IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-1053
Filed June 30, 2021
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JON MICHAEL CARPENTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, John M. Wright,
Judge.
The defendant appeals from his sentences, arguing he was denied the right
of allocution. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Israel Kodiaga, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J. and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
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GREER, Judge.
Jon Carpenter pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent
to deliver (methamphetamine) in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(6)
(2019) and failure to affix a tax stamp in violation of sections 453B.1(3)(a) and
453B.3. On appeal, Carpenter claims that despite declining to speak when the
court initially inquired whether his wished to, he was denied the right to “meaningful
allocution” before his sentence was pronounced because he was denied the
opportunity to explain the information in his presentence investigation (PSI) report
later on in the proceeding.
I. Facts and Earlier Proceedings.
In 2019, Carpenter was charged with several drug-related crimes and he
later pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver
(methamphetamine) and failure to affix a tax stamp. At sentencing, the court
rejected the parties’ joint recommendations. Citing Carpenter’s extensive criminal
history, as well as his prior failure to comply with pretrial supervision, the court
sentenced him to a term of imprisonment not to exceed ten years on the
possession charge and a term not to exceed five years on the tax-stamp charge.
He was ordered to serve the sentences concurrently with each other.
Prior to pronouncing the sentence, the court asked Carpenter if he wished
to say anything, Carpenter responded that he did not. Later in the proceeding
Carpenter was given further opportunity to explain some of the violations listed in
the PSI report. Despite these allocution opportunities, Carpenter appeals the
sentencing.
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II. Standard of Review and Error Preservation.
The Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure allow for the correction of an illegal
sentence at any time. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(5)(a). Sentencing errors “may be
challenged on direct appeal even in the absence of an objection in the district
court.” State v. Lathrop, 781 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Iowa 2010). Sentencing decisions
are reviewed for the correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. We review
the court’s decision for abuse of discretion. State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223,
225 (Iowa 1996). “An abuse of discretion is found when the court exercises its
discretion on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.”
State v. Evans, 672 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Iowa 2003).
III. Analysis.
Where, as here, the defendant pled guilty to crimes other than class “A”
felonies and disposition was entered on or after July 1, 2019, the right to appeal is
limited to those instances when the defendant establishes “good cause.” See Iowa
Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (Supp. 2019). Good cause is established “when the
defendant challenges his or her sentence rather than the guilty plea.” State v.
Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 2020). “We readily distinguish appeals
challenging the guilty plea itself from appeals challenging the sentence imposed
after the plea is accepted.” Id. at 105 (footnote omitted). The State does not
dispute that Carpenter has satisfied the good-cause requirement. So, we consider
the merits of Carpenter’s appeal.
A defendant’s right to allocution is codified in Iowa Rules of Criminal
Procedure 2.23(3)(a) and 2.23(d). See also State v. Nosa, 738 N.W.2d 658, 660
(Iowa Ct. App. 2007). The defendant must “be asked whether the defendant has
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any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against the
defendant.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(a). And “counsel for the defendant, and the
defendant personally, shall be allowed to address the court where either wishes to
make a statement in mitigation of punishment.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d). The
court need not recite any magic words; substantial compliance with the rule is
sufficient. State v. Duckworth, 597 N.W.2d 799, 801 (Iowa 1999).
At the sentencing hearing, Carpenter’s attorney spoke to some of
Carpenter’s mitigating factors. Then the following colloquy occurred between the
court and Carpenter:
THE COURT: Mr. Carpenter, is there anything you wish to say
before sentence is imposed?
CARPENTER: No—nothing, no, sir.
THE COURT: I couldn’t understand you.
CARPENTER: I said no, sir.
Later on in the hearing, as the court discussed its reasons for the imposed
sentences, Carpenter interrupted and asked to explain.
THE COURT: . . . I take into consideration you do have your
GED, but it appears from the [PSI] report that you did poorly on
pretrial supervision. That pretrial supervision report says you failed
to report.
CARPENTER: Can I explain?
THE COURT: Well, it seems—
CARPENTER: I was sick.
THE COURT: Just a minute.
CARPENTER: Okay.
THE COURT: It seems that you had your opportunity to say
anything you want to the court, but because I specifically called out
the poor . . . pretrial supervision aspect of this, I’ll give you an
opportunity to address that. Go ahead.
Further, the court also allowed Carpenter an opportunity to explain why he
had not yet obtained a driver’s license so he could begin working. The court then
returned to giving reasons on the record for the sentences, including that
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Carpenter failed to comply with probation and had been in and out of jail.
Carpenter once again interjected to ask if he could explain himself. The court
denied Carpenter’s latter two requests to explain other aspects of the PSI report.
“[A]s long as the district court provides the defendant with an opportunity to
speak regarding his punishment, the court is in compliance with the rule.” State v.
Garlick, No. 07-1507, 2008 WL 1885762, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008); see also State
v. Christensen, 201 N.W.2d 457, 460 (Iowa 1972) (holding defendant was not
denied right of allocution where asked, “Is there anything you would like to say to
the court before I pronounce sentence?”). Here, Carpenter was given an
opportunity to speak prior to the pronouncement of his sentence, but he waived
the right. And even after he told the court he had “nothing” he wished to say, the
court allowed Carpenter additional opportunities to interject and explain the
contents of the PSI report. Carpenter was not denied the right of allocution. Cf.
Duckworth, 597 N.W.2d at 801 (finding the defendant was denied the right of
allocution when “[t]he sentencing record clearly show[ed] the court made no effort
to provide [him] with an opportunity to volunteer any information in mitigation of his
sentence”).
IV. Conclusion.
Because Carpenter was not denied his right to meaningful allocution at
sentencing, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.
AFFIRMED.