NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 29 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 20-35156
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:18-cv-05978-RBL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
PERCY F. NEWBY,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
LAWN LIMITED; et al.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 21, 2021**
Before: SILVERMAN, WATFORD, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Percy F. Newby appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
20-35156
for the United States in its action seeking to reduce federal tax assessments to
judgment, set aside fraudulent property transfers, and foreclose on tax liens. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s
legal conclusions, McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir.
2004), and for clear error its factual determinations, Wolfe v. United States, 798
F.2d 1241, 1244 n.2 (9th Cir.), amended by 806 F. 2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1986). We
may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow
Cab Co., 389 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for the government
regarding Newby’s assessed tax liabilities for the 2002 through 2006 tax years
because the government introduced evidence of its deficiency determinations, and
Newby failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the
determinations were invalid. See Palmer v. IRS, 116 F.3d 1309, 1312 (9th Cir.
1997) (explaining that the IRS’s deficiency determinations are entitled to the
presumption of correctness unless the taxpayer submits competent evidence that
the assessments were “arbitrary, excessive, or without foundation”); Hughes v.
United States, 953 F.2d 531, 535 (9th Cir. 1992) (absent contrary evidence, official
certificates, such as a Form 4340, constitute proof of facts that assessments were
actually and properly made).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for the government
2 20-35156
regarding the attachment of tax liens to the property belonging to Newby,
including the two properties held by Lawn Limited, because Newby failed to raise
a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Lawn Limited was not his alter
ego. See 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (imposing a federal tax lien upon “all property and
rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to [a delinquent taxpayer]”);
G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 350-51 (1977) (holding that
the government may “properly regard” an alter ego’s assets as the delinquent
taxpayer’s assets for purposes of § 6321); Wolfe, 806 F.2d at 1411 (“State law
governs the determination of whether there exists an alter ego from whom the
government may satisfy the obligation of a taxpayer.”); Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v.
Symetra Life Ins. Co., 271 P.3d 925, 930 (Wash. 2012) (describing the alter ego
doctrine under Washington law).
We reject as meritless Newby’s contention that the district court lacked
jurisdiction. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7403 (authorizing the government to
commence civil actions for the recovery of taxes and enforcement of liens).
We reject as unsupported by the record Newby’s contentions that the district
court was biased against him.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
3 20-35156
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
20-35156