NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 24 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ORLANDO EDUVIGES PEREZ- No. 15-71446
AVALOS,
Agency No. A087-990-884
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 22, 2021**
Before: GRABER, FRIEDLAND, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Orlando Eduviges Perez-Avalos, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his
appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”).
Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo
questions of law, Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008), except
to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing
statutes and regulations, Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004).
We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Zehatye v.
Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006). We dismiss in part and deny in
part the petition for review.
Although Perez-Avalos argues that he demonstrated changed circumstances
sufficient to excuse his untimely asylum application, we lack jurisdiction to review
this challenge to the agency’s denial of Perez-Avalos’s asylum claim because he
did not exhaust it before the BIA. Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th
Cir. 2004).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Perez-Avalos
failed to establish past persecution, and the BIA explicitly considered the
cumulative effect of Perez-Avalos’s experiences in making this determination. See
Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Persecution . . . is an
extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as
offensive.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Lim v. INS,
2 15-71446
224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the threats to petitioner did not
inflict sufficient suffering or harm to compel a finding of past persecution).
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of withholding of
removal because Perez-Avalos failed to demonstrate a clear probability of
persecution based on a protected ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007,
1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An [applicant’s] desire to be free from harassment by
criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus
to a protected ground.”). Thus, Perez-Avalos’s withholding of removal claim fails.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT protection
because Perez-Avalos failed to show it is more likely than not he will be tortured
by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Guatemala.
Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009).
We reject Perez-Avalos’s contentions that the agency applied incorrect legal
standards in the analysis of his claims and applied an incorrect definition of torture.
I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413 (1984); Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194-
96 (9th Cir. 2003).
Finally, the record does not support Perez-Avalos’s assertion that the agency
failed to consider relevant country-conditions evidence or otherwise failed to
review and consider the evidence presented. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Caraveo v.
3 15-71446
Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 2018) (“There is no indication that the IJ or
BIA did not consider all the evidence before them.”).
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the
mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.
4 15-71446