Opinion issued May 18, 2021
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-21-00181-CR
NO. 01-21-00183-CR
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RICHARD A. DUNSMORE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 412th District Court
Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Case Nos. 56909 & 56910
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On October 8, 2010, appellant, Richard A. Dunsmore, was convicted of the
offenses of sexual assault and attempted sexual assault in trial court case numbers
56909 and 59610.1 On April 12, 2012, this Court dismissed Dunsmore’s untimely
appeals of his 2010 convictions for lack of jurisdiction. See Dunsmore v. State, Nos.
01-10-00981-CR, 01-10-00982-CR, 2012 WL 1249418, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] April 12, 2012, pet. ref d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Acting pro se, Dunsmore filed two related notices of appeal, assigned
appellate case numbers 01-21-00181-CR and 01-21-00183-CR, attempting to appeal
from a March 1, 2021 trial court order denying motions filed by Dunsmore in the
trial court, including a “Motion for the Appointment of Counsel to Determine Brady
Violation,” and “Request to Consolidate Brady Violation and Prosecutorial
Misconduct Hearings” concerning his 2010 convictions in trial court case numbers
56909 and 56910. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
We dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction.
The right to appeal in criminal cases is conferred by statute, and a party may
only appeal from a judgment of conviction or an interlocutory order as authorized
by statute. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02; TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2);
Ragston v. State, 424 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). A court of appeals
1
On November 10, 2016, the trial court entered an order of commitment in
connection with a final judgment on a unanimous jury verdict finding that
Dunsmore is a sexually violent predator. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 841.081; see also In re Commitment of Dunsmore, 562 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (affirming trial court’s judgment and order of
commitment).
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does not have jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order in a criminal case when
jurisdiction has not been expressly granted by statute. See Ragston, 424 S.W.3d at
52; see also State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 915 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011) (explaining appeals “in a criminal case are permitted only when they are
specifically authorized by statute”); Ex parte Doster, 303 S.W.3d 720, 724 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010) (noting “an interlocutory appeal is an extraordinary remedy”).
The trial court's March 1, 2021 order denying Dunsmore’s “Motion for the
Appointment of Counsel to Determine a Brady Violation” and “Request to
Consolidate Brady Violation and Prosecutorial Misconduct Hearings” is neither a
judgment of conviction nor an appealable interlocutory order. See, e.g., Dunsmore
v. State, Nos. 01-14-00251-CR, 01-14-00307-CR, 01-14-00274-CR,
01-14-00306-CR, 2014 WL 4418565, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept.
9, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (dismissing
Dunsmore’s appeal from order denying motion for appointment of counsel for lack
of jurisdiction); Cooper v. State, No. 05-12-01738-CR, 2013 WL 1286208, at *1
(Tex. App.—Dallas March 1, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (“[T]he denial of court-appointed counsel is not a judgment of
conviction nor does it fall within the categories of appealable interlocutory orders.”).
Because the trial court’s order denying Dunsmore’s motions was neither a
final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order, we hold that we lack
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jurisdiction over Dunsmore’s appeals. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals for lack
of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(f). We dismiss any pending motions as
moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Guerra, and Farris.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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