Filed 5/24/21 P. v. Wohn CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E075800
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1307093)
RONALD JUN WOHN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.
Affirmed.
Mark Raymond McDonald for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and A. Natasha
Cortina, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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In July 2013, Ronald Jun Wohn pled guilty and completed drug treatment and
probation for a drug possession offense. In 2016, the trial court dismissed his conviction
under a provision authorizing dismissal of a conviction if it “finds that the defendant
successfully completed drug treatment, and substantially complied with the conditions of
probation, including refraining from the use of drugs after the completion of treatment.”
(Pen. Code, § 1210.1, subd. (e)(1), unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code).
In 2020, Wohn petitioned to have his arrest record sealed under a provision
permitting the sealing of arrest records for anyone “who has suffered an arrest that did
not result in a conviction.” (§ 851.91.) The trial court denied the petition. Wohn argues
this was error because the earlier dismissal of his conviction rendered his arrest one that
did not result in a conviction. We conclude dismissal under section 1210.1
subdivision (e), does not change the fact that the arrest resulted in a conviction as defined
in section 851.91. We therefore affirm.
I. FACTS
On July 24, 2013, Wohn pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine. (Health and
Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a).) The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed
him on three years’ probation under Penal Code section 1210.1, subdivision (a), which
codified the provisions of Proposition 36. In February 2016, the court reduced Wohn’s
felony to a misdemeanor.
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In March 2016, Wohn completed probation, which included mandatory drug
treatment. The court then dismissed his conviction under section 1210.1,
subdivision (e)(1).
In August 2020, Wohn petitioned to have his arrest record sealed under
section 851.91. The court denied the petition, and Wohn timely appealed.
II. ANALYSIS
Section 851.91, passed by the Legislature in 2017, allows “[a] person who has
suffered an arrest that did not result in a conviction” to “petition the court to have his or
her arrest and related records sealed.” Wohn argues section 851.91 applies to his arrest
because, under the terms of section 1210.1, subdivision (e)(1), upon successful
completion of probation and drug treatment the court must dismiss the conviction and
“both the arrest and the conviction shall be deemed never to have occurred.”1 (§ 1210.1,
subd. (e)(1).)
Controlling here is the fact that section 851.91 defines the circumstances under
which a conviction didn’t occur in a manner that excludes Wohn’s situation. “For
purposes of this section, an arrest did not result in a conviction if any of the following are
true: [¶] (A) The statute of limitations has run on every offense upon which the arrest was
based and the prosecuting attorney of the city or county that would have had jurisdiction
1 Wohn also argues we must reverse because the trial court erroneously relied on
People v. E.B. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 47. However, we affirm a trial court ruling that is
“correct upon any theory of law applicable to the case . . . regardless of the considerations
that moved the lower court to its conclusion.” (Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control
Dist. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 550, 568.)
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over the offense or offenses upon which the arrest was based has not filed an accusatory
pleading based on the arrest. [¶] (B) The prosecuting attorney filed an accusatory
pleading based on the arrest, but, with respect to all charges, one or more of the following
has occurred: [¶] (i) No conviction occurred, the charge has been dismissed, and the
charge may not be refiled. [¶] (ii) No conviction occurred and the arrestee has been
acquitted of the charges. [¶] (iii) A conviction occurred, but has been vacated or reversed
on appeal, all appellate remedies have been exhausted, and the charge may not be
refiled.” (§ 851.91, subd. (a)(1).)
As those plain terms make clear, a defendant may petition to have their arrest
records sealed only if they were not as a matter of historical fact convicted or if they did
suffer a conviction which an appellate court reversed or vacated. Section 851.91 does not
permit a petition to seal arrest records for someone—like Wohn—who did in fact suffer a
conviction (by plea) but had the conviction dismissed by the trial court under
section 1210.1, subdivision (e). Section 1210.1, subdivision (e), had long been in effect
when the Legislature enacted section 851.91. If they had intended to allow petitioners
who had their convictions dismissed under section 1210.1, subdivision (e), to take
advantage of its provisions, they would have included that mechanism under the
provision setting out the circumstances in which “an arrest did not result in a conviction.”
(§ 851.91, subd. (a)(1).)
Wohn argues that, notwithstanding this statutory definition, his arrest did not
result in a conviction for purposes of section 851.91 because section 1210.1 directs that
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when a conviction is dismissed under its provisions, “both the arrest and the conviction
shall be deemed never to have occurred.” (§ 1210.1, subd. (e)(1).) As the People point
out, another appellate court considered and rejected the same argument in People v. D.C.
(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 727 (D.C.). That court concluded that, “[c]ontrary to defendant’s
argument, his arrest did result in a conviction,” and “[t]hough that conviction was later
set aside and ‘deemed never to have occurred’ . . . it still exists for some purposes.” (Id.
at p. 735.) For example, a conviction “deemed never to have occurred” under
section 1210.1, subdivision (e)(1), must still be disclosed in response to any direct
question or application for public office, may be disclosed by the state if the defendant
applies to be a law enforcement officer, and still restricts the defendant’s second
amendment rights. (D.C., at p. 736.)
We agree with the D.C. court that “[w]hile defendant’s arrest and conviction are
deemed never to have occurred for most purposes, we cannot conclude this [makes him]
the equivalent of a defendant who was arrested but never convicted. Rather, because
defendant’s arrest and conviction still exist for some purposes, he is in a markedly
different position from someone who was never convicted at all.” (D.C., supra, 54
Cal.App.5th at p. 736.) The bottom line is section 851.91 provides a way to seal arrest
records for any person who has been arrested but never properly convicted, while
section 1210.1 provides relief to people who were convicted of certain drug offenses but
successfully completed treatment and probation. We agree with D.C. that these two
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statutory schemes are fundamentally distinct and apply to defendants in completely
different circumstances.
III. DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying Wohn’s petition to seal his arrest record.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
SLOUGH
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
MILLER
J.
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