J-A03033-21
2021 PA Super 105
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JONATHAN RIVERA :
:
Appellant : No. 1788 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 26, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-08-CR-0000606-2018
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.
OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MAY 24, 2021
Jonathan Rivera appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the
Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County, after a jury convicted him of four
counts of corruption of minors—course of conduct;1 three counts of indecent
assault—person less than 13 years of age;2 two counts of indecent exposure;3
and one count each of criminal attempt to commit indecent assault—person
less than 13 years of age,4 and endangering the welfare of a child (EWOC).5
After careful review, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(ii).
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7). Counts 21 and 22 were graded as third-degree
felonies. Count 24 was graded as a first-degree misdemeanor.
3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3127(a).
4 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 3126(a)(7).
5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1).
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Specifically, because the Commonwealth’s amendment to the criminal
information unfairly prejudiced Rivera, we vacate Rivera’s convictions under
Counts 21 and 22, and remand for a new trial. Additionally, because the jury
did not find that Rivera’s EWOC conviction was the result of a course of
Rivera’s conduct or that his actions resulted in a substantial risk of death or
serious bodily injury, we remand for resentencing on Count 15. We affirm
Rivera’s remaining convictions.
On April 17, 2018, F.M.6 recorded a video in which her daughter, G.R.,7
accused Rivera of various acts constituting criminal sexual assault. The next
day, F.M. recorded another video in which her niece, C.P.,8 accused Rivera of
similar inappropriate behavior. F.M. then took these videos to the police,
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6F.M. is G.R.’s mother and K.M.’s sister. K.M. is C.P.’s mother. K.M. lived
with Rivera and C.P. at the time of the initial police reports.
7 G.R., born in October of 2010, was seven years old at the time of the initial
police report. G.R. alleged that Rivera committed multiple acts including
anally penetrating her, telling her to touch his privates, exposing himself to
her, and choking her with a lollipop. As discussed infra, Counts 2, 3, 6, 7,
14, 16, 21, and 25 of the Commonwealth’s charges, naming G.R. as the victim,
alleged a continuing course of conduct dating from January 1, 2009, which
predated G.R.’s birth by nearly two years.
8 C.P., born in March of 2010, was eight years old at the time of the initial
police report. C.P. alleged that Rivera anally penetrated her, touched her
privates with his private, and exposed himself to her. As discussed infra,
Counts 4, 5, 8-11, 17, 22, and 26, naming C.P. as the victim, alleged a
continuing course of conduct dating from January 1, 2009, which predated
C.P.’s birth by nearly one year.
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which led to the discovery of two additional child victim complainants, S.C.9
and S.M.10
On September 7, 2018, the Commonwealth charged Rivera with: Count
1—aggravated assault11 (victim G.R.); Counts 2 and 3—rape of a child12
(victim G.R.); Counts 4 and 5—rape of a child (victim C.P.); Counts 6 and 7—
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse13 (IDSI) (victim G.R.); Counts 8 and
9—IDSI (victim C.P.); Counts 10 and 11—attempted aggravated indecent
assault14 (victim C.P.); Counts 12 and 13—attempted aggravated indecent
assault (victim S.M.); Count 14—attempted aggravated indecent assault
(victim G.R.); Count 15—EWOC (victim G.R.); Counts 16, 17, 18, and 19—
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9 S.C., born in February of 2008, is K.R.’s daughter. K.R. was married to
Rivera, and the trio lived together for approximately three years. S.C. alleged
that Rivera rubbed her doll against his private parts and touched S.C.
inappropriately on her butt, over her clothing. S.C. was of elementary school
age when she lived with Rivera in Pennsylvania, but the Commonwealth
alleged the criminal acts commenced when S.C. was eleven months old.
10 S.M., born in March of 2003, testified that Rivera was her uncle’s friend.
S.M. lived and visited with that uncle in Scranton, Pennsylvania, on multiple
occasions in 2009, when she was six years old. S.M. alleged that Rivera
touched her inappropriately between four and nine times, once putting his
hands inside her underwear, and another time rubbing her stomach until she
fell asleep, after she woke up to find him on her bedroom floor apparently
looking for something.
11 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1).
12 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(c).
13 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(b).
14 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a)(7).
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corruption of minors (victims G.R., C.P., S.C., and S.M., respectively); Count
20—simple assault15 (victim G.R.); Counts 21, 22, 23, and 24—indecent
assault of a child (victims G.R., C.P., S.C., and S.M., respectively); and Counts
25 and 26—indecent exposure (victims “two female juveniles”).
On January 14, 2019, the court dismissed Count 13 as duplicative of
Count 12, and further ordered the Commonwealth to identify the complainants
for Counts 25 and 26. On July 31, 2019, mere days before the scheduled trial,
the Commonwealth—apparently disregarding the fact that the court had
already dismissed Count 13—moved to amend the information by changing
the location of Counts 12 and 13 and specified the victims for Counts 25 and
26, as G.R. and C.P., respectively. The court commenced a jury trial on
August 6, 2019.
At trial, following defense questioning of Pennsylvania State Trooper
Christopher Higdon, the Commonwealth inquired if Rivera, having been read
his Miranda16 warnings after his arrest, denied the charges against him.
Trooper Higdon, over defense counsel’s objection, testified that Rivera did not
deny committing the offenses and that Rivera wished to remain silent. See
N.T. Jury Trial, 8/6/19, at 101-02.
The Commonwealth rested its case-in-chief on August 7, 2019. The
defense began presentation of its witnesses that same day. On August 8,
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15 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1).
16 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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2019, the court dismissed Counts 10, 11, and 14, after the Commonwealth
agreed that it had proffered insufficient evidence to prove those charges.
Additionally, the court permitted the Commonwealth to amend Counts 12, 21,
and 22 by changing the latter two counts from first-degree misdemeanors
charged pursuant to subsection 3126(b)(3), to third-degree felonies charged
pursuant to subsection 3126(b)(3)(iii). See N.T. Jury Trial, 8/8/19, at 7-9.
On August 8, 2019, the jury returned a verdict acquitting Rivera of
Counts 1-9, 20, and 23, and convicting Rivera of Counts 12, 15, 16-19, 21,
22, and 24-26. At the sentencing hearing held on September 26, 2019, the
court sentenced Rivera to an aggregate term of eight to fifty-two years’
incarceration. Rivera filed a timely notice of appeal; both he and the trial
court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Following our grant of two extensions of time, see Order, 4/13/20;17
Order, 6/12/20,18 Rivera filed his appellate brief on July 6, 2020. Having also
been granted an extension, see Order, 7/31/20,19 the Commonwealth filed its
appellate brief on September 4, 2020. We subsequently granted two more
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17 Without opposition from the Commonwealth, Rivera requested, and this
Court granted, a 60-day extension to file his appellate brief. We ordered
Rivera to file his brief on or before June 22, 2020.
18 On June 10, 2020, Rivera, requested a 14-day extension, which the
Commonwealth did not oppose. We granted the request and ordered that
Rivera file his brief no later than July 6, 2020.
19 We granted the request and ordered the Commonwealth to file its brief on
or before September 4, 2020.
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extensions, see Order, 9/22/2020 and Order, 10/15/20,21 after which Rivera
filed a reply brief on November 13, 2020. On November 23, 2020, we
continued the case.22
On January 14, 2021, we ordered the parties to submit supplemental
briefs on or before January 28, 2021, to “specifically address how the Supreme
Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 717 (Pa. 2020),
applies to the instant case.”23 Order, 1/14/21. Both parties complied.
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20We granted the request and ordered Rivera to file his reply brief on or before
October 30, 2020, and noted that no further extensions would be granted.
21We granted Rivera’s request for an extension and ordered Rivera to file his
reply brief on or before November 13, 2020, again noting that no further
extensions would be granted.
22 We granted the Commonwealth’s application for continuance, in which
Rivera joined, ordering the Harrisburg Prothonotary’s Office to list this case
for the next available argument panel. The Prothonotary complied, at which
point this panel assumed jurisdiction over this case and listed it for remote
video-teleconference argument on February 4, 2021, due to the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic.
23 The parties agree that the Commonwealth proved its prima facie case at
Rivera’s preliminary hearing by relying solely on hearsay evidence. See N.T.
Preliminary Hearing, 8/17/18. In McClelland, our Supreme Court held that
the Commonwealth may not establish a prima facie case against a defendant
relying on hearsay evidence alone. See id. at 722 (reversing the previous
rule set forth in Commonwealth v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349 (Pa. Super. 2015)).
Rivera raised the issue of the adequacy of the Commonwealth’s prima facie
case in his Rule 1925(b) statement, but abandoned it in his original appellate
brief. The trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion addressed the issue, but relied
on Ricker in recommending we find no error. We note that our Supreme
Court published the McClelland decision on July 21, 2020, after Rivera’s case
was already on appeal. Subsequent to our supplemental briefing order, Rivera
argued that his failure to raise the issue in his appellate brief did not result in
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Following our review of the Supreme Court’s decision in McClelland,
the parties’ briefs, relevant case law, and the certified record on appeal, we
find that the Supreme Court did not intend to extend McClelland’s holding to
cases such as this one, where the complained-of defect in the preliminary
hearing is subsequently cured at trial. Cf. Commonwealth v. Ballard, 460
A.2d 1091, 1092 (Pa. 1987) (“A finding at a preliminary hearing that sufficient
evidence exists to require a defendant to stand trial is not subject to review if
there has been a subsequent independent judicial judgment that there is
sufficient evidence to require the defendant to stand trial.”);
Commonwealth v. Tyler, 587 A.2d 326, 328 (Pa. Super. 1991) (purpose of
preliminary hearing is not to prove guilt but to avoid defendant’s incarceration
or trial unless sufficient evidence establishes crime was committed and
probability that defendant was involved; “Once [an] appellant has gone
to trial and been found guilty of the crime, any defect in the
preliminary hearing is rendered immaterial[.]”) (emphasis added;
internal citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Mignogna, 585 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa.
Super. 1990) (deficiency in evidence at preliminary hearing cured where trial
judge determines trial evidence is sufficient for submission to jury).
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waiver because it would have been futile for Rivera to raise the issue where,
at the time of the preliminary hearing, Ricker was governing law. See
Appellant’s Supplemental Brief, at 4-9. Nevertheless, for the reasons noted
in this decision, we find we cannot apply McClelland retroactively to the
instant case.
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Here, because the Honorable Evan S. Williams, III, determined that the
Commonwealth’s trial evidence was sufficient to submit Rivera’s case to the
jury, any defect that existed in the evidence proffered at Rivera’s preliminary
hearing was subsequently cured. See Ballard, supra, Tyler, supra, and
Mignogna, supra; cf. McClelland, supra at 725 (interlocutory appeal taken
from pre-trial order denying motion seeking writ of habeas corpus);
Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172, 173 (Pa.
1990) (appeal taken from pre-trial order denying motion seeking writ of
habeas corpus). Moreover, Rivera fails to argue that the defect in the evidence
at the preliminary hearing tainted the validity of the verdict. See Mignogna,
supra at 4 (“[A] defendant must establish the existence of actual prejudice
arising from a denial of due process at the preliminary hearing in order to be
afforded the remedy of discharge.”); cf. Appellant’s Supplemental Brief, at 10
(“[The defects alleged here by Rivera] are of a type that require reversal
without a showing of prejudice.”) (emphasis added). Therefore, we will
not consider any deficiency in the Commonwealth’s evidence that may have
existed prior to this case’s submission to the jury, and we will proceed to
address the issues Rivera raises on appeal.
On appeal, Rivera presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court committed reversible constitutional
error when it admitted testimony commenting on Mr. Rivera’s
post-arrest, post-Miranda, exercise and assertion of his right to
silence?
2. Whether the trial court erred by permitting the Commonwealth
to amend the [i]nformation to add new felony offenses on the last
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day of trial, after the defense case was underway, and the
defendant was prejudiced by the amendment?
Appellant’s Brief, at 5.
First, Rivera claims that he is entitled to a new trial because the court
admitted evidence of his post-arrest and post-Miranda silence, in violation of
his constitutional rights to remain silent under the 5th and 14th Amendments
of the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. See Appellant’s Brief, at 31-43; see also Appellant’s Reply
Brief, at 1-15. Specifically, Rivera argues that the court permitted the
Commonwealth to place evidence into the record in contravention of our
Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Turner, 454 A.2d 537 (Pa.
1982), wherein our Supreme Court stated that, to admit evidence of the
defendant’s post-arrest silence:
[T]he Commonwealth must seek to impeach a defendant’s
relation of events by reference only to inconsistencies as
they factually exist, not to the purported inconsistency between
silence at arrest and testimony at trial. Silence at the time of
arrest may become a factual inconsistency in the face of an
assertion by the accused while testifying at trial that he
related this version to the police at the time of arrest
when[,] in fact[,] he remained silent.
Id. at 539-40 (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)) (emphasis added).
Rivera claims that his counsel’s questioning of Trooper Higdon, on cross-
examination, inquired into the completeness of the Trooper’s pre-arrest
investigation as well as the Commonwealth’s bases for seeking Rivera’s arrest,
rather than inquired into whether Rivera denied the allegations against him at
the time of his arrest. Restated, Rivera claims that the Commonwealth
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improperly relies on the defense question that related to Rivera’s pre-arrest
statements in asserting that a factual inconsistency existed at trial regarding
Rivera’s alleged post-arrest denial of the criminal charges against him.
The Commonwealth relies on our Supreme Court’s decision in
Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 719 A.2d 242 (Pa. 1988), where the Court
found the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant’s post-arrest silence was a
“fair response” and did not violate the defendant’s constitutional right to
remain silent where the defendant raises a factual inconsistency at trial. Id.
at 251. The Commonwealth argues that Rivera’s testimony attacked the
thoroughness and fairness of its investigation into his case, raising a factual
inconsistency, and thereby opened the door to “fair response.” See Appellee’s
Brief, at 11-13.
The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court
and an appellate court will not reverse the trial court’s determination absent
an abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Puksar, 740 A.2d 219, 225
(Pa. 1999). “Not merely an error in judgment, an abuse of discretion occurs
when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will,
as shown by the evidence on record.” Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 986
A.2d 84, 94 (Pa. 2009) (citing Commonwealth v. Cooper, 941 A.2d 655,
668 (Pa. 2007)) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
At trial, Rivera’s counsel’s cross-examination of Trooper Higdon
proceeded as follows:
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[By Defense Attorney:]
Q. And you still arrested my client[?]
A. Correct.
Q. So therefore you arrested my client based upon the forensic
interview.
A. Well not solely, but correct.
Q. Well you never talked to my client, did you?
A. No, I attempted to.
N.T. Jury Trial, 8/7/19, at 100 (emphasis added). On re-direct examination,
under the theory of “fair response,” see Copenhefer, supra, the
Commonwealth questioned Trooper Higdon as follows:
[By Commonwealth Attorney:]
Q. I’d like to direct your attention to June 26, 2018, at about 1400
hours, did you[,] along with other Pennsylvania State Police
Troopers[,] go to the home of Jonathan Rivera?
A. Yes.
Q. And was he arrested based on the arrest warrant?
A. I had an arrest warrant in hand, correct.
Q. At approximately 1430 hours, did you read Mr. Rivera his
Miranda warnings?
A. Yes.
Q. [W]hat are the Miranda warnings?
A. Miranda warnings are[—]I’ll say in easy terms[—]their right
to remain silent.
Q. Okay. After you read him his Miranda warnings, he never
told you that he didn’t do anything to any of these kids?
A. No.
Q. He never denied doing anything to—
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[Defense Attorney]: Objection to that. A person doesn’t have to
deny.
The Court: You’re correct, I think he’s just asking if he did. You
may answer.
A. He did not deny.
Q. He never said [“]I didn’t do this[”]?
A. No.
Q. What did he say?
A. Nothing, he said he wished to not talk.
Id. at 101-02 (emphasis added).
Here, we agree with Rivera that the court admitted Trooper Higdon’s
rebuttal testimony on re-direct examination in error, as it did not qualify as a
“fair response.” The defense’s questioning of Trooper Higdon, when read
within the context of the record, inquired into Rivera’s pre-arrest questioning
by police. See N.T. Jury Trial, 8/7/19, at 95-99 (defense attorney inquiring
into bases for Trooper Higdon’s belief that Rivera was perpetrator prior to his
arresting Rivera). As such, Rivera did not create a factual inconsistency with
regard to whether he denied the allegations against him “at the time of [his]
arrest.” Turner, supra (emphasis added); see also Copenhefer, supra at
252 (defendant clearly stated he cooperated with police because he had
nothing to hide and insinuated that he answered “everything” police believed
relevant during his questioning, when in fact, defendant had selectively
invoked right to remain silent when police inquired regarding most
incriminating questions). Nevertheless, we hold that the trial court’s error
was harmless because the prejudice to Rivera, if any, was de minimis.
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Our Supreme Court has long held that:
although a perfectly conducted trial is indeed the ideal objective
of our judicial process, the defendant is not necessarily entitled to
relief simply because of some imperfections in the trial, so long as
he has been accorded a fair trial. A defendant is entitled to a fair
trial but not a perfect one. If a trial error does not deprive the
defendant of the fundamentals of a fair trial, his conviction will not
be reversed.
Commonwealth v. Noel, 104 A.3d 1156, 1169 (Pa. 2014) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Wright, 961 A.2d 119, 135 (Pa. 2008)) (brackets and
quotation marks omitted). Where a trial court has erroneously admitted
evidence of post-arrest silence, we may find that no new trial is warranted if
we are convinced the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Commonwealth v. Adams, 39 A.3d 310, 321-22 (Pa. Super. 2012). The
Commonwealth carries the burden of proving harmless error.24 Id. at 322.
Our Supreme Court has clarified that harmless error exists where
the record demonstrates either: (1) the error did not prejudice
the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; or (2) the
erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other
untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the
erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and
uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the
prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison
that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.
Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 671-72 (Pa. 2014).
____________________________________________
24 But see Commonwealth v. Hamlett, 234 A.3d 486, 492 (Pa. 2020)
(“[S]ua sponte invocation of the harmless error doctrine is not inappropriate
as it does nothing more than affirm a valid judgment of sentence on an
alternative basis.”). Here, the Commonwealth, without citation, argued that
the doctrine of harmless error is applicable to Rivera’s case. See Appellee’s
Brief, at 13-14. Following our review of the relevant case law, see infra, we
agree.
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In Commonwealth v. Adams, 104 A.3d 511 (Pa. 2014), our Supreme
Court found harmless error where the prosecutor elicited testimony that
referenced the defendant’s post-arrest silence because the reference was
“contextual and brief and did not highlight [d]efendant’s silence as evidence
of guilt,” where the Court found “it was simply utilized to recount the
sequence of the [Commonwealth’s] investigation, in particular, how the DNA
sample was obtained from [d]efendant.” Id. at 518. See also
Commonwealth v. DiNicola, 866 A.2d 329, 337 (Pa. 2005) (where defense
counsel first created inference that Commonwealth’s investigative efforts were
minimal or one-sided, and where trooper testified both that defendant
declined police interview and that defense counsel advised trooper that
defendant denied allegations and would invoke right to remain silent,
reference to silence was “circumspect,” “limited to its context,” and “not used
in any fashion likely to burden [d]efendant’s Fifth Amendment right” or create
inference of admission of guilt since prosecution made no further reference to
defendant’s silence, thus, defendant did not suffer prejudice);
Commonwealth v. Whitney, 708 A.2d 471, 478 (Pa. 1998) (“Even an
explicit reference to silence is not reversible error where it occurs in a context
not likely to suggest to the jury that silence is the equivalent of a tacit
admission of guilt.”).
Here, as in Adams, we find that, in recounting the sequence of the
Commonwealth’s investigation into Rivera’s case, Trooper Higdon’s reference
to Rivera’s post-arrest silence—that Rivera failed to deny the allegations
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against him and “wished not to talk” after receiving his Miranda warnings—
resulted in de minimis, if any, prejudice. See also DiNicola, supra;
Hairston, supra. We conclude that the testimonial reference was “contextual
and brief,” see Adams, 104 A.3d at 518; see also DiNicola, supra at 337,
and that it rebutted the inference that police officers had failed to interview
Rivera at all as a part of their investigation into his case, see N.T. Jury Trial,
8/7/19, at 100 (Q: “Well you never talked to my client, did you?” A. “No, I
attempted to.”), rather than highlighted Rivera’s silence at the time of his
arrest as evidence of his guilt. See id. at 101-02. Indeed, the Commonwealth
did not mention Rivera’s post-Miranda silence again or reference it during
closing argument. See Adams, 104 A.3d at 515 (citing Commonwealth v.
Molina, 33 A.3d 51, 56 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (prosecutor’s questions eliciting
reference to defendant’s silence permissible when employed for narrow
purpose of describing police investigation, and not for implying defendant’s
guilt; however, where defendant’s silence used as substantive evidence of
guilt in closing arguments, prejudice to defendant results); see also
DiNicola, supra. Accordingly, the trial court’s error in admitting Trooper
Higdon’s brief and contextual testimonial reference to Rivera’s post-Miranda
silence—where such reference was not relied upon as substantive evidence of
Rivera’s guilt—did not deprive Rivera of the fundamentals of a fair trial. See
Noel, supra.
Next, Rivera claims that the trial court erred when it permitted the
Commonwealth to amend the information after the close of its case-in-chief
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and after the start of the defense at trial. Specifically, Rivera argues that the
Commonwealth’s amendments to Counts 21 and 22 upgraded those charges
from misdemeanors in the first degree25 to felonies of the third degree.26
The court permitted the Commonwealth to amend Counts 21 and 22
because the Commonwealth alleged the amendment simply changed the
grading pursuant to subsection 3126(b)(3)(iii). See N.T. Jury Trial, 8/8/19,
at 6 (Commonwealth Attorney: “There’s a subsection under indecent assault
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25Initially, the Commonwealth’s information charged Rivera, at those counts,
with indecent assault pursuant to subsection 3126(a)(7), which states:
(a) Offense defined. — A person is guilty of indecent assault
if the person has indecent contact with the complainant, causes
the complainant to have indecent contact with the person or
intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with
seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual
desire in the person or the complainant and:
* * *
(7) the complainant is less than 13 years of age[.]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7). Under subsection (b), those crimes were graded
as misdemeanors of the first degree. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(b)(3) (“An
offense under subsection (a)(7) is a misdemeanor of the first degree unless
any of the following apply, in which case it is a felony of the third degree: [i]t
is a second or subsequent offense[; t]here has been a course of conduct of
indecent assault by the person[; t]he indecent assault was committed by
touching the complainant’s sexual or intimate parts with sexual or
intimate parts of the person[; or, t]he indecent assault is committed by
touching the person’s sexual or intimate parts with the complainant’s sexual
or intimate parts.”) (emphasis added); see also N.T. Jury Trial, 8/8/19, at 6
(“[Counts 21and 22 are both] graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree.”).
26 Subsection 3126(b)(3)(iii) states that an indecent assault is graded as a
felony of the third degree when it “was committed by touching the
complainant’s sexual or intimate parts with sexual or intimate parts of the
person.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(b)(3)(iii). See also supra at n.31.
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that says it’s a felony of the third degree if the indecent contact has to do with
. . . the private parts of the suspect and the private part of the victim
touch[ing]. So I’m going to suggest that—I understand that it’s late in the
game to be upgrading two counts from misdemeanor 1’s to felony 3’s[—]but
I’m going to suggest that they’re lesser included offenses of the [] rape [and]
IDSI charges.”) (unnecessary capitalization omitted); id. at 9 (The Court:
“Okay, that’s fine. I’m going to allow [the amendments to Counts 21 and 22],
with the understanding I’m not adding a new offense[.] I am going to add
some language to [those counts t]hat will make reference to the sexual or
intimate parts that is mentioned in [subsection] (b)(3)(iii)[. This amendment]
adds an additional element to the offense, but that element is included in other
offenses that have previously been charged[,] so it’s really not adding
anything new.”).
Rivera asserts that he was unfairly prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s
last-minute amendment because it alleged, for the first time, that Rivera
brought “his intimate parts into contact with the intimate parts of another for
the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire[.]” Appellant’s Brief, at 47.
Additionally, Rivera argues that his trial strategy was adversely affected
insofar as his previous strategy permitted Rivera to avoid all felony charges
by pointing to a lack of physical evidence and denying any penetration
occurred, whereas, post-amendment, Rivera’s defense—if believed by the
jury—would no longer permit avoidance of all felony convictions since lack of
physical evidence, and lack of penetration, was no defense. See id. at 51.
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Rivera concludes that he suffered irreparable prejudice and, therefore, he is
entitled to a new trial. We agree.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 564 governs when the
Commonwealth may amend the charges against a defendant, and states:
The court may allow an information to be amended, provided that
the information[,] as amended[,] does not charge offenses arising
from a different set of events and that the amended charges are
not so materially different from the original charge that the
defendant would be unfairly prejudiced. Upon amendment, the
court may grant such postponement of trial or other relief as is
necessary in the interests of justice.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 564.
Our standard of review for a challenge to the court’s grant of an
amendment to the information is well-settled:
[We consider] whether the crimes specified in the original
indictment or information involve the same basic elements and
evolved out of the same factual situation as the crimes specified
in the amended indictment or information. If so, then the
defendant is deemed to have been placed on notice regarding his
alleged criminal conduct. If, however, the amended provision
alleges a different set of events, or the elements or defenses to
the amended crime are materially different from the elements or
defenses to the crime originally charged, such that the defendant
would be prejudiced by the change, then the amendment is not
permitted.
Commonwealth v. Davalos, 779 A.2d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2001)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Stanley, 401 A.2d 1166, 1175 (Pa. Super.
1979)); see also Commonwealth v. Jackson, 215 A.3d 972, 979 (Pa.
Super. 2019).
Since the purpose of the information is to apprise the defendant
of the charges against him so that he may have a fair opportunity
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to prepare a defense, our Supreme Court has stated that following
an amendment, relief is warranted only when the variance
between the original and the new charges prejudices an
appellant by, for example, rendering defenses which might
have been raised against the original charges ineffective
with respect to the substituted charges.
Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 897 A.2d 1218, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citing
Commonwealth v. Brown, 727 A.2d 541, 543 (Pa. 1999)) (emphasis
added). We consider the following factors to determine whether the defendant
suffered prejudice:
(1) whether the amendment changes the factual scenario
supporting the charges; (2) whether the amendment adds new
facts previously unknown to the defendant; (3) whether the entire
factual scenario was developed during a preliminary hearing; (4)
whether the description of the charges changed with the
amendment; (5) whether a change in defense strategy was
necessitated by the amendment; and (6) whether the timing of
the Commonwealth’s request for amendment allowed for ample
notice and preparation.
Sinclair, supra (citing Commonwealth v. Grekis, 601 A.2d 1284, 1292 (Pa.
Super. 1992)).
Here, under the first Sinclair factor, the Commonwealth argues that the
factual scenario supporting the charges remained the same before and after
the amendment because the additional element—that Rivera’s indecent
assault be “committed by touching the complainant’s sexual or intimate parts
with [Rivera’s] sexual or intimate parts,” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(b)(3)(iii)—was
previously alleged through the rape and IDSI charges.27 See Appellee’s Brief,
____________________________________________
27Counts 2-9 alleged Rivera committed the crimes of rape and IDSI against
both G.R. and C.P.
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at 16-17. As such, the Commonwealth would have us find that Rivera was
already on notice that he was accused of touching his intimate parts to the
intimate parts of his victims. We disagree.
In Rivera’s case, the factual scenario supporting the charges under
Counts 21 and 22 materially changed following the Commonwealth’s
amendment. See Sinclair, supra. G.R. alleged separate acts constituting
rape and indecent assault. See N.T. Jury Trial, 8/6/19, at 61, 62-63. G.R.
claimed that Rivera anally penetrated both her and C.P., and separately,
claimed she and C.P. each touched Rivera’s genitals. Id. Nevertheless, the
Commonwealth’s amendment required the logical inference that elements
from the rape or IDSI charges could be cobbled together, or merged, with
those of indecent assault. They cannot under these circumstances, where the
factual scenario underlying each charge is separate and distinct. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Richter, 676 A.2d 1232, 1236 (Pa. Super. 1996)
(“[W]hen an indecent assault conviction is predicated upon an act separate
from the act of forcible intercourse, the indecent assault conviction does not
merge with a conviction for rape. This is true whether the act [that]
constitutes indecent assault is committed immediately prior to, or
concurrently with[,] the rape.”); cf. Commonwealth v. Lomax, 8 A.3d 1264,
1268 (Pa. Super. 2010) (rape of child merged with first-degree misdemeanor
indecent assault where crime of rape, alleging touching of defendant’s and
victim’s genitals together, added no elements to indecent assault charge,
which Commonwealth based on defendant’s touching of victim’s sexual parts).
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Under the second Sinclair factor, Rivera claims that the amendment
added new facts previously unknown to him insofar as the Commonwealth
alleged, for the first time, that Rivera brought his intimate parts into contact
with G.R.’s and C.P.’s intimate parts for the purpose of arousing or gratifying
sexual desire. See Appellant’s Brief, at 47, 49 n.14. We agree.
The Commonwealth’s reliance on the facts underlying the rape and IDSI
charges is misplaced, since indecent assault contains an intent element that
the prosecution need not prove to sustain a rape or IDSI conviction. See 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a) (elements of offense includes that indecent contact was
“for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the person or the
complainant.”) (emphasis added);28 see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(c) (“A
person commits the offense of rape of a child, a felony of the first degree,
when the person engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less
than 13 years of age.”);29 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(b) (“A person commits
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, a felony of the first degree,
____________________________________________
28 Indecent contact is defined as “[a]ny touching of the sexual or other
intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual
desire, in any person.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101.
29 In addition to its ordinary meaning, “sexual intercourse” includes
intercourse per os or per anus, with some penetration however slight;
emission is not required. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101.
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when the person engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant
who is less than 13 years of age.”).30
Here, the Commonwealth’s information did not charge Rivera with
bringing his intimate parts into contact with G.R.’s and C.P.’s intimate parts
for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire until after the
court permitted the amendment to Counts 21 and 22. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
3126(b)(3)(iii) (indecent assault is third-degree felony when “committed by
touching the complainant’s sexual or intimate parts with [the defendant’s]
sexual or intimate parts”). As such, the Commonwealth’s amendment
resulted in the inclusion of a new fact previously unknown to Rivera. See
Sinclair, supra.
Under the third Sinclair factor, we note that, had Rivera raised a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence proffered at his preliminary
hearing in a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus, he would have been entitled to
relief in the form of a new preliminary hearing. See McClelland, supra.
With regard to the fourth Sinclair factor, the description of the charges
materially changed, as described above in the analysis of the first and second
Sinclair factors.
____________________________________________
30 Deviate sexual intercourse is defined as “[s]exual intercourse[,] per os or
per anus[,] between human beings and any form of sexual intercourse with
an animal. The term also includes penetration, however slight, of the genitals
or anus of another person with a foreign object for any purpose other than
good faith medical, hygienic[,] or law enforcement procedures.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3101. “A foreign object is any physical object not a part of the actor’s
body[.]” Commonwealth v. Kelley, 801 A.2d 551, 555 n.4 (Pa. 2002)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
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Under the fifth Sinclair factor, Rivera’s professed trial strategy was
adversely affected. See Appellant’s Brief, at 51. Prior to the Commonwealth’s
amendment, Rivera could avoid all of his felony charges—Counts 1-19—by
denying that any penetration occurred and relying on the lack of evidence.
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 3121(c), 3123(b), 3125(a)(7), 4304(a)(1),
and 6301(a)(ii). Conversely, post-amendment, Rivera’s defense that no
penetration occurred and that there was a general lack of physical evidence—
if believed by the jury—would no longer permit avoidance of all felony
convictions, since lack of penetration was no defense. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
3126(b)(3)(iii) (indecent assault is third-degree felony when it “was
committed by touching the complainant’s sexual or intimate parts with [the
defendant’s] sexual or intimate parts”).
Finally, under the sixth Sinclair factor, the Commonwealth’s
amendment request denied Rivera fair notice as well as the time necessary to
adequately prepare a defense. Indeed, the court permitted the
Commonwealth’s amendment after the defense had already begun placing
evidence into the record. See N.T. Jury Trial, 8/8/19, at 9.
In sum, all six of the Sinclair factors weigh in favor of finding that Rivera
suffered prejudice. See Sinclair, supra at 1223. We conclude, therefore,
that Rivera was unfairly prejudiced. Consequently, the court should not have
permitted the Commonwealth to amend Counts 21 and 22, see Davalos,
supra, and Rivera is, thus, entitled to have those convictions vacated. If,
upon remand, the Commonwealth wishes to refile those two charges, Rivera
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is entitled to a new trial on those two counts. See Commonwealth v.
Bricker, 882 A.2d 1008, 1022 (Pa. Super. 2005) (where trial court abuses its
discretion in permitting Commonwealth to amend charges, appellate court
may vacate convictions and order new trial as to those erroneously-amended
charges). Moreover, because the court sentenced Rivera to consecutive 1-7
years’ terms of incarceration on Count 21 and Count 22, our vacation of
Rivera’s convictions upsets the court’s sentencing scheme. Thus, Rivera must
be resentenced on the remaining convictions we have affirmed. See
Commonwealth v. Lekka, 210 A.3d 343, 358-59 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Benchoff, 700 A.2d 1289, 1294 (Pa. Super. 1997)) (“[I]f
we determine that a correction by this [C]ourt may upset the sentencing
scheme envisioned by the [sentencing] court, the better practice is to
remand.”).
Additionally, our review of the record requires that we remand for
resentencing on Count 15—EWOC. Although graded as a third-degree felony,
the Commonwealth’s information did not specifically allege, and the court did
not specifically instruct the jury regarding, either a “course of conduct,” see
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(b)(1)(ii), or a “substantial risk of death or serious bodily
injury,” see id. at (b)(1)(iii), to the victim, G.R., with regard to the Count 15
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EWOC charge.31 See N.T. Jury Trial, 8/8/19, at 180-81.32 Nevertheless, the
jury convicted Rivera of EWOC as a third-degree felony, rather than a first-
____________________________________________
31 The Commonwealth’s bill of information charged Rivera at Count 15 with:
COUNT 15—Endangering Welfare of Children—(FELONY 3)—
[Rivera], on or about, between 02/21/18 and 02/22/18, in
the County of Bradford, being a parent, guardian or other person
supervising the welfare of [G.R.] a child under 18 years of age,
knowingly endangered the welfare of said child by violating a duty
of care, protection or support, namely, intentionally shoved a
lollipop in and out of the victim’s mouth for sexual
gratification, getting it stuck in her throat causing cardiac
arrest, in violation of Section § 4304(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code, Act of December 6, 1972, as amended, 18
Pa.C.S.[A.] §4304(a)(1)[.]
Commonwealth’s Information, at 3 (emphasis added).
32 With respect to the EWOC charge, the court instructed the jury as follows:
The defendant has been charged with endangering the welfare of
a child. To find the defendant guilty of this offense, you must find
that each of the following elements have been prove[n] beyond a
reasonable doubt: [f]irst, that the defendant endangered the
welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection, or
support[; s]econd, that the defendant endangered the welfare of
the child knowingly[—a person’s conduct is [“]knowing[”] when
he or she is aware that it is practically certain that his or her
conduct will cause a particular result[; t]hird, that the defendant
was[,] at the time[,] a parent, guardian, person supervising the
welfare of the child under the age of 18, or a person that employs
or supervises such a person[—t]he term [“]person supervising the
welfare of a child[”] means a person other than a parent or
guardian that provides care, education, training or control of a
child[; f]ourth, that the child was under the age of 18 years at the
time of the endangering. If, after considering all the evidence,
you find that the Commonwealth has established beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the elements of this crime, you must find
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degree misdemeanor. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4304(b)(1)(i), (ii), (iii) (“An
offense under this section constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree. [] If
the actor engaged in a course of conduct of endangering the welfare of a child,
the offense constitutes a felony of the third degree. [] If, in the commission
of the offense under subsection (a)(1), the actor created a substantial risk of
death or serious bodily injury, the offense constitutes a felony of the third
degree.”).
Moreover, the court sentenced Rivera to 18 months’ to 7 years’
incarceration on Count 15—the statutory maximum for a third-degree felony.
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103(3) (“In the case of [a person who has been convicted
of] a felony of the third degree, [the person may be sentenced] for a term
which shall be fixed by the court at not more than seven years.”); cf. id. at §
1104(1) (“A person who has been convicted of a [first-degree] misdemeanor
may be sentenced to imprisonment for a definite term which shall be fixed by
the court and shall be not more than [5] years[.]”).
Because Rivera’s Count 15 was improperly graded as a third-degree
felony where the trial court failed to give a proper instruction on the offense,
we remand to the trial court for imposition of a sentence consistent with the
grading of this crime as a first-degree misdemeanor. See Commonwealth
____________________________________________
the defendant guilty. Otherwise, you must find the defendant not
guilty.
N.T. Jury Trial, 8/8/19, at 180-81.
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v. Hoffman, 198 A.3d 1112, 1123 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“[A] claim that the
court improperly graded an offense for sentencing purposes implicates the
legality of sentence. A challenge to the legality of sentence is never waived
and may be the subject of inquiry by the appellate court sua sponte.
Our standard of review is de novo, and the scope of our review is plenary.”)
(internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted; emphasis added);
see also Commonwealth v. Popow, 844 A.2d 13, 18 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(“[I]n order to be graded as a third-degree felony, the Commonwealth must
allege in the information and present evidence at trial of the additional factor
of ‘course of conduct,’ and the jury must be instructed on such. . . . We
cannot merely assume the jury found this additional fact when no evidence of
it was presented at trial and no mention of it was made in the jury’s
charge.”) (emphasis added).
Here, the court made no mention of either “course of conduct” or
“substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury” during the jury charge.33
See N.T. Jury Trial, 8/8/19, at 180-81; see also Commonwealth v.
____________________________________________
33 It is likely safe to assume the Commonwealth was proceeding on a theory
of “substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury,” see N.T. Jury Trial,
8/6/19, at 115 (Q: “Based on your training and experience, if
[cardiopulmonary resuscitation] hadn’t [] resulted in . . . the lollipop being
dislodged from [G.R.’s] throat, is there a significant chance she would
have expired?” A: “Almost assuredly.”) (emphasis added), rather than a
“course of conduct.” Nevertheless, because the court instructed the jury on
neither ground for increasing the grading of Rivera’s EWOC charge, we cannot
assume the jury found either element present here. See Popow, supra at
18 (“We cannot merely assume the jury found this additional fact when no
evidence of it was presented at trial and no mention of it was made in the
jury’s charge.) (emphasis added).
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Hartman, 638 A.2d 968, 971 (Pa. 1994) (when court instructs jury, objective
is to explain to jury how to approach its task and factors it should consider in
reaching verdict). Additionally, the jury verdict sheet failed to identify
whether the jury made any determination with respect to those terms. See
Jury Verdict Slip, 8/8/19, at 2. Because we may not assume that the jury
found either one of these additional facts with respect to the EWOC charge,
especially where they were not charged on those terms, see Popow, supra,
sentencing Rivera on the offense as a third-degree felony was improper, and
he is entitled to resentencing on Count 15. Id.
Convictions under Counts 21, and 22 vacated, all other convictions
affirmed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing in
accordance with the dictates of this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 05/24/2021
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