Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-19-00898-CR
Adrian Justino SOTO,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 290th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2018CR4647
Honorable Jennifer Pena, Judge Presiding 1
Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Irene Rios, Justice
Delivered and Filed: May 26, 2021
AFFIRMED
Adrian Soto appeals an order denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result
of an alleged illegal search. Soto argues the search warrant affidavit did not contain sufficient facts
to provide a substantial basis to conclude there was a fair probability heroin would be found in his
apartment and argues the affidavit therefore did not establish probable cause. Because the facts in
1
The Honorable Sid Harle, Presiding Judge of the Fourth Administrative Judicial Region, heard and ruled on the
motion to suppress. The Honorable Jennifer Pena presided over the plea proceedings and signed the judgment.
04-19-00898-CR
the affidavit and the reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are sufficient to establish
probable cause, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On January 24, 2018, Detective Chad Ripley presented a sworn Affidavit for Search
Warrant to a magistrate. The affidavit asserted that heroin was unlawfully possessed at an address
known as Soto’s residence and in four vehicles located at that address and known to be under the
control of Soto and his girlfriend, Maria Maldonado. The magistrate issued the search warrant and
on that same day, the San Antonio Police Department executed the warrant on Soto’s apartment.
The search yielded approximately 12.6 grams of heroin. Soto was charged with one count of
intentionally and knowingly possessing a controlled substance, namely heroin, in an amount
between 4 and 200 grams.
At a pretrial suppression hearing, Soto moved to suppress the seized heroin and argued the
evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal search because the affidavit in support of the search
warrant failed to establish probable cause that heroin was present in his apartment. The trial court
denied the motion and issued findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Soto thereafter entered a plea bargain. In accordance with the plea, the trial court sentenced
Soto to five years in prison, suspended the sentence, and placed him on community supervision
for a period of seven years.
Soto timely filed a notice of appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. Carmouche
v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We give trial courts almost complete
deference in determining historical facts. Id. When a trial judge makes express findings of fact, we
must examine the record in the light most favorable to the ruling and uphold those fact findings if
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they are supported by the record. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
We then proceed to a de novo determination of the legal significance of the facts as found by the
trial court—including whether a search warrant was issued on probable cause. See State v.
Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). In our review of a magistrate’s decision to
issue a warrant, we apply a highly deferential standard of review because of the constitutional
preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant over warrantless searches. Bonds v. State,
403 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “When in doubt, [we] should defer to all reasonable
inferences that the magistrate could have made.” Id.
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR A SEARCH WARRANT
In combined points of error, Soto argues on constitutional and statutory grounds that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the facts presented in the search warrant
affidavit did not establish probable cause to conclude a controlled substance would be found within
Soto’s residence.
A warrant to search a home must be based on probable cause. U.S. CONST. amend. IV;
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 18.01(b). A warrant to search for contraband
must be supported by an affidavit setting forth sufficient facts to establish probable cause that the
contraband is located at the particular place to be searched. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 18.01(b),
(g), 18.02(12). Probable cause exists if “the facts submitted to the magistrate are sufficient to
justify a conclusion that the object of the search is probably on the premises to be searched at the
time the warrant is issued.” Davis v. State, 202 S.W.3d 149, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We will
uphold the magistrate’s probable-cause determination if the magistrate had a substantial basis for
concluding that probable cause existed. Bonds v. State, 403 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013). In determining whether probable cause exists, the magistrate may interpret the affidavit in
a non-technical, common-sense manner and draw reasonable inferences solely from the facts and
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circumstances within the four corners of the affidavit. Id. Appellate courts should not invalidate a
warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical manner. Id.
The trial court’s findings of fact are not disputed, and the findings include:
• Adrian Soto’s apartment address.
• SAPD Detective Chad Ripley had been given information about Adrian Soto’s
narcotics trafficking activity by a confidential informant.
• SAPD detectives conducted surveillance of Adrian Soto.
• During the surveillance operations, SAPD detectives observed Adrian Soto leave his
residence in several vehicles and meet with individuals to make “drops” (drug-selling
transactions).
• These “drops” of narcotics were confirmed through controlled buys where an
undercover officer purchased narcotics from Adrian Soto.
• Over the course of two weeks, SAPD detectives recovered more than 12 grams of
heroin through these controlled buys.
• On January 24, 2018, Detective Chad Ripley applied for a search warrant of Adrian
Soto’s residence.
• The search warrant affidavit contained all of the above facts.
• The search warrant was granted by Magistrate Lori Crockett on that same date.
• The search warrant was executed on January 24, 2018.
In its conclusions of law, the trial court held: (1) “[t]he search warrant at issue is sufficient,” and
the “affidavit contains sufficient probable cause to connect Defendant with the crime charged”;
and (2) “[t]he affidavit contains sufficient probable cause to inform the issuing magistrate that the
items sought to be seized would be found at the Defendant’s residence.” The court therefore denied
the motion to suppress.
Detective Ripley’s affidavit in support of the search warrant also contained the following
factual allegations not addressed in the trial court’s findings. Detective Ripley stated the address
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of the place to be searched was an apartment in Soto’s name, and Soto paid its utilities. The
affidavit listed four vehicles located at the address and stated the vehicles were under the control
of Soto and Maldonado. Detective Ripley stated the SAPD Narcotics Unit had been investigating
Maldonado since 2012 for heroin trafficking. She had previously been subject to search warrants
that yielded heroin, and “[a]s a result, she no longer will sell from her house and attempts to conceal
its location.” Detective Ripley’s confidential informant told him Soto and Maldonado were in a
relationship and they were making “drops”—delivering heroin from vehicles. SAPD surveillance
of Soto and Maldonado confirmed the information. Officers observed them, together and
separately, drive from the residence using one of the vehicles listed in the affidavit and make drops.
The affidavit stated that on one occasion, officers saw Soto and Maldonado complete a drop
“around the block” and drive in a “haphazard manner” away from Soto’s residence to conceal its
location. Detective Ripley stated that during the two weeks preceding the issuance of the search
warrant, officers observed Soto and Maldonado making drops and then officers recovered the
heroin by contacting the people to whom Soto and Maldonado had dealt the heroin. The affidavit
stated that on January 24, 2018, the day Detective Ripley applied for the search warrant, Soto was
observed delivering heroin from one of the listed vehicles. Soto was arrested by patrol officers and
interviewed by a detective. The affidavit stated Soto gave a false address but later admitted he
lived at the address listed in the search warrant affidavit.
The totality of the circumstances shown by the facts stated in the search warrant affidavit
provided a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude there was a fair probability heroin would
be found in Soto’s residence. Both an informant and police surveillance established Soto and
Maldonado were dealing heroin from vehicles. Soto and Maldonado were observed on multiple
occasions leaving the residence, getting into one of the several vehicles listed in the affidavit, and
driving to a location where they made a “drop.” Officers confirmed that the substance Soto was
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dealing was heroin by making controlled buys and by contacting the other party to the transaction
after observing a drop. Soto took steps to conceal where he lived, and he lied to officers about his
address when he was arrested. The magistrate could have reasonably inferred from these facts that
it was fairly probable Soto kept heroin in his residence. Under our highly deferential review, we
hold the facts provided in the search warrant affidavit, along with the reasonable inferences that
could be drawn from them, were sufficient to establish probable cause. See Brown v. State, 115
S.W.3d 633, 637 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, no pet.) (concluding affidavit in support of search
warrant for residence based on probable cause because resident purchased iodine crystals more
than once, individual who knew resident heard she was cooking methamphetamine, and officers
seized methamphetamine from individuals in vehicle that had just left residence).
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Soto’s motion to suppress and affirm the
judgment of conviction.
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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