Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
June 8, 2021
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of
No. 54973-5-II
MATTHEW WINSTON BUTLER,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Petitioner.
WORSWICK, J. — Matthew Butler seeks relief from personal restraint imposed as a
result of his 2016 district court convictions for violation of a domestic violence protection
order and for resisting arrest. He argues that he can collaterally attack the protection
order because it was void. We disagree and deny Butler’s petition.
Butler and Nancy Coplen had a child together in 1997. Butler and Coplen’s
relationship deteriorated after Coplen married another man in 2006. On June 4, 2013,
following a confrontation between Butler and Coplen at a high school gym, Coplen filed
a petition in superior court for an order of protection against Butler under RCW
26.50.030 and asked for a temporary order of protection.1 A court commissioner denied
the request for a temporary order because the petition did not list a specific incident and
approximate date of domestic violence. After a hearing, another district court
commissioner denied the request for a full domestic violence protection order for the
same reason.
1
The parties reference this as a district court order, but the petition and subsequent orders
contain a superior court caption, and were filed under superior court cause number
13-2-07575-3.
No. 54973-5-II
On October 3, 2013, Coplen filed a petition for a parenting plan and a child
support order in superior court. Along with that petition, Coplen filed a motion for a
temporary protection order under former RCW 26.26.590 (2013), alleging additional
facts, some of which occurred after June 4. The superior court judge entered a temporary
protection order against Butler that day. The State later charged Butler with violating
that order by sending Coplen an e-mail. Butler argued that the October 3 temporary order
was barred by res judicata because of the denial of a protection order in June 2013. The
superior court rejected his argument.
The State charged Butler in district court with two counts of cyberstalking, one
count of violation of a domestic violence court order and one count of resisting arrest. A
jury found him guilty as charged. Butler appealed to superior court, raising the res
judicata argument among others. The superior court reversed his cyberstalking conviction
on First Amendment grounds, but affirmed the convictions for violation of a domestic
violence court order and for resisting arrest. Butler filed this timely personal restraint
petition.
We may grant relief to a petitioner who is under restraint and who can
demonstrate that his restraint is unlawful. RAP 16.4; In re Pers. Restraint of Domingo-
Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d 255, 262, 474 P.3d 524 (2020), cert. denied, No. 20-831 (U.S. Mar.
29, 2021). Restraint is unlawful when a conviction is obtained in violation of the United
States Constitution or the Constitution and laws of the state of Washington. RAP
16.4(c)(2). “Relief by way of a collateral challenge to a conviction is extraordinary, and
the petitioner must meet a high standard before this court will disturb an otherwise settled
judgment.” In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 132, 267 P.3d 324 (2011). A
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No. 54973-5-II
petitioner has the burden of demonstrating error and, if the error is constitutional, actual
and substantial prejudice. In re Pers. Restraint of Sandoval, 189 Wn.2d 811, 821, 408
P.3d 675 (2018). If the error is not constitutional, the petitioner must show that the error
represents a “‘fundamental defect . . . that inherently resulted in a complete miscarriage
of justice.’” 189 Wn.2d at 821 (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Finstad, 177 Wn.2d 501,
506, 301 P.3d 450 (2013)).
Butler argues that because the October 3 protection order was barred by res
judicata, his convictions for violation of a domestic violence court order and resisting
arrest arising out of that order must be reversed. He acknowledges that under the
collateral bar rule, he cannot challenge the validity of the October 3 protection order in a
prosecution for violation of that order. City of Seattle v. May, 171 Wn.2d 847, 852, 256
P.3d 1161 (2011) (quoting State v. Noah, 103 Wn. App. 29, 46, 9 P.3d 858 (2000). He
relies on May for its statement that “[a]n exception [to the collateral bar rule] exists for
orders that are void.” 171 Wn.2d at 852. He contends that the October 3 protection order
is void because it is barred by res judicata, therefore the collateral bar rule does not apply.
But even assuming that the October 3 protection order violates res judicata, Butler does
not show that that violation renders the order void.
An order is void if the issuing court lacked jurisdiction over the parties, lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, or lacked the inherent power to issue the order. Bresolin v.
Morris, 86 Wn.2d 241, 245, 543 P.2d 325 (1975); Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354 v. Mead
Educ. Ass’n, 85 Wn.2d 278, 284, 534 P.2d 561 (1975). Here, the superior court had
jurisdiction over the parties, had subject matter jurisdiction, and had the authority to issue
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No. 54973-5-II
the October 3 temporary order. Thus, Butler does not show it is void, so he is subject to
the collateral bar rule prohibiting him from attacking the validity of that order.
Butler does not show any grounds for relief from personal restraint. We therefore
deny his petition.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Worswick, J.
We concur:
Maxa, J.
Glasgow, A.C.J.
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