NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 1 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALEX BILBREW, No. 20-55557
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-10064-CJC-KS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LOUIS DEJOY, Postmaster General of the
United States,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 21, 2021**
Before: SILVERMAN, WATFORD, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Alex Bilbrew appeals pro se from the district court judgment dismissing his
action alleging federal employment claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Doughtery v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2011). We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Bilbrew’s action under Title VII and
the Rehabilitation Act, as well as Bilbrew’s claims regarding the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), because Bilbrew failed to allege
facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679
(2009) (a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief); Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062, 1064
(9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth elements of prima facie cases of discrimination and
retaliation under Title VII); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th
Cir. 2001) (setting forth elements of a prima facie case under the Rehabilitation
Act); Ward v. EEOC, 719 F.2d 311, 313-14 (9th Cir. 1983) (no express or implied
cause of action against the EEOC due to an adverse decision by the EEOC).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without leave to
amend because amendment would have been futile. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of
Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that “[a] district court acts within its discretion to deny leave to amend
when amendment would be futile”).
AFFIRMED.
2 20-55557