NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE ADALBERTO ZALDIVAR, Sr., No. 19-15442
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-01160-DGC-
DMF
v.
CHARLES L. RYAN; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 18, 2021**
Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Jose Adalberto Zaldivar, Sr. appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various
constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo the district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Zaldivar’s access-to-courts,
interference with mail, and retaliation claims because Zaldivar failed to allege facts
sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th
Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must
present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-53 (1996) (setting forth elements of an access-
to-courts claim and actual injury requirement); Nordstrom v. Ryan, 856 F.3d 1265,
1271 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing a prisoner’s First Amendment right to send and
receive mail); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (elements
of a retaliation claim in the prison context).
The district court properly dismissed Zaldivar’s Privacy Act claims,
retaliation claims arising from incidents in 2005, and his interference with legal
mail claims arising from incidents in 2005 and 2006, as time-barred. See Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims);
Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2018) (state tolling and statute of
limitations for personal injury claims apply to § 1983 action, and federal law
governs when claim accrues, which is when a plaintiff knows or should know of
the injury that forms the basis for his cause of action); Oja v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006) (there is a two year statute of
2 19-15442
limitations for Privacy Act claims, with a potential addition of an extra two years
for a material, willful misrepresentation). Contrary to Zaldivar’s contention, the
continuing violation doctrine does not save his interference with legal mail claims
from being time-barred.
Zaldivar’s request for injunctive relief, set forth in his opening brief, is
denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 19-15442