NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 21 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARIO DUSSTIN RAMOS-NAVAS, No. 19-72985
Petitioner, Agency No. A044-185-927
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted May 7, 2021
Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW, GOULD, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Mario Dusstin Ramos-Navas, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of deferral of
removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). “Where the BIA
conducts its own review of the evidence and law, rather than adopting the
[Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)] decision, our review is limited to the BIA’s decision,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
except to the extent the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” Guerra v. Barr, 974
F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). We review legal conclusions de
novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. Id. As the parties are familiar
with the facts, we do not recount them here. We grant the petition and remand.
Ramos-Navas argues in part that the BIA failed to consider his aggregate
risk of torture from all sources. Specifically, Ramos-Navas contends that his
potential torturers include: (1) gang members in prison; (2) public officials in
prison; (3) staff at mental health institutions; (4) Salvadoran security forces, or
private citizens participating in “death squads,” outside of prison; and (5) gang
members outside of prison.
“CAT claims must be considered in terms of the aggregate risk of torture
from all sources, and not as separate, divisible CAT claims.” Quijada-Aguilar v.
Lynch, 799 F.3d 1303, 1308 (9th Cir. 2015); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)
(stating that the agency shall consider “all evidence relevant to the possibility of
future torture”); Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 775 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that the
consideration of the risk of torture must “tak[e] into account all possible sources of
torture” and that the BIA erred by not considering “the aggregate risk that Cole
would face from police, death squads, and gangs”).
Contrary to the government’s contention, we conclude that Ramos-Navas
sufficiently exhausted this issue. “Exhaustion requires a non-constitutional legal
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claim to the court on appeal to have first been raised in the administrative
proceedings below, and to have been sufficient to put the BIA on notice of what
was being challenged,” but “this does not require the issue to have been raised in a
precise form during the administrative proceeding.” Bare v. Barr, 975 F.3d 952,
960 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal citation omitted). Here, while Ramos-Navas focused
on his risk of torture inside a prison or mental health institution, we conclude that
he sufficiently put the agency on notice that he was also raising the aggregate risk
of torture from additional sources. Cf. Quijada-Aguilar, 799 F.3d at 1308. For
example, in his brief to the BIA, Ramos-Navas quoted the portion of Cole that
concerns aggregate risk and mentioned “death squads” twice.
Because the BIA failed to consider Ramos-Navas’s aggregate risk of torture
from all possible sources if removed to El Salvador, we remand for it to do so.
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED AND REMANDED.
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