State v. Newman

[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

COURT OF APPEALS
FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
:
: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. John W. Wise, J.
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vs- :
: Case No. 20-CA-44
:
ARTHUR NEWMAN :
:
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Fairfield County Court
of Common Pleas, Case No.
2018CR532

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 24, 2021

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:

R. KYLE WITT JAMES A. ANZELMO
FAIRFIELD CO. PROSECUTOR 446 Holland Drive
DARCY T. COOK Gahanna, OH 43230
239 West Main St., Suite 101
Lancaster, OH 43130
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

Delaney, J.

{¶1} Appellant Arthur Newman appeals from the February 25, 2020 Judgment

Entry of Sentence of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is the state

of Ohio.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} The following evidence is adduced from the record of appellant’s jury trial.

{¶3} Appellant owned and operated a licensed truck repair shop in Fairfield

County known as “Newman’s Auto & Performance, LLC” and/or “Newman Auto

Transport, LLC.” Appellee asserted that appellant took in trucks for repair, switched out

parts to different customers’ trucks, and sold trucks he had no authority to sell.

{¶4} An investigator from the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) testified that

appellant has never been a licensed car dealer or a licensed vehicle salesperson, but

under Ohio law, he must be licensed if he sells more than 5 vehicles in 12 months, or

sells vehicles he does not personally own. Appellant claimed to sell “hundreds” of

vehicles per month, but admitted he knew he needed a dealer’s license and that he was

not a licensed vehicle salesperson.

{¶5} The ownership history of vehicles in Ohio is tracked through title registration

and run by the vehicle identification number (VIN). A new title is required every time a

new owner acquires a vehicle, even if the new owner is a dealer. If a vehicle is sold and

the title is not transferred within 30 days, penalties accrue; a lag in the transfer of title is

a red flag for fraud.

{¶6} Title registration is also key to obtaining permanent license plates for a

vehicle. A person must register title to obtain permanent plates, but the BMV will issue
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

temporary tags to a third party with a notarized Bill of Sale and Power of Attorney. The

BMV stamps Bills of Sale when temporary tags are issued. In the instant case, multiple

Bills of Sale seized from appellant’s residence bore the BMV stamp, indicating they had

been presented to the BMV.

{¶7} One of appellant’s former employees testified about his business practices.

Although spouses are not allowed to notarize documents that benefit each other,

appellant’s wife regularly notarized documents for appellant and appellee admitted into

evidence multiple documents notarized under appellant’s wife’s maiden name. Appellant

acknowledged his wife handled all of the paperwork for his various business entities.

Appellee alleged the wife’s employment at a car dealership gave appellant the necessary

knowledge to fraudulently process title paperwork.

{¶8} Appellant’s business practices began to catch up with him in 2018 when he

was increasingly unable or unwilling to produce trucks he allegedly sold and repaired.

Appellant wrote bad checks and offered excuses in ensuing investigations without

covering the checks. Appellant owed customers money and they couldn’t get their trucks

back. Appellant became embroiled in a civil suit; his assets were seized, his shop was

closed, and his assets were auctioned off. The inability to access his shop, including the

trucks and parts inside of it, was key to appellant’s excuses to dissatisfied buyers and

repair customers.

{¶9} At trial, a litany of appellant’s dissatisfied customers testified against him.

{¶10} On May 15, 2015, Jacob Hillyer gave appellant $28,000 to purchase a 2015

Ford F450. Hillyer received a temporary tag with the vehicle which expired in 45 days,

but by the time of expiration appellant had not delivered the title to the vehicle. Appellant
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

told Hillyer he had to pick up the truck for an “out-of-state inspection;” appellant then told

Hillyer there was a problem with the truck and offered to fix it. Appellant never returned

the truck; the truck was later recovered in Pickaway County by law enforcement; and

Hillyer had to pay an insurance company $6500 for the truck title. Appellant ultimately

failed to provide the truck title to Hillyer and, based upon the BMV records of ownership,

he lied repeatedly to Hillyer about the status of the truck title.

{¶11} Steve Gorby believed appellant’s shop was a truck repair shop that also

sold trucks. On May 23, 2018, Gorby paid appellant a deposit of $5000 for a 2014 Ford

F350. On May 25, 2018, Gorby completed paperwork and appellant gave him a 30-day

temporary tag, but did not turn over the title. Gorby gave appellant $20,000 and took the

truck home. Gorby dropped off the truck to appellant on July 22, 2018; appellant did not

return Gorby’s $25,000, nor did he provide Gorby with the vehicle title.

{¶12} On August 31, 2018, Newman Auto & Performance ordered $539.17 worth

of parts from Bob-Boyd Ford and paid by check. Bob-Boyd Ford deposited the check on

August 2, 2018, and it bounced. Despite appellant’s promises to cover the check, he

failed to do so and was served with notice of dishonor on September 13, 2018. Appellant

did not return the parts and did not pay the outstanding $539.17.

{¶13} In February 2016, Keith Laughlin took a 2008 Ford F350 to appellant to

rebuild the engine for $12,500, which Laughlin paid in cash installments. Laughlin picked

up the truck on May 19, 2016; on June 1, 2016, the truck broke down. Appellant told him

the parts were covered by warranty but not the labor. Laughlin brought the truck in to

appellant for repair, which cost an additional $3100. On July 17, Laughlin learned

appellant tried to buy the truck “out from under him” from the bank. Eventually the truck
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

was returned to Laughlin--missing its engine, keys, and other significant parts. Appellant

did not return any of Laughlin’s money.

{¶14} On June 20, 2016, appellant sold a Ford F350 to Weston McAfee for

$21,000. In July 2016, the truck “blew up” and McAfee had it towed to appellant’s shop.

Appellant quoted $6500 for parts and told McAfee the truck would take two to three weeks

to repair. McAfee paid appellant in July 2016 but the truck was not returned until a court

ordered appellant to return it on December 18, 2018. The repairs had not been completed;

the engine was missing, the cab wasn’t bolted down, and the dash was removed.

Appellant did not return any of McAfee’s money.

{¶15} In late June 2018, Matthew Ratliff took a 2006 Chevy truck to appellant for

repairs, which appellant said would take approximately one week and cost $5000. Ratliff

paid $2500 up front and was supposed to pay $2500 upon completion. In August 2018,

appellant told Ratliff to take the truck to a residence because appellant’s shop had been

seized. Ratliff never saw the truck again. Law enforcement eventually recovered the

truck at appellant’s residence. Appellant had the truck since June 2018.

{¶16} Appellant and his wife knew the truck was hidden in their barn. Appellant

took $4500 from Ratliff for repairs which were never completed. Appellant testified Ratliff

could have picked up the truck any time he wanted to; Ratliff testified he drove by the

property repeatedly looking for the truck and asked appellant to return the truck, to no

avail.

{¶17} Appellant and Nathan Otto of KN Excavation LLC agreed appellant would

sell KN’s truck for at least $15,000. Anything appellant made on the sale over $15,000

was his to keep. Appellant sold the truck on April 27, 2018. Appellant didn’t tell Otto the
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

truck was sold until June 2018. Appellant attempted to reimburse KN with the $15,000

from the sale of the truck with a postdated check. Appellee introduced appellant’s bank

records to establish that he knew the account did not have sufficient funds to cover the

check. The check bounced.

{¶18} KN Excavating reported the bad check to the Fairfield County Sheriff’s

Department and the matter was investigated by Detective Nicolia. Appellant offered a

number of excuses over several conversations but did not pay the $15,000.

{¶19} Bretton Lambert purchased the KN Excavation truck from appellant in April.

Appellant did not give Lambert the title until late June.

{¶20} Jeffrey Schwender took a 2005 Dodge Ram to appellant for repairs in

August 2018. Schwender paid appellant $5000 cash, including $4000 for parts. Appellant

said the repairs would be completed in a few weeks, but Schwender never saw the truck

again. It was eventually recovered by law enforcement.

{¶21} An employee of Auto Palace testified they lost a dealer plate at some point

and reported the missing plate to the BMV. The plate eventually showed up on appellant’s

wife’s Tahoe, and appellee presented evidence of a jail phone call between appellant and

his wife in which he instructed her to put the dealer plate on her own vehicle.

{¶22} Appellant testified on his own behalf at trial and argued he had no criminal

intent; he was merely a poor record-keeper and businessman. He acknowledged,

however, that he sold vehicles without a license, used dealer tags he was not authorized

to use, and possessed multiple Bills of Sale for the same vehicles.

{¶23} Appellant testified that he worked with someone named Max Curry, an auto

dealer with access to auto auctions. Appellant claimed he would pay Curry an agreed-
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

upon amount for vehicles purchased at auction; Curry’s dealership would obtain title to

the vehicles; and title would then transfer to the buyers of the vehicles. Appellant claimed

he didn’t know a license was required to sell vehicles; he believed he was authorized to

do so via Curry. Appellant also testified, however, that 75 percent of his time was spent

on auto repair and 25 percent of his time was spent on auto sales. The volume of

appellant’s auto sales, by his admission, was fifty to sixty vehicles per week which he

bought at auction and then sold.

{¶24} Appellant acknowledged a bad check was written to Bob Boyd on

Newman’s Auto & Performance LLC account, but it was signed by his wife. He

acknowledged the amount was owed, but disclaimed responsibility for it.

{¶25} Appellant also conceded the check to KN Excavation for $15,000 bounced,

but it was KN Excavation’s fault because he postdated the check and told them to hold

onto it. He thought the check would eventually be covered by deposits he made, but

those deposits were reversed. Rather than make the check good, or pay the $15,000 in

some other fashion, appellant texted KN Excavation repeatedly with excuses.

{¶26} Regarding the title charges, appellant testified titles were not transferred in

a timely manner and sometimes were not transferred at all, but that was due to his

agreement with River’s Edge which, he believed, gave him authority to sell vehicles.

{¶27} Regarding the theft charges, appellant conceded there were “timeliness”

issues and his customers were dissatisfied. However, he claimed to have no criminal

intent and therefore the missing vehicles, parts, and cash were chalked up to “breach of

contract” because a civil judgment against him closed his business and prevented him

from completing those jobs.
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

Indictment, trial, and verdicts

{¶28} Appellant was charged by superseding indictment as follows, with counts

grouped by victim and transaction:

COUNT OFFENSE VICTIM DATES/CONDUCT VERDICT SENTENCE
1 Engaging in a N/A Not guilty
pattern of
corrupt activity,
R.C.
2923.32(A)(1)
2 Grand theft of a Jacob May 15, 2018 to Not guilty
motor vehicle, Hillyer August 24, 2018,
R.C. obtained/exerted
2913.02(B)(5) control over 2011
Ford F450
3 Improper use of May 15, 2018 to Guilty 2 years
certificate of February 14,
title, 2019: failed to
R.C. deliver certificate
4505.19(A)(2) of title
and (B)
4 Grand theft of a Steve May 25, 2018 to Not guilty
motor vehicle, Gorby November 19,
R.C. 2019,
2913.02(A)(2) obtained/exerted
control over 2014
F350
5 Improper use May 25, 2018 to Guilty 2 years
of certificate of August 25, 2018:
title, failed to deliver
R.C. certificate of title
4505.19(A)(2)
and (B)
6 Passing bad Bob Boyd July October 1, Guilty Merges with
checks, R.C. 2018, issued bad Count 7
2913.11(B) and “starter check” in
(F) amount of
$539.17
7 Petty theft, R.C. Bob Boyd July 31, 2018 to Guilty of 1st 120 days in
2913.02(A)(1) November 19, degree jail
2019: misdemeanor
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

obtained/exerted
control over $539
8 Grand theft of a Rex February 1, 2018 Dismissed by
motor vehicle, Hilliard to July 23, 2018: appellee
R.C. obtained/exerted
2913.02(A)(2), control over Ford
2913.02(B)(5) F250
9 Theft, R.C. Rex February 1, 2018 Dismissed by
2913.02(A)(1), Hilliard to November 19, appellee
2913.02(B)(2) 2019,
obtained/exerted
control over
$1500 value in
“tires and
kickplate”
10 Improper use February 1, 2018 Dismissed by
of certificate of to June 4, 2018: appellee
title, R.C. failed to deliver
4505.19(A)(2), certificate of title
4505.19(B)
11 Grand theft of a Keith June 12, 2017 to Not guilty
motor vehicle; Laughlin December 18,
R.C. 2018,
2913.02(A)(2), obtained/exerted
2913.02(B)(5) control over 2008
Ford F350
12 Theft; R.C. Keith July 1, 2019 to Not guilty
2913.02(A)(1), Laughlin November 19,
2913.02(B)(2) 2019,
obtained/exerted
control over
$3100
13 Grand theft of a Weston July 1, 2017 to Not guilty
motor vehicle; McAfee December 18,
R.C. 2018,
2913.02(A)(2), obtained/exerted
2913.02(B)(5) control over 2008
Ford F350
14 Theft; R.C. Weston Not guilty
2913.02(A)(1), McAfee
2913.02(B)(2)
15 Grand theft of a Matthew June 15, 2018 to Not guilty
motor vehicle; Ratcliff November 19,
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

R.C. 2019,
2913.02(A)(2), obtained/exerted
2913.02(B)(5) control over 2006
Chevy Silverado
16 Theft; R.C. Mathew June 15, 2018 to Not guilty
2913.02(A)(1), Ratcliff November 19,
2913.02(B)(2) 2019,
obtained/exerted
control over
$4500
17 Passing bad KN Issued check no. Guilty of 1st Merges with
checks, R.C. Excavation 1023 in amount degree Count 18
2913.11(B) and LLC of $15,000 dated misdemeanor
(F) June 22, 2018,
knowing it would
be dishonored
18 Grand theft, KN April 27, 2018 to Guilty 18 months
R.C. Excavation September 25,
2913.02(A)(2), LLC 2018,
2913.02(B)(2) obtained/exerted
control over
$15,000
19 Improper use Bretton Guilty 2 years
of certificate of Lambert
title,
R.C.
4505.19(A)(2)
and (B)
20 Grand theft of a Jeffrey August 1, 2018 to Not guilty
motor vehicle; Schwender November 19,
R.C. 2019,
2913.02(A)(2), obtained/exerted
2913.02(B)(5) control over 2005
Dodge 3500
21 Theft; R.C. Jeffrey August 1, 2018, Not guilty
2913.02(A)(1), Schwender to November 19,
2913.02(B)(2) 2019,
obtained/exerted
control over
$5000
22 Theft; R.C. Auto October 16, Not guilty
2913.02(A)(1), Palace 2019,
2913.02(B)(2) obtained/exerted
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

(Carl control over
Frabott) vehicle dealer
plate

{¶29} The matter proceeded to trial by jury and appellant was found guilty upon

Counts 3, 5, 6, 7, 17, 18, and 19. He was found not guilty upon the remaining counts.

Appellant was found guilty of Count 17 as a misdemeanor of the first degree. The trial

court found Counts 17 and 18 merge, and Counts 6 and 7 merge. The remaining counts

do not merge. Further, the sentences upon Counts 3, 5, 18, and 19 are to be served

consecutively, for a total aggregate prison term of seven and a half years.

{¶30} Appellant was further ordered to pay a total restitution amount of

$22,054.17 plus 5 percent poundage through the Clerk of Court. The trial court itemized

the restitution as $6500 to Jacob Hillyer; $539.17 to Bob Boyd; and $15,015.00 to KN

Excavation LLC.

{¶31} Appellant raises six assignments of error:

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶32} “I. NEWMAN RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, IN

VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”

{¶33} “II. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BEHIND THE JURY FINDING

OF GUILT AGAINST NEWMAN, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF

THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION AND SECTIONS 1 & 16, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”

{¶34} “III. THE JURY’S FINDINGS OF GUILT AGAINST NEWMAN ARE

AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTIONS 1 & 16, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO

CONSTITUTION.”

{¶35} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY SENTENCED NEWMAN BASED

ON CONDUCT FOR WHICH NEWMAN DENIED AND WAS NOT CONVICTED, IN

VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS, GUARANTEED BY SECTION 10,

ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION AND THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.”

{¶36} “V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED NEWMAN TO

PRISON, INSTEAD OF COMMUNITY CONTROL, IN VIOLATION OF HIS DUE

PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTION SIXTEEN, ARTICLE ONE OF THE

OHIO CONSTITUTION.”

{¶37} “VI. THE TRIAL COURT UNLAWFULLY ORDERED NEWMAN TO SERVE

CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FOR HIS OFFENSES, IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS

TO DUE PROCESS, GUARANTEED BY SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO

CONSTITUTION AND THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.”

ANALYSIS

I.

{¶38} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues he received ineffective

assistance of counsel on several bases. We disagree.
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

{¶39} To succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness, a defendant must satisfy a two-

prong test. Initially, a defendant must show that trial counsel acted incompetently. See,

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). In assessing such claims,

“a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered

sound trial strategy.’” Id. at 689, citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158

(1955).

{¶40} “There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.

Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same

way.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The question is whether counsel acted “outside the

wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690.

{¶41} Even if a defendant shows that counsel was incompetent, the defendant

must then satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test. Under this “actual prejudice”

prong, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Evidence of unlicensed vehicle sales

{¶42} First, appellant asserts he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel

because counsel allowed admission of “other-acts evidence,” to wit: a license is required

to sell vehicles pursuant to R.C. 4517.02, and appellant didn’t have one. Brief, 11.

Appellant argues counsel should have objected to the unlicensed-sales evidence

because he wasn’t charged with selling vehicles without a license. Upon our review of
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

the record, though, the unlicensed-sales evidence was key to both parties’ cases. As

appellee points out, the issue at trial was appellant’s intent: was he a naïve businessman

ignorant of basic principles of operation of an auto repair and “sales” business, or did he

deliberately create the appearance of a joint auto repair-sales operation to take maximum

advantage of his customers and extract as much value from them as possible?

{¶43} It is uncontroverted that appellant did not possess a license to sell vehicles.

Appellant exploited this fact at trial as evidence of his sloppy business practices

surrounding his attempts to “flip trucks.” The unlicensed-sales evidence also furthered

appellant’s claims that he was an unlicensed salesperson for a dealership called “River’s

Edge” but he mistakenly believed he could get the vehicle titles after the vehicles were

sold.

{¶44} The unlicensed-sales evidence is not “other-acts” evidence. Appellant fails

to reveal how the licensing issue is inadmissible and objectionable. Evid.R. 404(B) states

in pertinent part: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the

character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be

admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. * * * *.” The Rule is in accord

with R.C. 2945.59, which states:

In any criminal case in which the defendant's motive or intent,

the absence of mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant's

scheme, plan, or system in doing an act is material, any acts of the

defendant which tend to show his motive or intent, the absence of

mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant's scheme, plan, or
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

system in doing the act in question may be proved, whether they are

contemporaneous with or prior or subsequent thereto,

notwithstanding that such proof may show or tend to show the

commission of another crime by the defendant.

{¶45} In the instant case, we decline to speculate what the basis of defense trial

counsel’s objection should have been; the unlicensed-sales evidence was not offered as

character evidence. We also note appellant has not assigned as error the admission of

this evidence by the trial court, which might have clarified his argument.

{¶46} Appellant’s tangible issue with the unlicensed-sales evidence seems to be

that it was “prejudicial” to appellant. Brief, 11-12. In State v. Morgan, 5th Dist. No.

18CA121, 2019-Ohio-2785, 140 N.E.3d 171, at ¶ 36, we cited the decision of the Ohio

Supreme Court in State v. Crotts:

As a legal term, “prejudice” is simply “[d]amage or detriment

to one's legal rights or claims.” Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed.1999)

1218. Thus, it is fair to say that all relevant evidence is prejudicial.

That is, evidence that tends to disprove a party's rendition of the facts

necessarily harms that party's case. Accordingly, the rules of

evidence do not attempt to bar all prejudicial evidence—to do so

would make reaching any result extremely difficult. Rather, only

evidence that is unfairly prejudicial is excludable. 104 Ohio St.3d

432, 2004-Ohio-6550, 820 N.E.2d 302, ¶ 23.

{¶47} Appellant’s argument with the unlicensed-sales evidence is best described

as an objection to defense trial counsel’s trial strategy. At trial, appellant used the
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

unlicensed-sales evidence as further proof of his bad business practices, although it

strains credulity that someone who sold vehicles in the volume claimed by appellant was

ignorant of a basic tenet of dealing in vehicles.

{¶48} We decline to find trial counsel ineffective on the basis of the unlicensed-

sales evidence. It is well-established that debatable strategic and tactical decisions may

not form the basis of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Harris, 5th Dist.

Richland No. 15CA9, 2015-Ohio-5400, ¶ 59, citing State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 85,

656 N.E.2d 643, 1995-Ohio-171. Even if the wisdom of an approach is questionable,

“debatable trial tactics” do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. A defendant

has no constitutional right to determine trial tactics and strategy of counsel. State v. Vales,

2020-Ohio-245, 143 N.E.3d 577, ¶ 40 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Cowans, 87 Ohio St.3d

68, 72, 717 N.E.2d 298 (1999. Rather, decisions about viable defenses are the exclusive

domain of defense counsel after consulting with the defendant. Id. When there is no

demonstration that counsel failed to research the facts or the law or that counsel was

ignorant of a crucial defense, a reviewing court defers to counsel's judgment in the matter.

Vales, supra, citing State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 49, 402 N.E.2d 1189 (1980).

{¶49} Moreover, even if there was any error in failing to object to the unlicensed-

sales evidence, the record supports appellee’s assertion that appellant was not

prejudiced. The jury asked the trial court whether the licensing issue was germane to the

counts of improper use of a certificate of title, and in response “the trial court instructed

the jury to only consider whether appellant was authorized or able to transfer ownership

of title,” as appellant acknowledges. Brief, 11. The jury is presumed to follow the

instructions of the trial court. Pang v. Minch, 53 Ohio St.3d 186, 187, 559 N.E.2d 1313
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

(1990), paragraph four of the syllabus. Appellant has not pointed to any evidence in the

record that the jury failed to do so in this case.

{¶50} Appellant has failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel regarding

appellant’s lack of a license to sell vehicles.

Statements of Max Curry in BMV investigation

{¶51} Second, appellant argues defense trial counsel was ineffective in failing to

object to a ruling of the trial court, in which the trial court sustained appellee’s objection

to appellant’s question. Max Curry was a car dealer for whom appellant claimed he

worked as a type of “agent” in selling trucks. Defense trial counsel asked the BMV

investigator whether Max Curry was under investigation and she assented; counsel then

attempted to ask her about statements Curry made during the separate investigation.

Appellee objected to the line of questioning and the trial court sustained the objection.

{¶52} Appellant now asserts defense trial counsel was ineffective in failing to

object to the trial court’s decision to sustain the objection. Appellant’s only argued basis

for such an objection is that the information was “pertinent to [his] defense.” Again, we

note the trial court’s decision sustaining the objection is not assigned as error.

{¶53} There was no proffer of the BMV witness’s disallowed testimony, but

appellant argues the testimony would have potentially exculpated him. Again, we decline

to speculate what the testimony would have been, and whether it would have been

admissible. See, State v. Hendershot, 5th Dist. Licking No. 99-CA-102, 2001 WL 46235,

*5. Appellant's claim with respect to both performance and prejudice rests on mere

speculation, and “[s]uch speculation is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance.”

State v. Short, 129 Ohio St.3d 360, 2011–Ohio–3641, 952 N.E.2d 1121, ¶ 119, citing
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

State v. Perez, 124 Ohio St.3d 122, 2009–Ohio–6179, 920 N.E.2d 104, ¶ 217; State v.

Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448, 2008–Ohio–2762, 890 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 219; State v. Elmore,

111 Ohio St.3d 515, 2006–Ohio–6207, 857 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 121.

{¶54} Assuming, arguendo, that trial counsel's performance was deficient, we find

that appellant has failed to prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, if the

testimony was allowed, the result of the trial would have been different.

Purported basis to request recusal of trial court

{¶55} Finally, appellant argues defense trial counsel should have moved for

recusal of the trial court because the same judge recused himself from a civil case

involving appellant. Appellant assumes a conflict of interest existed because the trial

court had a conflict of interest in the civil case.

{¶56} A judge is presumed to be unbiased and unprejudiced over the matters in

which he presides. State v. Ray, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2019 CA 0034, 2020-Ohio-1265,

¶ 14, citing In re Disqualification of Olivito, 74 Ohio St.3d 1261, 1263, 657 N.E.2d 1361

(1994). The appearance of any bias or prejudice on behalf of a judge must therefore be

compelling to overcome the presumption of integrity. Id. Our review of the record does

not reveal any evidence of prejudice or bias on the part of the trial judge. Id.

{¶57} Moreover, appellant asks us to take note of information outside the record,

to wit, the judgment entry of recusal in the civil case. Appellant has not made this

information part of the record. A claim requiring proof that exists outside of the trial record

cannot appropriately be considered on a direct appeal. Ray, supra at ¶ 16, citing State v.

Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 299, 754 N.E.2d 1150 (2001).
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

{¶58} We find counsel was not ineffective in failing to seek recusal of the trial

court.

{¶59} Appellant has not established ineffective assistance of defense trial counsel

and his first assignment of error is overruled.

II., III.

{¶60} Appellant’s second and third assignments of error are related and will be

considered together. Appellant argues his convictions are not supported by sufficient

evidence and are against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.

{¶61} The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence

are both quantitatively and qualitatively different. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,

1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541, paragraph two of the syllabus. The standard of review

for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is set forth in State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio

St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991) at paragraph two of the syllabus, in which the Ohio

Supreme Court held, “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to

determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

{¶62} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the

evidence, the court of appeals functions as the “thirteenth juror,” and after “reviewing the

entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility

of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must

be overturned and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387.

Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence and ordering

a new trial should be reserved for only the “exceptional case in which the evidence weighs

heavily against the conviction.” Id.

Improper use of certificate of title

{¶63} Appellant was convicted of three counts of improper use of certificate of title

pursuant to R.C. 4505.19(A)(2). That section states: “No person shall * * * *[p]urport to

sell or transfer a motor vehicle without delivering to the purchaser or transferee of it a

certificate of title, a salvage certificate of title, or a manufacturer's or importer's certificate

to it, assigned to the purchaser as provided for in this chapter, except as otherwise

provided in this chapter.” In support of his argument, appellant cites his own self-serving

testimony that in the Gorby and Hillyer transactions he was essentially acting as an agent

for Max Curry, and in the Lambert transaction, KN Excavation owned the truck and it was

their responsibility to transfer title to the buyer.

{¶64} To convict a defendant of selling a motor vehicle without a title, the state

must prove that the defendant did purport to sell or transfer a motor vehicle without

delivering to the purchaser or transferee a certificate of title. See R.C. 4505.19(A)(2).

Under this statute, one “purport[s] to sell” when he gives “the appearance of selling an

automobile [by implying he can legally transfer title] when a valid sale cannot in fact be

made due to the transferor's lack of ownership.” State v. Simpson, 9th Dist. Summit No.

21475, 2004-Ohio-602, ¶ 16, citing State v. Napier, 12th Dist. No. CA91-10-089 (July 20,

1992). Appellee must have shown appellant implied to the victims that he had the right to
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

transfer ownership of the vehicles, but he could not legally do so under the circumstances.

Id.

{¶65} In reviewing the entire transcript and all of the evidence in a light most

favorable to the prosecution, we find that there was sufficient evidence of each element

of the offenses to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; specifically, there was

sufficient evidence of appellant’s personal knowledge and involvement to sustain the trial

court's judgment. State v. O'Black, 3rd Dist. Allen No. 1-10-25, 2010-Ohio-4812, ¶ 14.

{¶66} In the Hillyer transaction, the victim bought a truck from appellant after

answering his ad on Facebook Marketplace. The ad stated the truck’s title was “clean

and clear.” Hillyer paid appellant for the truck, and then received a litany of excuses from

appellant as to why he failed to produce the title. Appellee presented evidence that

appellant was never the legal owner of the truck.

{¶67} In the Gorby transaction, the victim purportedly bought a truck from

appellant and received a bill of sale on appellant’s letterhead. Gorby ultimately paid

appellant $25,000 and the truck went back and forth between the parties for various

“repairs.” Ultimately the truck disappeared from appellant’s lot because it was allegedly

stolen, although no police report was made. Again, appellant held himself out as

someone with authority to sell the truck, as established by his text messages with Gorby.

B.M.V. records indicated appellant never owned the truck or had authority to sell it.

Ultimately, Gorby was left without the title and the truck.

{¶68} Regarding the Bretton Lambert/KN Excavation transaction, Lambert

responded to appellant’s Facebook ad and his texts with appellant were entered into

evidence. Lambert ultimately bought the truck, writing two cashier’s checks to appellant’s
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

wife at appellant’s direction. Appellant told him he couldn’t provide the title until the

cashier’s check cleared. The truck had temporary tags on it which expired in 45 days,

and appellant made various excuses why he couldn’t provide the title. Appellant didn’t

have the title because the legal owner—KN Excavation—didn’t know the truck had been

sold. Ultimately Lambert obtained title from Nathan Otto of KN Excavation, the legal

owner of the truck.

{¶69} Appellant essentially argues he acted as an agent for others in each of

these transactions, but appellee’s evidence established that he held himself out to the

purchasers as having legal authority to deliver title to the vehicles. In each case, he failed

to do so. We also do not find that the guilty verdicts were against the manifest weight of

the evidence. Although appellant proffered self-serving testimony clumsily attempting to

explain away his transactions, the testimony was contradicted by appellee’s witnesses

and documentary evidence. State v. O'Black, 3rd Dist. Allen No. 1-10-25, 2010-Ohio-

4812, ¶ 19. Even if an accused offers an innocent explanation for his conduct, “a jury is

not required to accept a competing inference of innocence if it may infer guilt, beyond a

reasonable doubt, from the same circumstances.” Id., citing State v. Rollison, 3d Dist. No.

9-09-52, 2010-Ohio-2162, ¶ 27, internal citation omitted. Furthermore, the trier of fact

was in the better position to judge the credibility of the witnesses.

{¶70} Appellant’s convictions for improper use of a certificate of title are supported

by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

Passing bad checks and theft—Bob Boyd Ford

{¶71} Appellant was found guilty upon one count of passing bad checks pursuant

to R.C. 2913.11(B)1 and one count of petty theft pursuant to R.C. 2913.02(A)(1)2 regarding

the transaction with Bob-Boyd. The jury was also given a complicity instruction regarding

each of these counts. Appellant asserts, though, that he is not guilty because his wife

signed the bad check and he had no criminal intent, i.e., he intended to pay the check.

At trial, appellant offered the excuse of the lockout from his business as a reason for failing

to cover the check.

{¶72} Appellee’s evidence established that Bob Boyd Ford received two orders

for truck parts which were delivered to Newman Auto; Bob Boyd received a check in the

amount of $539.17 from Newman Auto & Performance dated July 31, 2018, but the check

didn’t clear.

{¶73} The parts manager of Bob Boyd repeatedly called appellant directly

regarding the bad check, and appellant promised to pay but failed to follow through or

show up for appointments. On September 13, 2018, law enforcement provided notice of

dishonor. Appellee’s evidence is sufficient to support the verdict of guilty of passing bad

checks and theft, and the verdict is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

1 R.C. 2913.11(B) states, “No person, with purpose to defraud, shall issue or transfer or
cause to be issued or transferred a check or other negotiable instrument, knowing that it
will be dishonored or knowing that a person has ordered or will order stop payment on
the check or other negotiable instrument.”
2R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) states, “No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or
services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services * * *
[w]ithout the consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent.”
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

Passing bad checks and theft—KN Excavation LLC

{¶74} Appellant was found guilty upon one count of passing bad checks pursuant

to R.C. 2913.11(B) and one count of felony theft pursuant to R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) regarding

the transaction with KN Excavation, LLC. The jury was also given a complicity instruction

regarding each of these counts. Appellant asserts merely that when he wrote the check

to KN Excavation LLC, “he had expected to receive money in his account to cover the

check.” Brief, 17. This assertion does not mean appellant had no criminal intent, and is

also belied by the fact that he wrote a postdated check.

{¶75} Moreover, appellee’s evidence showed the efforts KN Excavation, LLC,

Nathan Otto, and the Fairfield County Sheriff’s Department to give appellant notice of

dishonor and attempts to get appellant to cover the check. They were met with only

excuses.

{¶76} In State v. Bound, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 03 CA 21, 2004-Ohio-6530, at ¶

39, we noted the state established a prima facie case of intent to defraud when the

account contained no funds and defendant knew the account was closed, and there is

sufficient, competent credible evidence presented concerning each element of the crime

of passing bad checks when the defendant knew the account did not have sufficient funds.

Id., citing State v. Lyons, 5th Dist. Holmes No. CA-476, 1993 WL 437740 (Oct. 13, 1993)

and State v. Smith, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2002CA00306, 2003-Ohio-2033 (Apr. 21, 2003).

{¶77} In the instant case, the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated appellant

wrote the check to KN Excavation, LLC; the check remained unpaid; appellant received

verbal and written notice from KN Excavation and Det. Nicolia that the check had been

dishonored; finally, the check remained unpaid and was not discharged by payment or
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

satisfaction within ten days. Bound, supra, at ¶ 40. The uncontroverted evidence further

demonstrated that appellant knowingly deprived KN Excavation of $15,000.

{¶78} In order to convict appellant of theft, appellee needed to prove that

appellant, either as a principal offender or as an accomplice, knowingly deprived KN

Excavation LLC of their property, without their consent, or beyond the scope of the

express or implied consent of the owner. State v. Johnson, 5th Dist. Stark No.

2009CA00303, 2010-Ohio-5703, ¶ 22.

{¶79} The cited evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to appellee, provided

sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction. Moreover, as a reviewing court on a

manifest weight claim, we do not find that the jury clearly lost its way in convicting

appellant of theft. Johnson, supra, ¶ 27.

{¶80} We also note that the jury convicted appellant of some counts and acquitted

him of others. The jury was clearly able to evaluate the evidence and witnesses and did

not lose its way.

{¶81} Appellant’s second and third assignments of error are overruled.

IV.

{¶82} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant summarily argues that the trial

court improperly sentenced him for conduct which he was not convicted. We disagree.

{¶83} We review felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in R.C.

2953.08. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231. R.C.

2953.08(G)(2) provides we may either increase, reduce, modify, or vacate a sentence

and remand for sentencing where we clearly and convincingly find that either the record

does not support the sentencing court's findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D),
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(l), or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659.

{¶84} Clear and convincing evidence is evidence “which will provide in the mind

of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.”

Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954). “Where the degree of proof

required to sustain an issue must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will examine

the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy

the requisite degree of proof.” Id.

{¶85} “R.C. 2929.11(A) governs the purposes and principles of felony sentencing

and provides that a sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated to

achieve the two overriding purposes of sentencing[.]” State v. Harris, 5th Dist. Muskingum

No. CT2019-0075, 2020-Ohio-4600, ¶ 32. The first is to protect the public from future

crime by the offender and others, and the second is to punish the offender using the

minimum sanctions that the court determines will accomplish those purposes. Id. The

sentence imposed shall be “commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness

of the offender's conduct and its impact on the victim, and consistent with sentences

imposed for similar offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B).

{¶86} “R.C. 2929.12 sets forth the seriousness and recidivism factors for the

sentencing court to consider in determining the most effective way to comply with the

purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C.2929.11.” Harris at ¶ 33. These

factors include the physical or mental injury suffered by the victim due to the age of the

victim; the physical, psychological, or economic harm suffered by the victim; whether the

offender’s relationship with the victim facilitated the offense; the defendant's prior criminal
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

record; whether the defendant was under a court sanction at the time of the offense;

whether the defendant shows any remorse; and any other relevant factors. R.C.

2929.12(B). R.C. 2929.12(C) provides factors a court must consider indicating the

offender's conduct is less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense,

including mitigating factors. R.C. 2929.12(D) & R.C. 2929.12(E) set forth factors bearing

on whether the offender is likely or not likely to commit future crimes.

{¶87} In the instant case, appellant summarily asserts the trial court improperly

sentenced him based upon “those individuals pertaining to charges for which [appellant]

was acquitted (sic),” and “considered that [appellant] was conducting business related to

his auto repair shop while he was in jail.” Although appellant has not given us the benefit

of citation to the record, we note the trial court was concerned with the number of victims

in the charged offenses. T. Sentencing, 51. The trial court stated its concern with

restitution for appropriate victims. The trial court cited appellant’s “propensity for deceit”

and his pattern of “robbing Peter to pay Paul.” T. Sentencing, 53, 55.

{¶88} The record established that the trial court considered the purposes and

principles of sentencing as well as the seriousness and recidivism factors set out in R.C.

2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12, respectively. Upon review, we do not find clear and convincing

evidence that the record does not support the trial court's findings or that the sentence is

contrary to law. The sentences are within the statutory ranges and the trial court

considered the appropriate statutory factors.

{¶89} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

V.

{¶90} In his fifth assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in

sentencing him to a prison term instead of community control. We disagree.

{¶91} Again, we review the imposed sentence under the standard of review set

forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), governing all felony sentences. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio

St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1. An appellate court may modify or vacate

a sentence only if the appellate court finds by clear and convincing evidence that “the

record does not support the trial court's findings under relevant statutes or that the

sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” Id. A sentence is not clearly and convincingly

contrary to law where the trial court “considers the principles and purposes of R.C.

2929.11, as well as the factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, properly imposes post release

control, and sentences the defendant within the permissible statutory range.” State v.

Dinka, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2019-03-022 and CA2019-03-026, 2019-Ohio-4209, ¶

36.

{¶92} Thus, this court may “increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence only

when it clearly and convincingly finds that the sentence is (1) contrary to law or (2)

unsupported by the record.” State v. Brandenburg, 146 Ohio St.3d 221, 2016-Ohio-2970,

54 N.E.3d 1217, ¶ 1.

{¶93} Appellant argues a term of community control is more consistent with the

purposes and principles of felony sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2929.11 and the record

does not support appellant's prison term pursuant to R.C. 2929.12. Appellant argues he

was acquitted of the most serious offenses, was unable to make restitution only because
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

his bank accounts were seized, and was remorseful. Moreover, serving a prison term

prevents him from working an available job and paying restitution.

{¶94} We note, however, appellant continued to make excuses for himself at

sentencing, blaming his criminal offenses on bad luck and naivete. T. Sentencing, 45-

46. Despite appellant's assertions, we find no expression of genuine remorse in the

record, nor has appellant cited any examples thereof. The trial court noted the victims are

out thousands of dollars, and some still never recovered operable vehicles. The trial court

noted appellant’s “propensity for deceit” and the simple fact that appellant took cash from

the victims then lied repeatedly.

{¶95} We do not find appellant's sentence to be clearly and convincingly contrary

to law or unsupported by the record. State v. Hiles, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2020-

0039, 2021-Ohio-685, ¶ 17, citing Brandenburg, supra, 2016-Ohio-2970, ¶ 1.

{¶96} The fifth assignment of error is overruled.

VI.

{¶97} In his sixth assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in

sentencing him to consecutive prison terms.

{¶98} Again, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) sets forth the standard of review for all felony

sentences. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231 ¶1.

Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may only “increase, reduce, or

otherwise modify a sentence * * * or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to

the sentencing court for resentencing” if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence

“(a) [t]hat the record does not support the sentencing court's findings[,]” or “(b) [t]hat the

sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a)-(b).
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

{¶99} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides:

If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for

convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender

to serve the prison terms consecutively if the courts finds that the

consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future

crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are

not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and

to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also

finds any of the following:

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple

offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was

under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or

2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for

a prior offense.

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as

part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two

or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or

unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed

as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the

seriousness of the offender's conduct.

(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates

that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from

future crime by the offender.
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

{¶100} “In order to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court

is required to make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing

hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry, but it has no obligation to

state reasons to support its findings.” State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 16 N.E.3d

659, 2014-Ohio-3177, syllabus. In other words, the sentencing court does not have to

perform “a word-for-word recitation of the language of the statute.” Id. at ¶29. Therefore,

“as long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct

analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to support the findings,

consecutive sentences should be upheld.” Id. If a sentencing court fails to make the

findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a consecutive sentence imposed is contrary to

law. Id. at ¶ 34. The trial court is not required “to give a talismanic incantation of the words

of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record and are

incorporated into the sentencing entry.” Id. at ¶ 37.

{¶101} During the sentencing hearing in the instant case, the trial court

considered the purposes and principles of sentencing, as well as the seriousness and

recidivism factors. The trial court found consecutive sentences are necessary to protect

the public, to punish appellant, and are not disproportionate to the crimes he committed.

The trial court made a specific finding pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b), supra, that the

multiple offenses were committed as part of more than one course of conduct and the

harm caused by the multiple offenses, to wit, the “large value of money,” is so great or

unusual that no single prison term adequately reflects the seriousness of appellant’s

conduct.
[Cite as State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124.]

{¶102} Upon our review of the record of the sentencing hearing and the

judgment entry, the trial court engaged in the appropriate analysis and made the requisite

findings. Therefore, we find the imposition of consecutive sentences in this case was not

contrary to law.

{¶103} Appellant’s sixth assignment of error is overruled.

CONCLUSION

{¶104} Appellant’s six assignments of error are overruled and the judgment

of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

By: Delaney, J.,

Gwin, P.J. and

Wise, John, J., concur.