United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 19-2018
EMORY SNELL,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
THOMAS NEVILLE, PATRICIA RUZE, MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTION, CAROL MICI, STEPHANIE COLLINS, LOIS RUSSO, DALE
BISSONNETTE, DOUGLAS DEMOURA, JEFFREY J. QUICK, MONSERRATE
QUINONES, and JOANN LYNDS,
Defendants, Appellees,
THOMAS DICKHAUT, Superintendent, THOMAS A. GROBLEWSKI, GREG A.
POLADIAN, THERESA SMITH, ROBERT CONLEY, CLESELY M. GARCIA,
PHILIP H. KONG, KEVIN ANAHORY, GENE CHAISSION, JOHN A. BELAIR,
THOMAS DEMOURA, JANE ROE, and JOHN DOE,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Denise Casper, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Thompson and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.*
*Judge Torruella heard oral argument in this matter and
participated in the semble, but he did not participate in the
issuance of the panel's opinion. The remaining two panelists
therefore issued the opinion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
Lucas I. Silva, with whom Sommer Wiss, Andrew C. Yost, and
Foley Lardner LLP were on brief, for appellant.
Mary Eiro-Bartevyan, Department of Correction Legal Division,
Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General for
appellees Thomas Neville, Massachusetts Department of Correction,
Carol Mici, Stephanie Collins, Lois Russo, Dale Bissonnette,
Douglas Demoura, Jeffrey Quick, Monserrate Quinones, and Joann
Lynds.
George J. Puddister IV, with whom Victor J. Koufman and Koufam
& Frederick, LLP were on brief, for appellee Patricia Ruze.
May 25, 2021
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. Americans are reputedly a
litigious bunch, and Emory Snell, an inmate at MCI-Concord in
Massachusetts, has greatly aided in keeping the federal and state
judiciaries busy. In this lawsuit, one of at least 170 he has
filed challenging his conviction and his prison conditions,
Snell's legal focus is on a first-floor Lexis Nexis terminal and
typewriter (collectively "the first-floor Terminal" or "the
Terminal") where he spent two plus years conducting legal research
and cranking out legal documents.1 Regrettably for Snell, prison
officials nixed his habit upon learning he was using the resources
without a diagnosed disability preventing him from climbing stairs
to the second-floor law library. Not appreciating this purported
lack of accommodation, Snell sued various prison officials as well
as the Massachusetts Department of Correction (collectively, "DOC
defendants"), and his prison physician, Dr. Patricia Ruze, for
injunctive and declaratory relief and damages. Finding no merit
to Snell's complaint, the district court granted summary judgment
to all defendants. See Snell v. Mici, No. 16-cv-11643-DJC, 2019
1 A Lexis Nexis terminal is a computer that allows users to
access only the Lexis Nexis legal research services without getting
into other parts of the internet.
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WL 4303264 (D. Mass. Sept. 11, 2019). Snell appeals part of that
order alleging several claims of error.2 Espying none, we affirm.3
Background
In order to understand the legal issues addressed in our
decision, we find it necessary to provide the reader with a
detailed background of events which triggered this appeal.
Therefore, we ask the reader's patience as we soldier through the
facts.
2 Because Snell does not challenge the district court's grant
of summary judgment for his other claims raised below, he has
waived his right to appeal those counts, and we will not consider
them. See Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., 918 F.3d 181, 186-87 (1st Cir.
2019).
3 Defendants raise a number of arguments about why we should
affirm summary judgment, including qualified immunity, Snell's
failure to plead sufficient facts proving the personal involvement
of all defendants, and Snell's failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Because we affirm summary judgment on
other substantive grounds, we need not reach those arguments. See
F.D.I.C. v. LeBlanc, 85 F.3d 815, 820 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that
we may affirm summary judgment on any independently sufficient
ground); see also Mihos v. Swift, 358 F.3d 91, 98-99 (1st Cir.
2004) (assuming qualified immunity is inapplicable does not equate
to a victory for the plaintiff). Also, because we affirm summary
judgment on all counts, we need not differentiate between the
defendants' individual and official capacities insofar as those
distinctions would otherwise matter for the analyses that follow.
See, e.g., Parker v. Landry, 935 F.3d 9, 14 & n.3 (1st Cir. 2019)
(claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot apply to state entities
or state employees in their official capacities); Bartolomeo v.
Plymouth Cnty. House of Corr., 229 F.3d 1133, *1 (1st Cir. 2000)
(per curiam) (assuming without deciding that individuals may be
subject to personal liability under Title II of the ADA and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
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When a party appeals from a district court's grant of
summary judgment, we describe the facts in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party (here, Snell), so far, at least, as a
reasonable review of the record obliges. See Nunes v. Mass. Dept.
of Corr., 766 F.3d 136, 138 (1st Cir. 2014); see also Santiago–
Ramos v. Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica de Puerto Rico, AEE, 834
F.3d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Chaloult v. Interstate
Brands Corp., 540 F.3d 64, 66 (1st Cir. 2008) ("drawing all
inferences in" the non-movant's favor)).
The Accommodation Process and Two-Tiered Library at MCI-Concord
After a jury convicted Snell of the first-degree murder
of his wife in 1995, he began serving a life without parole
sentence in the Massachusetts prison system, eventually landing at
the facility known as MCI-Concord in 2010. See Commonwealth v.
Snell, 705 N.E.2d 236, 238-39 (Mass. 1999). Snell arrived there
in less than stellar health. Amongst other ailments, he suffered
knee and back pain, and had degenerative joint disease which
limited his body's range of motion.4 A walking cane facilitated
his mobility. In consequence, upon his confinement, he began to
seek ways to better manage and endure his terms of incarceration.
Therefore, before delving into the details of Snell's particular
4 Degenerative joint disease, also known as osteoarthritis,
is the deterioration of the skeleton's cartilage or bony
structures.
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claims, some background on MCI-Concord's protocols for servicing
prisoners with physical disabilities is in order.
During the time period relevant to this appeal,
incarcerated persons like Snell had a couple of avenues to attain
relief. First, inmates could seek reasonable accommodations from
prison officials if they had physical or mental health disabilities
which prevented them from engaging in the standard routines of
prison life, such as a prison education or technical training
program. See 103 DOC 620, https://www.mass.gov/doc/doc-620-
special-health-care-practices/download; 103 DOC 408.07,
https://www.mass.gov/doc/doc-408-reasonable-accommodations-for-
inmates/download.5 For example, an individual with hearing loss
could request a hearing aid or a person with walking difficulties
could request a wheelchair. An inmate did not need to have a
medically documented disability to apply for such a reasonable
accommodation. See 103 DOC 620.
Second, inmates could also seek a "medical restriction"
from a medical professional. For instance, if a prison physician
advised an inmate not to climb stairs because such movement would
be harmful to the person's health, the inmate would have a "no-
stairs" medical restriction. A medical restriction traditionally
5 During the period in which the defendants allegedly harmed
Snell, a different version of the regulations was in effect, see
103 DOC 207.04, but they are functionally equivalent for the
purposes of our analyses.
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lasted for a maximum of one year, after which a physician would
have to renew it. But prison officials did accord indefinite
restrictions in some instances for individuals diagnosed with
long-term disabilities. A medical restriction, though, did not
automatically translate into an accommodation.
MCI-Concord followed prison regulations promulgated by
the Department of Correction when deciding whether to grant a
reasonable accommodation to an inmate, and Snell does not contend
MCI-Concord ignored them. Inmates could request accommodations
by: (1) asking any DOC staff member; (2) filling out a written
accommodation request; or (3) asking medical staff for a
restriction that the DOC defendants could translate into an
accommodation. See 103 DOC 408.07(8). One of the DOC defendants,
the facility's American with Disabilities Act ("ADA")6 coordinator,
reviewed such requests, filed written proof of the accommodation
(if granted), and provided written proof of the accommodation
directly to the requesting inmate. The regulations required the
DOC defendants to "[e]nsure that appropriate documentation
6 The ADA protects individuals from facing discrimination
based on any disability. Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems
Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 801 (1999) ("The ADA seeks to eliminate
unwarranted discrimination against disabled individuals in order
. . . to guarantee those individuals equal opportunity . . . ..").
We will provide more details about the law's specific protections
as we get into the analyses.
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concerning an inmate's reasonable accommodation(s) is maintained"
in their records. 103 DOC 408.05.
For requests related to medical needs, such as not
climbing stairs, the ADA coordinator almost always consulted with
medical staff before providing or denying the accommodation in
writing. While the DOC defendants ordinarily deferred to a medical
professional's judgment about what inmates needed, there were
limits built into the regulations. Before implementing a requested
accommodation, the DOC defendants, ever mindful of their
overarching responsibility to maintain order and security within
the prison confines, weighed risks including ensuring
accommodations did not appear to give unfair preferential
treatment to any particular inmate. See 103 DOC 408.07(8).
The accommodation process mattered to Snell because of
the prison layout. MCI-Concord has two libraries: the general
library on the first floor, and, as mentioned, the law library on
the second floor. The latter housed several Lexis Nexis terminals
and typewriters for inmate use. The general library on the first
floor also had the Terminal (which, recall, includes a typewriter),
but DOC defendants installed that station as an accommodation for
inmates with documented medical restrictions which hampered their
ability to reach the second floor.7 With few exceptions, even
7 MCI-Concord did not have an elevator that could reach the
second-floor law library.
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inmates with medical restrictions other than a no-stairs
restriction did not have (or should not have had) an accommodation
to access the Terminal according to prison rules.8 By prison
formality, the librarian (who oversaw both the first floor and
second-floor libraries) was charged with verifying an inmate's
documented accommodation before permitting use of the Terminal.
Without the appropriate accommodation, according to prison rules,
the inmate should not have been allowed use of the Terminal.
An Inmate's Litigious Medical History
Soon after arriving at MCI-Concord, Snell's persistent
health problems caused him to complain about having to climb stairs
to get to various areas within the prison, including the law
library. He sought (but did not get) a reasonable accommodation
from prison officials to use the first-floor Terminal.9 The denial
baffled Snell because when he was housed at a prior facility, he
had been given an indefinite medical restriction for bottom tier
housing (meaning he could reside in rooms on the first floor).
The authorizing doctor reasoned Snell needed a bottom tier
8 For example, inmates could receive an accommodation to use
the first-floor Terminal if they could not be in crowded spaces
due to medical conditions like Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
9 Notwithstanding his request, Snell, in fact, worked in the
second-floor law library as a clerk for almost a year, from October
12, 2011, until October 2, 2012, during which time he successfully
used the steps. A disciplinary infraction, unrelated to any
appellate gripes, caused Snell to lose this position.
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allowance because of his trouble negotiating stairs. From Snell's
vantage, an indefinite bottom tier restriction and a no-stairs
restriction were the same. However, DOC defendants clarified (in
a deposition for this suit) that even prisoners with bottom tier
restrictions ordinarily had to scale stairs; only prisoners with
specific no-stairs restrictions could avoid the climb.
Of import here, Snell maintains DOC defendants,
specifically MCI-Concord's ADA coordinator, did in fact grant him
a reasonable accommodation to use the first-floor Terminal at some
point prior to July 2013 because of his problems climbing stairs.
However, Snell has never produced any documentation to verify that
he ever had such an accommodation.10 The DOC defendants say that's
because in the timeframe pertinent to this litigation, he didn't.
Stair mobility issues aside, Snell had other troubles.
Various maladies, aches, and pains brought Snell to Dr. Ruze, his
prison physician, up to fifteen times a year. By her thinking,
Snell had obesity, a condition which she deemed a primary cause of
his degenerative joint disease and likely a contributor to his
hypertension and respiratory problems including sleep apnea. In
Dr. Ruze's medical opinion, one with which Snell emphatically
10 Snell alleges that he could not easily sort through his
140+ boxes of legal materials (apparently, the boxes were changed,
or their labels were destroyed). Snell nowhere contends, however,
that the DOC defendants mishandled their own records, lost the
accommodation form, failed to produce it in discovery, or that he
even had such a form.
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disagreed, Snell's degenerative joint disease did not
substantially limit his ability to stand, to ambulate, or,
importantly here, to climb stairs.11 She even opined that stair
climbing would strengthen Snell's knees, aid him in weight loss,
and improve some of his other ailments.
No matter the disagreement over stair ambulation, Dr.
Ruze and other medical personnel at MCI-Concord did not ignore
Snell's medical needs; far from it. From 2010 to 2017, Snell,
among other medical treatments, had x-rays of his knees and was
referred to specialists for his orthopedic problems. By way of
medical aids, prison medical personnel provided Snell with knee
sleeves, anti-embolism stockings, back braces, medication for leg
swelling, and the aforementioned cane. He was also afforded bottom
bunk, in addition to bottom tier, restrictions, and given light
work status. Despite all of the medical attention Snell received
in those seven years, no medical or correctional personnel ever
deemed a no-stairs restriction appropriate.
It was only in late 2018, about one year after Dr. Ruze
had departed her MCI-Concord prison job, that a doctor provided
11 Dr. Ruze stuck to this belief. In 2014, Snell requested
an elevator restriction that would permit him to take the elevator
rather than the stairs to a second-floor meeting for veterans (in
an area unconnected to the second-floor library site). Dr. Ruze
denied the request, telling Snell that he could negotiate one or
two flights of stairs on a weekly basis if he wanted to attend the
meeting.
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Snell with his long-sought no-stairs restriction. Dr. Churchville
-- Dr. Ruze's replacement -- examined Snell twice in early October,
and found him, at that time, walking slowly with visibly deformed
knees, relying on his cane for support. Reporting eight-out-of-
ten knee pain on November 7, 2018, Snell again requested a no-
stairs restriction. On November 8, 2018, Dr. Churchville acceded,
reasoning that Snell "was having more pain in his knee, [and] that
stair climbing would aggravate that" pain. That same day prison
officials transferred Snell to MCI-Shirley, a medium-security and
accessible facility where he could readily get to the law library
and more easily avail himself of other prison programs. Snell
remained there as of oral argument.
Inching His Way to This Litigation
We backtrack further to explain how Snell got to our
court. From July 2013 to October 2015, Snell used the first-floor
Terminal near daily despite not having a no-stairs restriction or
documented proof of an appropriate accommodation. Apparently,
Snell told the librarian, who started working at MCI-Concord in
September 2013,12 that he had an indefinite lower tier or no-stairs
restriction. It seems the librarian never checked the story out.
Additionally, since virtually no other inmates used the Terminal
12 The record does not make clear who oversaw the library
before September 2013, but the librarian key to this dispute worked
at MCI-Concord at least through February 2019 when his deposition
was taken.
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and because Snell was on it so frequently, the librarian assumed
Snell must have had an appropriate medical accommodation
permitting him to conduct legal research on the first floor. At
his deposition, Snell said he stopped using the second-floor law
library most likely because of the pain in his knees from "having
to climb up and down the stairs." For over two years no one ever
challenged his presence at the first-floor Terminal, and, as
mentioned earlier, Snell believed the DOC defendants had granted
him permission to use it because of his ambulatory challenges.
In August 2015, the prison librarian went on vacation.
While he was away, the Lexis terminals throughout the facility
temporarily shuttered. Also, with the librarian gone, Snell
claimed he could not get to the typewriter (the librarian was the
one who provided it to inmates). Claiming he had no access to
needed legal resources, Snell filed a grievance with DOC defendants
(citing his disability). A prison official (not one of the DOC
defendants) promptly resolved Snell's grievance but we'll provide
more details on how it got addressed later.
Then, on October 9, 2015, Snell, apparently disturbed by
some new issue concerning the amount of time he was being allowed
to spend at the Terminal, submitted a new grievance seeking
restoration of meaningful access to research time.13 In it, Snell
13 Inmates could request additional time to use library
resources, but Snell's grievance complained of a "wholesale"
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describes his physical disabilities, including his "difficulty in
climbing stairs," and the accommodations he claims were granted
him, including permission to use the first-floor Terminal because
of them. The new time constraint he says was an arbitrary
limitation which interfered with his "constitutionally mandated
adequate, effective and meaningful court access," and amounted to
a revocation of a reasonable accommodation previously afforded him
by the DOC defendants.
Ten days later, the DOC defendants denied Snell's
grievance regarding extra time, but they also noted that they were
"unaware of an ADA [accommodation] granted to [Snell]," as Snell
had described it, and added they "would be happy to review
[Snell's] situation if [Snell] can provide the necessary
documentation" to use the first-floor Terminal. Snell apparently
did not. On October 29, 2015, the DOC defendants formally ended
Snell's access to the Terminal. Thereafter, they denied Snell's
string of grievances and appeals through the end of 2015 and into
2016.
denial of "added legal / meaningful court access" because MCI-
Concord's policy apparently differed from other medium-security
facilities, which, according to Snell, offered more legal research
time to inmates. There is nothing in the record, other than this
October 9, 2015 grievance, reflecting any attempt by Snell to
request additional research time, and his briefs do not discuss
the matter beyond this specific grievance.
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Traipsing Away from the Prison Administrative Process
With his access to the Terminal blocked by
administrative determinations, Snell turned outward for
assistance. On June 22, 2016, Prison Legal Services, a not-for-
profit Massachusetts organization, got involved, sending the DOC
defendants a letter demanding they resume Snell's reasonable
accommodation (the Terminal) given his disability and what they
believed to be an indefinite no-stairs medical restriction from
1998. The DOC defendants promptly replied, reiterating the absence
of such a restriction or the presence of any other indicator in
Snell's medical record warranting such an accommodation. They
further expressed they had consulted with Dr. Ruze who reported
Snell should not have difficulty navigating stairs, especially
with the use of a cane.
Also on June 23, Dr. Ruze entered in Snell's medical
file what she characterized as an "administration note" to update
and to renew Snell's expiring medical restrictions (e.g., bottom
tier, bottom bunk, light work status). She did this even though
she did not examine him on that day. In her note, Dr. Ruze
observed, based on her many interactions with Snell, that he was
"ambulating well with a cane, could negotiate stairs, needs to
move slowly, and has good balance." Again, she withheld the no-
stairs restriction.
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On August 9, 2016, Snell filed a pro se complaint
challenging, at its core, the termination of his access to the
first-floor Terminal. The complaint was later amended after court-
appointed counsel entered the scene.14 Eventually, all defendants
moved for summary judgment and, after taking the matter under
advisement, the district court ruled in favor of the defendants.
Snell timely appealed and here we are.
Discussion
To repeat, Snell's legal fight clearly centers around
his loss of access to the first-floor Terminal, and he advances
several arguments here as to why the district court erred by
granting summary judgment to the defendants. First, Snell contends
that contrary to the district court's preliminary determination,
his appeals for injunctive and declaratory relief are not moot.
Second, Snell argues the DOC defendants and Dr. Ruze retaliated
against him in violation of Title V of the ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12203)
essentially because of his proclivity for filing lawsuits and
grievances. Third, Snell alleges that precluding him from using
14 The seven-count amended complaint alleged violation of the
Eighth Amendment (Count I); violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
(Count II); violation of the Fifth Amendment (Count III); violation
of art. 114 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (Count IV);
violation of the ADA's anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12203 (Count VI); and two claims solely against the DOC
defendants for violations of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12132, 12203, and Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C § 794 (Counts V
and VII). As noted earlier, Snell only challenges the grant of
summary judgment on some claims.
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the Terminal was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment because the defendants, knowing stair climbing
aggravated Snell's maladies, made him do it anyway if he wished to
exercise his right to use the law library. Fourth, Snell claims
the DOC defendants discriminated against him on account of his
disability by withholding a reasonable accommodation in violation
of Title II of the ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12132), the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794), and art. 114 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights (he does not appeal summary judgment against
Dr. Ruze on this count).
The DOC defendants say the district court got it just
right and appropriately denied Snell the relief he sought. They
argue here, as they did below, that they never discriminated or
retaliated against Snell -- anything but. Rather, they "reasonably
relied upon the [then extant] clinical judgment of Dr. Ruze" and
others in determining Snell could make his way to the second-floor
law library. Dr. Ruze, for her part, says she provided medically
adequate care, was never indifferent to Snell's needs, and never
retaliated against him. We will first take up Snell's mootness
claims before addressing each of Snell's remaining challenges.
A. Whether Snell's Appeals Matter Anymore (Mootness)
Delays within the legal system sometimes result in the
resolution of a plaintiff's injuries without courts having to be
significantly involved. In such circumstances, we say the
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plaintiff's arguments are moot. See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez,
577 U.S. 153, 160-61 (2016); Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481
(1982) (appeal becomes moot "when the issues presented are no
longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in
the outcome.") (citation omitted). The district court concluded
that Snell's transfer to the MCI-Shirley facility mooted his claims
for injunctive and declaratory relief because Snell no longer
needed a reasonable accommodation to access legal research
materials and the defendants no longer required him to climb
stairs. Snell thinks the district court erred because the harms
he suffered while at MCI-Concord could happen again in the future,
causing him once again to be transferred to another non-accessible
prison where, without a current no-stairs restriction, he will be
forced to climb stairs.
Because mootness touches upon jurisdictional issues
(i.e., whether we can even hear the merits), we address it before
his substantive claims, see Manguriu v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 119, 121
(1st Cir. 2015), and we review the district court's decision upon
a clean slate, see Méndez-Soto v. Rodríguez, 448 F.3d 12, 14-15
(1st Cir. 2006).
An inmate generally loses the right to challenge "prison
conditions or policies" at a particular facility when he transfers
or leaves that prison because his complaints would no longer have
any substantial impact on his life. Ford v. Bender, 768 F.3d 15,
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29 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 286-
87 (4th Cir. 2007) ("[C]ourts, including our own, have held that
the transfer of an inmate from a unit or location where he is
subject to the challenged policy, practice, or condition, to a
different unit or location where he is no longer subject to the
challenged policy, practice, or condition moots his claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief, even if a claim for money
damages survives.")). Here, once prison officials transferred
Snell to MCI-Shirley, an accessible facility which made available
to Snell, without impediment, appropriate prison legal resources,
Snell could no longer allege a continuing injury remediable by
injunctive or declaratory relief. See id.
However, there is a way for inmates to keep their
declaratory and injunctive relief claims alive after they leave
the prison in which the alleged harm occurred. If an inmate can
show the challenged policies are "capable of repetition, yet
evading review," then he can escape mootness. Ford, 768 F.3d at
30. The exception applies where: (1) the challenged action did
not last long enough for the parties to litigate the harm before
it ended; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the
complaining party will endure the same allegedly harmful action at
some point in the future. See Barr v. Galvin, 626 F.3d 99, 105
(1st Cir. 2010) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S.
449, 462 (2007)).
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We assume Snell's circumstances satisfy the first prong
and proceed to the second. In support thereof, Snell points to
systemic imperfections in the prison medical review process for
updating and renewing medical restrictions, and to his many battles
with DOC defendants in pursuit of a no-stairs restriction.15
Hammering the point, Snell tells us his no-stairs restriction from
Dr. Churchville expired in November 2019 without being renewed.
With this combination of concerns, Snell fears DOC defendants will
transfer him out of MCI-Shirley, a place where the absence of the
restriction does not affect his health.
The problem with Snell's argument is that he never
references evidence of problems so severe as would amount to a
systemically dysfunctional review scheme. Simply because the
medical review process, at times, has glitches, and because Snell's
no-stairs restriction has expired, does not mean Snell would not,
going forward, receive all appropriate restrictions and
accommodations if placed in a non-accessible facility. This is so
particularly given the documented degenerative changes to his
physical health, which the DOC defendants have acknowledged and
addressed. Further, Snell has remained at MCI-Shirley since
November 2018 and any uncertainty about how Snell might be later
medically evaluated or later housed does not suggest a reasonable
Snell often had his restrictions renewed annually, but the
15
renewal process was far from perfect, let alone automatic.
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likelihood of repetition. See Hunt, 455 U.S. at 482 ("[M]ere
physical or theoretical possibility" of reoccurrence are not
enough and "[r]ather, . . . there must be a 'reasonable
expectation' or a 'demonstrated probability' that the same
controversy will" happen again to the "same complain[ant]")
(quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per
curiam)); see also Ford, 768 F.3d at 30; Manguriu, 794 F.3d at 121
(assessing agency actions outside record when analyzing mootness).
As for Dr. Ruze, she no longer works as a contractor for
the Massachusetts Department of Correction and therefore has no
further medical responsibility for Snell; injunctive and
declaratory relief aimed at her would be of no avail. See, e.g.,
ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 53
(1st Cir. 2013) (once contract expired, nothing to enjoin).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision to
declare moot the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and
turn now to Snell's remaining claims for damages against the
defendants, claims which survive because his transfer out of MCI-
Concord does not erase any injury he may have suffered while he
was there. See Ford, 768 F.3d at 29 (quoting Incumaa, 507 F.3d at
287).
B. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment Claims
Appellants who lose at summary judgment get the benefit
of what we call de novo review, which is where we examine the
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entire record afresh to determine whether the law required the
moving party -- here the defendants -- to win. See Nunes, 766
F.3d at 142. We will agree the defendants should have won if "no
genuine dispute as to any material fact" exists in the record, id.
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a)), and the movants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, see Mason v. Telefunken Semiconductors
Am., LLC, 797 F.3d 33, 37-38 (1st Cir. 2015). If the non-moving
party (Snell) can point to record evidence allowing a reasonable
jury to return a verdict in his favor, then we would say there is
a genuine dispute of material fact and the district court
erroneously granted summary judgment. See Perry v. Roy, 782 F.3d
73, 78 (1st Cir. 2015); see also Enica v. Principi, 544 F.3d 328,
336 (1st Cir. 2008). That evidence, however, cannot "rely[] on
improbable inferences, conclusory allegations, or rank
speculation." Enica, 544 F.3d at 336 (quoting Ingram v. Brink's,
Inc., 414 F.3d 222, 228–29 (1st Cir. 2005)).
C. Retaliation on Account of Litigation
Snell leans on Title V of the ADA by alleging claims
which boil down to this: the DOC defendants and Dr. Ruze
retaliatorily conspired to keep Snell from the first-floor
- 22 -
Terminal because, he believes, his litigious character irked
them.16
We assess whether defendants illegally retaliated
against plaintiffs through a familiar burden-shifting exercise.
See D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 41 (1st
Cir. 2012) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
801–03 (1973)). Snell must present evidence that: (1) he engaged
in conduct protected by the ADA, such as complaining about a lack
of a reasonable accommodation; (2) the defendants subjected him to
some adverse action; and (3) there was a causal connection between
the protected conduct and the adverse action. Id. "An adverse
action is one that might well dissuade a reasonable person from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Id. If Snell
demonstrates evidence of all three (what lawyers call a "prima
facie" case), then the burden shifts to the defendants to provide
a "legitimate non-retaliatory explanation for the adverse action."
Id. at 42. If the defendants succeed, the story does not end
there. Once more the burden shifts back to Snell to establish
sufficient facts such that a reasonable juror could believe the
defendants' explanations were pretextual, meaning the defendants
16 Title V of the ADA makes such retaliation illegal: "No
person shall discriminate against any individual because such
individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this
chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
- 23 -
were "motivated by a retaliatory animus." Id. Although we step
cautiously when considering summary judgment motions involving
issues of motive and intent, such as Snell's retaliation
allegation, see Oliver v. Digit. Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 109
(1st Cir. 1988), the nonmoving party must proffer more than
"conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported
speculation" for his claims to survive, Coll v. PB Diagnostic Sys.,
Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1121 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Medina–Muñoz v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990)).17 With
these principles in mind, we turn to Snell's claims against each
defendant.
By October of 2015, Snell had lodged a number of
administrative complaints about stair climbing, and he had turned
to state court litigation at least once.18 But the October 9, 2015
17 Additionally, in suits brought by inmates, we are mindful
that some of our sister courts have been at times wary of
retaliatory claims because prisoners file them (or threaten to
file them) frequently, as Snell himself admits to having done.
See Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 2003); Adams v.
Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994). Because of this real world
reality, these courts have approached such claims with "particular
care" since, as they persuasively reason, "virtually any adverse
action taken against a prisoner by a prison official -- even those
otherwise not rising to the level of a constitutional violation -
- can be characterized as a constitutionally proscribed
retaliatory act." Goord, 320 F.3d at 352 (quoting Dawes v. Walker,
239 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)). Whether this
extra caution is warranted is not a fray we need to enter in
resolving Snell's claims.
18 It is unclear from the record but in May 2013, Snell sued
prison officials in Massachusetts Superior Court seeking
- 24 -
grievance newly bemoaning unreasonable Terminal time constraints
and reiterating his stair climbing deficits appear to have garnered
greater scrutiny. After considering Snell's requests, the DOC
defendants denied the grievance and thereafter prohibited Snell
from using the first-floor legal resources after one official found
him at the Terminal on October 29, 2015.19 To Snell, the DOC
defendants' swift action was by no means a coincidence; it was
retaliation to "keep [him] from getting access to the courts."
As for Dr. Ruze, Snell claims her participation in the
retaliatory conspiracy occurred when she wrote the June 23, 2016
administrative note wherein she reiterated her opinion that Snell
had no medical reason to stay on flat ground. Dr. Ruze did so,
says Snell, without medically reevaluating him, and on the same
day prison officials consulted her after receiving the Prison Legal
Services' demand letter asserting Snell's ADA rights. We first
address the allegations against Dr. Ruze before moving on to the
DOC defendants.
"reinstatement of his bottom-bunk placement" (which for some
reason had been taken away) "and judicial relief to prevent," as
he alleged, "further damage to [his] knees caused by being forced
to climb stairs." In March 2014, the court dismissed the case as
moot without prejudice because prison officials had returned Snell
to a bottom bunk.
19 Joann Lynds, the director of treatment who was supervised
by the ADA coordinator, came upon Snell at the Terminal. She could
not recall how she found him there but she testified at deposition
that she had never seen him there before.
- 25 -
i. Dr. Ruze
For the first prong of the test -- did Snell engage in
protected ADA conduct -- we conclude that Snell's numerous
grievances concerning losing access to the first-floor Terminal
can reasonably be viewed as protected conduct. See Esposito, 675
F.3d at 41.
However, Snell can make it no further. Turning to the
second step -- whether Dr. Ruze subjected Snell to any adverse
action -- our scour of the record finds no evidence demonstrating
she did. The June 23, 2016 note Snell points to as proof of an
adverse action makes no mention whatsoever of the Terminal; it
merely repeats Dr. Ruze's longstanding medical opinion concerning
Snell's ability to climb stairs. In fact, the myriad
administrative complaints concerning Snell's first-floor woes
(both before and after June 23, 2016) never mention Dr. Ruze as
acting adversely towards him. Rather, they focused almost solely
on Snell's understanding of what his 1998 "indefinite" bottom tier
restriction afforded him. Nor has Snell produced evidence of any
specific grievances he may have filed which voiced dissatisfaction
with Dr. Ruze's medical treatment (even as he insists he must have
submitted them) or which complained to Dr. Ruze about accessing
the Terminal. And although (as discussed more below) the DOC
defendants' decision to shut off Snell's first-floor Terminal
might reasonably be considered adverse vis-à-vis the responsible
- 26 -
decision makers, Snell's opening brief concedes Dr. Ruze had no
say in that decision. Her job was to provide medical restrictions
and recommendations based on her best medical judgment, not to
adjudicate what should be considered a reasonable accommodation,
a determination which the DOC defendants could have provided to
Snell with or without Dr. Ruze's medical input. As such, Snell
has not, as our case law requires, advanced evidence to create a
triable issue of fact regarding whether Dr. Ruze's note was an
adverse action which would "dissuade a reasonable person from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Esposito, 675
F.3d at 41.20
Even if Snell managed to get past prong two, his argument
falters at step three because there is no evidence Snell's
grievances caused Dr. Ruze to act adversely against Snell. Snell
counters that there is indeed such evidence of causation, and he
points to the timing of Dr. Ruze's June 23 note as such proof.
That Dr. Ruze provided the note to the DOC defendants on the same
day they provided Prison Legal Services with a justification for
denying Snell access to the first-floor Terminal and that Dr. Ruze
provided the note after the DOC defendants asked her about Snell's
medical history is, to Snell, significant. It demonstrates, says
20 As a kicker to the weakness of Snell's assertions, he
clearly was not dissuaded or particularly bothered by Dr. Ruze's
note. He continued to file grievances and to seek Dr. Ruze's
medical advice as a cordial patient.
- 27 -
Snell, that Dr. Ruze had a hand in punishing him for asserting his
ADA rights (even if, as he conceded, she could not control the
initial deprivation). While it is correct that temporal proximity
between a protected action (such as filing grievances) and the
adverse action (terminating Snell's use of the Terminal) can, at
times, demonstrate causation, see Esposito, 675 F.3d at 42 (quoting
Carreras v. Sajo, García & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 38 (1st Cir.
2010)), the proximity fails to do so in this instance. The DOC
defendants' revocation of Snell's first-floor Terminal usage
occurred some nine months before Dr. Ruze notated her June 23 stair
climbing opinion making any causal connection too attenuated.
But not so fast. Snell also argues causation is
established by the combination of two events on June 23, 2016,
before Dr. Ruze filed the administrative note later in the day:
(1) Dr. Ruze and the DOC defendants' discussion of Snell's law
library usage; and (2) Dr. Ruze's failure to reexamine Snell. No
reasonable juror could find either action separately or in concert
suspect. Dr. Ruze's administrative note articulated her (and other
medical providers') long-held medical opinion that Snell did not
require a no-stairs restriction -- an opinion clearly untethered
to Snell's legal research preferences. As for entry of her note
without a same-day examination, the record makes pellucid that Dr.
Ruze was exceedingly familiar with Snell, considering the multiple
times she treated him in 2016 and the abundance of times she saw
- 28 -
him over the preceding years. As mentioned earlier, she opined
stairs would improve, not harm, Snell's health and she retained
this medical opinion way past the entry of her June 23, 2016 note.
When treating Snell in April 2017, she still maintained he could
"walk quickly" with or without a cane, that he had 5/5 strength in
his lower extremities, and that his health would decline if he
stopped walking stairs. The record thus shows, beyond dispute,
that Dr. Ruze's consistent medical opinion, not Snell's protected
conduct or her discussion with the DOC defendants about that
conduct, caused her to pen the June 23, 2016 note. Cf. Collazo-
Rosado v. Univ. of P. R., 765 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir. 2014)
(consistent behavior by defendants undercut plaintiff's argument
that defendants' legitimate explanations for adverse employment
action were pretextual). Snell's speculative arguments to the
contrary are not enough to survive summary judgment. See Enica,
544 F.3d at 336.
ii. The DOC Defendants
So we move along to Snell's retaliation claims against
the DOC defendants. Reading the facts in the light most favorable
to Snell, we will assume he has made out his prima facie case of
retaliation. See Esposito, 675 F.3d at 41. We can also assume
the DOC defendants countered with a legitimate, non-discriminatory
explanation for keeping Snell away from the first-floor Terminal:
they claim to have done so only after they became explicitly aware
- 29 -
Snell was using it and after they confirmed Snell had no
accommodation due to a medical restriction warranting its use.
See id.; Collazo-Rosado, 765 F.3d at 93 (1st Cir. 2014) (proceeding
to the simplest way to resolve a retaliation lawsuit). What we
are left to decide is whether, as Snell contends, the DOC
defendants' proffered explanations hold up under scrutiny or
whether record evidence suggests those explanations are pretext to
cover up their true discriminatory intent.
"[T]here is no mechanical formula for finding pretext"
and it is thus a fact-intensive inquiry to uncover the DOC
defendants' true motives. Kelley v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 707
F.3d 108, 116 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Che v. Mass. Bay Transp.
Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 39 (1st Cir. 2003)). One way for a plaintiff
to survive summary judgment is by showing pretext through
"weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or
contradictions in the [DOC defendants'] proffered legitimate
reasons for [their] action [such] that a reasonable factfinder
could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer
that the [DOC defendants] did not act for the asserted non-
discriminatory reasons." Adamson v. Walgreens Co., 750 F.3d 73,
79 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Gómez-González v. Rural Opportunities
Inc., 626 F.3d 654, 662-63 (1st Cir. 2010)). If the undisputed
record evidence is insufficient to demonstrate pretext, then Snell
- 30 -
will be unable to meet his final burden. See Kelley, 707 F.3d at
116.
Snell asserts that the DOC defendants' proffered
explanation for shutting down his access to the first-floor
Terminal was inconsistent or contradictory with the actual record
because: (1) they knew about and sanctioned his use of the
Terminal between 2013 and 2015; and (2) they kept him away from
those legal resources for reasons other than his lack of a no-
stairs restriction.
a. Whether the DOC Defendants Knew about or Sanctioned Snell's
Use of the Terminal
Snell points to evidence which he says supports his
contention that he had permission to use the Terminal. Snell
testified at his deposition that the DOC defendants, specifically
the ADA coordinator, granted him a reasonable accommodation to use
the first-floor Terminal between July 2013 and October 2015 (though
they contest having done so). Remember also that Snell says the
DOC defendants knew about his use of the Terminal. If either were
true, Snell might well demonstrate the existence of a genuine
disputed material fact as to whether the DOC defendants' proffered
legitimate explanation for taking away Snell's access -- that they
only found out he was using the Terminal following the October 9,
2015 grievance -- was pretextual.
- 31 -
But the analysis is not so simple. Although our case
law recognizes that testimonial evidence can, at times, be
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact, we have also
repeatedly indicated that conclusory statements without support in
the record are not enough to survive summary judgment.21 See
Velázquez-García v. Horizon Lines of P.R., Inc., 473 F.3d 11, 18
(1st Cir. 2007) (holding that self-serving testimony is sufficient
to survive summary judgment so long as "the nonmovant's deposition
testimony sets forth specific facts, within his personal
knowledge, that, if proven, would affect the outcome of the
trial"); Medina-Muñoz, 896 F.2d at 8 ("Even in cases where elusive
concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, summary judgment
may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon
conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported
speculation.").
With that framing in mind, we take a deeper record dive
to see what contentions find support. First, we assess whether
there is evidence that the DOC defendants granted Snell a
reasonable accommodation. Next, we tackle whether there is record
21Snell also makes a passing allegation that he received the
accommodation following a 2013 state court lawsuit against an MCI-
Concord superintendent in which he challenged losing his bottom
bunk status. See supra note 18. In that suit, at least according
to the record before us, Snell never specifically demanded an
accommodation to access the first-floor Terminal, so it was never
addressed there.
- 32 -
support for Snell's assertion that they otherwise knew or
sanctioned his use of the Terminal from July 2013 to October 2015.
1. Whether the DOC Defendants Granted Snell a Reasonable
Accommodation
As mentioned earlier, there is no written documentation
of any reasonable accommodation having been granted to Snell,
despite the regulations requiring the DOC defendants to keep such
paperwork. Moreover, Snell makes no claim that the DOC defendants
violated their regulations or lost apt paperwork.22 Therefore,
without such documentation, we will take Snell's argument to mean
that the DOC defendants granted Snell's claimed reasonable
accommodation in some oral off-the-books method. The DOC
defendants, including the ADA coordinator, repeatedly testified
Snell was never granted a reasonable accommodation for first-floor
Terminal use. Had they done so, they would have used formal
channels to process and to correspond about such issues. Snell
does not dispute this testimony except to repeat the same refrain
-- "DOC authorities permitted Mr. Snell to use the . . .
[Terminal]." The only further detail he puts forward is that the
ADA coordinator sanctioned his use of the legal resources because
of his "orthopedic conditions and difficulty climbing stairs."
22 The DOC defendants kept an electronic system that
supposedly tracked all accommodations, and which did not show any
accommodation for Snell, but one DOC defendant testified to
documented accommodations existing off the electronic system.
- 33 -
According to the DOC defendants, staff did not grant
reasonable accommodations temporarily or orally, even when it was
obvious the inmate required one. For example, if an inmate in a
wheelchair asked the librarian to use the first-floor Terminal, he
could not do so without proof of an accommodation, notwithstanding
the self-evident fact that the inmate could not climb stairs. The
process to approve an accommodation for an inmate with "obvious
physical impairments," a group to which Snell claimed he belonged,
did not have to be lengthy. The librarian could call the ADA
coordinator who could approve the accommodation without checking
on a medical restriction, if the impairment was glaringly
discernable. Or, if the inability to stair climb was less
conspicuous (such as an inmate using a cane), the ADA coordinator
could check quickly with medical staff to see if the inmate had
any stair climbing medical restriction. If so, the ADA coordinator
would formalize the accommodation by memorializing it in writing.
Whatever the scenario, there would always be paperwork.
We note that although Snell says the ADA coordinator
granted him permission to use the Terminal, he puts no other meat
on the bones such as when or where the conversation occurred or
the context in which it arose or was supposedly granted. Without
more, we find Snell's statement amounts to a bald, conclusory
allegation insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the DOC defendants let him use the Terminal. Thus,
- 34 -
the decision to discontinue Snell's improper use of the Terminal
cannot reasonably be viewed as evidence of pretext.
2. Whether the DOC Defendants Knew about or Permitted Snell's
Terminal Use
Even if Snell had no formal reasonable accommodation, he
could demonstrate pretext if he raised a genuine issue of material
fact that the DOC defendants otherwise knew about or permitted his
use of the Terminal before Snell filed the October 2015 grievance
and before they stopped letting him access the first-floor
resources. As Snell tells it, two scenarios in the record support
his pretext claims in this manner. First, the librarian allowed
Snell to use the Terminal in full view without reprimand. And,
second, Snell points to the grievance he filed in August 2015 (the
grievance resulting from the vacationing librarian leaving Snell
high and dry), in which he pleaded for restored access to legal
resources including a typewriter and a Lexis terminal. Neither
asserted fact gets him very far.
Aside from that which we've already rejected, Snell
guides us to no other evidence disputing that it was the librarian,
not the DOC defendants, who permitted him to use the Terminal
without a proper medical restriction in violation of MCI-Concord's
rules. The policy preventing the librarian free rein was in place
by 2011, and Snell concedes that the librarian "understood that
the" Terminal was "designated for handicap-accessible use" only.
- 35 -
The librarian, however, admitted that he nonetheless let inmates
use the Terminal on a "[f]irst come, first serve" basis, apparently
in violation of the DOC defendants' rules. He specifically
believed that Snell could use the Terminal not because he checked
with the DOC defendants, but because Snell was using the Terminal
when the librarian started at MCI-Concord in September 2013 and
because Snell showed up nearly every day to use it.
Moreover, nowhere in his opening or his reply brief does
Snell describe or point to any evidence that the responsible DOC
defendants saw him using the resources "in full view" until they
found him there on October 29, 2015. By using the phrase "in full
view," perhaps Snell wants us to conclude that the DOC defendants
saw or should have seen him at the Terminal in the normal course
of the prison day during his two-plus-year stint on the machine.
But after thoroughly probing the record here, we have found no
evidence to support that contention. And without more information
in the record describing, for instance, what daily routine would
have brought Snell into the view of the DOC defendants, the
inference Snell asks us to draw amounts to speculation. That one
prison librarian failed to do his job does not morph the DOC
defendants' legitimate rationale into a contradiction evidencing
pretext. See Enica, 544 F.3d at 336 (speculation not enough to
survive summary judgment).
- 36 -
Second, as for the August 2015 grievance decrying his
typewriter and Lexis deprivation, Snell claims it proves another
prison official aside from the librarian (and one somehow involved
in administrative processes) became aware of Snell's first-floor
Terminal use and did not right then put an end to it.23 However,
pertinent here, Snell's August 2015 grievance, which the official
handled, makes no specific mention of first-floor legal resources
at all. Likewise, the official's five sentence response, which is
typed on the same page below the grievance, makes no mention of
first-floor equipment. But, Snell argues, because his grievance
does note that he "possess[ed] an unspecified 'special medical
needs restriction'" since 1998 (presumably his indefinite bottom
tier restriction) given his "difficulty in climbing stairs," we
should conclude the official (and, by extension, the DOC
defendants) had to know his complaint was making reference to his
loss of first-floor legal resources.
From the face of the document, we fail to see why we
should. In responding to Snell's grievance, the official
explained, without embellishment, how alternative staffing had
been arranged to provide access to a typewriter (and other items)
in the librarian's absence. As for the Lexis disrepair, the prison
23 Although that official's name and position appear in the
record, it is otherwise silent on what his particular duties and
responsibilities would have been to interrupt Snell's Terminal
usage, assuming he knew about it.
- 37 -
official wrote: "The issue with the Lexis computer system has
been resolved. Be advised that every effort is made to restore
the Lexis computer system in the event of malfunction." Other
parts of the record make clear the entire system of Lexis terminals
-- first and second-floor -- had been inoperable on the day Snell
complained and had to be fixed. Therefore, contrary to what Snell
contends, no evidence suggests the official's written resolution
of Snell's grievance, standing alone, could be reasonably viewed
as a grant of permission for him to use the first-floor Terminal
due to his medical condition. Snell's rejoinder thus does not
contradict the DOC defendant's repeated official position on his
many stair-climbing grievances; they believed Snell, in 2015,
could still negotiate the hike and they were not aware he was using
the first-floor Terminal.24 No contradictory evidence on this
point advances Snell's pretext argument.
b. Ulterior Motive Theory
Next, Snell attacks the second half of the DOC
defendants' proffered legitimate explanation -- that they kept
Snell from the first-floor Terminal because he lacked a no-stairs
medical restriction that could have qualified him for the
accommodation. Specifically, he urges that a reasonable jury could
24 Even after Snell filed the August grievance, it appears
the DOC defendants renewed their invitation for him to apply for
a reasonable accommodation to use the first-floor Terminal, but he
did not do so.
- 38 -
return a retaliation verdict in his favor due to circumstantial
evidence proving discriminatory animus. See Enica, 544 F.3d at
343 ("[C]ircumstantial evidence may certainly establish
discriminatory motive"). Snell points out that the DOC defendants
transferred him to MCI-Shirley, an accessible facility, on
November 8, 2018, the same day he received the no-stairs
restriction from Dr. Churchville. But Snell has not developed how
or why the DOC defendants' decision to transfer Snell once Dr.
Churchville determined Snell's condition had worsened evidences
pretext. See Charles v. Rice, 28 F.3d 1312, 1319 (1st Cir. 1994)
(empowering us to ignore perfunctory arguments).
Aside from Snell's lack of development, we note the
decision came almost three years after the deprivation of Snell's
access to the Terminal. Additionally, the DOC defendants, just as
they had earlier done with Dr. Ruze, followed prison procedures by
deferring to Dr. Churchville's updated November 2018 medical
opinion that Snell, upon further examination, should no longer
climb stairs and should have first-floor housing. That the DOC
defendants responded to the updated 2018 medical recommendation by
finding Snell an accessible prison without stairs, instead of
simply letting him use the Terminal, says nothing about the DOC
defendants' motivations for their 2015 ADA response. But see
Echevarría v. Astrazeneca Pharm., LP, 856 F.3d 119, 136 (1st Cir.
2017) (stating the "rock-solid premise that [a defendant's]
- 39 -
inadequately explained material deviation from standard procedure
can establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the
[defendant's] stated justifications are pretextual" (citing
Acevedo-Parilla v. Novartis Ex-Lax, Inc., 696 F.3d. 128, 142-43
(1st Cir. 2012))).
Snell's final attempt to show the DOC defendants'
reasoning for the adverse action against him was pretextual
complains that the DOC defendants singled out Snell for punishment
because they told the librarian specifically not to let him (and
no one else) use the first-floor Terminal. True, the DOC
defendants did tell the librarian to keep Snell away from that
station. But such is not the end of the story. Although the order
to enforce the "Handicapped Only" nature of the first-floor
Terminal may, on the surface, appear to affect only Snell, he has
pointed to no supporting evidence showing other inmates were
allowed to use the Terminal without an appropriate medical
restriction or without an approved accommodation once the
librarian was reined in. In fact, according to the librarian, no
other inmate has used the first-floor Terminal since the DOC
defendants reminded him to enforce prison regulations. On this
record, we cannot say that the DOC defendants acted with pretext
when they, in complete accord with prison regulations and
procedures and coupled with their prior denials of Snell's
grievances, instructed the librarian to follow the rules and to
- 40 -
keep an inmate without a qualifying restriction from using the
Terminal. See id. The DOC defendants never provided inconsistent
or contradictory reasoning about official first-floor Terminal
protocol. See id. (dismissing defendant's claim of pretext when
she did not raise any facts showing defendants' explanations were
"contradictory, incoherent, implausible, or inconsistent," or that
they were "'unworthy of credence'" (quoting Collazo-Rosado, 765
F.3d at 94)).25 Snell's assertions to the contrary are mere
"unsupported speculation" which cannot demonstrate the DOC
defendants' legitimate explanations were pretextual. Coll, 50
F.3d at 1121 (quoting Medina–Muñoz, 896 F.2d at 8).
25 Snell also argues that the temporal proximity between the
deprivation (October 29, 2015) and his grievance (October 9, 2015)
shows a causal connection necessary to prove his prima facie case.
As stated, we need not engage with the prima facie case argument
because we assumed Snell met his burden. However, even if Snell's
brief implied that temporal proximity proves pretext, he would be
mistaken. That there was a temporal proximity between Snell's
grievance and the DOC defendants' action does not alone get him to
his preferred destination. See Echevarría, 856 F.3d at 138
("Although such close temporal proximity 'may suffice for a prima
facie case of retaliation,' it 'does not[, standing alone,] satisfy
[the] ultimate burden to establish that the true explanation for
[plaintiff's] firing was retaliation for engaging in protected
conduct.'" (first alteration in original) (quoting Carreras, 596
F.3d at 38)). And, as demonstrated, the DOC defendants' actions
were an expected reaction by prison officials who learn about
behavior that violates prison rules.
- 41 -
D. Climbing the Cruel and Unusual Stairs to the Courthouse
(Eighth Amendment)
The district court determined there was no triable issue
of material fact that either the DOC defendants or Dr. Ruze
subjected Snell to cruel and unusual punishment by withholding a
no-stairs restriction and by discontinuing his reliance upon the
first-floor Terminal. Snell disagrees, once more alleging the
defendants' decisions caused harm to his health.
To succeed with an Eighth Amendment claim related to
medical problems, Snell must satisfy two elements against the DOC
defendants and Dr. Ruze. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-
05 (1976).26 According to the first prong -- the objective one -
- we must determine whether Snell had a "serious medical need[]"
for which the defendants provided inadequate care. Id. at 104;
see also Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 85 (1st Cir. 2014) ("To
sustain a claim under the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment,
[plaintiff] must show that she has a serious medical need for which
she has received inadequate treatment.").27 Under the second prong
26 The Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause makes the
Eighth Amendment apply to state actors. See Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). Title 42, United States
Code, Section 1983 provides a private right of action for
plaintiffs to litigate constitutional harms, including Eighth
Amendment ones. See Parker, 935 F.3d at 14.
27 Snell's opening and reply briefs insist that he is not
complaining about the quality of care he received; rather, it is
the denial of a reasonable accommodation for his inability to
ascend stairs which undergirds his Eighth Amendment challenge.
- 42 -
-- the subjective one -- we must assess whether the DOC defendants
and Dr. Ruze exhibited "deliberate indifference to [Snell's]
serious medical need" when they shut him out from the first-floor
Terminal. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. We also must keep in mind
that not every harm equates to cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 83
(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). We take
each prong in turn.
i. Serious Medical Need
For the objective prong, the range of serious medical
needs includes those which are either diagnosed by physicians or
"'[are] so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctor's attention.'" Id. at 82 (quoting
Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st
Because of the distinction, Snell argues that whether he received
"inadequate medical care" is irrelevant for determining whether he
suffered from a serious medical need sufficient to satisfy the
objective prong of our Eighth Amendment test. Snell, however,
does not cite to any First Circuit precedent supporting his view
that we can excise "inadequate medical care" from our analysis.
In fact, in his opening brief, he relies on Kosilek to lay out the
test for whether prison officials have violated an inmate's Eighth
Amendment rights. As just shown, Kosilek expressly requires
"inadequate treatment" of a serious medical need to satisfy the
objective prong, 774 F.3d at 85, and that is how we will analyze
the claim, because withholding a reasonable accommodation might,
in certain circumstances, constitute inadequate care. To the
extent Snell may be inviting us to follow other circuits, which
lump inadequate care into the subjective prong of deliberate
indifference, see, e.g., Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1159
(10th Cir. 2006), Snell cannot thereby avoid a wholesale discussion
of the topic.
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Cir. 1990)). As for whether the defendants provided adequate care,
prison officials are not required to render ideal care, let alone
cater to an inmate's preferred healthcare regimen. See id. They
simply must provide care at "a level reasonably commensurate with
modern medical science and of a quality acceptable within prudent
professional standards." United States v. Derbes, 369 F.3d 579,
583 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d
39, 43 (1st Cir. 1987)). Moreover, "[t]he law is clear that where
two alternative courses of medical treatment exist, and both
alleviate negative effects within the boundaries of modern
medicine, it is not the place of our court to 'second guess medical
judgments'. . . ." Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 90 (quoting Layne v.
Vinzant, 657 F.2d 468, 474 (1st Cir. 1981)); see also Ruiz Rosa v.
Rullán, 485 F.3d 150, 156 (1st Cir. 2007) (disagreement between
two medical professionals regarding the proper course of treatment
will generally be insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment
violation).
Even assuming Snell's various knee, back, and
respiratory ailments were objectively serious to a layperson, let
alone to a doctor, there is still no genuine issue of material
fact that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by providing
inadequate care, which, as Snell claims, "subject[ed] him to the
pain and danger of being forced to climb stairs to reach the
second-floor law library."
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Focusing on Dr. Ruze for our objective prong analysis,
the record indicates that her decision to withhold the no-stairs
restriction scales along with the accepted medical touchstones of
the time, see Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 90, especially considering she
also provided Snell with a range of other therapies to alleviate
his pains, including knee sleeves, bottom bunk restrictions, a
cane for walking, and a back brace, among other treatments which
the DOC defendants ensured Snell obtained.28 Dr. Ira K. Evans,
III, a physician expert retained by Dr. Ruze once Snell filed suit,
as well as several other health professionals who evaluated Snell
from 2010-2017, also opined Snell could have (and should have)
walked stairs to improve his health. At the very least, Snell did
not receive care far outside the scope of acceptable medical
practice. See id. at 82; cf. Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155,
1159 (10th Cir. 2006) (no deliberate indifference where evidence
"indicate[d] that the medical staff believed that the greater
threat to [prisoner plaintiff] arose from his use of a wheelchair,
28 Because the DOC defendants deferred to Dr. Ruze's and
other medical providers' judgments regarding inmates' proper
medical care, see 103 DOC 408.07(7), we can analyze the adequacy
of the care provided by all defendants by looking at Dr. Ruze's
decisions, see Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527 (7th Cir. 2008)
("The policy supporting the presumption that non-medical officials
are entitled to defer to the professional judgment of the
facility's medical officials on questions of prisoners' medical
care is a sound one.").
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because continued use of the wheelchair would result in muscle
atrophy and imperil his ability to walk.").
But wait, says Snell, Dr. Churchville and an expert
retained by Snell for trial, Dr. Michael G. Kennedy, MD., C.C.,
F.R.G.S. (C), disagreed with Dr. Ruze, her expert, and the other
medical professionals about Snell's proper medical treatment.
And, in Snell's telling, the competing expert opinions create, at
minimum, a genuine issue of material fact that he suffers from a
serious medical need. No disputing Dr. Churchville provided a no-
stairs restriction in November 2018, but, remember, this was three
years after the DOC defendants stopped Snell's first-floor
Terminal use and more than two years after Dr. Ruze's June 23,
2016 note confirming Snell could climb stairs. In addition to Dr.
Churchville, Snell's expert, Dr. Kennedy, also thought Snell
deserved a no-stairs restriction in October 2015 because he
"should, at all cost, [have] avoid[ed] climbing up and down stairs"
due to his problematic knees and back. But both events are
inconsequential since we have already assumed Snell suffered a
serious medical need in 2015. Our task, then, is to scrutinize
the record to see if evidence shows Snell received inadequate care
during the relevant time frame.
To remind, where medical experts do not contend the care
provided fell outside of the bounds of acceptable medical practice,
disagreement among the experts over the proper course of care does
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not help Snell. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 90. Although Snell's
expert report summarized the various procedures and treatments
Snell received over the years, it said nary a peep about whether,
in his opinion and to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
the care provided to Snell fell below the proper standard of care.
Same goes for Dr. Churchville who likewise during his deposition
never claimed or hinted that the defendants provided Snell with
inadequate care. Both doctors are permitted to have a differing
medical opinion than Dr. Ruze and her expert regarding the health
impact of stair climbing but such does not make for an Eighth
Amendment violation. See Ruiz-Rosa, 485 F.3d at 156 ("disagreement
as to the appropriate course of [medical] treatment [is]
insufficient" for an inmate "to prove a constitutional violation"
of his Eighth Amendment rights). As such, the record fails to
show Snell received inadequate care to satisfy the objective prong.
ii. Deliberate Indifference
For the sake of completeness though, we'll continue
along the tiered levels by assuming there is a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the objective prong and by turning to
assess the subjective element.
Deliberate indifference appears when defendants had a
"sufficiently culpable state of mind" by ignoring (or worsening)
the inmate's serious medical need. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834
(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)). Deliberate
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indifference is therefore more than negligence, or the "ordinary
lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety," yet it
need not be intentional harm. Id. at 835 (quoting Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). The defendants must have known
of the risk of harm to the plaintiff and disregarded it. See
Nunes, 766 F.3d at 142. Deliberate indifference consequently
occupies a "narrow band of conduct" that is "so inadequate as to
shock the conscience." Feeney v. Corr. Med. Servs. Inc., 464 F.3d
158, 162 (1st Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Needless to say, if
defendants acted reasonably in light of the inmate's serious
medical need, including by refusing an accommodation for safety or
institutional concerns, we will not decide they acted with
deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, even
if the defendants' actions resulted in an inmate's discomfort from
trekking to the second-floor library. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at
844; Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 91-92 (reasoned choice of medical
treatment among competing options rarely constitutes deliberate
indifference); Callahan, 471 F.3d at 1160 (collecting cases
explaining defendants have no right under the Eighth Amendment "to
a particular course of treatment").
a. Dr. Ruze
For the reasons stated above, Dr. Ruze crafted the
strategy to handle Snell's ailments based on a reasoned medical
decision, which makes it difficult, to say the least, for Snell to
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show deliberate indifference, even though he contends that had he
"had an actual medical need for a no-stairs restriction," it "would
support an inference that Dr. Ruze acted with deliberate
indifference" by continuing his no-stairs restriction in June 2016
"without examining or consulting" Snell. Dr. Ruze may not have
provided Snell with the type of care he desired or (viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Snell) he needed, but that
does not ring of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Estelle, 429
U.S. at 105-06 ("[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent
in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a
valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.").
b. DOC Defendants
As for the DOC defendants, we similarly conclude that
the record here yields no genuine issue of material fact which
would support a finding of deliberate indifference. Although the
DOC defendants could have independently granted Snell the
accommodation he sought for first-floor Terminal access, see 103
DOC 408.07, they had no reason to expect Snell needed it given
their justifiable reliance on the medical opinions of Dr. Ruze and
other health care professionals who treated Snell, see Matthews v.
Pa. Dept. of Corr., 613 F. App'x 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2015) ("[N]on-
medical prison officials are generally justified in relying on the
expertise and care of prison medical providers. Absent a reason
to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their
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assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-
medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the
Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference."
(ellipsis in original) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir.
2004))).
Even putting aside their reasoned reliance on the
opinions of medical professionals like Dr. Ruze, Snell had walked
up and down stairs (even if with a cane in hand and even if with
some difficulty)29 in other parts of the prison throughout his
confinement, denting Snell's argument that the DOC defendants
callously disregarded the risk he would suffer a more severe injury
without the accommodation. The DOC defendants, as the record
reflects, thus reasonably believed Snell could traverse stairs to
the second-floor law library without suffering serious or
irreparable harm. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 92 (finding no
deliberate indifference where decision fell "within the realm of
reason and made in good faith") (quoting Battista v. Clarke, 645
F.3d 449, 454 (1st Cir. 2011)).
We thus affirm the grant of summary judgment on the
Eighth Amendment claims. See Nunes, 766 F.3d at 142.
29 Forget not his job in the second-floor law library from
2011 to 2012.
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E. Reasonably Accommodating a Love for Litigation
Relying upon the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and art. 114 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,30 Snell proclaims that the DOC
defendants discriminated against him on account of his disability
by denying him a reasonable accommodation to research legal matters
through the Terminal.31 More specifically, Snell asserts we must
find the DOC defendants to have violated the anti-discrimination
laws if they knew Snell could not climb the stairs to access legal
materials available to the general prison population without a
significant risk to his health. Because all three statutes upon
which Snell rests this claim prohibit the same type of
discrimination, we can analyze them simultaneously through the
rubric of the ADA. See Nunes, 766 F.3d at 144 (analyzing ADA and
30 The DOC defendants contradict themselves about whether the
district court had jurisdiction to hear Snell's state law claim.
At first, their brief states that "[t]he district court had
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's [art.] 114 claim as it
arose from the same set of facts as plaintiff’s federal claims.
See[] 28 U.S.C. § 1367." Then, they argue Massachusetts "G.L. c.
93, § 103, which affords a right of action to adjudicate claims
under [art.] 114, vests exclusive jurisdiction in the superior
court, and therefore, Snell's claims must be dismissed." The DOC
defendants had it right the first time.
31 Although the DOC defendants urge us to affirm summary
judgment on Snell's claim pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws
ch. 151B, § 1, which protects employees, not inmates, from
discrimination, Snell has not raised this statute on appeal, and
it is unclear whether his complaint even alleged a violation of
that statute. We therefore need not address it.
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Rehabilitation Act claims together); Shedlock v. Dept. of Corr.,
818 N.E.2d 1022, 1032 (Mass. 2004) ("The ADA, the [Rehabilitation
Act], and art. 114 all prohibit the same conduct: disabled persons
may not be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits
of services, programs, or activities, and they may not be subjected
to discrimination." (citations omitted)).
Title II of the ADA requires public entities, including
prisons and their officials, see Pa. Dept. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524
U.S. 206, 210 (1998), to provide "meaningful access" to programs,
such as law libraries, by taking reasonable steps to overcome
barriers, like stairs, which impede access to those programs for
inmates with disabilities, Theriault v. Flynn, 162 F.3d 46, 48
(1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301
(1985)); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004)
(determining Title II "applies to the class of cases implicating
accessibility to judicial services"). As previously detailed,
MCI-Concord created a reasonable accommodation by establishing the
first-floor Terminal for inmates with documented medical
restrictions who could not traverse the stairs to the second-floor
law library.32 The question, then, is whether there is a genuine
32 "The regulations under the relevant portion of the ADA
refer to 'reasonable modification,' 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7),
while the coordinating regulations under the Rehabilitation Act
use the term 'reasonable accommodation,' 28 C.F.R. § 41.53, but
there is no material difference between the terms." Nunes, 766
F.3d at 145 n.6.
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issue of material fact that the DOC defendants violated the ADA
and its implementing regulations by keeping Snell from using said
accommodation.33 And the answer, once more, turns upon the reasoned
medical decisions upon which the DOC defendants relied.
We start by asking whether the record reflects
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact
that: (1) Snell "is a qualified individual with a disability; (2)
. . . he was either excluded from participation in, or denied the
benefits of a public entity's services, programs, or activities or
was otherwise discriminated against; and (3) . . . such exclusion,
denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of [his]
disability."34 Kiman v. N.H. Dept. of Corr., 451 F.3d 274, 283
33 "Because Congress explicitly authorized the Attorney
General to promulgate regulations under the ADA, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 12134(a), the regulations 'must [be given] legislative and hence
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
plainly contrary to the statute.'" Parker v. Univ. de P.R., 225
F.3d 1, 5 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000) (alterations in original) (quoting
United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984)). Snell makes
no claim that the regulations are invalid.
34 Title II of the ADA states: "no qualified individual with
a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 similarly provides that "[n]o
otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
- 53 -
(1st Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Parker
v. Universidad de P.R., 225 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000)).35
Art. 114 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights
declares: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, denied the benefits of, or be subject to
discrimination under any program or activity within the
commonwealth."
35 Courts recognize three types of discrimination prohibited
by the ADA: (1) disparate treatment, which arises out of the
actor's prejudice; (2) disparate impact, which results from a
facially neutral policy that causes a group, such as inmates with
disabilities, to lose access to a program or right available to
another group without a justifiable excuse for the difference; and
(3) denial of a reasonable accommodation the plaintiff needed to
meaningfully access a public service. See Nunes, 766 F.3d at 144-
45. Unlike the first two categories of discrimination, a plaintiff
does not need to demonstrate discriminatory animus for a reasonable
accommodation claim, which is the type raised by Snell. See Enica,
544 F.3d at 339.
Snell stresses that we must reverse the grant of summary
judgment because the district court mistakenly analyzed his Title
II ADA reasonable accommodation claim as one requiring him to show
the defendants' decisions "were based on any discriminatory
animus." Snell, 2019 WL 4303264, at *7. But Snell mistakes the
district court's reasoning, even if the district court could have
avoided some confusion by choosing a word other than "animus."
The third prong of an ADA Title II reasonable accommodation claim
mandates that plaintiffs explain how the decision to deny a
reasonable accommodation was discriminatory, even if the actors
denying the accommodation did not have any intent to discriminate.
See Kiman, 451 F.3d at 285. Without discrimination, there would
be no ADA claim. The district court thus commented about animus
only so far as to analyze whether the exclusion qualified as
discriminatory, using the term when discussing the medical
recommendations upon which the prison officials relied and whether
the prison officials excluded Snell from accessing legal materials
based on his disability. See Snell, 2019 WL 4303264, at *7. The
district court did not improperly require Snell to demonstrate
that the DOC defendants intended to discriminate against Snell.
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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Snell, we assume he is a qualified individual with a disability
under the ADA given his various back, knee, and respiratory
problems. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2); see also 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.108(a)(1)(i), (c)(1)(i) (disability means "[a] physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities" including "walking"). Further, the DOC
defendants revoked Snell's access to the first-floor Terminal in
October 2015, which we assume satisfies the second prong,
exclusion.
We thus turn to the third prong (whether the DOC
defendants excluded Snell on account of his disability). Unless
the evidence shows that the DOC defendants' decisions regarding
the reasonable accommodation were "so unreasonable as to
demonstrate that they were discriminating against [Snell] because
of his disability," we will hesitate to overturn the district
court's summary judgment decision. Kiman, 451 F.3d at 285.
Even examining the evidence in the light most favorable
to Snell, the DOC defendants did not "exclude[ Snell] from
participation," 28 C.F.R. § 35.149, in the law library "by reason
of his disability," 42 U.S.C. § 12132. In October 2015, Snell did
not have a medical restriction justifying his use of the first-
floor Terminal. The DOC defendants admitted they would have
allowed Snell to access the Terminal had Dr. Ruze, or any other
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medical provider, written Snell a no-stairs restriction. Until
November 2018, no doctor ever felt such a restriction was called
for, at which point the DOC defendants transferred Snell to an
accessible prison. By the Department of Correction's regulations,
the DOC defendants generally deferred to medical personnel on
medical questions such as whether Snell could (or should) climb
stairs, see 103 DOC 408.07, a reasonable decision to which we grant
deference, cf. Pollack v. Reg. Sch. Unit 75, 886 F.3d 75, 81 (1st
Cir. 2018) (granting deference to federal regulations implementing
the ADA); see also Matthews, 613 F. App'x at 170 (prison officials
may reasonably rely upon medical personnel when treating inmates).
Even putting aside the reasonable reliance upon medical
advice, the record reflects only that the DOC defendants kept Snell
away from the first-floor legal resources because they believed he
could get to the second-floor library. Snell may have had an
indefinite bottom tier restriction, but even prisoners on the
bottom tier would navigate stairs from time to time. Snell himself
climbed stairs to and from the law library for years, even while
he claimed to have the 1998 indefinite bottom tier restriction
exempting him from such an arduous feat. Although a layperson
could look at Snell and, given his use of a cane, suspect he might
have some difficulty traversing stairs, see Shedlock, 818 N.E.2d
at 1030-31 (describing cane use as indicative of difficulty with
stairs), and even acknowledging that forcing an inmate to
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experience pain to access the law library could constitute an ADA
violation, see Matthews, 613 F. App'x at 169; Anderson v. Bickell,
754 F. App'x 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2018), it does not necessarily
follow that the DOC defendants had to immediately jump to provide
Snell with an accommodation to access the first-floor Terminal
given the contrary medical evidence suggesting otherwise, see
Kiman, 451 F.3d at 285-86 (officials could deny cane to inmate
with ALS in certain circumstances); Hockaday v. Colo. Dept. of
Corr., 766 F. App'x 572, 575 (10th Cir. 2019) (noting "ADA
prohibits discrimination because of disability, not inadequate
treatment for disability" (quoting Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 609
F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds by
Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016))).
The DOC defendants also had interests in "maintaining
security and order" within the institution when they determined
whether providing the accommodation to Snell would have been
reasonable, and we will defer to such rationales. Pierce v. Cnty.
of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1217 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 n.23 (1979)). For security purposes,
the DOC defendants refused accommodations which appeared to
preference one inmate over others, such as allowing Snell access
to the first-floor Terminal without a no-stairs restriction when
all other would-be users would need to prove that they required an
accommodation.
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In the DOC defendants' reasonable interpretation of
Snell's medical needs and the institution's security needs, Snell
would not significantly risk his health by climbing stairs despite
his injuries and maladies, and the prison would suffer less
potential institutional unrest if the DOC defendants required
Snell to so navigate. Notwithstanding that Snell paints his
arguments as regarding a reasonable accommodation, at heart he
challenges the DOC defendants' reasonable reliance on his
physicians' "reasoned medical judgment," decisions with which
Snell disagreed. Kiman, 451 F.3d at 285 (quoting Lesley v. Hee
Man Chie, 250 F.3d 47, 58 (1st Cir. 2001)). As such, Snell's
litigious path has taken him astray. We find no error in the
district court's rulings.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of
summary judgment to the defendants on all counts is affirmed. Each
party to bear its own costs.
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