STATE OF MISSOURI, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. SD36684
)
MATTHEW AARON JACKSON, ) Filed: June 10, 2021
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BARRY COUNTY
Honorable Jack A. L. Goodman, Circuit Judge
Before Rahmeyer, P.J., Bates, J., and Francis, Jr., J.
AFFIRMED
PER CURIAM. Matthew Aaron Jackson (“Appellant”) appeals his conviction for
first-degree murder and armed criminal action. In one point, Appellant contends that the
State failed in its burden to prove the lack of self-defense. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
There is no dispute that Appellant killed Steven Chupp (“Victim”) with a knife in
the backyard of a mutual friend. The issue is whether the State proved a lack of self-
defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority of facts leading to Victim’s death are
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not disputed. Appellant was assisting the mutual friend get her house ready for an
appraisal. When Appellant saw Victim drive by he retreated to the backyard with a
pocket knife in the locked position. Victim knocked on the homeowner’s door, came into
her house, and asked questions about Appellant. The homeowner stated that Victim
seemed very angry and jealous and appeared to have been drinking. Victim asked if the
homeowner had heard that Appellant was with Victim’s girlfriend while Victim was out
of town. The homeowner responded that she thought Appellant and the girlfriend were
just friends and that Appellant “was driving her vehicle because he didn’t have wheels.”
Victim responded that “he was going to get him” and went around the side of the house to
the back. The mutual friend heard shouting from the backyard. Thus, the evidence
clearly indicated that Victim was the initial aggressor.
Once a defendant has injected the issue of self-defense into the case, the burden
shifts to the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of self-defense. State
v. Henderson, 311 S.W.3d 411, 413 (Mo.App. W.D. 2010). “A person is entitled to
acquittal as a matter of law on the basis of self-defense only if there is undisputed and
uncontradicted evidence clearly establishing self-defense.” State v. Dulaney, 989 S.W.2d
648, 651 (Mo.App. W.D. 1999). “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this
Court’s review is limited to whether the State has introduced sufficient evidence for any
reasonable juror to have been convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Bateman, 318 S.W.3d 681, 686-87 (Mo. banc 2010) (internal quotations and citation
omitted). This Court does not act as a super juror with veto powers, but gives great
deference to the trier of fact. Id. at 687. On review, this Court accepts as true all of the
evidence favorable to the State, including all favorable inferences drawn from the
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evidence, and disregards all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Id.
With this standard of review in mind, we must reject the testimony contrary to the
verdict given by Appellant as to the events leading up to the stabbing of Victim. That
includes everything that occurred in the backyard between Appellant and Victim.
Appellant does not and did not at the time of the incident deny that he was the one who
used the knife against Victim. He was cooperative with the police, told them where the
knife was, and admitted to stabbing Victim. From the beginning of his interview,
Appellant claimed to have been attacked and claimed self-defense. Appellant did not run
from the scene to evade responsibility. He hid in the woods until law enforcement and
first responders appeared. He openly admitted to using the knife and immediately
explained that he had been attacked. Appellant also exhibited wounds on his face. His
own wounds and the actions of Victim further support Appellant’s self-defense claim.
Because the burden shifted to the State and Appellant challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence on his claim of self-defense, we look to the evidence which the State
claims is sufficient evidence supporting the finding that Appellant did not act in self-
defense. Specifically, the State relies upon the testimony of Jonathon Brannan, someone
who was in jail at the same time as Appellant. Brannan testified:
Q. Did he at any point mention, he being [Appellant], . . . mention that
he had a prior confrontation with [Victim]?
A. Yes. [Appellant] stated that there was a physical altercation
between him and [Victim] that resulted in [Appellant] having his jaw
broken.[ 1]
....
A. [The incident at issue] was at a mutual acquaintance’s home. I
guess a friend that they had both shared. That [Appellant] shared along
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Appellant sought medical treatment after this prior altercation and an x-ray showed that he had trauma to
the back of his head but that his jaw was not broken.
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with [Victim].
Q. When he was discussing the matter of this mutual acquaintance’s
home, how would you describe his demeanor? How was his persona to
you - presented to you?
A. Um, he was always cautious, but almost callous, almost kind of
hardened.
Q. Did he make any statements as to how he felt about the event after
the event?
....
A. On one occasion [Appellant] stated that, um, he was glad that
[Victim] was deceased. That even his parents thought that he was a piece
of shit, excuse my language. Um, that the world was a better place without
him. He made a comment that his only regret about [Victim] dying was
that his little boy would grow up without a father. I took that - I assumed
that [Victim] had a son.
He made a statement that the best thing that was going to come out
of this was that he lived in Arkansas and after he was acquitted on self-
defense that he could go to Arkansas and get a medical marijuana card and
he stated that was the best thing to come out of this is because he could
claim post-traumatic stress and receive a medical marijuana card.
Clearly, many of these statements by Brannan have nothing to do with whether
Appellant acted in self-defense at the time of the incident. Appellant had been a friend of
Victim; he had been assaulted by Victim about a month prior to this incident, causing
Appellant to suffer serious injuries to his jaw. Specifically, Appellant’s statement that he
was glad that Victim was deceased and that the only regret he had was that Victim’s son
would grow up without a father do not support an inference that Appellant did not act in
self-defense. They only reflect his feelings toward Victim after the incident. Brannan’s
additional statements that Appellant was cautious, almost callous, and hardened are not
statements concerning an act of self-defense. Likewise, Appellant’s disparagement of
Victim that the world was a better place without him and that even Victim’s parents
recognized his worthlessness are not in any way related to Appellant’s claim of self-
defense. Even if these above statements after the fact as provided by Brannan are
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assumed to be true, they do not provide sufficient evidence that Appellant did not act in
self-defense at the time of the offense.
Additionally, there was evidence that Victim suffered wounds on his right hand
and arm that could be called “defensive wounds,” meaning injuries to the extremities
caused during a stabbing. It was clear that Appellant was injured in the face, ear and
forearm, suggesting that a fight had indeed occurred. 2 These facts alone do not provide
sufficient evidence that Appellant was not acting in self-defense; however, the jury could
have inferred that Appellant at some point was the aggressor in the fight.
The evidence and inferences that provide sufficient evidence includes the
following additional testimony by Brannan:
Q. Did [Appellant] at some point tell you what had happened, what he
had done to [Victim]?
A. That they were at this mutual acquaintance’s home and that
[Appellant] was alerted that [Victim] may be on his way or had come over
later that evening and he made a statement that if he did he knew he would
kill [Victim] that night.
Q. Did he say in what manner he was going to do that?
A. No, he did not. Not at that time. Later on he disclosed that when
[Victim] did show up I don’t know I guess a verbal altercation had
occurred. [Appellant] left the house when he did he had a Gerber locked-
blade knife on him. He opened the knife and put it in a locked position and
stuck it in his back pocket and left the house.
He told me that when [Victim] came out afterwards he turned
around and stabbed [Victim]. He said he couldn’t recall if it was three or
four times. He said he remembered stabbing him two or three times in the
upper abdomen and once in the side. And then he said that he, um,
dropped the knife and made a bee-line for like the brush or tree line and
stayed in there until first responders showed up which he said was quite a
lengthy time.
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The State argued at trial that the fact there was more blood on Appellant’s pants than his sweatshirt
showed Appellant was standing over Victim when he was stabbed. Although a responding officer testified
there was “more . . . blood on the pants th[a]n there was on the sweatshirt,” there was no expert testimony
regarding the significance of the blood splatters or patterns. In fact, Victim’s clothes were thrown in the
garbage. Appellant was booked in the jail hours after the incident. It is certainly a reasonable assumption
that the blood on his clothes continued to spread downward and not upward. There was no testimony how
Appellant’s clothes had been gathered after the incident. No reasonable inference can be taken from the
blood on the clothing.
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The statement that once Appellant knew Victim “may be on his way or had come over
later” could support an inference that Appellant planned to kill Victim if he showed up at
the friend’s house. Likewise, that Appellant “turned around and stabbed” Victim in
isolation may indicate the lack of self-defense.
Although this evidence is slight to support a lack of self-defense we are
constrained to conclude that the evidence and the inferences from the evidence provide
sufficient evidence supporting a lack of self-defense. We draw this conclusion partly
based on the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d 390 (Mo. banc
2014). Although the holding in the case was whether a lesser included offense instruction
should have been given, the case has been cited for the proposition that:
No matter how strong, airtight, inescapable, or even absolutely certain the
evidence and inferences in support of the differential element may seem to
judges and lawyers, no evidence ever proves an element of a criminal case
until all 12 jurors believe it, and no inference ever is drawn in a criminal
case until all 12 jurors draw it.
....
The question of whether the evidence is sufficient (i.e., whether a jury may
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt) is a proper question for trial and
appellate courts, but the question of what the jury must find has no place
in a criminal trial or appeal.
Id. at 399-400, 404 (emphasis in original).
This case was properly submitted to the jury with a self-defense instruction. The
jury chose to disregard the evidence adduced by Appellant that he acted in self-defense.
The jury chose to accept the evidence presented by the State. We question, after Jackson,
whether this Court has the authority to grant a judgment of acquittal based on the failure
of the State to provide sufficient evidence of the lack of self-defense after the jury renders
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a verdict. If we do have that authority, we must now hold that the evidence at trial met
the bare requirements of presenting sufficient evidence to support a lack of self-defense.
In other words the jury, and the jury alone, decided that the State had proven that
Appellant had not acted in self-defense.
The judgment is affirmed.
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