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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-14756
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:19-cr-60131-FAM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GIOVANNI ALMEYDA LONERGAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(June 10, 2021)
Before MARTIN, BRANCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Appellant Giovanni Almeyda Lonergan, a pro se federal prisoner, appeals
the district court’s denial of his motion for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by Section 603(b) of the First Step Act of 2018.1 On
appeal, he argues that the district court failed to address his arguments for
compassionate release, including that COVID-19 posed a special risk to
incarcerated individuals in general and to him specifically because of his asthma
and obesity medical conditions. He contends that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)
does not restrict a district court’s consideration of extraordinary and compelling
reasons to only those identified by the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). He argues that the district court needed to provide
specific factual reasons for its decision to deny him relief, including consideration
of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and whether he is a danger to others under 18
U.S.C. § 3142(g). He asserts that because of his potential release plan of living
with a family member to ensure his compliance with the law, his good behavior
while incarcerated, and the extra layer of accountability that registering as a sex
offender upon his release would provide, the § 3553(a) factors favor a sentence
reduction.
I.
1
Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (Dec. 21, 2018) (“First Step Act”).
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In May 2019, a federal grand jury charged Lonergan with one count of
transporting child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) and (b)(1),
and one count of possessing child pornography involving a minor younger than 12,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2). Lonergan pled guilty to one
count of possessing child pornography involving a minor younger than 12, and the
parties agreed to jointly recommend a sentence of four years’ imprisonment. The
district court sentenced Lonergan to 48 months’ incarceration to be followed by 15
years’ supervised release. As a special condition of supervised release, the district
court ordered Lonergan to register as a sex offender. Lonergan did not appeal his
conviction or sentence.
In July 2020, Lonergan filed a counseled motion for compassionate release
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He sought the immediate release from prison to
serve the remainder of his sentence in home detention. He contended that his
health profile matched those individuals who were commonly identified as being
most at risk of suffering severe health consequences from contraction of COVID-
19. He specifically noted that he suffered from asthma, costochondritis and
irritable bowel syndrome, and that he was obese. He also noted that he had been a
model prisoner, his offense was non-violent, he complied with all conditions of his
release while on bond, and he would be serving home confinement in his sister’s
home.
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Before the government responded, the district court denied Lonergan’s
motion for compassionate release, stating in part that the court had been fully
advised “in the premises” and it denied the motion because Lonergan had not
shown sufficient extraordinary circumstances to avoid the sentence of incarceration
for child pornography. (R. Doc. 50). Lonergan, pro se, sought reconsideration of
the district court’s denial of his request for compassionate release. The district
court denied the motion, and Lonergan perfected this appeal.
II.
We review a district court’s order denying a prisoner’s § 3582(c)(1)(A)
motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th
Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal
standard, follows improper procedures in making the determination, or makes
findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). A
district court also abuses its discretion when it fails to consider the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors when deciding a motion under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
United States v. Cook, ___ F.3d ___, ___, No. 20-13293 (11th Cir. May 27, 2021).
The abuse of discretion standard is not “simply a rubber stamp,” as a district court
“must explain its sentencing decisions adequately enough to allow for meaningful
appellate review.” United States v. Johnson, 877 F.3d 993, 997 (11th Cir. 2017)
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(quotation marks omitted). When the record does not allow for meaningful review,
we vacate the order and remand to the district court. Id. at 998.
III.
District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a term of imprisonment
but may do so to the extent permitted under § 3582(c)’s provisions. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c); United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11th Cir. 2020). Prior to
the enactment of the First Step Act in December 2018, § 3582(c)(1)(A) allowed a
district court to reduce a prisoner’s term of imprisonment only upon motion of the
BOP Director. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (effective Nov. 2, 2002, to Dec.
20, 2018). As amended by § 603(b) of the First Step Act, that section now
provides, in relevant part, that:
the court, upon motion of the Director of the [BOP], or upon motion
of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion
on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of
such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is
earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . , after considering
the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable, if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons
warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). We recently determined that the exhaustion
requirement applicable to a prisoner who wishes to file a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion
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on his own behalf is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule that may be
forfeited by the government. Harris, 989 F.3d at 911.
The policy statement applicable to § 3582(c)(1)(A) is found in U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Although § 1B.1.13 still provides that only the
BOP Director may file an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion and does not discuss
the exhaustion of administrative remedies, it otherwise tracks the language of the
statute. See id. However, in addition to determining that extraordinary and
compelling reasons warrant a reduction, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 states that the district
court must also determine that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of others
or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), and that the reduction is
consistent with the policy statement. Id.
As relevant here, the commentary lists a defendant’s medical condition and
age as possible “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting a sentence
reduction. Id. § 1B1.13, comment. (n.1). A defendant’s medical condition may
warrant a sentence reduction if he (1) has a terminal disease or (2) is suffering from
a physical or mental condition that diminishes his ability to provide self-care in
prison and from which he is not expected to recover. Id., comment. (n.1(A)). The
commentary also contains a catch-all provision for “other reasons,” which provides
that a prisoner may be eligible for a sentence reduction if, “[a]s determined by the
Director of the [BOP], there exists in the defendant’s case an extraordinary and
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compelling reason other than, or in combination with,” the other specific examples
listed. Id., comment. (n.1(D)).
We recently held that an order granting or denying compassionate release
under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) must indicate that the district court has considered “all
applicable § 3553(a) factors,” in addition to whether the movant has offered
extraordinary and compelling reasons and whether a reduction or release would be
consistent with the policy statement found in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Cook, ___ F.3d
at ___. While a district court does not need to exhaustively analyze each § 3553(a)
factor or articulate its findings meticulously, “it must provide enough analysis that
meaningful appellate review of the factors’ application can take place.” Id. at ___
(quotation marks omitted). We will not consider the § 3553(a) factors in the first
instance, and absent the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, we
cannot engage in meaningful appellate review. Id. at ___.
In Cook, the movant argued that (1) COVID-19 posed a uniquely high risk
to the incarcerated population; (2) his obesity, high blood pressure, and latent
tuberculosis placed him at a high risk of death or serious illness from a coronavirus
infection; (3) he was serving a disproportionately long sentence in light of
intervening court decisions that would render him no longer a career offender; and
(4) the § 3553(a) factors favored his release. Id. at ___. The district court denied
the motion before the government filed a response, as in the case here. We
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concluded that the district court’s order included “nothing to suggest [that] the
court considered, balanced, or weighed” any of the movant’s arguments or
considered the applicable § 3553(a) factors, noting that the order did not even
mention the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at ___. We rejected the government’s
argument that the district court’s statement of being “fully advised in the premises”
was sufficient to enable appellate review because “[t]his boilerplate . . . provide[d]
no insight into the district court’s reasoning.” Id. at ___. We also rejected the
government’s argument that we could affirm on any ground supported by the
record, regardless of whether the district court relied upon it, because the decision
to grant or deny compassionate release requires district courts to weigh various
considerations in the first instance, and we are careful to avoid exceeding our
limited role in reviewing sentencing decisions. Id. at ___.
IV.
As an initial matter, Lonergan’s NOA identifies the district court’s order
denying his reconsideration motion as the order being appealed, but Lonergan’s
arguments in his brief concern the district court’s denial of his underlying
compassionate release motion. However, the NOA as to the order denying him
compassionate release is untimely. Nevertheless, Rule 4(b) is not jurisdictional,
and the government has abandoned the issue of timeliness on appeal by failing to
brief it. Further, considering the liberal NOA requirements under Rule 3 and the
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fact that Lonergan is pro se, Lonergan’s failure to specify the order denying him
compassionate release in his NOA does not deprive us of jurisdiction, as
Lonergan’s brief demonstrates a clear intent to effectively appeal the denial of his
compassionate release request, and the government is not prejudiced, as it briefed
the issues relevant to compassionate release on appeal. See Nichols v. Alabama
State Bar, 815 F.3d 726, 730 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted) (An
appeal will not be lost “if a mistake is made in designating the judgment appealed
from where it is clear that the overriding intent was effectively to appeal,” and we
will “not narrowly read the [NOA] where the defect in the [NOA] did not mislead
or prejudice the respondent.”).2
Here, as in Cook, we cannot engage in meaningful appellate review because
the record does not reflect that the district court adequately explained its decision
in light of the applicable § 3553(a) factors. The district court’s statement regarding
the proximity between Lonergan’s incarceration and his motion provides no insight
into which § 3553(a) factors, if any, it considered when denying the motion, or
how any § 3553(a) factors weighed against Lonergan’s arguments. As in Cook, the
district court’s order summarily denied Lonergan’s motion without indicating that
2
In addition, we note that to the extent that Lonergan argues that district courts are not
limited by § 1B1.13’s policy statement when granting § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions, our recent
decision in United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2021). Moreover, Lonergan has
abandoned any challenge to the district court’s order denying his reconsideration motion by
addressing this issue for the first time in his reply brief.
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it had considered his medical conditions or his risk for severe illness from
COVID-19, or that it had even weighed these arguments against the § 3553(a)
factors. Contrary to the government’s contentions, we cannot affirm on the basis
that the record reflects that the § 3553(a) factors weigh against release, as we will
not consider these factors in the first instance. Accordingly, for the
aforementioned reasons, we vacate the district court’s order and remand this case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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