NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 22 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-50301
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:18-cr-01805-BAS-1
v.
ISAIAH SMALLWOOD JACKSON, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Cynthia A. Bashant, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 8, 2021
Pasadena, California
Before: GRABER, CALLAHAN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
At 9:00 p.m. on September 21, 2017, officers knocked on the door to Isaiah
Smallwood Jackson’s home and when, in response, he stepped out of his home,
they arrested him. The officers had probable cause to believe that Jackson had
sexually exploited a minor. Jackson was subsequently convicted of sexual
exploitation of a minor. On appeal, he argues that his confession and evidence
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
from his cell phone should have been suppressed and that the government failed to
prove the interstate commerce element of the charge. We affirm.
“We review de novo the district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress and
review the underlying factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Evans, 786
F.3d 779, 784 (9th Cir. 2015). Jackson is correct that, pursuant to United States v.
Lundin, 817 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2016), the officers were not authorized to knock
on his door without a warrant with the intent to arrest him. However, the Supreme
Court has held that “where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the
exclusionary rule does not bar the [the government’s] use of a statement made by
the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an
arrest made in the home in violation of [Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980)].” New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 21 (1990); see also Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (holding that a violation of the knock-and-
announce rule does not necessarily require the suppression of all evidence found in
the search). On appeal, Jackson does not contest that at the police station he
waived his Miranda rights and admitted that he met the victim and engaged in a
sexual act.
Even where the government has not raised harmlessness we may consider
whether an error is harmless. United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093,
1100-01 (9th Cir. 2005). We held “that sua sponte recognition of an error’s
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harmlessness is appropriate only where the harmlessness of the error is not
reasonably debatable.” Id. at 1101.
Here, excluding the evidence from the search of Jackson’s cell phone, there
remained overwhelming evidence of Jackson’s guilt. The jury heard the victim’s
testimony, evidence from the victim’s cell phone, testimony from the officers
involved in the case, and Jackson’s confession. The victim testified to the acts for
which Jackson was convicted, and Jackson admitted those acts. Both the victim
and Jackson stated that, before the assault, they had communicated only by cell
phone, using an Internet app. Thus, it is beyond debate that the admission of
materials from Jackson’s cell phone was harmless error.
Jackson’s challenges to the evidence and jury instructions concerning the
interstate commerce element of the charges are not persuasive, as we have held
that the Internet is an instrument of, and intimately related to, interstate commerce.
United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 952–53 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Costanzo, 956 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 931 (2020).
AFFIRMED.
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