blood
test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be
56
determined case by case based on the totality of the
circumstances.
Id. at 156, 133 S. Ct. at 1563. Further, citing McDonald v. United States,
333 U.S. at 456, 69 S. Ct. at 193, Justice Sotomayor emphasized that law
enforcement could not create their own exigent circumstances to evade the
warrant requirement. Id. at 152–53, 133 S. Ct. at 1561.
Finally, Justice Sotomayor noted that a sizeable majority of the
states now have various remote methods, such as telephone, radio, email,
and video conference, to apply for search warrants. Id. at 154–55, 133
S. Ct. at 1561–62. The Chief Justice noted in his opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part that judges often issue warrants in five to
fifteen minutes. Id. at 173, 133 S. Ct. at 1573 (Roberts, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
A few years after McNeely, the Supreme Court, in Birchfield v. North
Dakota, considered a challenge to a search where the suspect consented
only after being informed of the consequences of failure to consent under
a state’s implied-consent law. 579 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 2185–86. The
question in Birchfield was whether, under the totality of circumstances,
the consent obtained by law enforcement could be considered voluntary
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and therefore excuse the state from
obtaining a warrant prior to the search. Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 2186–87.
The Birchfield Court distinguished between blood tests and breath
tests. Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 2176–78. The Birchfield Court found that
unlike breath tests, blood tests “implicat[e] significant privacy concerns.”
Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 2178 (alteration in original) (quoting Skinner, 489
U.S. at 626, 109 S. Ct. at 1418). The Birchfield Court also noted that “a
blood test, unlike a breath test, places in the hands of law enforcement
authorities a sample that can be preserved and from which it is possible
57
to extract information beyond a simple [blood alcohol] reading.” Id. at ___,
136 S. Ct. at 2178. The Birchfield Court further observed,
It is true that a blood test, unlike a breath test, may be
administered to a person who is unconscious . . . . But we
have no reason to believe that such situations are common in
drunk-driving arrests, and when they arise, the police may
apply for a warrant if need be.
Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 2184–85.
The Birchfield Court concluded that the state could not establish
voluntary consent for a blood draw through its implied-consent laws if the
consequence of refusal to submit to a blood test was committing a criminal
offense. Id. In short, the Birchfield Court permitted the state, through its
implied-consent laws, to put some pressure on a suspect, such as a threat
of administrative penalty, but not too much pressure. Id.
Finally, the Supreme Court considered whether law enforcement
could obtain a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious driver
suspected of driving while intoxicated in Mitchell, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct.
2525. Like this case, the state in Mitchell relied exclusively on the theory
that warrantless blood draws may be supported by implied-consent laws.
Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2532. The lower court accepted the state’s theory
as did the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Id. A plurality of the United
States Supreme Court, however, had different ideas. The plurality elected
to decide the case based upon the exigent-circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement. Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2534–37.
Justice Alito wrote for a four-person plurality. In canvassing the
implied-consent precedents, the plurality noted that “our decisions have
not rested on the idea that these laws do what their popular name might
seem to suggest—that is, create actual consent to all the searches they
authorize.” Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2533. Instead, the Alito plurality
58
emphasized that the cases have dealt with “the specific constitutional
claims in each case.” Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2533.
The Alito plurality next considered the public policy grounds for
obtaining blood draws. Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2535–37. The Alito
plurality noted that “highway safety is a vital public interest,” that federal
and state laws have long maintained that tests measuring blood alcohol
content aid the public safety interest, and that enforcing blood alcohol
content laws “requires a test . . . accurate enough to stand up in court.”
Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2535–37.
The Alito plurality reviewed Schmerber, giving it a very narrow gloss.
Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2537–38. The Alito plurality concluded that in the
drunk-driving context, police are often “engag[ing] in a form of triage” in
allocating resources and that law enforcement faces the choice of getting
a warrant “to the detriment of critical health and safety needs.” Id. at ___,
139 S. Ct. at 2538.
The Alito plurality then announced its conclusion. According to the
Alito plurality, police would “almost always” be entitled to conduct a
warrantless blood draw to measure a driver’s blood alcohol content where
the unconsciousness of the driver requires that the driver be taken to a
hospital or similar facility. Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2539. But the Alito
plurality did not rule out the possibility that a driver could show that police
would not have taken a blood draw or that “police could not have
reasonably judged that a warrant application would interfere with other
pressing needs or duties.” Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2539.
There was one other important limitation in Mitchell. Justice Alito
emphasized that the legal conclusions in the opinion rested upon the fact
that “a breath test is impossible.” Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2531. This
important limitation appears in various forms throughout the plurality
59
opinion. See, e.g., id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2531 (“[T]he driver is
unconscious and therefore cannot be given a breath test.”); id. at ___, 139
S. Ct. at 2534 (“[The police had] no reasonable opportunity to give Mitchell
a breath test . . . .”); id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2537 (“Thus, in the case of
unconscious drivers, who cannot blow into a breathalyzer, blood tests are
essential for achieving the compelling interests described above.”). In
other words, the sweeping, nearly per se rule in Mitchell is limited to
situations involving an unconscious defendant.
Justice Thomas provided the fifth vote by concurring in the result of
the case. Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2539–41 (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment). Justice Thomas, however, would hold that there is a per se or
categorical exception to the warrant requirement where the “failure to act
would result in ‘the imminent destruction of evidence.’ ” Id. at 2540
(quoting King, 563 U.S. at 460, 131 S. Ct. at 1856). Justice Sotomayor,
joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kagan, dissented. Id. at ___, 139
S. Ct. at 2541–51 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). She wrote that the plurality
rested on the false premise that the states must choose between attending
to emergency situations and obtaining a warrant. Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at
2541. She wrote that the answer under the Fourth Amendment was clear:
“If there is time, get a warrant.” Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2541.
Justice Sotomayor emphasized that there were “carefully
circumscribed exceptions to the warrant requirement,” including exigent
circumstances. Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2543. She had a different view of
Schmerber than the plurality, noting that “special facts” in that case “left
the police with ‘no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant.’ ”
Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2544 (quoting Schmerber, 348 U.S. at 770–71, 86
S. Ct. at 1836). She noted that attempts to categorically exclude blood
draws from the warrant requirement were rejected in McNeely and
60
Birchfield. Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2544. According to Justice Sotomayor,
the plurality engaged in a “considerable overgeneralization,” which had
been rejected in McNeely. Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2550 (quoting McNeely,
569 U.S. at 153, 133 S. Ct. at 1561). Justice Sotomayor wrote that “no
one suggests that the warrant process should interfere with medical care”
but in many cases, “the police will have enough time to address medical
needs and still get a warrant before the putative evidence . . . dissipates.”
Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2550.
Justice Sotomayor acknowledge that drunk drivers are a cause for
great concern on the road, but argued that it is “ ‘[p]recisely because the
need for action . . . is manifest’ in such cases that ‘the need for vigilance
against unconstitutional excess is great.’ ” Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2551
(alteration and omission in original) (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635, 109
S. Ct. at 1423 (Marshall, J., dissenting)). Justice Sotomayor observed that
“a small delay to obtain a warrant is hardly a recipe for lawless roadways.”
Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2548.
Justice Sotomayor also addressed the question of whether the
Supreme Court should even consider the exigent-circumstances exception
given the state of the record. Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2545–47. Justice
Sotomayor noted that the State of Wisconsin had never argued for
application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the litigation. Id. at
___, 139 S. Ct. at 2545–47. Further, she observed that the Court granted
certiorari to answer “[w]hether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an
unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement.” Id. at ___ n.5, 139 S. Ct. at 2546 n.5 (alteration in
original). Sotomayor accused the plurality of taking on an issue that
Wisconsin had “knowingly and intentionally abandoned.” Id. at ___, 139
S. Ct. at 2545–46. The plurality thus operated without a developed factual
61
record or the usual give and take of the adversary process on legal
questions. Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2546.
Justice Sotomayor concluded by accusing the plurality of “act[ing]
recklessly” in deciding a significant constitutional issue without a factual
record and fully developed adversary proceeding. Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at
2546. According to Justice Sotomayor,
The plurality today carries that burden [demonstrating
the availability of exigent circumstances exception] for a State
that never asked it to do so, not only here but also in a
scattershot mass of future cases. Acting entirely on its own
freewheeling instincts—with no briefing or decision below on
the question—the plurality permits officers to order a blood
draw of an unconscious person in all but the rarest cases,
even when there is ample time to obtain a warrant. The
plurality may believe it is helping to ameliorate the scourge of
drunk driving, but what it really does is to strike another
needless blow at the protections guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2551.
Justice Gorsuch in a brief dissenting opinion noted certiorari was
granted to consider whether Wisconsin drivers impliedly consent to blood
draws “thanks to a state statute.” Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2551 (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting). The Court, Justice Gorsuch observed, chose to decide the
case “on an entirely different ground.” Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2551.
Justice Gorsuch wrote that “the application of the exigent circumstances
doctrine in this area poses complex and difficult questions that neither the
parties nor the courts below discussed.” Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2551. As
a result, Justice Gorsuch “would have dismissed [the petition] as
improvidently granted.” Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2551.
62
C. State Court Precedents Involving Warrantless and
Unconsented Invasions of Bodily Integrity by the State.
1. Implied consent. I now turn to an examination of state court
precedents regarding the constitutionality of invasions of bodily integrity
by the state based on “implied consent” laws where the suspect has not
given actual consent. As will be apparent, there are many jurisdictions
that have come to the conclusion that implied-consent laws are not a
stand-alone exception to the warrant requirement under both the Fourth
Amendment and the search and seizure provisions of their state
constitutions. What follows below is a summary of the important reasons
supporting these state court decisions.
Many of the state court cases rely upon Supreme Court cases in
their discussion of the validity of warrantless searches of unconscious
persons based upon implied-consent statutes. Many cases also cite to
parallel search and seizure provisions under the applicable state
constitutions. The state cases, however, do not generally provide a
separate analysis of state constitutional provisions.
Many state court cases involving unwarranted bodily invasions of
unconscious people by the state focus on the notion that in order to have
“consent” sufficient to avoid the warrant requirement, the consent must
be the product of a conscious mind in order to be “voluntary.” The notion
of consent as a voluntary act has existed in Anglo-American jurisprudence
for time out of mind. A corollary to the requirement of a conscious mind
is the necessity of the power to limit or revoke consent. Because the
features of a conscious mind are not present when blood draws are taken
from an unconscious person and an unconscious person is not capable of
limiting or revoking consent, state courts have repeatedly pounded that
the voluntariness required for a person to waive the warrant requirement
63
is not present. See, e.g., State v. Havatone, 389 P.3d 1251, 1255 (Ariz.
2017) (“We conclude that the unconscious clause can be constitutionally
applied only when case-specific exigent circumstances prevent law
enforcement officers from obtaining a warrant.”); People v. Arredondo, 199
Cal. Rptr. 3d 563, 573 (Ct. App. 2016) (“[C]onsent of this kind cannot be
characterized as ‘free[].’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Michael,
290 P.2d 852, 853 (Cal. 1955) (en banc))); People v. Ling, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d
463, 469 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2017) (“[I]t needs no citation of authorities
to state that an unconscious man is incapable of giving consent.” (quoting
Carrington v. Superior Ct., 107 Cal. Rptr. 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1973))); State
v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575, 581 (Idaho 2014) (“[I]rrevocable implied consent
operates as a per se rule that cannot fit under the consent exception
because it does not always analyze the voluntariness of that consent.”);
Byars v. State, 336 P.3d 939, 946 (Nev. 2014) (en banc) (“[T]he statute does
not allow a driver to withdraw consent, thus a driver’s so-called consent
cannot be considered voluntary.”); State v. Romano, 800 S.E.2d 644, 653
(N.C. 2017) (“The State did not present any other evidence [other than the
implied-consent statute] of consent or argue that under the totality of the
circumstances [that the] defendant consented to a blood draw.”);
Commonwealth v. Myers, 164 A.3d 1162, 1173 (Pa. 2017) (“[C]onsent
always must be revocable.”); State v. Fierro, 853 N.W.2d 235, 241–42 (S.D.
2014) (holding that when the trial court found no consent, the state did
not meet the burden of showing an exception to warrant requirement);
State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“[A] . . .
necessary element of valid consent is the ability to limit or revoke it.”).
The state court cases involving bodily invasions of unconscious
people without a warrant by the state further emphasize that whether
consent for purposes of search and seizure law has been provided by an
64
individual raises a question of fact and not law. Thus, the notion of
“implied consent” pursuant to a statute is said to be an inaccurate
description. As noted by a California appellate court in People v.
Arredondo,
“[I]mplied consent” is a misleading, if not inaccurate, label in
this context. Certainly consent sufficient to sustain a search
may be “implied” as well as explicit, but it is nonetheless
actual consent, “implied” only in the sense that it is
manifested by conduct rather than words.
199 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 571. In other words, “ ‘implied consent’ in the statute
does not mean that police may require drivers to consent to [testing] simply
because they drove.” State v. Baird, 386 P.3d 239, 247 (Wash. 2017)
(en banc). Instead, it means that “in situations that the legislature has
specified, if a driver chooses not to consent, the driver agrees that he or
she will incur the consequences of that decision.” Id. (footnote omitted);
see also State v. Padley, 849 N.W.2d 867, 876 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014)
(“ ‘Implied consent’ is not an intuitive or plainly descriptive term with
respect to how the implied consent law works. We suspect that it is a
source of confusion.”). The Arredondo court further noted that under the
law of contracts, consent may be implied but it is consent “in fact,” inferred
from conduct that constitutes an actual manifestation of consent. 199
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 571; see also Villareal, 475 S.W.3d at 799 (stating that the
question of the voluntariness of consent is a fact question).
The state court cases involving unwarranted bodily invasions of
unconscious people by the state also express concern regarding the power
of the state legislature to override constitutional commands in implied-
consent statutes. The Arredondo court discussed this concern at length,
noting that “[a] state legislature does not have the power to ‘deem’ into
existence ‘facts’ operating to negate individual rights.” 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d
65
at 574. But further, the Arredondo court worried about the implications
of legislatively-imposed consent:
It is far from implausible, for example, that a legislative body—
state or federal—might decree, in the name of public safety or
national security, that the use of the mails, or the phone lines,
or the Internet—all of which rely to a greater or lesser extent
on publicly owned property or facilities or publicly provided
services—constitutes consent to search the contents of all
communications thus conducted. Consent to search homes
might be “deemed” to be given by anyone taking advantage of
various publicly provided or subsidized privileges—like use of
public utilities, libraries, or schools. Consent to search the
person might be “deemed” to be given by use of a public
sidewalk or occupancy of a public place.
Id. at 577–78; see also Hannoy v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977, 987 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003) (“To hold that the legislature could nonetheless pass laws stating
that a person ‘impliedly’ consents to searches under certain circumstances
where a search would otherwise be unlawful would be to condone an
unconstitutional bypassing of the Fourth Amendment.”); Meyers, 164 A.3d
at 1174 (“[L]egislative proclamation that motorists are deemed to have
consented to chemical tests is insufficient to establish the voluntariness
of consent that is necessary to serve as an exception to the warrant
requirement.”).
Some of the cases focus on the fact that where officers can
practically obtain a warrant without significantly undermining the
efficiency of such search, the officers are required to obtain the warrant.
Bailey v. State, 790 S.E.2d 98, 103 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).
2. Exigent circumstances. I now turn to state court cases
considering whether the exigent-circumstances exception applies in the
context of obtaining blood draws from unconscious drivers suspected of
driving while intoxicated. Using Schmerber as a springboard, the states
are decidedly split. Some courts are relatively demanding in requiring the
66
state to make a strong showing of exigent circumstances, while other
courts seem more receptive to warrantless searches of unconscious drivers
under the exception.
For example, in State v. Bohling, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
held, over a dissent, that Schmerber created a per se exigent exception to
the warrant requirement. 494 N.W.2d 399, 401–02, 406 (Wis. 1993). The
Bohling majority relied upon: (1) the language in Schmerber; (2) the
language in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 624–
25, 109 S. Ct. at 1416–17, where the court minimized the intrusive nature
of blood draws; (3) interpretations of Schmerber by other courts; and (4) an
examination of the state’s interest in drunk-driving laws. Bohling, 494
N.W.2d at 402.
But, in contrast, the Supreme Court of Utah came to the opposite
conclusion in State v. Rodriguez. 156 P.3d 771, 774–80 (Utah 2007). The
Utah court relied upon Justice Brennan’s later explanation of Schmerber,
that “[t]he intrusion perhaps implicated Schmerber’s most personal and
deep-rooted expectations of privacy, and the Court recognized that Fourth
Amendment analysis thus required a discerning inquiry into the facts and
circumstances to determine whether the intrusion was justifiable.” Id. at
775 (alteration in original) (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. at 760, 105
S. Ct. at 1616).
There are at least three state court cases dealing with the application
of the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement in the
context of dissipation of marijuana metabolites. In Byars v. State, the
Supreme Court of Nevada noted that “[t]here [was] no indication in the
record that Trooper Murwin was prevented from seeking a warrant
telephonically.” 336 P.3d at 944. On the record of the case, the court held
67
that the state failed to establish exigent circumstances to justify the
warrantless search. Id. at 944–45.
A similar result occurred in City of Seattle v. Pearson, 369 P.3d 194
(Wash. Ct. App. 2016). In that case, a Washington appellate court
observed,
Absent other extenuating circumstances, the natural
dissipation of THC in a suspect’s bloodstream will constitute
an exigency sufficient to forgo the warrant requirement only if
the party seeking to introduce evidence of a warrantless blood
test can show that waiting to obtain a warrant would result in
losing evidence of the defendant’s intoxication.
Id. at 200. Further, the Washington court went on to state,
[W]e hold that the natural dissipation of THC from the
bloodstream is a relevant consideration in an exigent
circumstances analysis but is not a per se exigent
circumstance that justifies an exception to the warrant
requirement for nonconsensual blood draws in DUI cases.
Id. at 201. Based on the record, the court concluded that the warrantless
blood draw was not justified in that case. Id.
In State v. Anderson, however, a Washington appellate court
concluded, based on the record, that the state had made an adequate
showing of exigent circumstances in an alcohol and THC case based on
the facts and circumstances presented. 447 P.3d 176, 182 (Wash. Ct. App.
2019).
D. Iowa Cases Involving Warrantless Blood Draws.
1. Implied consent. Although they do not deal specifically with
implied consent, we have considered a number of search and seizure cases
that generally applied the notion of consent found in Schneckloth under
both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article
I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. In these cases, we applied the familiar
fact-based, totality-of-the-circumstances test. In some cases, we found
68
that the state failed to show valid consent. See, e.g., Reinier, 628 N.W.2d
at 467–69; State v. Horton, 625 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Iowa 2001) (en banc). In
other cases, we held that the state successfully demonstrated consent.
State v. Reinders, 690 N.W.2d 78, 84 (Iowa 2004). These cases show
consistent application of a nuanced, case-specific approach to consent.
We considered a question of a categorical, nonfact-based approach
in State v. Ochoa. 792 N.W.2d at 287–91. In Ochoa, the state asserted
that its executive action in imposing “search conditions” in parole
agreements authorized law enforcement officials to search the residence of
a parolee at any time and for any reason. Id. at 262. We noted that the
scope of the state’s asserted power was “stunningly broad.” Id. at 287–88.
We expressed concern about the “categorical nature” of the treatment of
the issue by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 289. We rejected
the artificial “act of grace,” “waiver,” or “constructive custody” theories. Id.
at 290–91. We noted that the asserted power of the state too closely
resembled a general warrant, where a search could be conducted without
any meaningful mechanism of control. Id. at 291. Although the case did
not expressly involve consent, we showed in Ochoa firm resistance to
broad, generalized policies imposed by the executive branch designed to
defeat individualized claims of search and seizure protection under the
Iowa Constitution. See id.
We considered the issue of consent in the context of a traffic stop in
Pals. 805 N.W.2d at 770–71. In Pals, we concluded, based again on the
totality of circumstances, that Pals’s consent could not be considered
voluntary under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 782–
84. Among other factual factors, we considered the fact that Pals was
subject to a pat-down search, that he was detained in a police vehicle, that
he was not told that he was free to leave, and that the officer had not told
69
Pals that the business related to the stop was concluded. Id. Our review
of the consent issue was clearly fact-intensive.
We considered an important consent issue in State v. Baldon. 829
N.W.2d at 789–91. In Baldon, the question was whether a signature by a
parolee convicted of drug offenses on a parole agreement that consented
to future warrantless searches of his home, vehicle, and belongings was a
valid consent under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Id. at
787–91. The courts across the country were split on the issue. Id. at 792–
95. After review of the cases, we sided with the jurisdictions that held that
the execution of a parole agreement did not categorically establish consent.
Id. at 800–03. A prospective consent-to-search provision in a parole
agreement did not solely give rise to a valid consent. Id. at 800. We noted
that there was no additional evidence in the record to reveal Baldon
voluntarily consented to a search. Id. at 802. But the state relied solely
on the parole agreement, which we found was insufficient. Id. We stated
that “more is needed.” Id. at 803.
The above principles have generally been applied by this court in the
context of claims of consent via implied-consent statutes. In State v.
Garcia, we considered whether an individual voluntarily submitted to a
blood test when an officer invoked implied-consent procedures. 756
N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 2008). We emphasized that in order to be
voluntary, the consent must be “freely made, uncoerced, reasoned, and
informed.” Id. The issue of consent was not “deemed” to be satisfied
merely by the statute, but needed to be proved, as a matter of fact, by the
state. Id. at 220–21, 223.
A second implied-consent case is State v. Overbay, 810 N.W.2d 871
(Iowa 2012). In that case, we determined that consent could be voluntary
under an implied-consent regime provided that the decision to submit to
70
the test was “a reasoned and informed decision.” Id. at 876 (quoting State
v. Bernhard, 657 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa 2003)). Again, the statute itself
was insufficient for consent to be “deemed” to have been satisfied. Id.
Instead, the state was required to prove that the consent, pursuant to the
statute, satisfied the voluntariness requirement. Id. at 879–80.
Finally, we considered the issue of implied consent in Pettijohn. 899
N.W.2d at 25–29. In that case, we considered the constitutionality of a
warrantless breath test obtained from a boater suspected of drunk
boating. Id. at 25–26. We canvassed jurisdictions, noting that consent
must be voluntary and must be subject to limitation or withdrawal. Id. at
28. Consistent with Garcia and Overbay, we rejected the state’s claim that
the implied-consent statute dealing with drunken boaters provided per se
consent sufficient to justify the warrantless breath test in the case. Id. at
29. We therefore held that the consent implied by the statute did not
automatically permit a warrantless search consistent with article I, section
8 of the Iowa Constitution. Id.
We then turned to the question of whether consent was given by
Pettijohn under the totality of circumstances to be sufficiently voluntary
to pass constitutional muster under article I, section 8. Id. at 29–38. We
canvassed the facts, including the intoxication of the boater, the detention
of the boater at the police station, the inaccuracy of the implied-consent
agreement read to him by the officers, and the imposition of a penalty of
at least $500 for failing to provide consent. Id. at 32–38. We concluded
that in light of all the facts and circumstances, consent was not voluntary
in the case. Id. at 37–38.
The majority opinion was qualified in one important respect.
According to the majority, the evaluation of the totality-of-the-
circumstances test could lead to different outcomes in a different case. Id.
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at 38. The majority stated “[a]ny decision relating to operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence will have to wait for another case raising
its constitutionality.” Id.
2. Exigent circumstances. In State v. Findlay, we considered
whether a search of the body of an unconscious person not under arrest
amounted to an unreasonable invasion of privacy. 259 Iowa 733, 735, 145
N.W.2d 650, 651–52 (1966). The Findlay court recognized that a warrant
was generally required and that the administrative “inconvenience to the
officers” and the “delay necessary to prepare the papers and present the
evidence to the magistrate” is not an “exceptional circumstance” sufficient
to avoid the warrant requirement. Id. at 739, 145 N.W.2d at 654. But the
Findlay court emphasized that “the situation [was] different where the
delay will cause the destruction of the evidence, and where . . . there is a
showing the officer believes delay will result in a loss of the vital evidence.”
Id. at 740, 145 N.W.2d at 654.
Although the opinion is cryptic, it is an early version of the exigent-
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement in the context of an
unconscious driver suspected of driving while intoxicated. On the one
hand, it is clear that expressions of administrative convenience clearly are
insufficient to avoid the warrant requirement. On the other hand, when
law enforcement produces expert testimony stating that, under the facts
and circumstances, the state faced imminent destruction of evidence, the
state might not be required to seek a warrant. Findlay is a something for
everyone case.
There are two more recent Iowa exigent-circumstances cases that
provide additional guidance. The first case is State v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d
340 (Iowa 2008). The case concerned a driver involved in an accident and
suspected of drunk driving and was arrested and taken to the Des Moines
72
police station. Id. at 341. After the suspect refused a breath test, he was
taken to the hospital and a blood sample was taken without his consent.
Id.
In Johnson, we directly confronted the two strands of authority
emanating from Schmerber. Id. at 343–45. We rejected the per se
approach to exigency adopted by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
Bohling, 494 N.W.2d at 402, in favor of the more fact-based approach
adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah in Rodriguez, 156 P.3d at 776.
Johnson, 744 N.W.2d at 344.
The second case is State v. Harris, 763 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 2009) (per
curiam). In Harris, we considered a warrantless blood draw where the
driver in a single vehicle accident had killed a pedestrian. Id. at 270.
Under the applicable statute, a warrantless blood draw was permitted if
“[t]he peace officer reasonably believes the officer is confronted with an
emergency situation in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant . . .
threatens the destruction of the evidence.” Id. at 271–72 (quoting Iowa
Code § 321J.10A(1)(c) (2006)).
In Harris, we again considered the question of the scope of
Schmerber. Id. at 272–73. We again noted that Schmerber required more
than the mere dissipation of alcohol to justify a warrantless search. Id. at
272. We also stressed the Schmerber language that for the warrantless
blood draw in that case, there was not time to obtain a warrant and that
“given these special facts,” a warrantless search was permitted. Id.
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770–71, 86 S. Ct. at
1835–36). In short, we clearly aligned with the line of cases that
interpreted Schmerber to be a case about “special facts” and not a case
about the categorical endorsement of warrantless searches for blood
draws. See id.
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We then turned to analysis of the facts in Harris. The record showed
that the officer was acting at the direction of the county attorney with
respect to the warrant application. Id. at 273–75. The officer’s testimony
included the following:
Q: . . . [C]ould you tell the Court what the emergency
situation was in this case that caused you to draw blood . . .
without a warrant . . . . A: Well, I was following the guidelines
from [the county attorney]. . . .
....
Q: Was the emergency situation that [the county
attorney] says take the blood? A: This is what the county
attorney—we had all what we thought we may have, what we
might have, and this was the decision of the county attorney.
Q: And you followed his instructions? A: And I
followed his instructions.
Id. at 274 n.2 (first alteration and first, second, third, and fifth omissions
in original).
As a result, the suppression was affirmed. Id. at 275. Harris plainly
stands for the proposition that the reasonability component of the exigent-
circumstance exception, at least in Iowa, has an objective and subjective
component.
IV. Discussion of the Merits.
A. Implied Consent. In my view, the precise issue presented and
decided by the district court, and raised on appeal, is whether an
unconscious driver may be “deemed” to have consented to a blood draw
under Iowa’s implied-consent statute consistent with the Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 8, has a clear answer: No.
At the outset, as noted by the authorities in more than a dozen
states, the narrow and jealously guarded theory of consent to avoid the
warrant requirement in search and seizure cases is fact-based. Whether
74
one operates under the consent approach of Schneckloth or the more
demanding waiver theory of Zerbst, the notion of the surrender of
constitutional rights by the individual requires a deliberate and voluntary
act. The basic premise of consent is that it is an act of free will, given
voluntarily. And, it has been repeatedly said, in order for consent to be
voluntary, it must be subject to limitation and, ultimately to revocation.
See, e.g., Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252, 111 S. Ct. at 1804. But see Iowa Code
§ 321J.7 (prohibiting revocation of “implied consent”). The notion of
voluntary consent is a question of fact and is a constant across different
fields of law. See, e.g., Johnson v. Associated Milk Processors, 886 N.W.2d
384, 390 (Iowa 2016) (holding in contract law consent may be express or
implied “from acts and conduct” (quoting Davenport Osteopathic Hosp.
Ass’n of Davenport, Iowa v. Hosp. Serv., Inc., 261 Iowa 247, 253, 154
N.W.2d 153, 157 (1967))); State v. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Iowa
1988) (en banc) (holding that determining consent to intercourse is “the
consequential fact” in a sexual abuse case); Jarvis v. Stone, 216 Iowa 27,
35, 247 N.W. 393, 397 (1933) (determining that whether an automobile is
driven without the owner’s consent is a question of fact).
None of these features are present when consent is “deemed” to have
occurred solely based on the legislature’s declaration in Iowa’s implied-
consent statute. See Iowa Code § 321J.6. Consistent with the vast
majority of state court cases, our caselaw under article I, section 8 has
consistently rejected artificial, categorical approaches to consent, and
instead requires the state to show that consent was truly voluntary based
on an individualized, fact-based inquiry. See, e.g., Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d
at 29–38; Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 800–03; Overbay, 810 N.W.2d at 879–
80; Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 287–91; Garcia, 756 N.W.2d at 220–23.
75
Further, the notion that a driver is “deemed” to have consented to a
blood draw solely based upon driving on the highways imposes an
unconstitutional condition on a government benefit. This issue was
explored in one of the amicus briefs filed in Mitchell. See Brief of Amicus
Curiae California DUI Lawyers Ass’n in Support of Petitioner at 4–10,
Mitchell, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019) (No. 18–6210), 2019 WL
1092735, at *4–10 [hereinafter Mitchell Amicus Brief]. The brief noted that
in Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583, 46 S. Ct. 605 (1926), the
Supreme Court struck down a state law that, as a condition of operating
on its highways, required private carriers to become public carriers.
Mitchell Amicus Brief, at 4–5, 2019 WL 1092735, at *4–5. The Supreme
Court declared:
If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional
right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel
a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties
embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus
be manipulated out of existence.
Frost, 271 U.S. at 594, 46 S. Ct. at 607; see also; Koontz v. St. John’s River
Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 606, 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013) (“[T]he
unconstitutional conditions doctrine forbids burdening the Constitution’s
enumerated rights by coercively withholding benefits from those who
exercise them.”); Arredondo, 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 570–71, 577–78 (listing
possible extension of unconstitutional conditions). Similarly, the amici
argued, implied-consent laws contain the implied condition of forfeiting
one’s search and seizure rights against a warrantless search in order to
drive. Mitchell Amicus Brief, at 7, 2019 WL 1092735, at *7.
If the door is open to unconstitutional conditions, the amici
suggested, the end result could severely undermine our panoply of
76
constitutional rights. Id. at 9–10, 2019 WL 1092735, at *9–10. The amici
cited United States v. Scott, where the Ninth Circuit noted:
Government is a monopoly provider of countless services,
notably law enforcement, and we live in an age when
government influence and control are pervasive in many
aspects of our daily lives. Giving the government free rein to
grant conditional benefits creates the risk that the
government will abuse its power by attaching strings
strategically, striking lopsided deals and gradually eroding
constitutional protections.
450 F.3d 863, 866–67 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 1492 (1989).
If implied-consent statutes can, as a matter of law, require all drivers
to waive search and seizure protections with respect to warrantless blood
draws, may the state, then, pass a statute declaring that all drivers must
waive search and seizure protections for their cell phones, their car
interiors, their glove compartments, or the persons in their car? And the
reach of statutorily created consent could extend well beyond the highway.
May the government condition the granting of a building permit on implied
consent to search the premises without a warrant? See Elkins v. District
of Columbia, 710 F. Supp. 2d 53, 56–61, 65 (D.D.C. 2010), vacated on
other grounds, 690 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2012). In short, the replacement
of the established, fact-based, constitutionally required voluntary consent
with a statutory system of trumps would have the potential to eliminate
the effectiveness of our State and Federal Bill of Rights. That sharp sound
one hears in the background is George Ells and his compatriots screaming,
“NO, NO, NO!” to the State’s claim of legislative supremacy to override the
precious terms of article I of the Iowa Constitution.
And, the notion that the legislature can as a matter of law “deem” a
driver to have consented to a search by simply using the roads amounts
to a general warrant or writ of assistance—the very reasons for the
77
development of American search and seizure law. See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d
at 263–74; see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 403, 134 S. Ct. at 2494. If all of the
tens of thousands of persons driving on the Iowa roads each day “consent”
by force of law to “waive” the constitutional protections of the Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 8, is that not a legislative enactment of
a general warrant? In Maryland v. King, Justice Scalia described the hated
general warrants as “warrants not grounded upon a sworn oath of a
specific infraction by a particular individual, and thus not limited in scope
and application.” 569 U.S. 435, 466, 133 S. Ct, 1958, 1980 (2013) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Isn’t that exactly what Iowa Code sections 321J.6 and
321J.7 do? Doesn’t the implied-consent statute mean that blood draws
for everyone on the open road are now permitted without an oath, without
particularity, and unlimited in scope? Preventing the state from having
the power to generally search large groups of people without a warrant was
precisely the abuse that search and seizure law was designed to prevent.
For all of the above reasons, even the United States Supreme Court
is, currently at least, unwilling to justify warrantless searches of an
unconscious person based on implied-consent statutes. From a process
point of view, Mitchell is surely a procedural pretzel, with the Supreme
Court taking a case to resolve the question of whether implied consent
permitted the warrantless search of an unconscious driver, and then
twisting the case to decide the unraised question of exigent circumstances
that was not briefed by the parties and, indeed, was conceded by the state
below. This extraordinary maneuver suggests the Supreme Court did not
want to touch the hot stove issue of warrantless searches based on the
legal concept of implied consent.
In any event, I would reject the notion that a statute can “deem” the
fact of consent under the Iowa Constitution in light of the free will nature
78
of consent embraced in the caselaw, rejection of unconstitutional
conditions, the similarity of implied consent to a general warrant or writ of
assistance, and our consistent recent caselaw. See Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d
at 28–29 (rejecting mere existence of statutory implied consent to permit
administration of a warrantless test and stating “we must determine,
under the totality of the circumstances, whether Pettijohn effectively
consented to submit to the breath test”); Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 802
(“Considering our obligation to ensure that consent remains a doctrine of
voluntariness that functions with integrity, we conclude a parole
agreement containing a prospective search provision is insufficient
evidence to establish consent.”); Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 291 (“[A] parolee
may not be subjected to broad, warrantless searches by a general law
enforcement officer without any particularized suspicion or limitations to
the scope of the search.”).
The only rationale for avoiding a warrant presented by the State at
the district court was that consent was “deemed” under Iowa’s implied-
consent statute. The State made no effort to show exigent circumstances
to avoid the warrant requirement. As a result, McGee’s motion to suppress
should have been granted. I would thus vacate McGee’s conviction and
remand the matter to the district court.
B. Exigent Circumstances.
1. Preservation of error. There is an initial issue of preservation of
error. As is apparent from an examination of the transcript of the legal
argument at the hearing, the State made no claim at all of exigent
circumstances below. Further, the district court made no factual or legal
findings on the issue. This is thus not a case where a change of law
occurred while a claim of exigency was pending before the court. The State
simply did not claim exigency, period.
79
A decision not to pursue exigent circumstances would not have been
careless as, under our caselaw, there was little chance that the State could
prevail on the issue. The facts reveal that the case has a striking parallel
to Harris, where we held that if the only reason advanced for not getting a
warrant was the directives of the prosecutor, exigent circumstances have
not been established. 763 N.W.2d at 270, 275. A decision not to proceed
would be consistent with a strategic decision not to present a meritless
claim.
We have previously considered a case where the state did not make
a claim in the district court during a suppression hearing and then
attempted to resurrect it for the first time on appeal. See Baldon, 829
N.W.2d at 789. In State v. Baldon, the state, before the district court,
asserted that Baldon had consented to a search through a parole
agreement, but did not raise any generalized argument under a “balancing
test” or “special needs” theory. Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 351, 105 S. Ct. 733, 748 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
judgment)). We stated:
The State did not introduce evidence of any particular need
for the parole officer to search Baldon, either predicated on
individual suspicion, background information particular to
Baldon that would have been known to the parole officer, or
the general mission of parole. Thus, the only issue we address
on appeal is whether a parole agreement containing a
consent-to-search clause renders suspicionless and
warrantless searches of parolees reasonable under the search
and seizure clause of the Iowa Constitution.
Id. at 789–90. A dissent argued that we should have considered the issues
not presented because of caselaw developments that occurred after the
district court proceedings. Id. at 847 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). The
question of issue preservation in this case presents nearly identical
80
circumstances as the issue preservation question presented and decided
in Baldon.
We have stated that “[i]t is a fundamental doctrine of appellate
review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the
district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut,
641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). Here, there is no question that the
State did not raise exigent circumstances before the district court. Thus,
if the preservation ruling in Meier v. Senecaut, as applied in Baldon, is to
be followed, we would not address the exigent-circumstances issue raised
by the State for the first time on appeal. I would follow our precedent and
decline to consider the exigent-circumstance question which the State did
not raise in the trial court below.
The problem here is especially acute when we are asked to depart
from past precedent and adopt the newly developed approach in Mitchell
to a blood draw designed to obtain evidence of marijuana use. No record
has been developed to guide us in the potential fashioning or refurbishing
of our traditional approach to exigent circumstances. We should not
engage in significant constitutional innovations without a thorough record
below.
2. Discussion. If I were to address the question posed on appeal as
a first responder, without a record or decision of the district court on the
issue, I would find the constitutional innovations to the Fourth
Amendment law introduced by the Supreme Court in Mitchell problematic
and inapplicable to our consideration of the question under article I,
section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. To the extent I would look to federal
caselaw for guidance, I find the opinions of Justice Sotomayor in McNeely
and Mitchell far more persuasive than the Mitchell plurality opinion.
Further, I would rely on the better reasoned traditional Iowa and state law
81
precedents that have consistently employed a narrow exception to the
warrant requirement based on exigent circumstances demonstrated by the
state, on the record, of a compelling need and impracticability of obtaining
a warrant.
The problems with Mitchell are manifest. First, remarkably, it shifts
the burden to the defendant of showing that an exception to the warrant
requirement does not exist. See Mitchell, 588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at
2539. That innovation is inconsistent with our caselaw and is an
undesirable development. Obtaining a warrant is the norm and exigent
circumstances the exception. The burden of proving an exception to the
generally applicable rule, especially one of such importance as the warrant
requirement, should rest with the state. See, e.g., Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749–
50, 104 S. Ct. at 2097 (stating the government bears a “heavy burden” to
show exigent circumstances); Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601
F.3d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The officers bear the burden of
establishing that the threats posed exigent circumstances justifying the
warrantless entry.”); Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 764 (9th Cir.
2009) (“[A]s with other exceptions to the warrant requirement, the
Government bears the burden of demonstrating that the search at issue
meets the[] parameters.” (quoting United States v. Stafford, 416 F.3d 1068,
1074 (9th Cir. 2005))); Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1996)
(“To excuse the absence of a warrant, the burden rests on the State to
show the existence of these exceptional situations.”).
Further, the information necessary to prove the exception is in the
possession of the state, not the defendant. See, e.g., N.Y., New Haven &
Hartford R.R., 355 U.S. at 256 n.5, 78 S. Ct. at 214 n.5 (“The ordinary rule,
based on considerations of fairness, does not place the burden upon a
litigant of establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his
82
adversary.”); cf. Breese v. City of Burlington, 945 N.W.2d 12, 23 (Iowa 2020)
(“Given the function of the state-of-the-art defense, placing the burden on
the party challenging the defense is illogical because the defendant will
normally have access to information regarding when the improvement was
made.”). Why could the State not obtain a warrant? How long would it
have taken? What other tasks did the officers have to do? How many were
available? Are we prepared to provide the defendant with the kind of
discovery necessary to attempt to put the needle through the camel’s eye
created by Mitchell? If not, have we created an impossible burden? Indeed,
was that not the goal in Mitchell? And is the Mitchell Court ensuring that
the exigent-circumstances exception is “narrow and jealously guarded?”
At least one state supreme court has already rejected the burden shifting
in Mitchell. See State v. Key, 848 S.E.2d 315, 316 (S.C. 2020) (“We have
carefully considered the Mitchell holding and conclude we will not impose
upon a defendant the burden of establishing the absence of exigent
circumstances.”).
Second, even assuming the defendant is entitled to robust discovery,
the substantive standard is nearly impossible for a defendant to show. A
defendant must prove a remarkable negative, “that police could not have
reasonably judged that a warrant application would interfere with other
pressing needs or duties.” Mitchell, 588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2539.
As the Supreme Court has noted, “as a practical matter it is never easy to
prove a negative.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218, 80 S. Ct.
1437, 1444 (1960); see also Rivera v. Woodward Res. Ctr., 865 N.W.2d
887, 898 (Iowa 2015) (“Plaintiffs are rarely required to prove a negative.”);
Commonwealth v. Buonopane, 599 A.2d 681, 683 n.2 (Pa. 1991) (“[A]
virtually impossible burden [is] placed upon a party required to prove a
negative.” (quoting Commonwealth v. DeHart, 516 A.2d 656, 668 (Pa.
83
1986))). Police always have other things they could be doing. Under
Mitchell, obtaining a warrant in a drunk-driving case may be excused by
officers who state they had other responsibilities. Indeed, police
departments can structure their staffing arrangements to ensure that a
warrant is never required in a drunk-driving case because of thin staffing.
Mitchell does not mention the traditional view that administrative
convenience does not justify evasion of the warrant requirement. See
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 481, 91 S. Ct. at 2046 (stating that the constitutional
command of the warrant requirement “is not an inconvenience to be
somehow ‘weighed’ against the claims of police efficiency.”).
Third, the approach in Mitchell is inconsistent with our prior
caselaw. For instance, consider Harris where we rejected the state’s effort
to escape the warrant requirement where a warrant was not obtained as a
result of adherence to a policy of the local prosecutor. 763 N.W.2d at 275.
Here, the record before the district court shows that Officer Fricke did not
pursue a warrant based upon his understanding of department policy. A
rational state actor would have recognized that there were no “special
facts” to support exigent circumstances and Harris foreclosed any
argument based on compliance with policy.
Fourth, it is inconsistent with the case-by-case approach that has
been applied to determining exigency. McNeely, of course, dealt with the
dissipation of alcohol, but its principles apply here with full applicability.
Indeed, the caselaw suggests that McNeely adequately handles claims of
exigency arising from drugged driving. See, e.g., Byars, 336 P.3d at 944–
45; Anderson, 447 P.3d at 182; Pearson, 369 P.3d at 201.
Fifth, our cases should not whipsaw around like a wild caboose at
the end of a federal caselaw train. See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 266 (noting
instances of “whipsaw” in caselaw where the court reversed precedents
84
based solely upon changes in United States Supreme Court doctrine).
Here, the United States Supreme Court has not been remotely consistent.
In McNeely, Justice Sotomayor’s opinion was protective of Fourth
Amendment rights, carefully sought to follow applicable precedent, and
was consistent with the search and seizure principles outlined at the
beginning of this opinion. In Mitchell, decided only a few years later, the
Court embarked on a dramatically different path, explainable only by
changes in the Court’s membership. Mitchell runs against traditional
principles of search and seizure law, including the need to carefully defend
the protections of the Bill of Rights against state encroachment, the need
to fashion only narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement, the notion
that search and seizure protections are not defeated by mere
administrative convenience, and the placement of the burden of
demonstrating exceptions to the warrant requirement on the state. So, if
the issue had been preserved, I would adhere to the approach in McNeely
under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.
While there is a substantial body of scientific literature on the
dissipation of alcohol, less is known about the dissipation of marijuana.12
If the issue had been actually litigated in the district court, we would know
more. We might also know how long it takes to get a warrant in an OWI
12Unlike the level of alcohol in the bloodstream, the level of marijuana metabolites
in the bloodstream may not be a reliable indicator of intoxication. As noted by one
resource,
The nationally recognized level of impairment for drunken driving is .08
g/mL blood alcohol concentration. But there is no similar national
standard for drugged driving. Drugs do not affect people consistently.
Drugs such as marijuana can also stay in the system for weeks, thus
appearing in roadside tests while no longer causing impairment.
Drugged Driving: Marijuana-Impaired Driving, Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures (Nov. 9,
2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/drugged-driving-overview.aspx
[https://perma.cc/PG26-2R4S].
85
case. In this case, however, we are flying blind. So, on this appeal, I see
no basis for developing some kind of new legal standard for marijuana,
particularly one simply copied from Mitchell—a decision based solely on
alcohol. Whether the State could have met its burden in this case under
the traditional exigent-circumstances requirements, I do not know, but
what I do know is that the State did not try to make the required showing.
I would not remand for a second chance. But to the extent the State is
entitled to a second chance, it should not be based upon a newly developed
framework fashioned by this court on appeal on a completely inadequate
record.13
13In this case, McGee also raises a claim that the application of Iowa’s implied-
consent law to him violates equal protection and that strict scrutiny should apply because
the classifications affect his fundamental constitutional rights. The equal protection
claim is viable only if the court finds Iowa Code sections 321J.6 and 321J.7
constitutionally applied in this case to validate the blood draw. The majority declines,
however, to apply the terms of the implied-consent statute in this case. That’s a good
thing, as the statute is, as demonstrated by this opinion, unconstitutional under article
I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. As a result, McGee’s equal protection question is
moot. That means the majority’s discussion of the issue is dicta. Because I have found
that the implied-consent provisions cannot constitutionally be applied against McGee,
the equal protection claim is also moot under my approach. As a result, it is not necessary
to address it on the merits.
There is also a reference in the majority opinion to Baker v. City of Iowa City, 867
N.W.2d 44 (Iowa 2015), in a footnote. In Baker, we held that where the basis for an
assertion of a fundamental right was a constitutional claim and that claim failed, the
classification would be judged on a rational basis test. Id. at 57.
The majority cites to People v. Hyde, 393 P.3d 962, 969 (Colo. 2017) (en banc),
and People v. Kates, 428 N.E.2d 852, 855 (N.Y. 1981), two cases from other jurisdictions
where an equal protection challenge to an implied-consent law was rejected because the
court found no search and seizure violation.
Although I agree that Baker was properly decided, the principle in that case is
extremely narrow. It depends on the proposition that the fundamental interest asserted
as giving rise to strict scrutiny for equal protection purposes is entirely eliminated by the
adverse ruling on the individuals’ other constitutional claim. In other words, the claim
supporting the assertion of a fundamental interest must be completely extinguished for
Baker to apply. If the implied-consent law implicates a fundamental right and is invalid,
any classifications might well be subject to strict scrutiny. But, as noted above, the claim
is moot and needs not be addressed here.
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V. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the district
court and remand the case with instructions that the motion to suppress
should have been granted. I note that my approach does not prevent the
state from searching for evidence through blood draws from an
unconscious individual suspected of intoxicated driving. The state is never
powerless to get such a blood sample, it only must get a search warrant or
show the exigent circumstances that make obtaining such a warrant
impracticable. As noted by Justice Gorsuch when serving as a judge on
the Tenth Circuit, “The [Fourth] Amendment and the common law from
which it was constructed leave ample room for law enforcement to do its
job. A warrant will always do.” United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988,
1015 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
But my approach does not have the analytical overkill of Mitchell;
rather, it permits warrantless blood draws only in the narrow
circumstances historically permitted by search and seizure doctrine. The
only downside to my approach is that it might be less efficient. But the
fact that obtaining a warrant requires some time and effort is not
constitutionally significant. A blood draw involves the state thrusting a
needle into your body and drawing out a substance that can provide many
intimate details of health and life. It is a grave error to generally exempt
such intrusions from the warrant requirement where truly exigent
circumstances are not present.
With respect to the Hyde and Kates cases, these cases found no constitutional
violation and, therefore, there could be no fundamental interest for equal protection
purposes that would trigger strict scrutiny based on the unfounded constitutional claim.
These cases, and Baker, are limited to their narrow context. Nothing in the
majority opinion or the footnote should affect the ability of a party to plead multiple,
overlapping constitutional claims. The loss of one constitutional claim, of course, does
not necessarily affect another.
87
#19–1219, State v. McGee
OXLEY, Justice (dissenting).
In this case, on this record, I do not believe that the United States
Supreme Court would extend Mitchell v. Wisconsin’s holding that the
exigent circumstances involving suspected OWI from alcohol consumption
apply equally to cases involving marijuana. 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2525
(2019). Absent an exigency, the State violated McGee’s Fourth
Amendment rights when it took the blood draw without obtaining actual
consent or a warrant. I therefore respectfully dissent.
After describing the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement as being met only when “there is
compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant,” id. at
___, 139 S. Ct. at 2534 (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149,
133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 (2013)), Justice Alito went to great lengths to
describe the “compelling need” that justified a warrantless blood test taken
from an unconscious driver suspected of drunk driving, id. at ___, 139
S. Ct. at 2535–37. Justice Alito summarized:
The importance of the needs served by BAC testing is
hard to overstate. The bottom line is that BAC tests are
needed for enforcing laws that save lives. The specifics, in
short, are these: Highway safety is critical; it is served by laws
that criminalize driving with a certain BAC level; and enforcing
these legal BAC limits requires efficient testing to obtain BAC
evidence, which naturally dissipates. So BAC tests are crucial
links in a chain on which vital interests hang. And when a
breath test is unavailable to advance those aims, a blood test
becomes essential.
Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2535 (emphasis added).
He then supported how compelling the need was with well-
established and undisputed empirical data: alcohol-related accidents took
ten to twenty thousand lives per year between 1982 and 2016; “federal
and state lawmakers have long been convinced that specified BAC limits
88
make a big difference” in reducing the number of alcohol-related accidents;
and, critically, “[e]nforcement of BAC limits . . . requires prompt testing
because it is ‘a biological certainty’ that ‘[a]lcohol dissipates from the
bloodstream at a rate of 0.01 percent to 0.025 percent per hour[;] . . .
[e]vidence is literally disappearing by the minute.’ ” Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct.
2536 (second alteration and omission in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting McNeely, 569 U.S. at 169, 133 S. Ct. at 1570–71 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Even then, Justice Alito
recognized continued adherence to McNeely, “the constant dissipation of
BAC evidence alone does not create an exigency,” and a warrant is still
required unless there is “no time to secure a warrant.” Id. at ___, 139
S. Ct. at 2537 (citing McNeely, 569 U.S. at 150–51, 133 S. Ct. at 1552).
The fact that THC may dissipate from the blood “quickly” is not both
the beginning and the end analysis. If that is all that was needed to find
a “compelling need,” Justice Alito would not have described in such detail
the reliability of the science surrounding blood alcohol concentration
(BAC) levels, the significant impact a specific BAC level has for law
enforcement’s ability to enforce laws, and the effectiveness of laws setting
particular BAC limits at reducing alcohol-related traffic accidents. See id.
at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2535–37.
Rather, the rationale for collecting the disappearing evidence is
critical in determining whether the State has a compelling need that
overrides Fourth Amendment protections. Evidence of a certain level of
THC does not carry the same meaning as evidence of a BAC level. Whereas
all fifty states and the District of Columbia outlaw driving with a BAC
above .08, there is no magic number for THC. There is no magic number
because marijuana is a much more complicated drug than alcohol, not
only with respect to how and when it dissipates from the blood, but also
89
with respect to the extent to which it impairs a driver’s abilities. See
Andrea Roth, The Uneasy Case for Marijuana as Chemical Impairment
Under a Science-Based Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 103 Calif. L. Rev.
841, 897 (2015) [hereinafter Roth] (“Applying this DUI alcohol framework
to the marijuana context, it is clear that the THC blood limits chosen by
states have no scientific basis if their purpose is to target dangerous
driving. On the contrary, the science that does exist strongly suggests that
these levels do not correspond with dangerous driving impairment. This
is not to say that driving while stoned is safe; it is only to say that, as of
this writing, THC blood levels cannot legitimately be used to define
chemical impairment under a science based jurisprudence of
dangerousness.”).
Justice Alito’s description of the importance of BAC levels makes
clear that the sought-after evidence must be practically necessary for the
administration of law enforcement’s duties, in addition to being time
sensitive. The uniform and scientifically verified .08 BAC level has made
accurate BAC determinations a necessary mechanism for enforcing
alcohol-related offenses. It is inappropriate to recast that logic in the
context of marijuana, where there is no scientific consensus regarding
marijuana impairment, at what levels impairment arises, or what certain
evidence says about current impairment. It would be wrong to say that a
blood test for THC is foundational to highway safety the same way BAC
testing is.
At least partially in recognition of the difficulties with measuring and
evaluating impairment caused by marijuana use, Iowa law criminalizes
operating a motor vehicle “while any amount of a controlled substance is
present . . . in the person’s blood or urine.” Iowa Code § 321J.2(1)(c)
(2018). The presence of carboxy-THC, the nonimpairing metabolite of
90
marijuana, satisfies the “any amount of a controlled substance” prong of
operating while intoxicated. See State v. Childs, 898 N.W.2d 177, 184
(Iowa 2017) (“The Iowa legislature chose to cast a wider net, criminalizing
driving with any amount of prohibited substances in one’s body, including
the nonimpairing metabolite at issue commonly found in urine after
marijuana use.”); see also Iowa Code § 321J.1(4) (defining “controlled
substance” to include “any metabolite or derivative of the drug, substance,
or compound” listed in section 124.204).14 “The strict standard relates in
part to the current hurdles in testing drug impairment. For example, [in
2019], there [wa]s no device for a peace officer to identify marijuana-
impaired driving or even an accepted standard to identify such an
impairment.” State v. Newton, 929 N.W.2d 250, 258 n.2 (Iowa 2019)
(citation omitted). The legislature has, effectively, taken care of any
exigency caused by dissipation of active THC by allowing officers to charge,
and a court to convict, an individual for OWI based only on the presence
of carboxy-THC.
McGee was charged and convicted with operating a motor vehicle
under the “any amount” prong of OWI. See Iowa Code § 321J.2(1)(c). The
majority does not dispute that there are no exigent circumstances related
to testing for carboxy-THC, the only substance needed to support a
conviction under section 321J.2(1)(c), since that metabolite is admittedly
14In State v. Childs, we justified “[t]he harshness of Iowa’s flat ban [a]s ameliorated
by the fact that the motorist would be asked to submit to chemical testing only after the
officer performed a lawful traffic stop and had reasonable grounds to believe the driver
was impaired.” 898 N.W.2d at 185. And just two years ago we rejected a due process
challenge to the “any amount” statute as applied to metabolites of a controlled substance
that remains in the blood for days based on the “broader ‘statutory scheme’ ” under which
“a properly invoked blood or urine test is part and parcel to a criminal prosecution under
Iowa Code section 321J.2(1)(c).” State v. Newton, 929 N.W.2d 250, 256–57 (Iowa 2019)
(quoting State v. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d 306, 315 (Iowa 2000) (en banc)). Query what the
majority’s opinion does to that broader statutory scheme.
91
detectible for at least “some time.” A conviction under subsection (1)(c)
subjects the defendant to the same punishment as a conviction for
operating under the influence under subsection (1)(a). See Iowa Code
§ 321J.2(2) (imposing same penalties for any violation of subsection 1).
With respect to enforcing Iowa’s OWI laws, law enforcement’s compelling
need for evidence is satisfied the same whether the blood is drawn quickly
in an attempt to capture active THC or after a bit of a delay when carboxy-
THC may be the only thing still present. Despite the clear lack of any
exigency in capturing carboxy-THC in a suspect’s blood, and despite the
majority’s own recognition that active THC can stay in the body for hours
or even days and marijuana’s unpredictable properties make inferences
about its psychoactive effect nearly impossible, the majority nonetheless
leaps to the conclusion that the presence of active THC in the blood “makes
the case for impairment stronger than it otherwise would be.” The majority
then uses this unsupported conclusion to move from a clear lack of
exigency in this case involving an any-amount OWI (which requires no
evidence of impairment, so there is no need to strengthen “the case for
impairment”) to the broad generalization that because active THC
dissipates quickly, evidence of marijuana use always creates an exigency.
The majority justifies its broad holding by proclaiming that law
enforcement should not have to “settle” for lesser evidence when stronger
evidence is available. Except they should when it comes to infringing on
a citizen’s Fourth Amendment protections without a warrant—unless they
can prove a compelling need to support the exigency exception to the
warrant requirement. See Mitchell, 588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2535.
It may be that “there are legitimate reasons why law enforcement
would want more,” including, at least theoretically, avoiding jury
nullification or the need to support the causation element of a charge
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under Iowa Code section 707.6A(4), as offered by the majority. But
“compelling need,” not hypothetical “legitimate reasons,” is the standard
for establishing exigent circumstances. See Mitchell, 588 U.S. at ___, 139
S. Ct. at 2535 (“BAC tests are crucial links in a chain on which vital
interests hang. And when a breath test is unavailable to advance those
aims, a blood test becomes essential.” (emphasis added)). Further, those
justifications must come from the State in support of its reliance on the
exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, not as an
after-the-fact rationalization created by this court. See State v. Watts, 801
N.W.2d 845, 850 (Iowa 2011) (“The State has the burden of proving ‘by a
preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless search falls within one
of these exceptions.’ ” (quoting State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 107–08
(Iowa 2001))).
Even then, the jury nullification rationale presupposes the jury
would ignore a judge’s instruction that the presence of a marijuana
metabolite satisfies our laws, a presumption we repeatedly decry. See,
e.g., State v. Gomez Garcia, 904 N.W.2d 172, 183 (Iowa 2017) (“We
presume jurors follow the court’s . . . instructions.”). This is hardly a
compelling state interest that can be equated with a scientifically proven
BAC level that saves thousands of lives to support overriding a driver’s
Fourth Amendment rights.
I do agree with the majority that the need for evidence of active THC
to support a section 707.6A(4) charge, which requires proof of a causal
connection between impaired driving and serious injuries, could
potentially support the exigent circumstances needed to dispense with a
warrant—if it could be shown that active THC levels correlated to impaired
driving. But there is no evidence in this record to support that proposition.
And it is not so well established that we should be doing our own research
93
and relying on student notes and commentators’ views to find post hoc
support for the State’s compelling interest needed to establish an exigency.
Cf. State v. McCall, 839 S.E.2d 91, 95 n.2 (S.C. 2020) (discussing
toxicologist’s testimony regarding THC metabolization); City of Seattle v.
Pearson, 369 P.3d 194, 201 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (same). Indeed,
Professor Roth explains that “even if . . . scientists could straightforwardly
infer proximity of use from THC blood levels, marijuana’s unpredictable
properties render nearly impossible any inference about the likely
psychoactive effect on the brain of a specific THC blood level.” Roth, 103
Calif. L. Rev. at 887.
Another more fundamental problem with this justification is that
McGee was not charged with violating section 707.6A(4). Recognizing this
deficiency, the majority combed the record to find evidence of the victim’s
injuries, concluding thirteen stitches, two weeks of missed school, and a
fear of riding in a car support its conclusion that “situations like this can
be fluid,” so an exigency exists in this case. Under the majority’s rationale,
an exigency exists in any case involving any type of injury.
But the State did not offer the potential for a section 707.6A(4)
charge as a justification at the suppression hearing. To the contrary,
Officer Fricke expressly (and repeatedly) testified at the suppression
hearing that he did not even attempt to obtain a warrant because he
understood he could not get one in this case because there were no serious
injuries. Thus, as a factual matter, that need cannot support an exigency
in this particular case. See Mitchell, 588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2537–
39 (plurality rejecting Justice Thomas’s lone view for a per se exception to
the warrant requirement for drunk-driving cases and maintaining the
case-by-case analysis recently espoused in McNeely).
94
On the facts presented at the suppression hearing, the State failed
to establish the exigent circumstances necessary to avoid procuring a
warrant, and I would hold that McGee’s Fourth Amendment rights were
violated. In fairness, Mitchell came down after the suppression hearing,
where the State relied on the implied-consent statute and offered no
evidence of exigency even in light of McGee’s argument that an exigency
was required to support the warrantless blood draw. At a minimum, the
State should be tasked with presenting facts to the district court to
support the compelling need to obtain evidence of active THC, as opposed
to evidence of carboxy-THC, when the officers chose to forego a warrant.
As it stands, the majority has found a compelling need as a matter of law,
and the State gets a pass on that required showing.
I do not believe the Supreme Court would extend Mitchell’s
categorical rule for driving under the influence of alcohol to driving with
any amount of marijuana in the driver’s blood or urine, and I therefore
respectfully dissent.
Appel, J., joins this dissent.