United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
____________
No. 21-5025 September Term, 2020
1:20-cv-03354-UNA
Filed On: May 25, 2021
Donald White,
Appellant
v.
Edward Markey, United States Senate, et al.,
Appellees
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BEFORE: Pillard and Walker, Circuit Judges, and Sentelle, Senior Circuit
Judge
JUDGMENT
This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia and on the brief and supplement filed by appellant. See
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 34(j). It is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s order entered December
22, 2020, be affirmed. Appellant has not shown that the district court erred in
dismissing the case without prejudice for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a) and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant’s complaint did not
set forth “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” or “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Additionally, appellant failed to plead facts to establish his
standing to sue, and “the defect of standing is a defect in subject matter jurisdiction.”
Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987). To establish Article III
standing, plaintiffs must allege an injury that is “concrete, particularized, and actual or
imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable
ruling.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013)
(quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149–50 (2010)).
Appellant has not
demonstrated what, if any, injury he sustained as a result of the facts alleged.
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
____________
No. 21-5025 September Term, 2020
Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk
is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution
of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App.
P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.
Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT:
Mark J. Langer, Clerk
BY: /s/
Daniel J. Reidy
Deputy Clerk
Page 2