United States v. Worrell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DiSTRJCT OF COLUMBIA

UNITES ST A TES OF AMERICA,
Case No. 1:21-cr-00292-RCL
v.
* REDACTED*
CHRISTOPHER \VORRELL,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After defendant Christopher Worrell was arrested on charges stemming from his

participation in the January 6, 2021 breach of the United States Capitol, Chief Judge Howell issued

an order detaining him pending trial. ECF No. 13. Defendant moved for emergency

reconsideration of that order on the basis of: among other things, the government's treatment of

his non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and his risk of contracting a severe COVID-19 infection. See ECF

No. 16-1. Chief Judge Howell denied that motion, and the Circuit affirmed. United States v.

Worrell, No. 21-3020, 2021 WL 2010795 (D.C. Cir. May 5, 2021 ). The case was later transferred

to the undersigned. Defendant then filed the present motion-his second emergency motion for

reconsideration-again arguing that inadequate medical treatment for his lymphoma and the risk

posed to him by COVJD-19 are reasons to reconsider the previous detention order. ECF No. 4 7-

1. After the government filed an opposition, ECF No. 49, the Court held a hearing on the motion

at which the defendant testified. Min. Entry 5/4/2021. In response to this Court's Order, the

government provided supplemental briefing, ECF No. 60, to which defendant replied, ECF No.

64.

Upon consideration of the parties' filings, ECF Nos. 47, 49, 60, 64, the arguments set forth

at the hearing, and the underlying record, the Court finds that there are no previously unknown
 facts having a "material beariug" on the issue whether there arc conditions of release that will

reasonably assure the safety of others and the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2). Nor has

defendant met his burden to show that there is a "compelling reason" for release under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3 J 42(i). Thus, for the reasons explained below, the Court will DENY defendant's emergency

motion for reconsideration, ECF No. 47.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

The government has proffered the following evidence in its filings opposing defendant's

motion for pretrial release and defendant's motions for reconsideration of the order detaining him

pending trial. See ECF Nos. 9, l 9, 49, 60.

At approximately 1:00 P.M. on January 6, 2021, a joint session of Congress convened to

certify the Electoral College vote count for the 2020 Presidential Election. ECF No. 9 at 6. As

elected members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives met in separate chambers inside

the U.S. Capitol building, a large crowd gathered outside. Id. at 7. U.S. Capitol Police Officers,

as well as temporary and permanent security barriers, stood between the crowd and the Capitol.

Id

Capitol Police were unable to maintain these barriers. Id. Between 1:00 and 2:00 P.M.,

individuals from the crowd overwhelmed police barriers and barricades around the outside

perimeter of the U.S. Capitol grounds. Id. at 10. As the riotous crowd surged to the steps of the

Capitol building, a single line of law enforcement attempted to hold back the crowd from the

entrances to the building's interior. Id. Over the next half hour, members of the crowd exchanged

blows with, threw objects at, and pepper sprayed the officers attempting to hold back the crowd.

Id. Others grabbed and carried away law enforcement barriers-exposing the officers to the

crowd. Id.

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 At this precarious moment, defendant positioned himself next to a wooden stairway on the

side of the Capitol plaza, unclipped a canister of pepper-spray gel from his tactical vest, and

discharged a stream of pepper-spray gel toward the law enforcement officers positioned at the base

of the steps. Id. at 10-11. The moment was captured by a photographer and submitted in the

government's filings. Id.

Around 2:00 P.M., the mob forced its way past officers and into the Capitol building. Id

As they did so, they broke windows and assaulted members of the Capitol Police. Id When the

mob broke into the building, Congressional membe{·s and then-Vice President Pence were forced

to evacuate. Id.

Although defendant was not one of the rioters who breached the Capitol building,

defendant was part of the mob that, during the time officers struggled to keep the crowd from

advancing between 1:00 and 2:00 P.M., engaged in attacks on the Capitol Police. Id.

Defendant is an avowed member of the Proud Boys organization. Id. at 3-4. He was

arrested wearing a shirt with the words "Proud Boys" emblazoned on it, and law enforcement

located in his house numerous shirts, patches, and challenge coins featuring the Proud Boys colors,

logos, insignia; or specific Proud Boys chapters. Id. at 4. The govemmcnt also proffered pictures

and videos showing defendant wearing Proud Boys apparel or colors. Id.

According to defendant's live-in girlfriend, on January 6, 2021, she and defendant traveled

to Washington D.C. with other Proud Boys in vans paid for by another individual. Id. at 8. They

stayed in hotel rooms paid for by another individual. Id. Defendant and other Proud Boys used

radio-communication devices on January 6, and he marched to the Capitol wearing tactical gear,

prepared for confrontation. Id.

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 B. Defendant's Conduct After the Capitol Hiot and Subsequent Arrest

On January 18, 2021 the FBI conducted a voluntary interview with defendant. ECF No. 9

at 12. A tip uotificd the FBI that defendant had posted a video on his Facebook page showing him

at the Capitol issuing commands to other rioters. Id. at 12. 1 In his interview, defendant admitted

that he was at the Capitol, but denied any wrongdoing and specifically denied entering the Capitol

building. id.

On March 12, 2021, the FBI went to defendant's residence to arrest him incident to the

execution of a search warrant. Id. at 13. But defendant was away camping. Id Over the phone,

an FBI agent instructed defendant 10 turn himself in to the nearest FBI field office in Sarasota,

Florida. Id Defendant refused and stated that he would turn himself in at his residence, which

was several hours away. Id For public-safety reasons, the FBI declined to force defendant to turn

himself in at Sarasota. Id

While defendan1 was being arrested at his residence, he told law enforcement that he knew

who alerted the FBI to his activities, offering a particular individual's name. Id He also mentioned

that he was upse1 at a particular Twitter user who had exposed his identity online. Id Defendant

said something to the effect of, if he ever found that person, the FBI would "be corning for [him]

again." Id.

I~ its most recent filing, the government proffered several more of defendant's statements

from his Faccbook page. For example, on January 18, 2021 (the day defendant was interviewed

by the FBI) he told one Facebook user:

Worrell: Gola visit from FBI an hour ago

Worrell: I just put a troll post out .Believe I know who ratted

1 The government explains that it has thus far been unable to obtain this video.

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 User: Feds have been going over every vid with a fine tooth comb
though. They may have just ID'd yt u from public vids
Worrell: . ... We shall sec
Got a plan
User: Forget him for now, he's inelevant. ...
Worrell: I am 99.9 I know who called.

ECF No. 60-2 at 12. In a public post that same day, he ,:i.1rote, "SO WHOMEVER [sic] CALLED

THE 'FEDS' ON ME REST ASSURED I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND WE WILL BE

DISCUSSING THIS SOON!! The best part is you have NOTHING accept [sic] empty

accusations!! You are the piece of shit I knew you were!!" Id. He then responded to several

comments concerning this person, noting in one, "It's a simple case of a butt hurt pu"'*y ass bitch

that thought they could F**k with someone with some dumb bullshit!! They are about to get

educated in 'real life."' Id.

C. Procedural History

l. Chief J udgc Howell's Order Of Detention

On March 19, Chief Judge Howell issued an order detaining defendant pending trial. ECF

No. 13. Chief Judge Howell first found that the government could seek pretrial detention because

defendant's charged conduct involved a felony and the use of a dangerous weapon. ECF No. 27

at 62, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(1)(1 )(E). Chief Judge Howell then found that each of the factors in 18

U.S.C. § 3142(g) supported defendant's detention. She concluded that clear and convincing

evidence demonstrated that no condition or combination of conditions of release would reasonably

assure the safety of others and the community. ECF No. 13 at 2. Her analysis is briefly

summarized in the following discussion.

First, Chief Judge Howell found that the nature and circumstances of the offense weighed

"heavily" in favor of detention. Id. at 5. Defendant was charged with four felonies stemming from

the Capitol Riot, in which his participation was "planned, calculated, and intentional." Id.

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 Defendant assembled with other Proud Boys and was equipped with a tactical vest, pepper spray,

and a radio-communications device. Id. And at the Capitol, "[d]efendant discharged pepper spray

gel directed at a thin police line keeping the rioters from entering the Capitol via the West Plaza."

Id. Second, the weight of the evidence-which includes photos and videos clips of defendant at

the Capitol-weighed strongly in favor detention. Id. at 6. Third, defendant's history and

characteristics also weighed in favor of detention. Id. at 6-7. Here, defendant was previously

arrested for impersonating a police officer, which involved "intimidating conduct towards a total

stranger in service of taking the law into his own hands." Id at 7. Defendant's initial refusal to

turn himself in, and his statements during his arrest concerning others who exposed or reported

him to the J7BI, also "raise[ d] serious and troubling signals about defendant's willingness ... to

not intimidate or threaten any potential witnesses." Id. at 7. Finally, all of these circumstances

"taken together amplify concern that defendant will not adhere to a court order and that no

condition or conditions will assure the safety of the community, potential witnesses, and, in

particular, those who aided the government in identifying defendant, if he were to be released."

Id. at 8.

2. Defendant's First Emergency Motion For Reconsideration

On March 26, 2021, defendant filed his first emergency motion for reconsideration, arguing

that he had not received adequate medical care for his non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and that his

underlying conditions placed him at risk of contracting a severe COVID-19 infection. ECF No.

16-1 at 8 .2 On the issue of medical care specifically, he argued that his requests for two prescribed

2 Defendant also reargued that the four factors in § 3142(g) did not support his detention in light of the
Circuit's decision in United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 2021 ). ECF No. 16-1 at 8-12. As
reflected by the transcript, Chief Judge Howell rejected those arguments. ECF No. 41 al 41 ("[T]he
defendant clearly disagrees with the Court's conclusions from-111y consideration of those factors that are
required to be considered; but there is nothing that the Court has heard that persuades me tha1 there was an
error in the consideration of those factors even post Munchel.").

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cancer medications had been denied and that he had been deprived of an opportunity to be seen by

his physician, Dr. Bino Rucker. See ECF No. 16-1 at 3.

The government opposed these claims and made detailed proffers in its opposition and at

a hearing on the emergency motion on April 9, 2021. Regarding defendant's requests for

medication, the government explained that defendant's prescription for one medication-a topical

compound cream-expired prior to his arrest. ECF No. 29 at 11. As of April J, 2021, Dr, Rucker

"was unable to provide the dosage level for the cream or instructions for the pharmacy on how to

compound the cream," id. at 12, and he could not provide medical records related to the

prescription, id. at 14. Dr. Rucker explained that he could not do so because he has no medical

staff, keeps no medical rec·ords, and that he provides a "concierge" holistic or nontraditional

medical service. Id. at 13-14. Additionally, defendant refused permission from the Charlotte

County Jail's staff to have his girlfriend transport his leftover cream from home, ECF No. 29 at

14. Chief Judge Howell found that defendant's issues with obtaining the cream appeared to stem

from his own "lack of cooperation," and that defendant's characterization of medical need was

belied by his refusal to ask his girlfriend to bring the remaining cream and his failure to keep his

prescription up to date. Id at 40; see id. at 17.

As to the second prescription for naltrexone hydrochloride, the government explained thal

the medical staff at the Charlotte County Jail were unaware of any use for naltrexone as a cancer

treatment. Id. at 15. Dr. Rucker contended that he prescribed it for "off-label use." Id. at 16. But

here too, the medical staff at the jail were unable to obtain any additional medical records with

respect to that prescription because Dr. Rucker did not keep them. Id. Defense counsel

nevertheless argued that naltrexone was necessary for "pain management." Id. at 18.

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 Chief Judge Howell rejected defendant's arguments. She first noted that, "to say the least,

Dr. Rucker's assistance in this matter hasn't been as fulsome as one would hope whether

Mr. Worrell was incarcerated or not. And this medication presumably was not so significant that

he kept his prescription up to date." Id. at 17. Chief Judge Howell also found:

[T]he government's opposition and detailed proffer [] about
conversations and medications between the jail facility where the
defendant was held and the efforts by and to get his treating
physician to step forward and communicate as to the authorizations
for that medication is very illuminating, in terms of this doctor not
being able to provide records ... admitting he was using an ... off-
label usage of one of the medications; didn't seem particularly
cooperative with the medical facility where the defendant was
held ... that he doesn't have the records and he can't provide the
compound, and it was just-appears to have been really a lack of
cooperation. In addition, the defendant could have had his girlfriend
or partner bring the medication but he didn't want to bother her with
that.

Id at 39--40. In any event, Chief Judge Howell concluded that defendant would be able to receive

any necessary medication and care when he arrived at the D.C. Jail. Id. at 19, 41, 45 ("The D.C.

Jail has very adequate medical intake.").

The Circuit affirmed Chie~ Judge Howell's ruling. Worrell, 2021 WL 2010795, at* 1. The

Circuit first concluded that defendant did not adequately preserve his challenge to Chief Judge

Howell's finding that the pepper-spray gel he used was a dangerous weapon. Id Nor could

defendant show that the Chief Judge's conclusion was plain error. Id. Next, the Circuit affirmed

the Chief Judge's dangerousness determination, which was not clearly erroneous. Id. Defendant

"'actually assaulted police officers' with pepper spray gel." Id. (quoting Munchel, 991 F.Jd at

1284). And the dangerousness determination was "further buttressed" by defendant's "threats

against others-including potential witnesses," and his "membership in and alleged coordination

with the Proud Boys, some of whose members have been indicted for conspiring to attack

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 Congress." Id While defendant's appeal was pending, and prior to his arrival at the D.C. Jail, he

contracted CO V lD-19. Id at 2. To the extent that defendant argued that his CO VID-19 diagnosis

warranted pretrial release, the Circuit instructed this Court to consider that argument in the first

instance on remand . Id

3. The Filing Under Review: Defendant's Second Emergency Motion For
Reconsideration

On May 11, defendant filed the present motion for reconsideration. ECF No. 47. By the

time he filed the motion, he had recovered from COVID-19. But he describes his experience with

COVID-19 as "severe" and alleges that it caused him intense "psychological and emotional

distress." ECF No. 47-1 at 7. He argues that he has been denied access lo medical treatment and

his prescribed cancer medications (the cream and nahrexone), and that he remains at risk of severe

reinfection from COVID-19. Id. at 4, 6--7. In support, he provides affidavits from Dr. Rucker,

who states that he is the "treating oncologist" for defendant. ECF No. 47-4 at 1. 3 Dr. Ruckcr's

submissions note that while he has not seen defendant since before his ancst on March 12, 2021,

ECF No. 64- 1 at 2, it is his opinion that both prescriptions are medically necessary, that defendant

is at increased risk of rccontracting COVID-19, and that defendant should be released from

detention because confinement aggravates defendant's non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, id. at 2---3; ECF

No. 47-4 at 1- 2.

The government opposes the motion for reconsideration. ECF No. 49 . In its opposition,

foctual proffers in the hearing on this motion, and its supplemental brief and exhibits filed in

3
Notably, counsel chose to attach to the present motion the same March 24 "affidavit" from Dr. Rucker
included in the initial emergency motion for reconsideration. See ECF No. 47-4 . It is not clear that this
filing is indeed an affidavit because it does not sfate that it is under penalty ofpe1:jury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746.
In any event, the affidavit provides no information about defendant's risks of reinfection after recovery
from the disease. See id. Only after the government filed its opposition and a supplemen1al brief did
defendant provide an updated affidavit for Dr. Rucker. ECF No. 64-1. ll is not clear why this affidavit was
not submitted with the defendant's motion in the first instance. See i11fi·a n.7.

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 response to this Court's Order, ECF No. 50, the government has provided extensive information

about defendant's medical history and care while in custody. The Court has reviewed these

submissions in full, and it briefly summarizes the information here.

Defendant was diagnosed with COVlD-19 upon his arrival at the O.C. Jail, but he is no

longer exhibiting symptoms or testing positive. ECF No. 49 at 5. Unity Healthcare (the D.C.

Jail's contracted healthcare provider) disputed defendant's allegation that his lymphoma condition

is "rapidly deteriorating" and reported no significant change in defendant's examination since his

arrival at the D.C. Jail. Id at 5-6. Six days after his arrival, he was scheduled for an appointment

with an oncologist. ECF No. 60-3 at 4. Defendant's medical records show that in August 2020,

his treating oncologist at the Moffitt Cancer Center (i.e., not Dr. Rucker) recommended an

alternative chemotherapy regimen as a substitute for the drug rituximab (to which defendant had

an allergic reaction), as well as a repeat PET scan and bone-marrow biopsy. ECF No. 60-2 at 2;

ECF No. 60-3 at 58. Defendant declined this treatment plan, did not follow up with the oncologist,

and apparently did not see any oncologist between August 2020 and his arrest. See, e.g., ECF No.

60-3 at 58. In February 2021, he visited Dr. Rucker--a urologist who practices alternative

medicine for cancer patients-on a single occasion and received prescriptions for the two

medications that he seeks in his motion for reconsideration. id. While at the D.C. Jail, he has met

with multiple doctors in the chronic-care facility. Id. at 47-48. They determined that his requested

medications arc outside the standard of care, have questionable support in the scientific literature,

and that his condition would be best managed by an oncologist, not a urologist. Id. So they

declined to prescribe the defendant's requested medications. Id.

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 On May 19, 2021, defendant visited Dr. - Ali, an oncologist at Howard University

Hospital. ECF No. 60-4. 4 Dr. Ali reported with respect to defendant:

Cutaneous B cell lymphoma: ... He needs Dermatology evaluation
for a repeat skin Biopsy to assess the sample with molecular studies,
PET scan for interim staging. He will need to be treated given
symptoms-pruritis, [treatment] likely will be
Gazyva/Bcndamustine he will need bone biopsy and port placed. He
understood and agreed with the plan, followed by maintenance.
[History of] Head and neck ca, currently on remission, no sign or
symptoms suggestive ofrecurrence. RIC after skin Biopsy and PET
scan.

Id. at 5. The report also notes that defendant had "no lymphadenopathy" and "no skin lesions,"

although defendant had reported skin Jcsjons. Id at 3-4. This discrepancy is not addressed

explicitly in the report. Id. Dr. Ali did not prescribe defendant's requested medications. A follow-

up appointment was scheduled with the chronic-care clinic at the D.C. Jail, and the D.C. Jail

medical staff have received written referrals for the recommended procedures. See ECF No. 60-3

at 4.

The government also provided evidence disputing defendant's characterization of his

COVID-19 infection as severe and detailing defendant's treatment for, among other things,

COVID-19, a cyst he had on his back, and a broken hand. See, e.g., ECF No. 60-3 at 6-7, 17-18,

21,101, 104, 108-14.

Defendant replied to the government's supplement. ECF No. 64. In his reply, defendant

criticizes the government's characterization of Dr. Rucker and his medical care. ECF No. 64 at l.

4
Defense counsel asserts that the government failed to "even name the Howard oncologists, the
Government [employees], or Unity employees who apparently dispute Dr. Rucker's prescriptions." ECF
No. 64 at 3. That is false. Defendant's treating oncologist-Dr. - Ali-has his name appear in the
government's exhibits. S'ee ECF No. 60-4. (Defense counsel acknowledges Dr. Ali's identity on the next
page of the same filing.) The names of the two physicians at the chronic-care facility are also specifically
mentioned in the government's filings. ECF No. 60-3 at 48-49 (Doctors Mitchell and a=;:r::.a......,,..
Crenshaw).

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 He also argues that the government has been deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and has

violated his due process rights. See id. at 11.

On June 1, 2021, defendant then filed a "supplement" to his reply alleging that he suffered

a period of unconsciousness and fell to the floor on May 30, 2021. ECF No. 66 at 1. He states

that he was put on a stretcher and brought to the medical unit. Id. lie remembers being asked

questions, but cannot remember them or how he answered. Id. He now represents that he "has a

large hematoma from where he landed on his head." Id. And he states that "to the best of his

memory, he was given two over the counter painkillers and sent back to his cell," rather than taken

to the hospital. Id. He claims that D.C. Jail personnel did not examine him further or provide him

with a CT scan. Id. And he argues, in addition to his earlier criticisms of his medical care, that

this incident alone constitutes "deliberate indifference." Id

Defendant's motion is now ripe for consideration.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Pretrial Detention Under the Bail Reform Act

The Bail Reform Act, 18 lJ. S. C. § 3141 et seq., authorizes the detention of a defendant

awaiting trial on a federal offense only under certain, limited circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3 l 42(f).

First, the government may seek a defendant's pretrial detention if the charged offenses fall into

any of five enumerated categories. § 3 l 42(f)(I). Those categories include:

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 (A) a crime of violence,5 a violation of section 1591, or an offense
listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) 6 for which a maximum term of
imprisonment of IO years or more is prescribed,

(B) an offense for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment
or death,

(C) an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten
years o_r more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act ... the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act. , , or
[46 U.S.C. § 705],

(D) any felony if [the person charged] has been convicted of two or
more offenses described in[§§ 3142(f)(l)(A)~(C)] if a circumstance
giving rise to federal jurisdiction had existed, or a combination of
such offenses, or

(E) any felony that is not otherwise a crime of violence that involves
-a minor victim or that involves the possession or use of a firearm or
destructive device ... or any other dangerous weapon[.]

§ 3142(t)(l)(A)--(E).

Second, the government may also seek detcntion--0r the court sua sponte may hold a

detention hearing to determine whether pretrial detention is appropriate---whcn the case involves

"a serious risk" that the defendant will flee or "will attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure,

or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror."

~ 3142(t)(2).

If the Bail Reform Act authorizes pretrial detention, the judicial officer must hold a hearing

to determine whether there are conditions of release that would reasonably assure the appearance

~ The Bail Reform Act defines "crime of violence" as (A) "an offense that has as an clement of the offense
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,"
(R) "any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense," or (C) "any
felony under chapter 77, 109A, 110, or 117." 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4).
6
Section 2332b(g)(5)(B) lists offenses that become a "federal crime of terrorism" when the offense is
"calculalcd to i11Jluc111,;c or <1ffcet !lie conduct of government by i11timidatio11 or coercion, or to retaliate
against gove111111e11t conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B).

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of the defendant as required and the safety of any other person and the community. § 3142(:t). If

the judicial officer finds that "no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure

the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the communityi"

the judicial officer "shall order" the person detained pending trial. § 3142( e)(l) (emphasis added).

A finding that no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably assure the safety of

any other person and the community must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.

§ 3142(f). And a finding that no conditions would reasonably assure the defendant's appearance

as required must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Xulam,

84 F.3d 441, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Under some circumstances that are not present here, the Bail Reform Act may establish a

rebuttable presumption of detention. See § 3142(e). But where, as here, the presumption is not

implicated, the court instead must consider the following factors to determine whether there are

conditions that would reasonably assure the defendant's appearance and the public's safety:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including
whether the offense is a crime of violence, a violation of Section
1591, a Federal crime of terrorism, or involves a minor victim or a
controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destructive device

(2) the weight of the evidence against the person

(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including-

(A) the person's characteri physicaJ and mental condition,
family 1ies, employment, financial resources, length of
residence in the community, community tics, past conduct,
history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history,
and record concerning appearance at court proceedings

(B) whether, at the time of the current offense of arrest, the
person was on probation, on parole, or on other release
pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence
for an offense under Federal, state, or local law; and

14
 (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the
community that would be posed by the person's release.

§ 3142(g).

B. Reopening a Detention Hearing Under Section 3142(t)(2)

Important here, § 3142(f)(2) provides that a hearing "may be reopened, before or after a

determination by the judicial officer, at any time before trial if the judicial officer finds that

infomiation exists that was not known to the movant at the time of the hearing and that has a

material bearing on the issue whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure

the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other person and the community."

§ 3142(f)(2). The statute does not define the term "material bearing," so the Court looks to the

ordinary meaning of those words. Here, there may be some surface ambiguity about the phrase's

precise connotation. One possible view is that it refers to information that merely relates in some

way to a detention determination. But another view is that it refers specifically to information that,

if true, would affect the validity or propriety of detention itself. See Material, 131uck~__l_,FtW

I)ictionnr , (10th ed. 2014) (listing definitions for "material" as either "having some logical

connection with the consequential facts" or, alternatively, "of such a nature that knowledge of the

item would affect a person's decision-making; significant, essential"). If the phrase means the

former, then defendants may reopen detention hearings by introducing new information merely

with some sort of connection to their detention. But if it means the latter, the defendant must

introduce new information that's not only logically connected to dctcntio:n, but that might also

significantly affect the decision whether to detain the defendant.

The problem with the former, "mere logical connection" view is that it necessarily treats

some of the statutory language as surplusage. Cf Qi-Zhuo v. Meissner, 70 P.3d 136, 139 (D.C.

Cir. 1995) ("[A]ll words in a statute are to be assigned meaning[.]"). If Congress wanted to convey

15
 that defendants could reopen detention hearings with information merely related or connected to

detention, it could have simply used the word "bearing," since "bearing" already connotes a

connection or relationship. See Webster's New International Dictionary 192 (3d ed. 1965)

(likening the term "bearing" to a "relation" or "connection"). Instead, Congress went further. It

stipulated that the new information must have not only a "bearing" on-that is, a logical connection

to-detention, but that it must have a "material bearing" on detention. § 3142(f). So "material"

here must mean something more than a mere "logical connection," since "bearing" already

conveys precisely the same semantic content. In other words, it must refer to materiality in its

second sense-the sort of information essential to, or capable of significantly affecting, the

detention decision. Only this latter reading gives full effect to both words in the term "material

bearing." Thus, in addition to "bearing" on-having a logical relation to-